



EUROPEAN
JOURNAL
of
TRANSFORMATION
STUDIES

2022

Vol. **10** No. **1**

EUROPE OUR HOUSE

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF TRANSFORMATION STUDIES

2022
Vol. 10, No. 1

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e-ISSN 2298-0997



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CONTENTS

Regular Papers

Simant Shankar Bharti	6
<i>the Re-Emergence of the Ukraine Crisis and Role of the European Union in the De-Escalation of Conflicts”</i>	
Vasyl Buslenko	20
<i>Influence of the Power and the Opposition on Democratization Dynamics in the Slovak Republic</i>	
Jakub Potulski, Agnes Horvath	41
<i>The Role of Non-governmental Organizations in Hungary at the Local Level</i>	
Ariadna Sorokivska-Obikhod	52
<i>Russian Information Campaign Against Georgia: After the War in August 2008: Goals, Narratives and Actors</i>	
Oksana Kosiuk	78
<i>Propaganda and Journalism (in the Context of the Second Karabakh War)</i>	
Romina Agbaba	97
<i>Sustainable-Responsible Tourism Values and Crisis Management – Issues and Critical Reflection</i>	
Tetiana Stepura, Tetyana Nagornyak, Vasyl Lypchuk, Uliana Sadova	112
<i>Migration-Caused Qualitative Changes in Human Potential of the States in the Territorial Migration Labour Market “Ukraine–Poland–Germany”</i>	
Snezana Djordjevic	138
<i>Smart Cities` Developmental Capacities in the Fields of Spatial Planning and Construction - Lessons from Copenhagen to Belgrade</i>	
Ruizan Mekvabidze, Roman Smietanski	155
<i>Transformation of Education in Context of the Competitive Job Market Requirements: an Analysis of the University Potential in Terms of Developing Research Skills for Students</i>	

REGULAR PAPERS

THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS AND ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE DE-ESCALATION OF CONFLICTS

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Abstract

Once again, the Ukrainian crisis has re-emerged after the Belarus-Russia joint defence exercise near the eastern border around October/November 2021. In December 2021, almost 100,000 troops were sent by Russia towards the Ukrainian borders. In this context, the article explores all the possible dimensions of the current crisis and the responses of Kyiv. Moreover, it also assesses the role of the European Union in the empirical setback of Ukraine. To validate the arguments, the study incorporates qualitative content and discourse analysis in order to phenomenological evaluation of the speeches by governmental and European officials. The latest findings suggest that there was an ongoing dialogue between the Western alliance and Russia to escalate tensions. Moscow had shown that they don't have any intention to attack on Ukraine if the Russian interests are recently compromised. Then, there would be serious consequences.

Key words: *Ukraine Crisis, European Union, Russia, NATO, Conflict Management*

INTRODUCTION

Ukraine has become an independent sovereign country after a long linguistic ideological struggle with the former Russian empire and the Soviet Union. Until 1991, it was under influence and part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). After the col-

lapse of the USSR, Ukraine never achieved a pattern of perfect democracy which is suffering from a weak economy and distorted foreign policy. The Ukrainian policies have been wavers between pro-Russian and pro-West or pro-European (Fisher 2014). There are a number of factors within geopolitical and geoeconomics approaches in Ukraine, which resulted as a sovereign country has never been empowered to play an influential foreign policy role in the international order. In most cases, the West and Russia both want to influence the Ukraine in order to maintain close geostrategic ties.

Likewise, Ukraine has never been a stable country between a great geopolitical strategic location of Central and Eastern Europe. Initially, a country maintained a close relationship with the Russian Federation. From time to time, the rise of Western power as the European Union (EU) resulted a very influential for the Eastern neighbourhood countries. It was resulted as many Central and Eastern European countries joined the EU, for example the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and others. Some of these countries were formerly part of the USSR. Consequently, the real dilemma started for Ukraine whether to go with the EU states or Russia. But Ukraine has dreamed about joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)¹ and the EU. The increasing of the Ukrainian interest towards so-called Western dreams resulted the 2014 crisis for the country due to Russian aggression. John J. Mearsheimer explained the cause of the Ukraine crisis as ‘the prevailing wisdom in the West’ which ‘can be blamed almost entirely on Russia’s aggression’ as mentioned in his article *Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault* (Mearsheimer 2014: 77).

However, once again Russian troops are to the nearby border of Ukraine and aggression is on the peak due to this, there is fear and chaos around there. In this scenario, the study conducts an empirical analysis of the Ukrainian crisis that first arose in 2014 and its re-emergence in late 2021. After all, the earlier of 2022 was the peak time of the crisis and the period of crisis converted into a ‘war’. Here ‘crisis’ is also means for worldwide economic and humanitarian crisis that has emerged by the time. Then the phenomenological method mainly used here to ‘describe, understand and interpret the meaning’ of the current crisis in Ukraine and show or point at similarities and differences with previous crises. Because the phenomenological research design provides to observe a particular situation where we can define the phenomenology of both political philosophy and political psychology of states, peoples, leaders, diplomats, and scholars (Bloor and Wood 2006: 128-129). The Ukraine crisis leads to several phenomena and a series of events. Even the word ‘crisis’ is a controversial term for Ukrainian people and scholars. This article combined such events and evaluated the re-emergence of the crisis until February 2022. It was a period of crisis which later converted into a full-scale war when Russia attacked Ukraine on February 24,

¹ The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a military alliance between the EU 27, the US, Canada, Albania, Iceland, UK and Turkey.

2022. This study uses many newspapers articles and media contents, so qualitative content analyses in the context of words, texts, transcripts of speeches by leaders and diplomats (Pierce 2008: 263). The content analysis provides a scope of the widespread impact of the Ukraine crisis and its implications for the EU and Russia.

Furthermore, Central and Eastern European geopolitical landscape has been constantly changing since the post-war period and especially for the EU and Ukraine such as aspiration of territorial security and prosperous economy (NATO & EU). There is a constant change in political and security scenarios. For that, a qualitative discourse analysis is a perfect method to assess the tension in the region. By the use of this method, the study can provide better observation of the Ukrainian crisis since 2014 to now in the context of debate or discussion, language, and communications as the role in shaping the international order in international relations. The application of this analysis helps generate a rigorous, systematic, and convincing result in order to fill the literature gaps (Burnham 2008: 248). To validate the argument using above mentioned methods with study, it has been applied via primary sources of data, such as speeches and statements by governments and officials, foreign ministry presses briefs, official reports and contents from official websites. Secondary sources of data include book chapters, books, articles, magazines, reports, and issues widely discussed and reflected by think tanks and newspapers.

UNDERSTANDING OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS

All the situation started with an internal Ukrainian crisis at the end of 2013. It was the time when the former President Viktor Yanukovich vetoed 'a deal for greater integration with the EU'. After that, many big events took place. The first was with anti-government protests tumbled the government and Yanukovich ran away from the country in February 2014. It was an opportunity for Russia to 'salvage of its lost influence' in Ukraine. In Ukraine, there are many of native Russian speakers and ethnic Russians and many of them were voted for former President Yanukovich in 2010. The anti-government protest barely had seen in support for the Euromaidan protest to his removal from power (Fisher 2014). In March 2014, the interesting twist came when Russian troops took control of Crimea formally, which was part of Ukraine. Before it, 'Crimeans voted to join the Russian Federation, and it was a disputed referendum over the Crimean Peninsula, as Western leaders declared. Russia punished with economic sanctions Russian President Putin mentioned that he is committed to 'protecting the rights of Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Crimea and South-east Ukraine (Herszenhorn 2014; Global Conflict Tracker 2022).

But the crisis goes beyond the Crimean so-called referendum and Russian control, along with the EU the Western countries called it "illegal and illegitimate". On 1 March 2014, the Russian Federation Council adopted a Resolution to 'the use of Russian Armed Forces on the territory of Ukraine'. According to the Council, using of 'Armed Forced' on the Ukrainian territories to normalise the socio-political situa-

tion in the country.² While ‘conflict later broke out the between Ukrainian and Russia-backed separatists. Because, in April 2014, pro-Russian separatists and rebels started controlling Eastern Ukrainian territory. Separatists backed by Russia declared the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. These Eastern Ukrainian territories also known as the Donbas. Meanwhile, Russia and Ukraine signed agreements in Minsk during 2014 and 2015. This aimed to bring forth a ceasefire. Since the conflict, more than 14,000 people have died. After that agreement, Ukraine has experienced numbers of repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement. The conflict is transforming the situation into a trench war (Chadwick 2022). On 17 July 2014, separatists broke down a Malaysian Airlines (MH17) over the Donbas by the separatists and 298 people lost their lives. Separatist forces used missile fire and believed that it was a Ukrainian military jet (Boyd-Barrett 2017).

However, Sauer considered the Ukraine crisis as ‘a symptom of a wider conflict between two major powers or blocs and its architecture within post-Cold War security in Europe.’ Where the Western block kept NATO alive and it ‘deteriorated the relationship with Russia’. On several occasions, the Moscow warned and despite of the fact Ukraine was invited to be a member of the NATO (Sauer 2017). These are also one of the key reasons that Russian aggression has increased over time. Henry A. Kissinger outlined the public discussion of the Ukraine crisis as a ‘confrontation’. Ukraine issues are often posed as a showdown and it is more about the dilemma whether the country should join the East and the West. He suggested that Ukraine should not join any side and better to ‘function as a bridge between them’ (Kissinger 2014). But this is more complex than Kissinger’s remarks because there is no common consensus among pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian or (Ukrainian nationalist) leaders. A country can only be united as a strong sovereign nation if its leaders are also ideologically united. For that, the Ukrainian scholar and leaders should unite on common grounds and they need to show solidarity like Poles, which is the best implication for the Ukraine.

Sauer explored the economic dimension of the Ukraine crisis. He said that Putin’s popularity started to fall with the world economy fallout in 2008. Since then, large-scale street protests have begun in Moscow, and they wanted political change during the period 2011-2012. Then, President Putin needed to react, so it resulted in repression (Sauer 2017: 88). But Mearsheimer explained that “the West’s triple package of policies (NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and democracy promotion) added fuel to a fire waiting to ignite in the creation of crisis” (Mearsheimer 2014: 88). On 25 May 2014, Petro Poroshenko became the elected president of Ukraine. After that, Ukraine (along with Georgia and Moldova) signed Association Agreements (AAs) with the EU. The AA was an explicitly instrument as an alternative to accession as full membership of the EU. After the Ceasefire Agreement, second direct Russian troops inter-

² The Federation Council’ extraordinary 347th meeting adopted a Resolution available at: <http://council.gov.ru/events/news/39851/>.

vention was ended with the capture of Debaltseve during February 2015. On 12 February 2015, Angela Merkel, François Hollande, Putin, and Poroshenko agreed on the second peace plan in Minsk. Later, Russia-Ukraine-EU trade talks did not go well, and Russia suspended (in retaliation) the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) trade preferences for Ukraine in January 2016 (Charap and Colton 2017).

THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE UKRAINE CRISIS: THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE 24 FEBRUARY 2022

The re-emergence of the current Ukraine crisis can track back to the spring 2021, when Russia began building of defence wall by then thousands of troops nearby Ukraine. The country's military build-up is a response to threats from NATO as claimed by the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu. At that time, Russian troops were deployed in two armies and airborne formations toward the western region, which worried Ukraine. In the counter argument, NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg described the act of Russian military deployment as "unjustified, unexplained and deeply concerning". US President Joe Biden showed concern about Russian build-up and spoke during a phone call with Putin as "called on Russia to de-escalate tensions" (Euronews 2021). It was the first time since the 2014 crisis, when Russia sent thousands of combat troops towards the Ukrainian borders. The news cited that the troops were withdrawing later on. On 1 September 2021, the "Joint Statement on the U.S.-Ukraine Strategic Partnership" was published on the strategic partnership based on commitments such as free, democratic and peace. It was mentioned about 1) deepening Strategic Defense Cooperation, 2) Supporting to Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic Aspirations (possible entry to NATO), 3) Providing Ukraine with Security Assistance worth \$ 60 million package and 4) Enacting Defense and Security Sector (with Ukraine's status as a NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partner) (The White House 2021). These are the main concerns of the Kremlin which made them uncomfortable. Once again in October 2021, Russia began sending troops and military equipment towards the nearby borders of Ukraine, which has been 'reigniting concerns about a potential invasion of Ukrainian territories.' The movement of Russian forces was seen in areas of the Kremlin. Putin drew a strong warning to Kyiv's Western ties that expansion of any kind of NATO military infrastructure on Ukrainian territories would be considered a "red line" for Moscow. The conflict also started between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Eastern Donbas region after 7.5 years. The US and EU started to notice the military movements during October and November. Moscow cited it as 'a massive joint military exercise with Belarus' which is also known as Zapad 2021. The publicly available satellite found the imagery of Russia's 41st Combined Arms Army, which normally stayed in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk. After the Zapad 2021 exercise, Russian troops left military equipment included with control and communication canters on the training site near Ukrainian borders,

as mentioned by Oleksiy Danilov, Secretary of Ukraine's national security and Defense Council (Sonne et al. 2021; Global Conflict Tracker 2022).

Besides, more than 100,000 Russian troops have been placed moving towards near the Ukraine borders with armours, missiles, and other heavy weaponry in December. There are many commercial satellite imagery and social media posts available online from November and December. The US intelligent agencies assessed about the Kremlin aimed to draw up for a military operation which engaging up to 175,000 troops and it could see in upcoming weeks (Schwartz and Reinhard 2022). Recently, there has been tension between NATO and Moscow. In mid-December 2021, Russia put demand of 'a highly contentious list of security guarantees' for Kyiv's Western allies. After accepting these demands by the West, Russia would defuse the tension over Ukraine. The Russian demands included; 1) ban on Ukraine entering the NATO, 2) a limit to the deployment of military and weapons to NATO's Eastern flank of NATO and 3) an immediate effect of NATO forces returning to where they were stationed in 1997, which were before an Eastward expansion. Moscow warned that if Russian interests would ignore, then similar to the Cuban missile crisis (West) they would have to face a 'military response'. US officials said that some part of the aggressive proposal and "legal guarantees" by the Kremlin is "unacceptable". Along with the United States and other its allies also rejected the above demands and warned Russia of retaliation if Ukraine invades, as well as the Moscow also has to face economic sanctions (Roth 2021).

Henrik Larsen stated in the current crisis that "NATO integration is clearly the vital interest at stake from the Kremlin's perspective, in accordance with its long-standing obsession with guarantees of a militarily neutral Ukraine" (Larsen 2022). Russians are looking to the Eurasian Economic Union to create an environment for inclusion of Ukraine. These are just a prospect. Yet, there is no clear sign for immediate resolution of the Ukraine crisis. Meanwhile, the peace negotiations took place between the US and Moscow in Geneva in the middle of January 2022. Also, several rounds of talks have also been taking place with US allies in Kyiv and Berlin. After the Geneva talks, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated the dialogue with his Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and both "agreed that it is important for the diplomatic process to continue". Blinken has not considered it just a negotiation and, according to him, it was just "exchange of concerns and ideas" (Forgey 2022).

The Biden Administration issued a new warning to the Kremlin and announced to 'send nearly 3,000 additional troops to Poland and Romania'. Another 8,500 American troops already there on "high alert" which could be a possible deployment to Eastern Europe. The US President Biden told to the Russian President Putin "As long as he is acting aggressively, we are going to make sure we can reassure our NATO allies and Eastern Europe that we're there" (Bilefsky and Pérez-Peña 2022; Stewart and Antonov 2022). It aimed to provide a shield to Eastern European allies in order

to avoid potential invasion of Ukraine. Moscow has once again denied any kind plans to invade Ukraine.

But no specific date has been found for invasion. Even President Biden counters it as much about public speculation and the Washington is still assessing the risks. As per previous assessment by Washington, the invasion could begin before the end of the Beijing Winter Olympics (Feb. 2020). On 11 February 2022, the White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan advised its US citizen to leave Ukraine in the next 24 to 48 hours. He cited that “If a Russian attack on Ukraine proceeds, it is likely to begin with aerial bombing and missile attacks that could obviously kill civilians without regard to their nationality” (McLeary & Toosi 2022). Until writing this article, tension has remained same during negotiations between the Russian and the US and other European allies (mainly France and Germany). There has not been any formal agreement made yet. Whatever was speculated by the US intelligence and scholars became reality on 24 February 2022. When Russia attacked several Ukrainian strategic points and it has been 200 days war is still there which is a global crisis for the people across the world.

THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE DE-ESCALATION OF CONFLICTS

In this discussion, the stake of Europe is important to respond. But the New York Times latest report mentioned that Europeans are divided on Russian aggression and they are dilemma that ‘how to respond various forms’ of the challenge posed by the Moscow. Since World War II, Europe allowed Russia to ‘upend the security structure’ and allow to keep the peace in the region. Once again, this is one stake for Europe whether they can allow President Putin to escalate the current tension. The crisis also caused them to break up among the EU and NATO. While former Chancellor Angela Merkel is also not in the mainstream negotiation and has a fluent Russian speaking skill, it also helped to developed ‘good working relationship with President Putin’. New Chancellor Olaf Scholz is still having not shown his prominent role in re-emergence of the crisis due busy in domestic issues management. The main stake of the EU is ‘dependent on Russian gas supplies’. Previously, President Putin used this terrain to negotiate with Europe successfully. Europe is sharing significant trade ties with Moscow. If Russia could invade then they would have to serious economic sanctions which are already facing since 2014 when the last crisis emerged (Bilefsky and Pérez-Peña 2022).

Many European mainstream leaders made serious remarks and concerns about the Ukraine crisis, and some of them showed serious solidarity with Kyiv and people of Ukraine. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba cited that “Kyiv is open to dialogue and looking for a diplomatic solution, but we will not cross our red lines and no one will be able to force us cross them”. On 8 February 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron visited Kyiv in order to discussion over the crisis with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. President Macron is one of the lead-

ing politicians paying feverishly to stabling tensions between Eastern countries and he showed optimism after the meeting. After his meeting with both President Putin and Zelenskyy, he mentioned that “calm is needed in words and actions” if not, “there is a risk of escalation”. Next, he also mentioned that both leaders confirmed that they would respect for “best means to protect Ukraine’s integrity”. President Macron also told that there is a need for time to get results and it is not possible to “resolve the crisis in few hours” and it would take “days and the weeks and the months to come that will allow us to progress”. During the media interview, President Macron and Zelenskyy cited the Minsk protocol with Ukraine and Russia, where leading mediators were Germany and France, which is only way to build peace and ‘a sustainable political solution’. Before Monday (7 February) President Macron already met with President Putin and he mentioned that “President Putin assured me of his readiness to engage in this sense and his desire to maintain stability and territorial integrity of Ukraine. There is no security for the Europeans if there is no security for Russia” (Deutsche Welle 2022).

The recent crisis is also a test for young European parliamentarians and governments in the EU and their solidarity with transatlantic alliance. Bruce Stokes suspected that it is also a litmus test and trust must be proven by its allies US and President Biden. There are many young members in the Europe’s national parliaments and those are viewed the world after the Cold War. Because ‘ten years back no one imagined that Kremlin could deploy and attack Ukraine’ mentioned by a member of the Polish Sejm Law and Justice Party. Meanwhile, a member of the Green Party of the German Bundestag stated that “the integrity of Ukraine is threatened by the acts of Russia. And Germany and the EU must stand on the side of Ukraine”. Another Green Party Bundestag member cited that “Strengthening European sovereignty is important and not against the interests of the United States for Europe to become a more reliable partner” (Stokes 2022). Most young parliamentarian expressed ‘mistrust’ and some showed their aggressive remarks ‘trigger-happy Yankees’ about the US.

The European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen said that the EU is prepared with “robust and comprehensive package of financial and economic sanctions” and other bundle of sanctions to unleash on Moscow if they do not stop aggression towards Ukraine (Reuters 2022). Peter Stano, EU Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Spokesperson also mentioned that the EU official has discussed diplomatic de-escalation tactics in neighbouring countries. Mr. Stano mentioned that the EU prepared and we have “vital interest to find a solution to thus current crisis through dialogue and through engagement” (Summers 2022). The EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell said: “We are living, to my understanding, the most dangerous moment for security in Europe after the end of the Cold War” (Al Jazeera 2022). The EU and its allies are continuously involved in diplomatic talks with Moscow in order to de-escalate confrontation with the Kremlin. During this tension period, the EU is also assessing the potential energy crisis if the eastern border fallout. There are also risks of a surge

in gas prices and cyber security threats are also out there (Fleming & Khan 2022). In the response to potential border fallout, the EU and some of the Member states supported with little or low light-weight arms and other assistances.

The EU-Ukraine relations are deep and they are very important trading partners. Both partners adopted an Association Agreement (AA) and a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The DCFTA was negotiated during 2007-2011 and installed in 2012. The EU-Ukraine signed the political provision of AA on 21 March 2014, as well as other provision also signed in Brussels on 27 June 2014. The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement entered into force on 1 November 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine 2021). Ukraine is one of the priority partners for the EU and working for a stable, prosperous, and democratic environment for its citizens. The EU and its Financial Institutions allocated more than EUR 17 billion grants and loans. The EU also provides visa-free travels for the Ukrainians, which was entered into force in June 2017. In response to the COVID-19, 'the EU provided a package over EUR 190 million to support immediate needs and socio-economic recovery'. Moreover, the EU also provided EUR 1.2 billion as micro-financial assistance to revive the local business in the Ukraine. Ukraine also received vaccines through COVAX facilities, which mobilised over EUR 3 billion by the Team Europe and the EU Member States (European Commission 2022).

Now overall, the geoeconomics scenarios have been changed into the realistic geopolitical crisis in Europe as a whole. The Eurasian heartland's attention is currently on geopolitics shifting to Europe. Whatever has taken place in Europe that always affected the whole world. After the attack in Ukraine by Russia, the EU and its allied partner imposed heavy sections economic and political as well also decided to overcome the oil & gas dependency on its counterpart. This means the EU and its partner want to hit Russia's domestic economy which is almost 15 per cent of GDP contributed by the EU and its member states.

EVALUATION OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND ESCALATION OF THE TENSION

The re-emergence of Ukraine crisis can mainly be understood by discussions in international relations. Where 'theories of deterrence and great power relations' can simply define that a big power always put army in front to peruse the interests of a country. There is often the best example of Indo-China border conflict that occurs since 1962 war and China always used these tactics to peruse their trade and other foreign policy goals. Because there is a huge trade deficit of India with China. China also occupied many important lands of India, for example, Aksai Chin and other nearby Indian borders. Here is a similar case between Russia and Western allies. Whenever Russia found that Ukraine is going away close to the West, they retaliate with military movement near the Ukrainian borders. Russia cannot attack any of the NATO and EU member countries, so they have Ukraine as a week-target between the powers. Ukraine has always been trapped between these powers. David Ignatius cited:

“The Ukraine confrontation has been a case study in deterrence and its limits. It’s like the Cuban missile crisis, in reverse” (Ignatius 2022). He mainly referred to the all-Ukrainian crisis as the history books, and its root cause can only be found via history of both countries (Russia-Ukraine).

A former Ukrainian member of Parliament, Hanna Hopko stressed that always trying to say that Ukraine is a failed state, Ukraine is an artificial state” (Kotsonis and Chakrabarti 2022). A similar remark made by Stanford Scholar Steven Pifer “Kremlin’s unwillingness to recognize Ukraine as a sovereign state has resulted in a major strategic failure for Russia” (Witte 2022). If we see that the Ukrainian disturbance, all these threats of invasion and Russian aggression started after the presidency of the Putin. Since the 2014 conflict, it has claimed that more than 13,000 people lost their lives in the Donbas conflict. It would be wrong if we only accused the big powers and Ukrainian citizens of being equally responsible for the crisis just because they dreamed of a secure world and economic prosperity like the EU citizen. So, do they not have right to choose their prosperous future? How has the Ukraine crisis become a complex security crisis? and are there any permanent solutions? These are important questions that everyone should ask especially by Ukrainian. These are also serious research topics. It could be also a result that the re-emergence of the crisis could be escalating the tensions peacefully. Is there any guarantee that it will not emerge in the near future? From time to time, Ukraine experienced violations of seize fire (Minsk protocol).

As Mearsheimer accused the West for the Ukraine crisis in 2014, there was the same NATO enlargement, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West supported the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine (Mearsheimer 2014: 77-78). Is anything changed in the new crisis? No, nothing has changed in the past 7-8 years. If we see the US-Ukraine and the EU-Ukraine relations, in both cases, the Western ties have been strengthened ever before with Ukraine. But Ryszard Zięba highlighted that “the Ukraine crisis is a manifestation of acute geopolitical rivalry between the West and Russia for influence in Ukraine”. He also found that “Ukrainian hope for better life turned out to have crippling consequences for Ukrainians themselves”. He also agreed with Mearsheimer that the US and its European allies counter a choice in Ukraine (Zięba 2017). But there is a major question of the ‘sovereignty’ of a state and a sovereign state like Ukraine can choose any side and the decision of the people in Ukraine must be respected. If Euromaidan is a result of the EU’s soft power influence on the Ukrainian people, then Mearsheimer’s argument does not completely validate the justification of the Ukraine crisis.

Moreover, some of discussion found as the critical assessment of the European unity e.g., the EU solidarity is not similar to the previous one. Nathalie Tocci argued that there is a ‘slow-motion drama unfolding on the European continent’, but Europeans are not active. The EU has always been a best player in the case of an ‘escalating crisis unfolding between Russia and Ukraine’. There has been played ‘a star role’ in pri-

or events. In the matter of hard power, Europeans played key role in ‘the shadow of the US’. Without them, the EU has not dealt with the Ukrainian saga alone (Tocci 2022). There is a need to reorient the EU’s geostrategic towards Ukraine where it has a great stake. Because European security is once again at a similar position that was in 2014. The EU and its allies have only option to stay with effective implication of the Minsk Agreement; otherwise, Paris and Berlin can mediate something new. There are still dialogue and diplomacy missing between the EU and its allies, Ukraine between Russia. The peace-making effort itself is in crisis due to rest of the world is also not forcing the world power to involvement in dialogue and diplomacy. The ‘real’ effort is still missing in the way of peace between Russia and Ukraine so there is only peace in the chaos. Likewise, Putin is keep threatening the use of military mobilisation and the use of nuclear weapons.

CONCLUSION

If we conclude the re-emergence of the Ukraine crisis, there was ongoing negotiation, aggressive counter arguments and Ukrainians are living in hope, chaos and fear before the war. But the question is that why Russia wants aggressive behaviours against the West and a Ukraine to peruse its goals? On the other hand, the COVID-19 pandemic already increased inflation and the EU’s and Russian economy are already facing serious consequences. The new crisis only would create more tension, fear, and chaos. Mostly, it would hit the economy more pathetically so these are other means of the crisis such as flued the price of oil and gas which also affect commodities and products worldwide. After Brexit, the United Kingdom (UK) is already facing its domestic challenges, and there is already ongoing political drama. There is not UK’s stake posed with the EU so the Western solidarity is lacking this time. Over the past five years, analysis of the Europe’s politics indicated that liberal order is already in failure mode after the rise of new populism. The new leadership is not showing active diplomacy to escalate tension. It would be a great test for the new political leaders. Europe is already facing a sovereign debt crisis, migration, and Brexit, the EU’s domestic issues with Hungary and Poland in the shadow of the global pandemic.

The EU is facing turf wars over foreign policy and lack of institutional motivation. Meanwhile, the new German government is already establishing mode. If the EU did not show solidarity, they cannot afford the consequences of the Ukraine crisis. The US, UK, Italy, Germany, and France all needed to come together to deal with the crisis. So, there could be rapid progress and they can also avoid further economic loss. The future of Ukraine all depends on these important actors in the affairs of Europe. The Europe should move beyond shuttle and phone diplomacy because it’s not helping ease the crisis. Because at the end of February (24), it already resulted in a re-emergence of crisis into reality and Russia has begun a full-fledged

war on Ukraine which was referred to as the so-called ‘Special Military Operation’ by the Moscow.

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INFLUENCE OF THE POWER AND THE OPPOSITION ON DEMOCRATIZATION DYNAMICS IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC

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Abstract

Available differences between the transition to democracy and its consolidation have actualized the need for researching conceptual perspectives of the functioning of political institutions and constructing an optimal model of their interaction as a guarantee of further democratization. The goal of this paper is to determine the influence made by the ruling authorities and the opposition on the dynamics of democratization in the Slovak Republic. The combination of methodological principles based on the concept of social capital conversion, fluctuation theorem, institutional and neo-institutional approaches constitutes the methodological foundation of the research. The paper has determined specifics of the interrelationship between the power and the opposition in the state before 2020 in the context of current political processes. The main conclusion reached is that the process of democratization in the Slovak Republic has significantly depended on the strategies of social capital accumulation and conversion, selected and implemented by the power and the opposition, as well as on the development of stable dispositions between them in the political field.

Key words: *Democratization, Opposition, Power, Political Processes, Political System, the Slovak Republic.*

INTRODUCTION

The differences between the transition to democracy and its consolidation predetermined the relevance of the present research which studies conceptual perspectives of the functioning of political institutions and development of an optimal model for in-

teraction between them as a guarantee of democratic changes. As for democracy itself, in the recent decades its main theme has changed and, as stated by K. Popper, “today it is not a justification of the idea of democracy through ethical, theological, philosophical constructions or arguments of common sense, but rather a concern for its fragility and searches for ways to strengthen it” (Popper, 1988). Political history has a lot of examples in which democracy, formally preserving a certain system of institutions and procedures, gradually contradicts its classical understanding as a “majority rule”. Instead, we can observe the so-called “democracy deficit”, with the decreased level of citizen participation and minor involvement of the opposition in the political decision-making. This makes the modernization of the political system in countries with approximately the same structure of the political field different.

Of particular *relevance* is the analysis of the interrelationship between the power and the opposition as the factor predetermining the linearity of transition to consolidated democracy. The case study is based on the Slovak Republic.

The problem under research is determination of the impact of the relationship between the power and the opposition on the democratization dynamics in the Slovak Republic.

The objectives of the research are as follows:

- to determine the specifics of the relationship between the power and the opposition in the Slovak Republic in the context of ongoing political processes;
- to clarify the strategies of accumulation and conversion of social capitals of the power and the opposition as well as their effect on the state democratization dynamics.

The article consists of four interrelated parts. The first part substantiates the theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of the relationship between the power and the opposition in the context of their effect on democratization. The second part analyzes the status of scientific research into this range of problems. The next part discloses the division of the political domain between the pro-ruling and opposition actors in the context of the ongoing political process. The fourth part of the article is dedicated to the analysis of the democratization dynamics in the Slovak Republic, with determination of the effect of the power and the opposition on the divergence and convergence phases.

1. THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

The methodological basis of this research is made up by the combination of methodological principles of the concept of social capital conversion (Bourdieu, 2002), fluctuation theorem (Sorokin, 2007), institutional and neo-institutional approaches. The theory of social capital conversion helps to substantiate individual and group strategies of social capital conversion and to identify the dynamics of the objective structure of the political field, the proportionality of dispositions between the power and the opposition, as well as the change of their boundaries during repositioning. The relationship between the power and the opposition is seen as the process of ac-

cumulation, conversion, and exchange of capital in the struggle for the metacapital of the state.

To determine the impact that the relationship between the power and the opposition has on the fluctuation of the political system when one political force is replaced with the other one, we have applied the fluctuation theorem developed by P. Sorokin as a component of the social stratification theory. He defined “fluctuation” as permanent oscillations from the optimal value. This process is typical not only for socio-cultural systems but for specific fields, including politics, as well. Fluctuation goes through a number of consecutive stages: disintegration – crisis – mobilization of forces – new socio-cultural order (Sorokin, 2007). Changes occur in a certain quantitative and qualitative direction before they reach a “saturation point”. After that, they continue by inertia or under coercion. According to Sorokin, when the political potential of movement in one direction is exhausted, movement in the opposite direction starts, though on a new basis. Therefore, following the principles of cyclicity and evolution, one system of power is replaced by the other, alternative system, which, influenced by the dominance of new value orientations, starts moving in the opposite direction towards the new “saturation point”. This approach helps to consider the relationship between the opposition and the ruling authorities as a struggle between the deterrence and stratification forces, bringing a better understanding of the causes of fluctuations in the social stratification profile and identifying the determinants which bring the system to its equilibrium. We assume that, in the case of the Slovak Republic, deviation from the equilibrium as the result of the actions of the opposition as the leveling force, finally restores the initial democracy status and contributes to its deepening.

We also assume that democratization dynamics results from a certain conversion strategy of not just the ruling, but the opposition elite as well and is of non-linear nature. To study this hypothesis, in the research we have identified the level of democracy in the Slovak Republic within a certain time domain and recorded benchmarks diagnosing the changes in the democratic movement trajectory.

In order to operationalize and generalize the data and identify defining points, we have applied several global indices. The most commonly cited and extensive indices, which in one way or another meet the five criteria of democracy, formulated by the German political scientist W. Merkel (democratic electoral regime, rights of political participation, civil liberties, horizontal accountability, guarantees of the effective governance exercise by the democratically elected representatives (Merkel, 2004)) have been selected for analysis in the present paper. Among them there are Freedom House Index, World Bank International Monitoring Project *Worldwide Governance Indicators*, the *Polity IV Project* etc. The data presented in the projects are mainly related to the early 2000s. This has determined the choice of the lower research boundary. 2018 has been defined as the upper research boundary. This gives us the possibility to analyze the influence made by the power and the opposition on democratization

in the country before the Covid-2019 pandemic. By its nature, this factor reminds the strange attractor that has deepened the convergence of democratization. Therefore, the political changes in the trajectory of democratic development of the state that took place after 2019 require a separate study.

We have studied the dynamics of rates and causes of growth and decline of such indicators as “Rule of Law”, “Voice and Accountability”, “Political Stability and Absence of Violence”, “Stability of Democratic Institutions”, “Stateness”, “Political Participation”, “Political and Social Integration” and others that are important for assessing the quality of the democratization process in political systems at different stages, as well as the models of these interrelations. This has made it possible to identify the dynamics of democratization and to establish certain defining points that diagnose its strengthening or weakening. Hypothetically, these points were the result of a struggle between stratification and equalitarian forces. We assume that the change in the democratization vector depends on the patterned relations between the power and the opposition. Implementation of quantitative data has made it possible to build a dynamic model of democratization in Slovak Republic, developed with consideration of the influence made by oppositional social agents and the specifics of their conversion strategies.

Using indicators “Stability of Democratic Institutions”, “Rule of Law” and “Stateness” the study shows that elections are the point of balance between the power and the opposition and, at the same time, a new starting point in the process of democratization. They fix a new ratio between political forces, giving the possibility to a more competitive political actor to implement its election program and continue democratic processes. By restarting relations between competing forces, relieving political tension from publicly significant issues, setting a starting point for new political stratification and gradual organizational formation of the opposition, and increasing the potential of the deterrent force, the elections allow stabilizing the political system for a while. The indicator “Political Participation” has helped to define the time periods when there were violations of democratic rights and freedoms in Slovakia (the right to free elections, freedom of expression, and freedom of association). Analysis of the indicator “Political and Social Integration” has revealed the conversion strategies of the ruling Smer-SD.

2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The interrelations between the power and the opposition in the context of democratization have not yet been the subject of research in foreign and domestic studies. Most of the literature on post-communist regime democratization problems focused on the analysis of the governmental activity and parliamentary stability. Instead of the growing interest in the opposition, scholars focused on the governmental mandate and duration of the government’s rule as well as on the factors constituting the basis for the different trajectory of post-communist transformations.

One of the reasons for certain lack of scholars' attention to the role of interrelationship between the power and the opposition as democratization factors in Slovak Republic is an exceptional variability of the object of research. The opinion that in the conditions of instability of the party and government functioning it is difficult to even determine who was in the opposition at that time is still rather wide-spread. In the opinion of P. Kopecky, M. Spirova, "the changing institutional framework has hindered a clear-cut assessment of the opposition's institutional opportunity structure, while the complex nature of the political process has made any evaluation of the role of the opposition in constitutional practice a challenging task" (Kopecky, Spirova, 2008).

This problem is in general terms mentioned by many authors researching the processes of transition to democracy in the Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, substantial analysis of its aspects can be found in the paper by M. Kubat (Kubát, 2010). The scholar studied the party dimension of the opposition functioning in the Slovak Republic in a detailed way and determined the role of institutional factors in the development of the opposition. That enabled us to substantiate rational motives in the choice of this or that interaction option by the power and the opposition.

In the article the author also grounded his ideas on the paper by P. Sorokin (Sorokin, 2007), in which the fluctuation theory is described. The theoretical part of the article is supplemented by Bourdieu's paper (Bourdieu, 2002), where the theory of capital accumulation and conversion is disclosed. For a deeper understanding of the issue extremely important are the scientific achievements of A. Ágh (Ágh, 1995), P. Kopecky (Kopecky, 2008), M. Spirova (Spirova, 2008). They substantiate the theoretical and methodological approaches to the functional aspects of the parliamentary opposition in post-communist democracies. Theoretical aspects of the problem are analyzed in the studies made by K. Popper (Popper, 1998), W. Reisinger (Reisinger, 2003). Due to specific direction of the research, of primary importance have been the papers dedicated to the political conditions of the opposition development in the context of democratization processes in Slovak Republic. First of all, we refer to the works of D. Leška (Leška, 2013), D. Malová (Malová, 2011), P. Učeň (Učeň, 2011). J. Marušiak (Marušiak, 2017) dedicated his article to the analysis of new trends in the party system of the state. The scholar proved and generalized the reasons that provoke the emergence of business-type parties and their oppositional capacity, especially in the period between the elections. The nature of interrelations between political opponents in the parliament and the dynamics of the country's democratization is covered in the works by Kollár M. (Kollár, 2011), Vašečka M. (Vašečka, 2011). The nature of the relationship between political opponents in the parliament is covered in the papers by G. Mesežnikov (Mesežnikov, 2011). The formation of pro-government and opposition circles during election campaigns is covered in the study by S. Szomolányi (Szomolányi, 2010). Generally, Slovak scholars in their works do not tend to

consider the parliamentary opposition as a separate political institution and to specify the model of its interaction with other power institutions in the temporal dynamics. At the same time, rather interesting for us was the integrative combination of the researches related to the theoretical and empirical aspects of democratization, the specificity of democratization in Slovak Republic as well as the relationship between the power and the opposition.

3. POLITICAL CONTEXT OF DEMOCRATIZATION

Transition to democracy in Slovak Republic took place within the global democratization process that embraced the countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. Methodologically, this process did not fit the “classical” model of three subsequent stages of transition to democracy (liberalism, democratization, consolidation). In the opinion of A. Kljuchkovych, “in the case of Slovakia the sequence of transition was violated due to lack of delineation between (parallel nature of) the liberalization and democratization phases as well as short-term functioning of the hybrid political regime causing zigzag-shaped (non-linear) trajectory of the transition” (Kljuchkovych, 2019). We agree to T. Kuzio’s standpoint who said that “Slovakia implemented its fourth transit which included development of political democracy, market economy, national statehood, and political nation” (Kuzio, 2001).

As far as conceptualization of democracy itself is concerned, several core theoretical directions can be pointed out here: competitive elitism concept (M. Weber, Ph. Schmitter), liberal democracy (J. Lock, Ch. Montesquieu), pluralistic democracy model (R. Dahl), participatory democracy model (C. Pateman, B. Barber). In our opinion, in the case of the Slovak Republic the liberal democracy concept is the most acceptable in the context of our research, with its focus on the actual freedom of faith, expression, assembly, demonstrations; pluralism; uncertainty about the consequences of choices and availability of alternative sources of information as well as regular channels for the expression and representation of their interests and values (Diamond, 1999). These and other elements of liberal democracy make up the basic criteria by which Freedom House makes its annual assessment of political rights (competition, opposition, participation) and civil liberties in different countries of the world.

The dynamics of democratic transformations in the post-socialist space substantially depended on the level of competition among pro-government and oppositional political parties. At the same time, each country had a different balance of political forces, characteristic rules of “political game”, and a specific institutional environment for the parliamentary opposition. A. Ágh notes that the first stage of democratic transformations is the stage of parliamentarization (the East Central European parliaments have had an overwhelmingly dominant role in politics) (Ágh, 1995). The first democratic elections organized in then-Czechoslovakia, brought the post-opposition to power, and the Communists, as outsiders, occupied the niche of the parliamentary opposition (Kubát, 2010).

In 1994-1998, during the rule of HZDS and its leader V. Mečiar the state was experiencing some democratic backsliding. It was accompanied by restrictions set for democratic rights and freedoms of citizens, a slowdown in the European integration, and the weakening the inter-party competition by narrowing the opposition's institutional capacity to control government activities. In the face of real threats to liberal democracy, the efforts of the parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political opposition merged (Buslenko, 2014). The government formed around this party was opposed by a weak and fragmented opposition. It lacked internal consensus and could not effectively compete with illiberal parties for influence. At that time its fragmentation was conditioned by ideological heterogeneity due to which opposition both center-right and center-left forces. This factor significantly complicated the development of a policy alternative to the one offered by the government. HZDS presented itself as a wide-spectrum movement. Its neutrality enabled it to carry out populist policy and maneuver between nationalism and center-leftism, taking the votes of the constituency from the classical left-wing and right-wing parties (Leška, 2013).

Gradually, the opposition parties began to coordinate their strategies, considering the policy of V. Mečiar's government to be populist and anti-democratic. Since 1998 Slovak Republic has restored the democratic practice of the party-in-power alteration and democratic control of the executive power. This created objective conditions for eliminating the consequences of Mečiar's illiberal rule and gave impetus for the implementation of the European integration policy and further democratization.

In 1998–2010 the relationship between the power and the opposition was occasionally very intense and sharp, accompanied by regular political crises. This happened because significant party fragmentation in the parliament led to the development of the minimum winning coalitions and ideologically diverse government and parliamentary opposition. Under such conditions, the parliamentary opposition remained ideologically and organizationally split and included political parties that represented the political spectrum from left to right. Smer, led by R. Fico, remained the main opposition force.

The 2010 election campaign was taking place in the background of a more clear division between the pro-ruling and opposition parties. The latter was caused by the fact that the previous parliamentary coalition that consisted of the center-left Smer-SD, ultra-right SNS and right-wing L'S-HZDS implemented the policy incompatible with the principles of liberal democracy. Its implementation, in the opinion of the Slovak scholar G. Mesežnikov, aimed at the "weakening of the mechanisms of controlling executive authorities, total marginalization and deligitimization of the parliamentary opposition, violation of the principle of equality before the law" (Mesežnikov, 2011 a). The deficit of democracy was enhanced by the global economic crisis which also affected the Slovak Republic. The government of R. Fico failed to cope with its negative consequences. As the result there came budget deficit rise from 1.9 % of the GNP in 2007 to 7.8 % in 2010. (D. Malová, P. Učeň, 2011). That is why the opposition right-wing

parties SDKÚ-DS and KDH together with the newly established “Sloboda a solidarita” (SaS) and the Party of the Hungarian Minority (Most-Híd) tried to adjust the election programs as they could make them closer to the basic topic of the election campaign. The main slogans of the opposition were accusations of the government of its incapability of coping with the consequences of the global economic decline in the country as well as of the spread of such negative phenomena as clientelism and corruption. 2010 was the year of the third full rotation of the parties in power due to the election. Previous change from the pro-government status to the opposition one took place in 1998 and 2006. S. Huntington once offered a test for consolidated democracy, which involved a twofold change of the parties in power. The third rotation of power showed that the Slovak Republic was exactly at that stage of its development. After power rotation the new ruling coalition started its governance which was characterized by mutual cooperation and respect for constitutional laws and balances. The government undertook a number of legislative and administrative measures aimed to strengthen the openness of the institutional system. The then-coalition had a small numerical advantage over the strong and moderately integrated opposition (79:71) (Szomolányi, 2011).

After the 2010 parliamentary election a new configuration of the party system developed in the Slovak Republic, which included a powerful Smer-SD, two middle-range parties (SDKÚ-DS and SaS) and three smaller parties (KDH, Most-Híd and SNS). In that period “the country still had the party system division into two blocks of different nature in place: the block of national and populist parties that included Smer-SD and SNS as well as the block of program parties made up by SDKÚ-DS, SaS, KDH, and Most-Híd (Mesežnikov, 2011 B). This division line influenced the nature of the interparty relationship considerably, including the coalition strategies used as well as access of the parties to power, their political style and adherence to a certain type of political culture.

At the same time, it has been noticed that the “power-opposition” dichotomy is prone to a certain indistinctiveness and non-transparency. For example, there can be traced the influence of economic capital on the structure of the overall party capital, which reinforces the political capacity of business-type parties and the interdependence between business and politics. Entrepreneurial parties were created directly by businessmen or leaders and received funding from them. Before elections such entrepreneurial parties usually criticize the government. This sort of opposition behavior can be considered as a technology that increased the effectiveness of mobilization of the frustrated pro-government electorate. New political parties’ rise to power in the form of individual projects can be explained by the voters’ “fatigue” with constant rotation of power, frustration with the low government efficiency, and the search for “new faces” in politics. One example are Civic Understanding Party (SOP), Alliance of the New Citizen (ANO), SaS and We Are Family – Boris Kollár. The Slovak scholar J. Marušiak reasonably writes that “success in parliamentary elections and even par-

ticipation in government did not motivate such parties to create territorial structures or improve the mechanisms of internal democracy” (Marušiak, 2017).

On March 10, 2012 Smer-SD won a convincing victory in the early parliamentary election, getting 83 seats in the parliament out of 150. Having gained the support of the left-party voters, the party was supported by 44.4 % of votes (BTI, 2016). That enabled Smer-SD to establish the one-party government headed by R. Fico. The party’s coming to power was not accidental. The success of Smer-SD was considerably due to the high level of centralization that allowed avoiding internal opposition and fractionalization with the minimum level of party democracy. This is the leader-type party grouped around the charismatic R. Fico.

The one-party government had a rather weak and fragmented parliamentary opposition. The ruling Smer-SD became the obstacle for its uniting and implementation of controlling functions, since, having the absolute majority of votes in the parliament, it tried to openly weaken it all the time. That was manifested in the violation of procedural processes via ignoring of the legitimate claims of the opposition deputies. Opposition fragmentation and rather powerful positions of Smer-SD can be accounted for by the positioning of social and political forces. Back then the party system of Slovak Republic remained rather fragmented, in spite of its openness. The Smer-SD, dominating in the left flank of the party spectrum, was not faced with any real competition from the left. Among the center-right parties there were no powerful entities. The party of M. Dzurinda SDKU-DS was gradually losing its deputies in the parliament, part of whom left it or changed their party belonging. The process was taking place in the background of enhancement of the influence of the Network (Sieť) set up by the former KDĽ member R. Procházka. During the 2014 presidential election he was the third most successful candidate and got 21 % votes in the first round of elections. Some fragments of the “old” center-right parties contributed to the appearance of new individual projects (Nova, Chance, SKOK, OĽaNO, ĽSNS).

The activity of populist parties impeded positive democratization development considerably. In particular, Smer-SD used “rigid” populism options for the sake of the preservation of its consolidated capital that was based on the delegated party capital as well as the personal symbolic capital of its leader R. Fico (Mesežnikov, 2008). This was manifested in foreign policy and the rights of minorities matters; unclear and ambiguous political program, declaration of the “popular” nature of its own political line, and not specific policy suggestions.


4. DEMOCRATIZATION TRENDS

Building a formal model of democratization in the country implies taking into account the influence made by social agents and the nature of their interaction; for this, we will apply the following indices and indicators of democratization: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Freedom House, the Polity IV Project. They will serve

as an empirical basis and will help us determine fluctuations periods when democratization of a political system goes through the phases of divergence and convergence as well as to reveal the reasons for such processes.

One of the tools for the conceptual analysis of democratization processes is annual analytical generalizations presented by the *Polity IV* Project. The Project lasted from 1992 to 2013 and its results reflect transformation periods in the government policy for each country, including such characteristics as the strengthening of authoritarian tendencies, weakening of central power, intensification of direct popular participation. Graphs that reflect transformation trends of a political regime and allow drawing conclusions about the state of democratization in the country were extremely important in the context of the researched issues. As it can be seen from Graph 1, the lowest level of the regime's democracy was recorded in the Slovak Republic in 1994-1998 (7 points out of maximum 10).

Graph. 1. Dynamics of the regime's democratization in the Slovak Republic in 1992-2013




Source: *Polity IV Project (2013)*.

It should be noted that the upper and lower points of this period coincided with the parliamentary elections and the change of the ruling elite. This gives grounds to preliminarily consider elections to be the upper points of fluctuation.

Change of power in the country in 1998 initiated positive changes in terms of democratization of the regime, which in the period from 2000 to 2008 approached 9 points. After that it was stabilized at the maximum level of 10 points. According to the EIU, the democracy index in the Slovak Republic in 2007-2018 averaged 7.35 points,

with 7.4 points in 2006. Since 2015 there was a slight decrease to 7.29, and then to 7.16 points in 2018 (Graph 2).

Graph. 2. Democracy Index in the Slovak Republic in 2006-2018



Note: 0 is the lowest index, 10 is the highest.


Source: Economist Intelligence Unit (2018).

The research made by *Bertelsmann Stiftung* has demonstrated a slightly different trend. Graph 3 shows a more explicit slow decline in the democracy index from 9.4 in 2010 to 8.6 in 2018. The regression in these dynamics correlated with the decrease in the Governance Index and such indicators as “Stability of Democratic Institutions”, “Rule of Law”, and “Stateness”. The trend towards relative stabilization of democratization in the country, evident in 2006-2017, showed two contradictory trends. On the one hand, there was a noticeable consolidation of democracy as the “transformation of random systems, reasonable norms and unpredictable decisions that have emerged during the transition to credible relations of cooperation and competition” (Rejsinger, 2003). One point of evidence is the fact that the change of power that took place in 2006, 2010, and 2012 did not significantly affect the fluctuations, which is quite symptomatic and requires a deeper analysis. Of interest is the fact that during 2006-2010 and 2012-2017 Smer-SD remained the ruling party.

On the other hand, the lack of obvious fluctuations in the democratization processes revealed some sort of “freezing” in the political changes directed at the development, expansion, and solidarization of democratic rule. Therefore, it is important to pay more attention to both short-term decisions (contextual approach) and strategies and approaches of the ruling elite to the political system development (structural approach), made to achieve effective functioning of democratic institutions and procedures and to support further trajectory and process of democratization. The combination of structural and contextual approaches is quite useful and allows to comprehen-

sively approach the phenomenon under study, taking into account interrelations between social agents. The application of all these types of theories in combination with the concept of social capital conversion to the development of the post-communist Slovakia will contribute to the progress in the consolidation of the structural and contextual understanding of democratization processes.

Graph. 3. Dynamics of democratization in the Slovak Republic in 2006-2018



Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2018).


When Smer-SD joined the political arena, the relative stabilization of the country's political system became evident. As it can be seen from Graph 4, in 1996-2005 the arithmetic mean of political stability was 0.87, however, in 2006-2017 it increased to 0.9. At the same time, after 2006 the amplitude of fluctuations in this indicator has been significantly decreasing. In particular, in the period from 1996 to 2005, the highest surge, 0.59 points, was observed in 1998-2000, while during the 2006-2017 period the most substantial difference of 0.26 points was recorded in 2006-2008.

However, the value of the "Political stability" indicator alone is not yet a sufficient argument to assess the state of democratization.

The overall picture was complemented with the indicator "Stability of Democratic Institutions", modeled by BTI. Graph 5 demonstrates certain fluctuations in the indicator in 2008, 2010, and 2014, which chronologically coincided with the parliamentary elections and prove the growing conflict of the inter-party relations in the period of elections as well as their gradual decline in the period between the elections. At the same time, the indicators "Performance of Democratic Institutions" and "Commitment of Democratic Institutions" show additional parameters of changes in the political stability trend. Thus, in 2006-2012 the indicator "Performance of Democratic Institutions" was recorded at the level of 9 points. After 2012 a gradual decline could be traced, and this indicator decreased to 8 points in 2014. At the same time, there


was a noticeable decrease in the indicator “Commitment of Democratic Institutions” from 9 points in 2016 to 8 in 2018. All this generally determined a slow trend towards the decline of the political stability index from 9.5 to 9 during the 2006-2008 period, and then from 9.5 to 8 during the 2010-2017 period, with the increase of 0.5 points in 2008-2010.

Graph. 4. Changes of the indicator “Political Stability and Absence of Violence” in the Slovak Republic in 1996-2018



Note: 2.5 is the maximum rate, - 2.5 – is the minimum.
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (2018).

Graph. 5. Changes of the indicator “Stability of Democratic Institutions” in the Slovak Republic in 2006-2018



Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2018).


Against the background of a relatively linear trend of democratization, the stability index and additional indicators give us grounds to assume the following. First of all, when Smer-SD came to power, political stability in the country was gradually de-

clining. Moreover, this trend progressed in 2010-2017. Given the fact that similar processes had already been observed in 2006-2008, it seems that the wave of the political situation destabilization became a breeding ground for the center-left Smer-SD. This also seemed plausible because the so-called “soft” populism became a tool that allowed its leader R. Fico to accumulate political capital.

Besides, the government demonstrated its fairly low management efficiency. In particular, Graph 3 shows the instability and drastic changes in the relevant rates. The stage of gradual decline from 7.4 to 7 points was taking place during 2006-2010. After that we can see a slow regression to 6.7 points in 2017. This backsliding, on the one hand, testified to complex changes in the management model of the transformation period. On the other hand, it showed that low level of management efficiency had become an obstacle on the way to democratization but not an obstacle on the way to another coming to power by Smer-SD. It seemed that the power disregarded effective governance as a significant resource for capital accumulation and preferred potentially stronger ones.

The decline of the democracy index correlated with the indicator “Stateness”. As it can be seen from Graph 6, it started to decrease since 2010. This can be explained by the aggravation of ethnonational problems in the country as the result of the policy of national populism implemented by R. Fico. Since 2014 the negative dynamics was shown by the indicator “No Interference of Religions Dogmas”. It dropped from 10 points in 2014 to 9 in 2016. Violation of religious rights and freedoms in the country by the ruling party is one of the signs of a defective democracy.

Graph. 6. Changes of the indicator “Stateness” in the Slovak Republic in 2006-2018



Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2018).

It is noteworthy that in the process of interaction between the power and the opposition positive changes in democratization were gradually developing, in particular, the ones demonstrated by the indicator “Voice and Accountability” (Worldwide Govern-


nance Indicators, 2018). As we can see, after the 1998 parliamentary elections which brought the opposition to power the process of democratization underwent some positive changes. The citizens' ability to participate in elections increased significantly, and the government itself became more accountable and transparent, which was a sign of liberal democracy. In fact, since 2002, according to the WGI, there has been a distinct trend towards stabilization of the "Voice and Accountability" indicator at the rate of 1 point. At the same time, from 2002 to 2017, despite permanent changes of power, this indicator remained stable. It seems that there was an imitation of the struggle between the deterrence and stratification forces. This is quite symptomatic, as it was not about the stabilization of democratic processes in terms of transparency, elections' democracy, and openness of power, but about their stopping at the level of 2002.

As it can be seen from Graph 7, BTI's studies demonstrate the stage of high rates of indicators "Free and Fair Elections" and "Association/Assembly Rights" in 2006-2018. During this period they did not go below the maximum 10 points, which proves the trend towards democracy stabilization. On the whole, this testified to the fact that, first of all, the reform of these institutions caused by the interaction of the equalitarian and stratification forces had been a success and, as a consequence, had ensured voting rights of citizens, transparency, and competitiveness in the electoral process. Secondly, no political force questioned alternatives to democratic processes and institutions as an essential feature of consolidated democracy.

However, democratization, according to W. Reisinger, "belongs to the political changes taking place in an effort to expand and solidify democratic ways of governing and where citizens are entitled with the right to freedom of expression" (Reisinger, 2003). This right allows vetoing undemocratic decisions of legally elected government officials. In fact, these are channels for the formation of social capital for the opposition. As Graph 7 shows, the "Freedom of expression" indicator in Slovak Republic is quite contradictory, unstable, and reveals the most problematic areas in the index of political participation. The stage of stabilization of the indicator rates at the level of 10 points was recorded in 2006-2008. After that, it began to regress to 8 points in 2012. Since 2014 the indicator has been fixed at the level of 9 points. Limitation of citizens' rights to express their views created certain obstacles on the way to the equalitarian forces development.


In general, the indicator "Political Participation" did not change significantly. Over the entire period under analysis it decreased from 9.8 to 9.5 points in 2006-2008 and 2010-2012. After 2012 its rate has stabilized at 9.8 points. It's worth mentioning that its decline coincided with the parliamentary elections and the beginning of the rule of the majority government led by Smer-SD. This allows us to consider 2010 to be a bifurcation point, with a short-term perspective of fluctuation divergence.

Graph. 7. Changes of the indicator “Political Participation” in the Slovak Republic in 2006-2018



Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2018).

Graph. 8. Changes of the indicator “Stateness” in the Slovak Republic in 2006-2018




Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2018).

In the language of social capital theory, this meant that the ruling party tried to strengthen its position in the political field in a non-democratic way through constitutional changes, which in the long run undermined the system of checks and balances in power. By making changes in the parameters of democratization (institutional design), Smer-SD, in fact, increased its fluctuation.

We should note a specific trait of the democratization process during the Smer-SD rule. BTI's research did not discover significant violations in the field of citizens' rights protection. The corresponding indicator did not change significantly and averaged at the rate of 9 points. At the same time, since 2010, negative trends have been traced in the indicator "Independent judiciary". It has demonstrated a steady regression changing its rate from 9 points in 2010 to 8 in 2012. Since then there hasn't been any noticeable positive dynamics in this area, which is quite symptomatic. We may assume a certain effect of the political factor on the judiciary, which reduced its role in the protection of citizens' rights and undermined the effectiveness of democratic institutions.

To better understand the nature of behavior and the role of social agents in the context of democratization, we will analyze the indicator "Political and Social Integration". As we can see from Graph 9, there was a slight increase in this indicator from 7.5 to 8.3 points in 2006–2010, with subsequent stopping and stabilization at the rate of 8.3 points in 2016. In 2016-2017 the index decreased to 7.8 points. Against this background the growth of the indicator "Interest Groups" from 8 points in 2008 to 9 points in 2010 can easily be seen. It is worth mentioning that during the Smer-SD government such a high rate remained stable. It can be assumed that this was somehow linked to the activities of public agents who were in power and through which the pro-government party could accumulate associated capital. Thus, a network of formal and informal ties between the ruling elite and the carriers of economic capital was being formed. Therefore, the absence of changes in the democratization process meant that none of the agents was interested in changing the existing "rules of the game". In this regard, I must agree with the opinion expressed by S. Patrushev, who, taking D. North's concept of institutional evolution as a basis, stated: "the state may be interested in preserving inefficient institutions ... such institutions can be supported by powerful groups with special interests; and the evolution of the society may depend on a once-chosen institutional trajectory" (Patrushev, 2006). Such a situation, according to the Ukrainian researcher O. Chaltseva, "is typical of closed systems, unprepared for innovations and seeking to preserve their institutional order in the system" (Chaltseva, 2017). Accordingly, in such circumstances, the development of full value democratization of the political system is impossible, because it acquires the traits of imitation, which leads to institutional changes that cannot always be predicted.

The influence of social agents as associated capital carriers on the democratization in Slovak Republic has been quite considerable and cannot be underestimated. In addition, it, having a latent nature, is not taken into account before detection in any index. It was difficult to make the analysis because for a long time, a social agent could influence government agents through bribery and blackmail using a network of informal connections, while remaining in the shadows. This allows us to assume certain errors in the estimation of the "Interest Groups" indicator.

Graph. 9. Changes of the indicator “Political Participation” in the Slovak Republic in 2006-2018

Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index (2018).

CONCLUSIONS

Thus, the article studies the effect of interrelationship of the power and the opposition on the democratization dynamics in the Slovak Republic. Such a goal of the research has caused the following research objectives: to determine the specifics of the relationship between the power and the opposition in the Slovak Republic in the context of ongoing political processes; to clarify the strategies of accumulation and conversion of social capitals of the power and the opposition as well as their effect on the state democratization dynamics.

The key conclusion is that the democratization process in the Slovak Republic depended considerably on the strategies of accumulation and conversion of social capitals of the power and the opposition as well as on the development of stable dispositions between them in the political field.

In the Slovak Republic the dichotomous political field structure was shaped, which was intrinsically and directly linked to voters and pre-determined establishment and appearance of the positions and interests related to a certain situation in this field. Such positions resulted from indirect, “coordinated” relationship between the pro-ruling and opposition parties, based on the striving for accessing the state’s metacapital. That forced the competing parties to produce alternative projects that aimed not at promoting democracy strengthening, but at taking into account the competitor’s positions and mobilizing the constituency for the sake of fixing and enhancing one’s positions. Hence, the popularity of populist parties in the Visegrad Group countries as the result of gradual replacement of the inter-party competition with in-

formally fixed rules of the “game”, where the main actors developed as the result of the political discourse the problems that were though close for the constituency, but distracting from the core problems (corruption and ways of its combating, power transparency, etc.).

Such processes were taking place in the background of the drastic increase in the political capital of Smer-SD. The increase in the party’s popularity was conditioned by the so-called “soft populism” which expanded its presence in the political field at the expense of both center-left and center-right parties. Through the mechanism of democratic elections and application of the majority principle, Smer-SD managed to control the legislative and executive power democratically, strengthening its positions in the system of separation of powers. This strategy of the social agent is well-illustrated by P. Bourdieu’s approach to the properties of the field. He believed that there is a constant struggle acquiring different forms between those who dominate the field and their contenders. In this struggle the former are trying to protect their monopoly and to eliminate competition, while the latter – to destroy the obstacles set by the right for entering the field (Bourdieu, 2002). The fragmentation and organizational weakness of the opposition in Slovak Republic allowed Smer-SD to determine the stakes and specific interests, while other players in this field were forced to follow them. Slovakia’s political system resembled a battlefield between the ruling elite seeking to maintain control over the distribution of specific metacapital of the state and to retain a legitimate violent control, and the opposition elite fighting for control but forced to accept the rules of the game and the basic stakes as an basis important for entering the field.

The trend dynamics of democratization in Slovak Republic reproduced by means of indicators in the model form is characterized by the periods of fluctuation and its main phases – divergence and convergence. It has been established that parliamentary elections were the typical points of fluctuation. They allowed agents to legitimately implement the election strategy, to change the vector of democratization in a constitutional way, to determine the short- or long-term implementation of the strategy of the ruling party or its leader, which, under the conditions of greater consolidated social capital, helps either the deterrence or stratification forces in their coming to power, triggering the dissipative democratization of the political system.

On the basis of the democratization trend analysis we have identified the determining points that marked democratization termination and its entry into the fluctuation phase. This state of the system has been defined as the result of achieving a certain balance between the power and the opposition, as the prolongation of the established “rules of the game”, according to which the parties bore minimum transaction costs, thus reducing the inter-party competition and bringing about institutional stability. It has been proven that after a certain stabilization there comes the stage at which the level of democracy of the political system goes down to a new saturation point (convergence).

Besides, there has been a negative trend in the political system democratization as well. In our opinion, this is the result of pattern relationship between the power and the opposition, which was manifested in the reproduction of political practices and was rather aimed not at the democratization but at the preservation of dispositions in the political field and further distribution of the state metacapital. Since the pro-ruling and opposition parties mainly embraced democratic ideas and procedures, imitating inter-party competition, fluctuation was slow.

A prospective direction for further research is determination of the effect of strange attractors on the relationship between the power and the opposition. Here the effect of the pandemic on the convergence of the democratization processes in terms of limitation of the political influence of the opposition and strengthening of the executive branch of power is meant. We also consider it to be expedient to develop the methodology for determining the institutional opportunities of the opposition's influence on the power. That would enable to determine the dynamics of the changing strength of the opposition pole in the political field as an additional democratization indicator.

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THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN HUNGARY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

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Abstract:

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Hungary have undergone a major transformation in various aspects since the 1990s. During the last years under communist dictatorship, non-government sector was the destination for those who desired drastic changes in society because this sector was strongly supported by those, who desired a democratic reform, such as academic and media elites, foreign organizations and governments. The principal goal of this study is to present the role of Hungarian NGOs in local decision-making processes and elections through legal background, financial support and human resource management.

Key words: *NGOs, Hungary, Civil Society, Democratization*

1. NGOS IN THE SOCIO-POLITICAL THEORY

In recent years, the importance of NGOs in providing social services and their participation in political processes has increased. The function of an intermediary between society and the market (economy) and the state in the provision of social services

and the implementation of other goals is and will be in the coming years a source of intensive development of the so-called third sector, as well as increasing the diversity of its institutions and methods of achieving its objectives. The growing number of NGOs, their increasing importance and the transfer of more and more public resources to them creates the need for comprehensive research on the role and importance of NGOs in modern societies. Such analyses attract the interest of many researchers who try to understand the role and importance of NGOs in the modern political system. The unflagging interest in the non-governmental sector results in a significant number of publications, reports regarding the role and significance of the non-governmental organizations' sector in particular countries. Of the one part, NGOs are considered to be the basis of civil society, and thus as the element that determines the democratic character of the socio-political system, and of the other part, as an element that should play a significant role in solving socio-economic problems of a given society as an alternative mechanism to the state of provision of social services.

The nineties of the twentieth century became a period of rapid growth of research on the issues of NGOs. Most academic researchers agreed that the development of third sector organizations in developing countries would play a major role in raising the standard of living, economic development and ensuring the democratic nature of political systems. [See: Drabek, 1987, Brown & Korten 1991, Fisher, 1993, Salamon, 1994]. The term NGO's includes various categories of entities that differ from each other by the purpose and the scope of the action, the organizational and legal form, possessed resources, etc. On the global scale as well as in individual countries, it is impossible to determine the exact number of non-governmental organizations. It is associated with a large number of organizations, the diversity of legal entities and the rules of their registration, as well as the dynamics of the creation and disruption of activities. In general, this category includes entities that do not work to achieve financial profit and do not belong to the government sector at the same time. The term "non-governmental organizations" emphasizes their independence from the public administration (government) and their non-profit activity, which is not a profit attitude that distinguishes them from business institutions. That is why NGOs are included in the so-called third sector, whereas the first sector is public administration and the second sector is business.

From an economic perspective, the necessity of the third sector explains the theories of market and state inefficiency in meeting social needs (*government and market failure theories*). The sociological and political theories emphasize their importance in increasing social integration, implementing the principle of subsidiarity, building a civil society, social dialogue and participatory democracy. In normative terms, it is assumed that they are a necessary element of the system of states that want to be considered democratic. It is assumed that the development of the third sec-

tor expresses the essence of a democratic state that ensures its citizens participate in the wielding public power.

In contemporary theories on the role and importance of non-governmental organizations, it is emphasized that in modern societies they play the role of an intermediary between power, market, and society. They express the needs of citizens and take over the service of certain areas of social life. Such an understanding of NGOs is related to the perception of them as an important part of the wider socio-political phenomenon of civil society. The third sector (non-governmental organizations), as well as local government institutions are to constitute a structure that most fully enables the development of civil society, which is a prerequisite for economic and social development and safeguard for citizens' rights.

The category of civil society is - like many concepts in the humanities - an ambiguous concept and its understanding has changed along with historical conditions. Its use depends to a large extent on the context, and in the literature, on the subject, we encounter many different ways of understanding civil society. Contemporary understanding of civil society refers to the Tocqueville tradition to a large extent, and therefore it is identified primarily with the existence of autonomous, voluntary civic associations, referred to as the third sector, which, unlike the first - covering the market, i.e. private entities and goals, the second - covering the government, where entities and goals are public, includes private entities when the goals remain public. Civil society is thus identified with groups and organizations, both formal and informal that operate independently of the state and the market/economy to ensure social interests.

In the simplest definition, civil society is the whole of non-state institutions, civic organizations, and associations operating in the public sphere. These are relatively autonomous structures towards the state, created from the bottom up and generally characterized by the voluntary participation of their members. It is, therefore, a society in which there are many associations independent of the bureaucratic structures of the state, formed on the initiative of citizens in order to solve various social problems on their own [see: Cohen, Arato 1994: IX]. The universally accepted definitions point out that civil society consists of a network of political groups and voluntary associations shaped in a space extending between the individual and the state. These groups engage in expressing the interests of their members and try to shape the political culture of a given society, its values, aspirations and models of making political decisions [Cohen, Kennedy 2007: 71]. Contemporary concepts of civil society perceive them as a society operating outside the sphere of politics (e.g. in the form of associations and non-profit organizations, foundations).

As a result of the polemics, both academic and publicist, the conviction was established that liberal democracy is not only democratic political institutions, but also, and perhaps above all, an active citizen. Without the structures of civil society, the construction called the democratic state is only a scaffolding, which must be en-

capsulated with constant civic activity. A necessary condition for a democratic society is therefore the creation of a network of autonomous social institutions and associations, which are an expression of voluntary agreements of citizens, their pursuit of self-interest and self-development. It is thanks to them that civil society has specific structural boundaries and is defined internally by various entities.

Contemporary political theory and, at the same time, political practice, is dominated by the vision of such a state organization in which active individuals and the so-called civil society play the most important role. Therefore, at the present stage of development of political institutions, the model of a participative unit, i.e. directly solving its own economic, social and political problems, as well as the model of the “active” society is preferred. In this model, non-governmental organizations play an important role, which is treated as a necessary mechanism for the good functioning of a democratic society.

2. THE ROLE OF NGOS IN SOCIO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

NGOs are an essential element of the modern liberal-democratic society by creating structures enabling people to take up social and economic activities. They are, therefore, the element that expresses the essence of civil society. That’s the socio-political theory. It should not be underestimated because it has its impact on shaping the way of thinking about the world of politicians and representatives of public administration, and thus affects the practical activity of political and economic institutions. In accordance with the assumptions currently made, modern non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are perceived as one of the basic actors of socio-economic processes, as well as the most effective form of social policy implementation.

The development of NGOs in the contemporary world is related to the fact that they are perceived as the most effective way to achieve social objectives, and are also seen as an essential element of a democratic society. Therefore, NGOs receive significant financial support for their socio-political activities, which makes this form of social activity very attractive. The transfer of funds and other resources through the structures of non-governmental organizations is now standard practice, and NGOs are considered as an indispensable partner in the implementation of a large part of social policy.

The practice of supporting NGOs is associated primarily with attempts to find the best mechanism by which we can support socio-economic development in developing countries. This problem became particularly important at the turn of the eighties and nineties when the fall of the so-called the Eastern Block has put a large number of countries in political transformation towards a market economy and a democratic society. The question arose how to support this transformation and mitigate its effects. NGOs have begun to be seen as an alternative to the inefficient and often corrupt administrative structures institutional mechanism for solving social problems. Moreover, due to the perception of NGOs as an important part of civil society, it was recognized that support for the non-governmental sector is tantamount to supporting

the construction of a democratic society and political attitudes characterizing highly developed societies. In the early nineties, World Bank Vice President Moeen Qureshi said that NGOs are the most effective instrument in reducing poverty in developing countries. The main task of NGOs was to create formal structures that would mobilize people to take actions for the development and raising of the standard of living and quality of life.

The significance that began to be attributed to NGOs arose from the theoretical and ideological assumptions. The collapse of statist economies and political systems resulted in the state-administrative structures being considered an ineffective tool for solving socio-economic problems. Therefore, it was assumed that the most effective source of social and economic development is primarily the activity of individuals (entrepreneurs, volunteers, etc.). Starting from these premises, NGOs started to be given a great role because it was assumed that development should be initiated *by citizens* and *for citizens*. There was a widespread view that people should organize themselves to solve local problems, and the state's administrative structures, especially in developing countries, are too weak and ineffective. Therefore, various social organizations should play a central role in the process of mobilizing people to work together for the socio-economic development. Representatives of governmental administration and international institutions began to see NGOs as an alternative institutional mechanism enabling the effective transfer of funds to developing countries, and the development of NGOs was identified with the development of democratic structures. Therefore, more and more resources were being transferred to the development of NGOs, and it became a very common practice to make the transfer of funds dependent on the inclusion of non-governmental organizations in the decision-making processes concerning their use. Therefore, the nineties became a period of rapid development of NGOs, which gradually became one of the important socio-political entities.

3. THE ROLE OF NGO IN HUNGARY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

In order to understand the contemporary role played by Hungarian NGOs in the socio-political system, it is necessary to take into account the historical Background of NGOs in Hungary. As European system claims that one of the most important consequences of civic transformation is when a citizen knows his/her right and is willing to take an active role in public life, non-profit sector was formed with the same spirit in Hungary. Alongside the state, the civil society also governs the political movements and aims to have a certain influence on the state. A strong civil society guarantees a strong non-profit sector and the development of political parties. The civic sector is a part of the civil society where smaller groups functioning as an institution can stand up and raise their voice.

The civic sector in Hungary was born in the reform era but only after 1867 did this sector actually witness a major development. If there were 319 associations in 1862, by 1878, this number was multiplied by six times. Around 2000 associations varying

in forms and goals were founded until the First World War. Some of them already aimed at political goals or, at least, had the attempt to influence the political life. Notably, there was a feminist association which strived for women suffrage from 1904 and national associations which were concerned with the autonomy of different nations. Between the First and the Second World War this period featured the blooming of approximately 14 000 organizations in different fields. According to Putnam [Putnam 2000], there were more than 400 registered organizations only in Budapest. The era from the Second World War until 1990 s slipped into the shadow of Communist dictatorship; therefore, everything was subjected to close inspection of the centralized authority. A number of organizations were still allowed to continue their work as long as they did not pose any threat to the political regime. For example, the Post Pigeon Sport Association founded in 1882 could remain their operation with 10 000 members during this period. It is safe to say that organizations which dealt with hobbies and culture could still survive during this time. Towards the end of this period, the non-profit sector and non-profit organizations had experienced a significant change. The sector was supported actively by Hungarian intellectual community as well as foreign associations aiming at democratization. Associations created in this era were financed from abroad with an international background. During the 1980s, George Soros provided generous financial support for education, culture and science so that with the modification of law, associations were still able to operate independently.

The modification of the Civic Code of Law marked the reemergence of foundations in Hungary: there were more than 8000 new organizations registered by 1989. The merging law of 1989 paved the way for independent organizations. Regardless of the deep crisis in economy, education, healthcare, etc., non-profit sector had an unexpected fast growth which can be explained in many ways. Eva Kuti [Kuti 1992] has summarized the main reasons for this phenomenon which are presented as follows: 1) Respect for traditions: When the Civic Code of Law was approved, people revived the organizations which were previously banned due to political reasons, namely the Scout Organization; 2) Nostalgia: People tended to have strong nostalgia towards the Pre-communist time; 3) Solutions for ex-party members: Associations and foundations were places where ex-party members could take refuge in to survive in the new era; 4) Support from the government: The development of this sector was strongly supported by the government in terms of finance and politics; 5) Replacing public services: During the first year after the change of regime, most public services were missing; therefore the appearance of non-profit organizations became crucially important [Kuti 1992].

In addition, one can also take into consideration the fear and disappointment by 1990 as one of the reasons. While a part of the society wanted a more radical change, the other part was already satisfied with what they had achieved. A lot of political organizations had a starting point as civil organizations, but later on they became po-


litical parties. It cannot be denied that neither the government nor the private sector could react to the changed demands of the society, hence there came the exponential growth of the non-profit organizations.

More attention started to be given to international organizations, governments and private figures who financially supported new organizations. However, there have been no studies so far about how the organizations were chosen other than the general demand for the organization to be democratic, legal and respect the organization that gave them support. On the whole, the growth of this sector at this time can be well-defined in numbers. Non-profit organizations were a new frame for advocacy and social convergence. It was possible for different groups to conduct advocacy for themselves and handle social problems without the intervention of the government. In brief, one can conclude that the most important elements of traditional civic democracy were active participation, legal and political equality and solidarity.

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4. FROM THE 1990S UNTIL NOW

Fig. 1. Existing non-profit organizations between 1993-2015




Source: KSH database

By the mid-1990s, the change of regime resulted in disappointment for many people. Apart from the adoption of presidential institution of the republic and constitutional

court, the acceptance of parties, parliament and media was declining rapidly. The reason why trade unions' acceptance has never been on a high level after the change of regime although they played an important role for the third sector would certainly worth researching. The growth of the civil sector was essentially steady until 2010, when the number of organizations started to decrease due to the new regulators and the change in political environment.

Fig. 2. Formation of the NGO's in 2015



Once again, there was a major transformation in the development of the civil sector in the beginning of the new millennium. Lots of trainings and other opportunities were given to the non-profit sector, including the outcome of the Phare Program as a preparation for European Union membership. Participants in the non-profit sector acquired necessary financial and legal knowledge to stabilize the operation of their organizations. Therefore, it was not difficult to realize that the quality of services offered by civil associations were substantially improved.

However, like other countries in Eastern Europe, the rapid and spectacular growth of organizations may mask the fact that there is a relatively low level of participation and commitment towards civil organizations. The market-like environment was seen as a huge challenge for a majority of people who had been able to plan and live their lives without competition before. In the new system, conviction of being left alone is the only thing that needs to be solved. This individualization is different from Western Europe since there have been already market players who competed against each other.

In the 2000s and even today, there have been a major issue whether actors in the civil sector can work on cooperation's that have mutual benefits and are able to build partnership with governmental and economic actors or not. Several researchers in-

cluding Robert D. Putman have examined this area and finally concluded that states function better and people live better when civil sphere is strong. Putman (2000) also indicated that in a community that works efficiently, there are more people who are members of all kinds of civil society. Therefore, there is an actual and strong network that can have a positive impact on both the state and the government as well as the decisions of economic operators. Governance is regarded to be much more effective when society was willing to act to enforce its interest and tend to cooperate with others.

5. CHALLENGES FACED BY CIVIL SECTOR IN CURRENT SYSTEM

There has been a growing doubt among citizens about the situation of civil sector no matter how far Hungarian political system progresses. The problem at European Union level is that they do not see how they can influence decision-making processes. Because of the internal contradictions of representative democracy in Europe and Hungary in particular, their problems are often articulated by civilians.

Changing the welfare system leads to the decrease of trust in the state. In Hungary, the promise about a welfare state has created nothing but an unfulfilled dream. This negative effect, therefore, causes citizens to turn away from traditional political organizations and membership of parties. Trade unions, not to be excluded, also lie in this downward trend. Thanks to democratization, nowadays the gap between decision makers and ordinary people has been widened greatly since it is not until the election period that there are much more activities to be done. After the regime change, trust in political parties and politicians in Hungary has never been high, but nowadays, we can see that the rejection of traditional political parties is becoming a trend in many other European countries.

Regarding the activities of NGOs, there is a constant dilemma between the achievement and acceptance of national organization. The one-tiered national organizations of Kadar system, which were guided by the state, haunted people with centralization processes. The reorganization observed since 2010 in Hungarian political system clearly shows the marks of centralization. Jean Monnet once listed some essential principles of democracy participation, "There is nothing possible without the help of people, without institutions, without patience there is nothing constant". As the civil society plays a major role in the operation of democratic systems, we had better pay more attention to where and how civil society can be strengthened. Well-established and well-functioning NGOs are able to exercise constant control over elected leaders and have influence on periods which are not only before elections.

Besides, in order to tackle these challenges, it is vital that actors from non-profit sector reach a high level of dialogue and cooperation. There are two paths for effective national and international organizations. One is that organizations working on a professional basis (for example legal aid, security, or education...) are horizontally structured based on their portfolio. The other way requires local level coopera-

tion that creates trust and mutual benefits. Thanks to the Internet, there are plenty of resources for those who are looking for good examples of effective operation of non-profit sector. In many cases, these cooperations are mainly based on personal relationships and there is a sense of trust but no institutional relationship.

It is easily seen that the central government is strongly involved in decision-making processes in many cases. The majority of decision-making bodies in different decision-making bodies are now given to government delegates. The downgrading of the local government also caused serious damage to the civil sector as they were potential negotiating partners and practicing terrain where civil organizations were able to act effectively for their members. The state level is considered bureaucratic, and does not guarantee necessary conditions for effective work in terms of organization and finance. There is no “rural foot”, a bottom-up cooperation framework in the majority of civil society organizations.

Here, someone may question the funding of civil sector. In the previous time, foundations and associations were created out of donations from private individuals. There was a dependence: if a donor had secured the fund, the organization must have clearly met the donor’s expectations, but this was independent from the state. Nowadays modern civil organizations in Hungary as well as elsewhere in the world receive funds mostly from where their controlled activities are expected to expand.

6. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS FOR CIVIL SECTOR

There should be cooperation between public bodies and civil organizations that would guarantee their intervention in decision-making processes but do not become addictive to sponsoring programs. Companies, businesses and international or domestic aid can help free the civil sphere from excessive use of public crutches. There are also problems caused by actors and winners of recent post-communist market economy with no social profile, the new owner or manager middle class “philanthropy” of the long established stable and open capitalism with centuries’ old socio-cultural norms who give, help, merge and measure traditions of self-help cultures.

It is ultimately important that civil sector should have an area that must maintain its independence in every circumstance. This is the area of legal rights protection, political culture, democratic rights and procedures. In Hungary, the potential for cooperation between these types of organizations and the appropriate level of state increases. This happens due to the fact that a number of human right principles are enshrined in the principles of European Union. In order to protect these principles, they are willing to provide financial resources, professional and political support to Hungarian organizations. It should be noted that these types of organizations have to retain their independence from other “donors”.

Today’s political debates are filled with operation of NGOs in Hungary and the transparency of their funding. There was a bill before that parliament would make it mandatory to indicate all foreign donations to all Hungarian NGOs. Hungarian legislation

adapts to international practice in the sense that political parties and their organizations cannot belong to non-profit organizations. There is a difference among the opinions on which organizations belong to political sphere. The new law adopted in 2011 excludes Hungarian political parties from the non-profit sector, but foundations and associations that support them and also participate in election campaigns are considered non-profit organizations.

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RUSSIAN INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST GEORGIA: AFTER THE WAR IN AUGUST 2008: GOALS, NARRATIVES AND ACTORS

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Abstract

The article aims to reveal the main components of Russia's information campaign against Georgia after the end of the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 in the context of the use of "soft power". The article shows the growing influence of the available means and instruments of Russia's "soft power", the main ones being non-governmental organizations and groups that promote the ideas of Eurasianism, hold joint Russian-Georgian events and meetings, and, as a result, promote anti-Western sentiment in Georgia. The main goal of Russia's "soft power" in Georgia is to create a friendly and positive image of Russia and to convince society of the only correct pro-Russian course of Georgia. The main research methods are: system-structural, generalization, historical-genetic, chronological and structural-functional analysis. Chronological framework of the study - 2008-2015. The results of the study can form a theoretical basis for the formation and implementation of various methods of counteracting the information and psychological influence of the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet space.

Key words: *Russian-Georgian War in August 2008, Information Warfare, Post-Soviet Space, "Soft Power", Hybrid War*

INTRODUCTION

Russia's main goal is to dominate in the South Caucasus region and strengthen Russian sphere of influence, which is defined as post-and neo-imperialism. The Russian Federation builds relations with the neighbors, as with the former colonies, without considering them as fully sovereign states. To achieve the goals, Russia uses separatism and irredentist claims in neighboring states to blackmail and, if necessary, to dismember them. Russia uses the concept of a strong state as an instrument of foreign policy towards Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine. After the end of the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, the main tool for achieving Russia's neo-imperial goals in Georgia was the use of Russia's interpretation of Joseph Nye's concept of "soft power", which is largely based on lies and misinformation.

"Soft power" is a set of diplomatic, economic, political, military, legal, cultural instruments of non-violent influence on the situation in foreign countries in the interests of national security of one's own state. It includes international cooperation in various fields (political, military, economic, cultural, etc.); providing free assistance to other countries with attention to certain areas of economic policy; participation in post-conflict (post-crisis) recovery in other countries; the use of information technology to manage large masses of people around the world (in particular, the widespread introduction of social networks); introduction of educational programs and internship programs for representatives of foreign countries, the most promising in professional and social terms, in their country. The forces and means of "soft power" are aimed at attracting other countries to their culture, way of life, political ideals and programs - as opposed to "hard power", which is based on the use of coercive measures of military and economic force to force other actors in international politics to behave. Joseph Nye junior, a professor at the John F. Kennedy Harvard Institute of Public Administration, first formulated these concepts. "Soft power" can be possessed not only by states, but also by other actors in international politics - non-governmental organizations and international institutions [Nye 2004].

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow sought to keep the former Soviet republics under its control within organizations such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), disguising its imperial goals under economic and ideological cooperation. The main task for Russia was to spread an ideology that would be acceptable to the former Soviet republics. Most post-Soviet states saw imperialist goals in Russia's integration activities. Russia created separatism and contributed to its spread in the so-called "near abroad", using threats, blackmail and tools of economic influence (embargo, sanctions). If necessary, the Russian Federation used "hard power" (the use of military and economic force to force other actors in international politics to the desired behavior) against Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.

With the coming to power of V. Putin in the 2000s the Russian Federation demanded that the West create a so-called "new architecture of security" and "indivisible secu-

rity in Europe”, which were supposed to provide recognition of Russia’s special rights in the so-called “privileged” spheres of interest in the post-Soviet space. In 2008, by invading Georgia, Russia showed the West that it would not allow European and Euro-Atlantic structures to unite states that are in the sphere of Russia’s interests. The reaction of the world community to the events in Georgia in August 2008 clearly demonstrated the lack of a clear NATO position and Europe’s strong dependence on Russia’s energy supplies. That is why Moscow has stepped up efforts to create a new Eurasian Economic Union project that could provide the conditions for Russia’s survival as a great power and integrate post-Soviet states under Russian control.

Basic research methods. Thanks to the system-structural method, it was possible to consider the object of study, the Russian information campaign in Georgia, as a generalized phenomenon consisting of elements, each of which has its own specifics and functions, but simultaneously these elements are closely interconnected. The method of generalization became helpful in formulating the conclusions of the study. The historical-genetic method made it possible to consistently reveal the evolution of the creation and activities of key actors of Russian influence in Georgia, their main approaches and narratives. The chronological method allowed us to consider these processes in a chronological order in the postwar period 2008-2015. The structural-functional analysis allowed a comprehensive study of the system of key actors of Russian influence in Georgia and identify the functions performed by each element.

1. GOALS AND NARRATIVES OF RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA

Propaganda is a form of communication aimed at spreading in society the world-view, theory, statements, facts, arguments, rumors and other information to influence public opinion in favor of a particular common cause or public position. For effective influence, propaganda must cover as much space as possible “information reality” - a set of ideas, symbols, ways of understanding the world, which is formed by all streams and sources of information, determines the mass and individual consciousness and behavior. Propaganda is usually repeated and disseminated through various media to shape the chosen outcome of public opinion. In contrast to the objective presentation of information, malicious propaganda selectively presents information in order to encourage certain generalizations or uses the emotional coloring of the message to provoke a sensory rather than rational reaction to what is said. The desired result of propaganda is a change in attitude towards its subject. Propaganda uses the same techniques and techniques like advertising and public relations. In postwar usage, the term “propaganda” more typically refers to the political or nationalist use of these methods or the promotion of a set of ideas, as the term has taken on a negative connotation. Propaganda has much in common with government public information campaigns aimed at encouraging or denying certain forms of behavior. Russian propaganda (Kremlin propaganda) is Russian state information policy, special information events, and a conglomeration of relevant state bodies and institu-

tions that under the guise of “public information” are engaged in the psychological treatment of the population of the Russian Federation and the population of other countries - especially post-Soviet countries and the Russian diaspora. Russian state propaganda is total, cynical, false, uses the basic methods of Soviet propaganda, as well as the experience of other authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Aggressive Russian propaganda has become a well-designed and effective tool in spreading Russian influence both domestically and in the post-Soviet space. Following the events of August 2008, the Russian Federation changed its foreign policy towards Georgia, combining the achievements of the Soviet propaganda machine with a full arsenal of “soft power”.

Distinctive features of Russian propaganda are:

- the idea of the plurality of truths that each story has two sides and the reliability of the sources is insignificant;
- flexibility, the lack of principles and unscrupulousness;
- cynicism
- constant throwing of misinformation into the information space of the media;
- absolute falsehood, inconsistency with reality and the invention of the necessary “facts”-modeling and creation of the so-called “parallel reality”;
- one-moment and situational dissemination of information, and denial of information that has been reported recently;
- creating a “dirty” information field to increase mistrust, fear, panic and apathy.

The main goals of Russian propaganda are declared in the country’s foreign policy and national security documents. Since the early 2000s, the concept of “putinism” has emerged in Russia – it is a common feature of the regime, political mentality, and state ideology. Early “putinism” was based on the need to “restore order” to ensure the civilizational advancement of Russia. The ideological support of early “putinism” was the growing influence of Russia in the club of developed countries, holding major political and cultural events in Russia and so on. Modern “putinism” is based on the need to establish Russia as one of the centers of a “multipolar world” in an effort to revive the political status lost by the Soviet Union. Attempts to revive the Soviet Union, which are carried out both on the ideological front and by overt or covert use of military force, are the ideological support of modern “putinism”.

Discussing Russian propaganda, two important documents need to be identified:

1. Vladimir Putin’s political manifesto “Russia and the changing world”.
2. Program article of the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Valery Gerasimov “The value of science in prediction”, which highlights the main provisions of the new military doctrine of the Russian Federation.

In the article “Russia and the Changing World”, V. Putin describes the Russian version of “soft power”, which differs radically from J. Nye’s definition of “soft power” (as a mechanism for achieving strategic goals by creating an attractive and successful model) [Nye 2004]. Vladimir Putin sees this concept as “a mechanism for achieving

foreign policy goals without the use of force, interference or aggression” and emphasizes the strategic importance of “reintegration” of Russian compatriots living abroad. He examines various global challenges and notes that “the modern world order and stability cannot be imagined without a strong Russia” and outlines the fundamental components of instability - non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are the main sources of separatism and extremism that only destabilize countries (for example “Arab Spring”) [Putin 2012].

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also stressed the importance of Russia’s “soft power”, arguing that “this mechanism is the best tool for promoting Russia’s national interests abroad”. As a result, almost all Russian international foundations or research organizations are beneficiaries of Russian foreign ministry grants [Vojtišková & Novotný 2016: 21].

An important fact was the statement of General Valery Gerasimov that “the political goals of the XXI century can be achieved by non-military and information means”, which became an important aspect of Russia’s “hybrid” war [Meister 2016: 3]. According to V. Gerasimov, “modern Russia will be able to neutralize any threat from the West and “Operation to force Georgia to peace” revealed the lack of unified approaches to the use of Armed Forces outside the Russian Federation” [Gerasimov 2013].

According to the “Gerasimov’s Doctrine”, the main goals of Russian propaganda are:

- defense-avoidance of “color revolutions”/“Arab Spring” and ideological treatment of the local population;
- offensive-influence on Western societies through misinformation and rumors (fabrications) spreading to protect “Russian national interests”;
- severance of relations between the EU and its strategic partners (USA and Canada);
- paralysis of the decision-making process in the EU and NATO structures;
- creation of various myths (legalization of LGBT marriages; migration will lead to mass criminal and sexual violence; the United States is going to start a war and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will be used as shields);
- the spread of various false doctrines (“post-Soviet space is a legitimate zone of Russian influence”);
- discrediting the countries of the Eastern Partnership with the use of the Orthodox Church, public organizations and foundations;
- presentation of Ukraine as an aggressor and a country with a fascist regime;
- promoting the image of indomitable Russia – “no sanctions can harm us” [Meister 2016; Samadashvili 2015].

Gerasimov’s Doctrine” is a continuation of the reflections of one of the main ideologues of Russian propaganda, Igor Panarin. According to him, “nothing has changed since the end of the Cold War and the main task of modern Western policy is the removal of the Russian president and the partition of Russia” [Panarin 2012]. I. Panarin speaks

about the need to use such elements as creating public stereotypes, manipulating people, spreading misinformation and spreading rumors [Darczewska 2014: 15].

The main ideologue of the Russian Federation is Alexander Dugin, according to whom the principles of liberal democracy and liberalism in general directly contradict the “Russian idea” (worldview) [Vojtišková & Novotný 2016]. O. Dugin develops the concept of “Russian world”, based on Russian culture, language, history and Orthodox morality. The concept became the main guideline of the Russian Federation in creating a buffer zone around Russia, which will include protectorates (a form of interstate relations in which one state is under the protection (primarily military) of another state) and dependent states. He predicts the implementation of this political vision in the Eurasian space (in the geopolitical zone stretching from Cairo to Beijing). The consolidation of the post-liberal and neo-conservative Eurasian Union will be based on the idea of anti-Americanism and isolated from “Western tendencies” (LGBT marriages, terrorism, mass migration). O. Dugin criticizes fascism, communism and liberalism as dangerous ideologies for family and religious values [Dugin 2009].

O. Dugin’s political views are very popular in the Kremlin and in the Russian Orthodox Church [Judah 2013]. According to the Moscow Patriarchate, “Vladimir Putin was sent and anointed by God”. A number of clergy supports this narrative. Thus, Russian Orthodox activist Dmitry Tsorionov fully justifies Putin’s policy and considers it God’s will. According to him “Russian President Vladimir Putin has every chance to become God, because Putin can connect with God and receive all his perfections” [Gazeta.ru 2015].

The Russian Orthodox Church plays an important role in promoting the idea of “Russian world”. Patriarch Kirill stated at a meeting with Moldovan clergy that “Holy Russia is not an ethnic, political, linguistic term, but a spiritual term. It is the unity of values, the spiritual orientation that shapes our spiritual unity and stands above any political boundaries”. On November 3, 2009, at the Third Assembly of the Russian World, Patriarch Kirill mentioned the term “Russian World” 38 times, arguing that a united “Russian World” could become a strong actor in global politics, more powerful than any political alliance [Information portal of “Russkiy Mir” foundation 2009]. The issue of religious ideological treatment is very important in Russia. One of the main tools of the new ideological approach is Orthodoxy. This factor is used as a “banner” by which Russia “justifies” its own political and military interventions abroad. The Kremlin is manipulating the use of religious unity in various Orthodox countries. Thanks to the International Foundation for the Unity of Orthodox Christian Nations, Russia funds various forums and conferences aimed at criticizing and demonizing the Western world (as an antagonistic society for the Orthodox Church) [Samadashvili 2015].

Russia’s military-political leadership has made every effort to define Russia’s new identity and its role in a changing world, trying to find an ideological and legal ba-

sis for achieving its imperial goals. The determining factors influencing the modern geopolitical thinking of the Russian leadership were the ideas of “neo-Eurasianism” by O. Dugin and P. Shchedrovitskiy. In particular, P. Shchedrovitskiy is a generator of ideas about the future of Russia and ways of development, which are called the concept of “Russian world”, which should provide Russia with a “proper place” in a globalizing world. This concept was developed in 1993-1997 and today is a kind of model for Russian politicians and propagandists. According to the author of the concept of “Russian world”, large countries in the context of globalization should develop either through colonization or at the expense of diasporas. Russians and “Russian-speaking” people living outside the Russian Federation are the so-called “immune system” of the Russian Federation [Shchedrovitskiy 2006].

The main direction of Russia’s foreign policy is the post-Soviet space, in which, according to the concept of “Russian world”, live as many Russians as inside Russia. The category of Russians also includes bilingual people who, in addition to their native language, also speak Russian. Thus, many ethnic non-Russians also fall into the category of Russians. This concept states that there is a certain socio-cultural reality in the post-Soviet space, the so-called “civilization space”, which is based on three foundations: Orthodoxy, Russian language and culture, common historical memory and views on social development. This is a purely imperial expansionist concept, disguised as a civilizational and cultural project created by Russia to legitimize its actions in the post-Soviet space. Thanks to the skillful propaganda and active work of the Russian media, it can be successfully implemented. The idea of “Russian world” was first voiced in 2007 during President V. Putin’s annual address to the Russian Federal Assembly: “Russian is the language of the historical brotherhood of nations, it is a living space for many millions of people in the Russian-speaking world a community that goes far beyond the Russian Federation borders” [Pkhaladze, 2010b].

The idea of a “divided Russian people as the largest divided people in the world with the right to reunification” was voiced by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his address to the Federal Assembly on March 18, 2014 [President of Russia website 2014]. Commenting on the situation in Crimea on March 7, 2014, the press secretary of the President of the Russian Federation D. Peskov stated that “V. Putin is the main guarantor of the security of the “Russian world” and the area of responsibility of the Russian Federation in terms of national security has increased, its borders are wider than the state borders of the Russian Federation” [Vzglyad 2014].

2. MAIN ACTORS OF RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA

The main actors in the spread of Russian propaganda in the context of the “soft power” concept use are public organizations, foundations, think tanks, research institutions, expert clubs, television, news agencies, the cyber army, and people working in social media. They actively spread fictions (fabrications), which purpose is to create chaos. The most famous actors of Russian propaganda in the world:

- Russian world Foundation, established in 2007 by the Ministries of Education and Foreign Affairs. The annual budget is 5.12 million euros. The main goal is to promote the Russian language and culture. The organization operates dozens of research and educational centers around the world. One of the functions is to select promising young people and prepare them for future activities;
- Rossotrudnichestvo (Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation), founded in 2008 by a decree of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The main goal is to promote Russia's political and economic goals. It operates in 81 countries. The official budget of the organization by 2020 was increased from 40 to 115 million euros;
- Gorchakov Foundation (The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund)-established in 2010 by a decree of President Dmitry Medvedev. The main goal is to support the foreign policy interests of the Russian Federation. Budget - 660 thousand euros. It includes The Primakov Georgian-Russian Public Center founded in 2013;
- Foundation for Supporting and Protecting the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad, established in 2012 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and Rossotrudnichestvo. The main goal is to protect the interests of compatriots living abroad, mainly in the Baltic States. The annual budget is 9.1 million euros;
- World Russian Press Foundation (World Association of Russian Press) established in 2014 by the Government Commission on Compatriots Abroad. The purpose of the organization is to present the Russian position abroad and to form an objective image of Russia [Julukhidze 2018].

The budgets of these foundations, created to promote Russia, are comparable to similar Western foundations (for example, the budget of the British Council was about 210 million euros in 2015, the Goethe Institute about 213 million euros in 2015). However, Russian foundations have private funding through the so-called "hawala system" (a money-laundering scheme, an informal banking network that operates outside the official system and transfers certain amounts of money without physically moving them), so it is impossible to determine their annual budget or income [Samadashvili 2015].

To legitimize foreign policy, the Kremlin uses various think tanks and research institutions:

- Valdai Discussion Club, founded in 2004 by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy of the Russian Federation. The purpose of the organization is to conduct research activities and organize an annual large-scale conference. This forum is attended by well-known figures who make pro-Kremlin statements and assessments;
- Russian International Affairs Council, founded by President Dmitry Medvedev in 2010. The purpose of this research center is to deepen cooperation between Rus-

sian and foreign think tanks. The organization often publishes analytical documents in support of Russian policy;

- Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, founded in 1992. The institute was part of the Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation until 2009, was re-organized and subordinated to the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation. The purpose of the organization is to publish works that support the foreign policy of the Russian Federation;
- Institute of International Relations and Strategic Studies (Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques) is a leading pro-Russian research center in France. The Institute is a beneficiary of grant projects of the Russian World Foundation;
- French Institute of International Relations (Institut Français des Relations Internationales) – a pro-Kremlin think tank in France, a beneficiary of grant projects of the Russian World Foundation;
- Institute of Democracy and Cooperation (Institut de la Démocratie et de la Coopération), founded in Paris in 2008, also had a representative office in New York until 2015. The purpose of the organization is to support and justify Russian foreign policy interventions;
- Dialogue of Civilizations Research Institute (Dialog der Zivilisationen), founded in 2016 in Berlin. Analytical center that publishes pro-Russian research papers. The Institute is a beneficiary of Russian federal grant programs [Samadashvili 2015; Julukhidze 2018].

Television is actively used to spread Russian propaganda, namely the “Russia Today” (RT) channel, which has been operating since 2005. RT is an international multilingual news channel funded by the Russian government (20 billion rubles allocated in 2020). RT is the second most watched news channel in the world (after BBC News) and the first to receive over a billion views on the Internet [Samadashvili 2015]. RT audience is over 700 million viewers. RT broadcasts in over 100 countries. The channel broadcasts around the clock and covers the Russia’s official view on major international events.

News agency and radio “Sputnik” includes websites, mobile application, online broadcasts, radio service and press centers, founded by the international news agency “Russia Today” in 2014. “Sputnik” has regional offices and bureaus in different countries, news sites work around the clock in 30 languages. The Internet audience numbered about 64 million visitors per month in 2019. In addition to news content, “Sputnik” sells photo reports, live broadcasts, infographics and public opinion polls. To suppress and paralyze sources of information, the Russian Federation actively uses the cyber army. The greatest success of the cyber army was achieved during the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, the first large-scale coordinated cyber-attack was carried out, which took place in parallel with and complemented the regular military offensive. Several Georgian servers (Georgian government, financial, business

and media websites) and Internet traffic were seized and relocated under external control [Hollis 2011].

The Russian side has managed to worsen communication between the Georgian government and the public; suspend financial transactions; there was confusion about the development of the situation; the Georgian government's efforts to disseminate information about the Russian invasion were thwarted; the Georgian government was deprived of many sources of information; it became more difficult to inform the outside world about what was happening, reducing the chances of receiving outside help, namely the Georgian government's ability to resist the Russian invasion became impossible. The Russian side also created the "StopGeorgia.ru" website, which provided instructions for ordinary users on how to carry out cyber-attacks against the Georgian side quickly and easily. This has allowed to attract more Russian users to cyber-attacks [Shakarian 2011: 63].

The so-called "troll factory" (Internet Research Agency), founded in 2013 in St. Petersburg (Russia), makes a significant contribution to the spread of Russian propaganda. That is, the Internet system of people who spread misinformation through social media, insult other users for expressing different opinions that do not coincide with the official position of the Russian Federation. The staff numbered about 300 people. According to M. Sidon's research, "on average, a troll posts 50 publications per day. Each of them has 6 Facebook accounts and 10 Twitter accounts, publishes at least 3-5 messages per day and regularly uploads propaganda texts to social networks. An estimate of 33.5 million Russian rubles per month is provided for their maintenance. The main task of network trolls is to write comments to organize fake discussions, which should be joined by real, not anonymous users" [Pomerantsev & Weiss 2015].

Russia also distributes its stories in leading Western publications. The government-paid insert about Russia is published in print and on the websites of "The Telegraph", "Washington Post", "New York Times", "Wall Street Journal" and "International New York Times" in 23 countries in various languages. The insert is edited together with the editors of publications and it is claimed that is this side of Russia, which is missed by Western journalists, denying any propaganda [Pomerantsev & Weiss 2015: 18]. The American public relations agency "Ketchum Inc." is engaged in spreading pro-Russian views in the world through lobbying and political promotion. In 2006-2015, the agency received about \$ 60 million for cooperation with the Russian government. In 2008 alone, Russia spent about \$ 20 million on services provided by PR companies "Ketchum Inc.", "Kreab Gavin Anderson", "GPlus" and "Alston & Bird LLP" to change the political regime in Georgia by inciting internal unrest and destabilization [Civil Georgia 2009].

3. INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST GEORGIA IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD

To achieve its political goals, Russia is actively waging an information and propaganda war against the West, but the main targets for Russia remain the post-Soviet states. Russia seeks to increase its political and economic influence over these target countries and finally establish its monopoly in the South Caucasus. The main means to achieve this is to carry out measures aimed at reducing confidence in democratic values and increasing chaos.

Although Georgia is not a part of the “Russian world”, it has fallen into the category of compatriots and territories that “naturally and geopolitically belong to the Russian-political orbit and must remain under Moscow’s control” [Shchedrovitskiy 2006]. The largest agitational campaign against Georgia took place in 2005-2009, especially during the preparations for the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. The mainstream Russian media spread the following narratives about Georgia:

- Georgia must stay with Russia because of its geographical location, common 200-year history and common Orthodox religion;
- the Georgian and Russian peoples are fraternal peoples, and Georgia’s political leadership is betraying this friendship, going against historical logic and trying to take Georgia out of Russia’s sphere of influence;
- Russia will never let go of Georgia, and joining NATO and the EU will destroy Georgia;
- The West is not a reliable partner, Georgia has illusions about its Western perspective.

After the end of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, Russia focused on the use of “soft power” instruments such as diplomatic activities in its policy towards Georgia; protection of the rights and interests of Russian citizens living abroad; cooperation in the field of culture, education and science; activities of public organizations; impact on the media space; religious factor. In addition to the usual tools of “soft power” (language, cultural influence), Russia uses destructive propaganda and conducts information campaigns against the West. The main narratives are:

- The West is the enemy and wants to destroy Russia;
- The West is in the process of degradation, incapable of further development and immersed in dirt and vice;
- Russia is morally pure and will be able to consolidate around itself all the states that profess the right moral values;
- Western democracy is a myth, in fact the West is divided, and Russia’s activities are legitimate [Rondeli 2014].

After the war in Georgia in 2008, the intensity of Russian propaganda reached its apogee in 2014 during the events in Ukraine. In the information campaign against Ukraine, the Russian Federation used national Russian TV channels that broadcast the following contextual and propaganda narratives:

- there is a Slavic or “Russian world”, and Ukraine is an integral part of it;

- The Great Patriotic War continues, fascism in Ukraine has not yet been defeated, and Stepan Bandera's followers, extreme nationalists and fascists who rule in Kyiv, want to divide one Slavic (Russian) nation and weaken Russia;
- Ukrainian events are provoked by the West and are a conspiracy against Russia;
- Russia's activities are legal, Russia is telling the truth, and the West is lying;
- Eurasianism is the right step towards a better future for Russia, Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries;
- Ukraine is an important part of this Union, and the West and the Ukrainian fascists want to destroy it;
- The West has deviated from God and lost moral values.

At the same time, NGOs, compatriots' organizations, experts, and social media (so-called "troll factories") simultaneously disseminated messages of Russian propaganda on the Internet on a large scale. As the Russian media are fully controlled by the government - the Kremlin holds weekly meetings with media leaders and allocates a special budget for the media [Rondeli 2014].

After the end of the Russian-Georgian war on August 31, 2008, in an interview the then President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev said: "Georgia occupies an important place in the list of privileged interests of the Russian Federation. We have a special historical relationship, friendship and good neighborliness". On September 25, 2008, the then Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin gave the "green light" to exercise "soft power" in Georgia. According to him, "we must develop good relations with the cities of Georgia. We should not leave Georgia to nationalists and irresponsible people". It is worth noting that after the end of hostilities in Georgia, many Russian high-ranking officials also expressed their "warm feelings" towards the Georgian, Abkhazian and Ossetian peoples [Pkhaldze, 2010b].

Russia has successfully tested its propaganda in the context of using "soft power" against Georgia and has managed to dismember it. In post-Soviet societies, there is still a fertile ground for strengthening anti-Western sentiment among various sections of the population through the remnants of the Soviet legacy, the influence of Russian propaganda, and the crucial role of the clergy. Russia's political leadership has a unique vision of world politics - Russia is a victim of a Western conspiracy, especially on the part of the United States; The West is in the process of degradation, and Russia is moving towards a bright future. These statements are calculated for Russia's domestic and post-Soviet "consumption". Russian media, local pro-Russian NGOs and groups claim that European integration is not necessary for the Georgian economy and is dangerous for Georgia's culture, while accusing the Georgian government of not integrating with Russia. To this end, a certain "alternative reality" was created, which seriously affected the public opinion both in Georgia and in the post-Soviet countries. The Soviet experience became the basis for modern Kremlin "brainwashing".

As Russian remains the language of communication for the majority of ethnic minorities (about 20 percent of the population) in Georgia, as well as a tool for communication between different ethnic groups and audiences (Georgian, Azerbaijani, Armenian, Russian) - many young people do not know Russian, but middle-aged and elderly people still speak Russian and use Russian-language media (mainly television) [Rondeli 2014].

In January 2010, the Russian-language First Caucasus Information Channel (PIK TV) began broadcasting in Georgia, which stopped broadcasting in October 2012 with the coming to power of Georgia's new pro-Russian leadership. Newscasts about news from Georgia, Russia and the world accounted for 70% of the channel's programs, broadcasting was around the clock. The idea of creating "PIK TV" belonged to the then President of Georgia Mikhail Saakashvili. The TV channel served as a source of information for the Russian-speaking population of Georgia, and was also used as a means of counter-propaganda. Due to the high quality of TV journalism and its alternative view, the TV channel gained popularity in the post-Soviet space and provoked sharp criticism from the official authorities of the Russian Federation. "PIK TV" was part of the Public Broadcaster of Georgia and was financed from the state budget. The TV channel broadcast documentaries about the crimes of the Bolsheviks and the Sovietization of Georgia, as well as various talk shows hosted by members of the Russian opposition. In June 2011, the channel's website was additionally translated into English [Newsru.com 2010].

In regions of Georgia inhabited mainly by ethnic minorities (Armenians in Samtskhe-Javakheti and Azerbaijanis in Kvemo Kartli), most non-Georgians are insufficiently integrated and involved in Georgian socio-cultural and political life. The main reason is the low level of knowledge of the Georgian language. Earlier, "PIK TV" channel informed the local population about Georgia's domestic policy. With the cessation of broadcasting of the "PIK TV" channel, the information gap was filled by Russian TV channels. Currently Georgian TV channels "Obieqtivi", "Imedi", print and electronic media "Asaval Dasavali", "Saqinform", "Iverioni", "Geworld.ge", "Georgian Times" and the Russian news agency "Sputnik" spread Russian propaganda and anti-Western positions in the context of the "soft power" use. Features in the presentation of information are: dissemination of anti-Western and pro-Russian rhetoric, xenophobic and homophobic statements, emphasis on the restoration of Russian-Georgian friendship and normalization of relations between Russia and Georgia [Rondeli 2014].

Another tool for spreading Russian propaganda in the context of the "soft power" use is the activities of pro-Russian non-governmental organizations in Georgia. They carry out anti-NATO and anti-European activities, promote so-called Eurasianism and organize anti-Western and anti-NATO rallies, together with their Russian counterparts organize meetings of Georgian and Russian youth, invite groups of Georgian youth to Russia and create a friendly and positive image of Russia. The most active pro-Russian NGOs in Georgia are the Eurasian Institute (People's Movement for

Russian-Georgian Dialogue and Cooperation project), Historical Heritage, Russian Lev Gumilev Center, Society for the Scientific Study of Caucasus, Young Political Scientists' Club, Caucasian Cooperation, Global Research Center, People's Orthodox Movement, Eurasian Choice (Patriot TV project), New Leftists-People's Patriotic Movement, Society of Erekle the Second, "Russian World" foundation (Russian language courses for Georgian citizens project), Russian and Georgian People's Unity Foundation, The Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, Russian-Georgian Public Foundation. It is worth noting that most of the NGOs were established after the end of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008 and the official severance of Russian-Georgian diplomatic relations, and are often founded by the same individuals. The activities of pro-Russian NGOs are to organize and conduct seminars-conferences with the participation of Georgian, Russian and other experts in economics, politics, media, culture and arts; as well as protests organization that helps strengthen anti-Western sentiment in Georgia [Dzvelishvili & Kupreishvili 2015].

In 2009, Gulbaat Rtskhiladze and Irakli Vekua founded the Eurasian Institute in Georgia. The main goal of the organization is to help improve Russian-Georgian relations. With the coming to power of pro-Russian political forces in Georgia in 2012, the Eurasian Institute's activities intensified in the direction of restoring friendly relations with Russia. In 2013, the Eurasian Institute founded the Young Political Scientists' Club, whose members are constantly promoting anti-Western discourse, for example, in their speeches stating that the United States and the EU aim to undermine Georgia's national traditions. Since 2014, representatives of the organization have attended various meetings in Russia at the Institute of CIS countries, the Institute for Forecasting and Settlement of Political Conflicts, the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies. In 2013, the Eurasian Institute launched the People's Movement for Russian-Georgian Dialogue and Cooperation project (georus.org), which helped ease tensions in Russian-Georgian relations. In 2015, the Eurasian Institute launched the initiative "Why May 9 is Georgia's Victory Day", which involved students and veterans of World War II in order to objectively cover information about these events. The organization's partners are Georgian publications: "Geworld.ge", "Saqinform", "Iverioni", Russian Lev Gumilev Center, which disseminates the ideas of "neo-Eurasianism", and the Society for the Scientific Study of Caucasus, established in October 2010 at a conference in Abkhazia and registered in Russia, which specialized on the study of the Caucasus and aimed at cooperation with Russia [Nauchnoe obshestvo kavkazovedov 2010].

In 2009, Tariel Gagnidze founded the non-governmental organization Historical Heritage in Tbilisi. A statement issued during the founding process said: "As information about Russia and Georgia is falsified, the organization will help the younger generation learn about their country's true past. To this end, it will publish state historical acts, modern memoirs, biographical materials, etc." In 2013, the Historical Heritage published a book in Georgian "Unknown Putin", which, according to T. Gagnidze, col-

lected materials that objectively reflect the policy of Russia as a state and the personality of Russia's President as the main leader of this policy [Neizvestnyj Putin 2013]. "Geworld.ge" (Georgia and the World) has been published since 2009, with Irakli Todua as its editor-in-chief. The publication has a trilingual (Russian, Georgian, English) website, which is updated daily. "Geworld.ge" actively covers the activities of the Eurasian Institute members, invites them to comment on various topics and disseminates their views, often homophobic and xenophobic. In 2010, the news agency "Saqinform" was founded, with Arno Khidirbegashvili as editor-in-chief and owner. The agency's materials are dominated by anti-Western sentiments, it cooperates with the Georgian media union "Obieqtivi", established in 2010, and the Russian news agency "Rex" (www.iarex.ru). In 2012, Zaur Nachkebia founded "Iverioni", which also publishes pro-Russian materials [Dzvelishvili & Kupreishvili 2015].

In 2011, Gulbaat Rtskhladze and Nana Devdariani founded the Caucasian Cooperation. There is an organization of the same name in Moscow with which the Georgian organization works closely. The purpose of the Caucasian Cooperation is to restore Georgian-Russian scientific ties. The organization has held conferences, including "The Great Victory Achieved by Unity: The Caucasus during the Great Patriotic War" and "Demographic Problems Existing in Georgia" and runs a Russian-language website "Russia-Georgia: Expert Dialogue" (georgiamonitor.ge). In February 2013, during a visit to North Ossetia, a representative of Shota Apkhaidze stated that "in 2008, M. Saakashvili committed genocide against the Ossetian people" [Tarhanova 2013].

Nana Devdariani is also a co-founder of the Center for Global Studies, the People's Orthodox Movement and the People's Legal Foundation. In 2013, Irakli Ubilava founded the Global Research Center, which is a partner of "Geworld.ge". The purpose of the Global Research Center is to "promote expert dialogue in Georgia and abroad". The organization has held a number of conferences and seminars on the negative impact of NATO in Georgia, as well as published studies based on the views or analysis of members of the Eurasian Institute. For example, "NATO Myths and Reality", where the Alliance is portrayed in a negative context. It has been argued that the West needs Georgia's membership only to meet its own interests, meaning providing "cheap" soldiers to carry out various NATO operations [Dzvelishvili & Kupreishvili 2015].

In 2010, the People's Orthodox Movement was founded in collaboration with "The Georgian Times". According to the organization's charter, its purpose is to promote state-building based on Orthodox values, preserve Georgian identity, develop and support traditional Christian lifestyles, promote the idea of monarchy as a form of government in Georgia and implement joint projects with the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church [Dzvelishvili & Kupreishvili 2015].

In May 2013, Archil Chkoidze, Maia Khinchagashvili and Boris Manzhukov founded the Eurasian Choice, which aims to implement cultural, educational, scientific and social projects, holding events for children and youth in the Eurasian space. The Eurasian Choice is engaged in charitable activities, publishing museum and educa-

tional materials, translation of foreign literature. The organization's co-founder Archil Chkoidze often appears in the Russian media as an active supporter of Georgia's pro-Russian foreign policy, promotes the ideas of "neo-Eurasianism" by O. Dugin and states that "it was the West that occupied Georgia". In 2010, the Eurasian Choice created the New Leftists-People's Patriotic Movement, which also spread anti-Western sentiments [Eho Kavkaza 2015].

In 2009, the Society of Erekle the Second was established, headed by Archil Chkoidze. The scope of activities of the organization includes the promotion of Russian culture and art in Georgia and vice versa - the promotion of Georgian culture and art in Russia; closer integration of the Russian-speaking population of Georgia into Georgian society and assistance to them in learning the state language; promoting the protection of the rights of the Russian-speaking population of Georgia; development of Georgian-Russian dialogue at the public level; promoting the beginning and development of political dialogue between the authorities of Georgia and Russia [Kavkazskij Uzel 2009]. The organization initiated Russian language courses in Georgia, funded by the "Russian World" foundation established in Russia [Information portal of «Russkiy mir» foundation 2013], and repeatedly organized rallies demanding the restoration of diplomatic relations with Russia and a referendum to determine the country's foreign policy. The partner of the Society of Erekle the Second is Russian and Georgian People's Unity Foundation, whose website published information about relations between Russia and Georgia. In 2015, the Eurasian Choice and the Society of Erekle the Second founded Patriot TV project (a television based on authentic Georgian traditions useful to the future generation of the country, based on Georgian ethical ideas) to spread pro-Russian sentiment [Dzvelishvili & Kupreishvili 2015].

In 2010, the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund was founded. The organization's official website states that "international events in recent decades have shown that "soft power" policies - the ability of the state and society to influence the international space through their cultural, historical and political values - have not lost their significance and importance". The creation of the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund was the first and unique for modern Russia mechanism of state-public partnership in the field of foreign policy, which will intensify the international activities of Russian non-governmental organizations and other civil society institutions. The main task of the Fund is the successful formation of a worthy socio-political and business image of Russia in the world. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Foundation Serhiy Lavrov, "over ten years of the Foundation's work it has achieved significant progress in supporting public diplomacy, doing much to expand international contacts of domestic nonprofits. More than 300 grant projects were supported, more than 500 events were held". Leonid Drachevsky became the Executive Director and Chairman of the Board of the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund [Fond Gorchakova 2010]. With the assistance of the Gorchakov Foundation, in

July 2013, the Georgian-Russian Public Center named after E.M. Primakov, headed by Dmitry Lortkipanidze. The Georgian-Russian Public Center organizes and holds meetings of Russian and Georgian experts and public representatives, conducts free Russian language courses, actively cooperates with Tbilisi universities and promotes the involvement of students in major international projects involving the two countries [Fond Gorchakova 2013].

The Georgian non-governmental organization Caucasian House is also actively cooperating with the Alexander Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund and various conferences have been held jointly between Russian and Georgian youth. The meetings took place within the framework of the Russian-Georgian Dialogue for Peace and Cooperation project, which was implemented with the support of the United Kingdom. Unlike other non-governmental organizations, the Caucasian House does not spread anti-Western sentiments [The Centre for cultural relations Caucasian House 2015].

In November 2014, the Russian media corporation “Sputnik Georgia” began broadcasting in Georgia. Initially, the programs were broadcast on FM 101.4, which belonged to Radio Monte Carlo. This fact caused public outrage - the non-governmental organization “Institute for the Development of Freedom of Information” demanded the publication of documents and further clarification, and the National Communications Commission of Georgia initiated proceedings. A study of the case showed that content in Georgian for “Sputnik Georgia” was prepared by the “Newsgeorgia” news agency. Sanctions were later imposed on both organizations, and broadcasting was stopped. In 2015, Tato Lashishvili, editor-in-chief of “Svobodnaya Gruzia”, registered “Sputnik Georgia”, a limited liability company that is a partner of “Obieqtivi” and “The Georgian Times”. Currently, “Sputnik Georgia” maintains a website and broadcasts radio programs [Dzvelishvili & Kupreishvili 2015].

The Russian media space has also spread to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to the Decree of the President of Abkhazia Serhiy Bagapsh of November 20, 2009, made free broadcasting of 7 Russian TV channels: “First Channel”, “NTV”, “TV Center”, “REN TV”, “Culture”, “Petersburg’s 5 Channel”, “New Television of Kuban”. The information space of South Ossetia has also been completely occupied by the Russian media. According to Georgian law, media distribution must be licensed, which is why the Georgian National Communications Commission fined “NTV”, “TV Center”, “Russia” and “Kultura” channels in 2009 for unauthorized broadcasting in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and demanded the cessation of unauthorized broadcasting, but the commission’s decision was not complied with. Russian websites and social networks are widespread in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. For example, since February 2009, Odnoklassniki.ru has allowed users from Abkhazia and South Ossetia to register as residents of separate countries, and the Yandex-Map server has changed the Abkhazian and South Ossetian borders with a separate line separating them from Georgia [Tsatsanashvili 2010].

There are other non-governmental organizations in Georgia whose goals are to promote Russian culture and develop Russian cultural centers in Georgia. The International Cultural and Educational Union “Russian Club” has been operating in Tbilisi since 2003, the president of which is the head of the Tbilisi State Academic Russian Drama Theater named after A.S. Griboyedov Nikolai Sventitsky. The union publishes a monthly socio-cultural magazine “Russian Club”. Public associations “Raduga”, cultural, charitable and scientific-educational union of the Russian community in Georgia, the Russian Cultural Center “Iskra”, the Association of Russian-speaking journalists of Georgia, the Russian Cultural Center “Zhemchuzhina”, the Union of Russian Women of Georgia “Yaroslavna” are also engaged in cultural projects in Georgia - they organize meetings, round tables in various fields of culture, literary evenings, performances and other events [Pkhaldze & Devdariani 2010].

Another successful environment for Russia’s “soft power” use was Georgia’s cyberspace. In April 2009, a powerful cyber-attack was carried out against Georgian websites, blocking the websites of the court and the media. The technology used is publicly available commercial software used by computer network administrators. Hackers have modified the software to suit their destructive intentions. They have stepped up a number of so-called stress tests, which are commonly used to estimate the size of servers to handle http-packet waves. Another program was also changed - software-damaged websites were sent to randomly selected, non-existent addresses. For example, during the attack on the website of the Office of the Patriarch of Georgia, the English version of the website showed a phrase that caused outrage in the Azerbaijani media. For several days, Azerbaijani and Georgian spiritual leaders and journalists have condemned the fact as a deliberate act of incitement to hatred, thus preventing the conflict. The cyber-attack on the website of the Office of the Patriarch of Georgia was carried out from Belgium. E-mails registered in the Georgian.ge domain have also been blocked during this period [Tsatsanashvili 2010].

Russia is actively using the religious factor as an instrument of “soft power” in Georgia. About 80% of the population are followers of the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which has a high level of trust in society. After the end of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church remained good. Both Churches cooperated in providing assistance to the civilian population, Georgian Catholicos-Patriarch Ilya II visited the conflict zone with a pastoral visit, brought humanitarian aid, although the territory was occupied by Russian troops. After the end of hostilities contrary to the Kremlin’s policy, the Russian Orthodox Church refused to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church has adopted a resolution officially recognizing the jurisdiction of the Georgian Orthodox Church over the Abkhazian and South Ossetian dioceses. But in September 2009, the Abkhaz Orthodox Church declared its independence from the Georgian Orthodox Church. The Georgian Orthodox Church

has become an instrument for Russia to put pressure on the Georgian community and promote its narratives - as a result, Georgian clergy have openly linked the EU to destroying values, undermining Georgia's national traditions and spiritual mission, and spreading anti-Western sentiment [Kakachiya 2014].

After the end of the war in 2008, Russia focused on using the cultural factor in the context of "soft power", trying to create the image of a friend and win the sympathy of the Georgian people. Old Soviet ideas, clichés and stereotypes were used for this purpose. The main emphasis is on the common Soviet past, the status of the Russian Federation as the successor to the Soviet Union and the common "Russian space", as well as the works of joint Soviet cinema. Mass events with the participation of Russian cultural figures were held in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. An Agreement on Cooperation between the Ministries of Culture of the Russian Federation and Abkhazia was signed on November 11, 2009, and on July 6, 2010 between the Ministries of Culture of the Russian Federation and South Ossetia, which provided for cooperation programs in the field of culture. Since 2010, St. George's Ribbon action has been held with the participation of students from Abkhazian schools to celebrate Victory Day in World War II. In November 2009, Abkhazia began the process of switching to Russian phone codes +7,940 for mobile communications and +7,840 for landlines, and in January 2010 it completely switched to the Russian telephone code system. In South Ossetia there were round tables "Russia's role in restoring Ossetia's statehood", "Russia and South Ossetia in the 21st century", "Ossetians in the Russian army", "I am a citizen of Russia" campaign as part of the celebration of Russia Day, the Russian House was also opened [Bachiashvili 2010].

Education and science are also used as tools of Russia's "soft power" in Georgia. The educational process in Georgia, except for the occupied territories, is carried out in accordance with the curricula and manuals approved by the Ministry of Education of Georgia. Teaching in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is carried out in Russian according to curricula and manuals approved by the Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation, which are fully consistent with Russian ideology. Very little attention is paid to the Abkhazian and Ossetian languages, the level of their study is reduced to the level of an optional subject. The same applies to the study of the Georgian language in places with a predominant Georgian population, for example, in the Akhagori district of South Ossetia, Georgian language and literature were removed from the curriculum in 2010, and in the Gali district of Abkhazia education in the Georgian language is banned. After graduating from secondary schools, young people from the occupied regions are given the opportunity to receive higher education in higher educational institutions of the Russian Federation at the annual quota. In parallel, the Russian Federation is holding a number of events with the participation of public figures from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Representatives of Russian scientific circles often visit Abkhazia to hold joint conferences and develop projects. For example, in 2010 on basis of the Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology established

a joint Russian-Abkhazian enterprise “ERA-SFTI” for the high-tech production of polycrystalline silicon panels, which are necessary for environmentally friendly electricity production [Bachiashvili 2010].

The Russian side as an instrument of «soft power» used the granting of Russian citizenship to the people of Abkhazia and South Ossetia even after the end of the war. On August 26, 2008, then Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev signed a decree recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and on September 9, 2008, diplomatic relations were officially established between Russia and the Republic of Abkhazia, Russia and the Republic of South Ossetia. In April 2009, the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of South Ossetia and the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Abkhazia began their work. In January 2009, the Embassy of the Republic of South Ossetia in Russia opened, and on May 17, 2010, the Embassy of the Republic of Abkhazia was officially opened in Russia. On February 1, 2010, an agreement on visa-free travel was signed between the Russian Federation and the Republic of South Ossetia and the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia. On June 11, 2009, the online publication “Ossetian Radio” reported that “the temporary consular post of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in South Ossetia is accepting documents for the issuance of Russian foreign passports”. Extreme pressure and coercion were reported in the Gali district of Abkhazia and the Akhagori district of South Ossetia, where the population was forced to obtain passports from Abkhazia and South Ossetia along with Russian passports. As the socio-economic situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia was extremely critical and the local population suffered from mass unemployment, the acquisition of Russian citizenship provided visa-free travel between Russia and the occupied territories and appointment pensions and allowances for Russian citizens [Pkhaladze 2010a].

As a tool of “soft power”, Russia has used diplomacy to increase its influence in the region. Thanks to Russian diplomatic efforts, the international OSCE Mission to Georgia and the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia were shut down in 2009. A plan for resolving the military conflict in Georgia was signed on August 12, 2008 in Moscow during a meeting between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and French President Nicolas Sarkozy (so-called Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan). On August 14, the Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan was signed by the leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, on August 15 by Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, and on August 16 by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. The Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan included six points: 1) not to use force; 2) finally cease all hostilities; 3) ensure free access to humanitarian aid; 4) the Georgian Armed Forces must return to their places of permanent deployment; 5) the armed forces of the Russian Federation must be withdrawn to the line preceding the start of hostilities; 6) international guarantees for stability and security in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Subsequently, after consultations with M. Saakashvili, the thesis on the international discussion of the status of South Ossetia and

Abkhazia, which was previously included in the sixth point of the Plan, was rejected. The initial text of the sixth paragraph was as follows: “the beginning of an international discussion on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia”. Following the signing of the document, accusations were made of violating Russia’s compliance with the terms of the Plan in accordance with the fifth paragraph, as Russian military units remained in South Ossetia. Russia has stated that Georgia has not complied with the terms of this agreement. On September 8, 2008, three additional items were added to the Plan: 1) concerning the procedure for withdrawing the armed forces of the parties to the line preceding the start of hostilities; 2) considered the continuation of the UN and OSCE international missions and the deployment of a new EU observation mission of 200 observers by 1 October 2008; 3) announced the beginning of international discussions on the situation on October 15, 2008. On September 9, the amended Plan was signed by Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, and on October 1, 2008 an unarmed civilian European Union Monitoring Mission began monitoring the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from the territories adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although the Mission’s mandate extended throughout Georgia, the de facto authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia denied observers access to the territories under their control. The EU Monitoring Mission also stated that Russia did not comply with the fifth point of the Agreement, as Russian military units and equipment continued to remain in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On 13 February 2009, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution welcoming the six-point agreement of 12 August 2008 and the follow-up to its implementation of 8 September 2008 [EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia 2008].

The OSCE Observer Mission has been working in Georgia since 1992, with the main goal of promoting a peaceful solution to the conflict in South Ossetia. Following the end of the 2008 war and the Russian Federation’s recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Russia demanded conditions for the extension of the Mission’s mandate, which ended on 1 January 2009 - the Mission will continue its activities only if the OSCE also recognizes the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. According to the Russian version, an OSCE Mission to South Ossetia should be opened alongside the OSCE Mission to Georgia. The Russian side called South Ossetia a “host country” and introduced the concept of a “border between Georgia and South Ossetia”. It was also envisaged that the OSCE Mission to South Ossetia should take all measures in coordination with the host country and maintain contacts with the Russian military contingent, which, if implemented, would legitimize the Russian military presence in South Ossetia in accordance with OSCE provisions. In order to legalize the de facto activities of the South Ossetian authorities, the following version was devised: The OSCE Mission should assist the South Ossetian authorities in resolving interethnic relations. In addition, it was the South Ossetian authorities, not the OSCE, that were to select the staff of the OSCE Mission and limit the number of support staff recruited on the ground. It was envisaged to conclude a separate

agreement on the details of the organizational position of the Mission between the OSCE and the de facto authorities of South Ossetia. Every six months, the mandate of the OSCE Mission to South Ossetia was expected to be extended with the consent of the host country, which would create additional leverage for Russia's influence on the Mission's activities. It was also planned to establish a similar OSCE Mission to Abkhazia. As this version proved unacceptable, the OSCE began work on a draft Mission with a Neutral Status, which provided for the presence of twenty-two observers from the Georgian side and eight observers from the South Ossetian side with the right to cross administrative borders. However, Russia did not agree to such conditions – Russia's representative to the OSCE Anwar Azimov said: "If the OSCE Mission issues are not resolved by June 30, 2009, Russia will terminate the OSCE presence in Georgia as a whole". Thus, on June 30, 2009, the OSCE Mission to Georgia ceased its activities [Sharashenidze 2010a].

The United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia has been operating since 1993, with the main aim of verifying the implementation of the July 27, 1993 ceasefire agreement between the Georgian government and the de facto Abkhazian authorities, with a special focus on the situation in the city of Sukhumi, as well as to investigate allegations of ceasefire violations and efforts to resolve similar incidents with those involved. During the 2008 war, the UN Monitoring Mission in Georgia was based in the Upper Kodori Gorge, the Zugdidi and Gali sectors, and had 136 military observers, with 18 UN police and 311 civilian personnel on the ground. After the end of the war, the UN Secretary-General proposed a neutral name - the United Nations Stabilization Mission - did not mention Abkhazia or South Ossetia as part of Georgia in either the title or the text of the report. This provoked a reaction from Georgia, which did not agree with the de facto recognition of Abkhazia, the Russian side demanded the use of the terms "Republic of Abkhazia" and "borders of Abkhazia". Due to disagreements between members of the UN Security Council on the extension of the mandate, the UN Monitoring Mission in Georgia was suspended on June 15, 2009 [Volski 2010].

As the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has become one of the important forums for discussing the consequences of the Russian-Georgian war, Russia has tried to use "soft power" to actively defend its point of view, discredit the Georgian side, and avoid criticism and unacceptable resolutions. The main directions of Russia's activity were appellate to the norms of international law and were based on the Russian interpretation of historical or modern realities: 1) Georgia has no historical rights to South Ossetia, it was annexed to Georgia by J. Stalin, and Ossetians do not want to be part of Georgia; 2) Russia is the only patron and protector of the Ossetian people - a small and oppressed nation affected by M. Saakashvili's regime, and Russia's military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is explained only by the will of the local population; 3) Russia did not violate international law, as there is a principle of self-determination of nations; 4) Russia has used the precedent of Kosovo's declaration of independence, calling for a new world order and a new security archi-

tecture in Europe, as the old system is a relic and has proved ineffective; 5) Russia plays a secondary role in this situation and is not responsible for it, as there was no military conflict between Russia and Georgia - there was a conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia, which began with Georgia's attack on South Ossetia, Russia acted only as a mediator, because Abkhazia and South Ossetia had their own governing bodies; 6) Russia considers the Georgian people as fraternal, which turned away from Russia, receives military assistance from the United States, Russia in Georgia was in the status of a peacekeeper, whose efforts were not appreciated; 7) Mikhail Saakashvili started the war to hide internal problems - there is no democracy in Georgia, and the majority of the population is dissatisfied with the government; 8) Georgia must sign a non-force use agreement. Although the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in its resolutions urged Russia to revoke the recognition of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, to provide access to EU and OSCE monitoring missions to these territories, together with the de facto governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to promote the movement of Georgian citizens in these territories, condemned the granting of Russian citizenship to the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and ethnic cleansing of Georgians in these regions - Russia did not meet any of these requirements, calling them politicized [Sharashenidze 2010b].

International negotiations on security in Abkhazia and South Ossetia between Georgia, Russia and the United States began in Geneva on 15 October 2008 with the mediation of the EU, the UN and the OSCE. Russia tried to make Abkhazia and South Ossetia official participants in the talks, but Georgia did not agree. In the format of the Geneva talks, two working groups were formed: one on incident prevention and response mechanisms, and the other on issues of internally displaced persons and refugees. Between October 2008 and July 2010, twelve rounds of talks were held. At various stages, Russia has traditionally raised the issue of arms supplies to Georgia and criticized Western governments for supplying weapons to Georgia. Russia's main diplomatic goal in these talks was to lobby for Georgia to sign a non-use agreement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Although the Georgian side stated that a similar agreement (the so-called Medvedev-Sarkozy Plan) had already been signed on August 12, 2008, Russia has always referred to "new realities", arguing that units of the Russian armed forces remain on the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the basis of agreements concluded with the "two governments". The Georgian side refused to make unilateral commitments and sign an agreement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia as separate parties, insisting on the existence of an already signed agreement between Russia and Georgia. In turn, the Russian side also refused to sign the agreement and did not recognize itself as a party to the conflict. As a sign of no progress in the talks, the Abkhaz side boycotted further meetings, accusing Western mediators of supporting Georgia. Thus, the Geneva talks did not bring the desired success in resolving the post-war situation in the region and were suspended due to Russian efforts [Pkhaldze & Sharashenidze 2010].

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Thus, it can be concluded that after the end of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, the Russian Federation made every effort to use “soft power” on diplomatic, cultural, religious and educational fronts to increase its influence in the isolated regions of Georgia.

Today, Russia is successfully using all available means and tools of “soft power” in Georgia. The lack of diplomatic relations between Russia and Georgia to some extent limits the possibilities of Russia’s anti-Western activities in Georgia. NGOs and groups promoting Eurasianism, organizing anti-Western and anti-NATO rallies, promoting rapprochement with the Russian Federation, holding joint Russian-Georgian meetings and events, organizing trips of Georgian youth to Russia, etc. are the main actors in spreading Russian propaganda in Georgia. The main goal is to create a friendly and positive image of Russia and convince Georgians of the only correct pro-Russian course of Georgia.

There are four media audiences in Georgia: Georgian, Russian-speaking, Azerbaijani and Armenian. The Abkhaz and Ossetian audiences in the two separate regions also need special attention due to the growing pro-Russian influence. There is currently no national TV channel or daily newspaper in Russian in Georgia. About 20% of Georgia’s population are ethnic minorities, for whom Russian remains the language of communication. Although television is the leading media as the most influential tool for manipulating public opinion, the print media, which partially occupy the Internet, still play a role and influence. That is why ethnic minorities remain the main consumers of information of Russian media (mainly television) and are the most vulnerable audience for the spread of Russian propaganda.

It is worth noting that the democratic media in Georgia pay more attention to domestic political processes and do not consider countering Russian influence to be an urgent and necessary task. That is why the Georgian government needs to pay more attention to neutralizing lies and misinformation coming from Russia, and to develop and organize effective measures to counter the spread of anti-Western sentiment in Georgia. It is also necessary to create a center for counteracting Russian propaganda, which will provide adequate information to all citizens and media, and will positively contribute to the establishment of interethnic relations.

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PROPAGANDA AND JOURNALISM (IN THE CONTEXT ON THE SECOND KARABATH WAR)

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Abstract

Propaganda has always existed; it only changed its forms. In the early days of media it first flooded the pages of popular periodicals and later when the media improved and clearly outlined their boundaries on the basis of international standards it became in opposition to journalism and was legally circulated without obstacles exclusively in party and religious media. Therefore it is regarded in journalism as a negative manifestation of fake creativity and gross evidence of information imbalance. However, has this ambivalent phenomenon really disappeared “law abidingly” from leading mass media and consequently what effect has it had on public consciousness and national security of states which are in zones of military confrontation? We are answering the above mentioned and similar questions in the article through the example of the analysis of key mass media in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia and Ukraine. Mediation of the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh was purposefully chosen as the objective of scientific receptions but not the war in eastern Ukraine as it could be reasonable to expect with the aim to abstract ourselves from personal views and experiences and check objectively if there is any propaganda and how it works in the coverage of global military conflicts that directly or indirectly affect certain states. It was equally important to investigate whether the implementation of information standards contributes to settlement of intra-state and international confrontations. It has been found out that compliance with media norms is in inverse proportion to national interests. Finding a way out of these clear-cut situations opens up prospects for new research

Key Words: *Nagorno Karabakh, Propaganda, Ideology, Media, Armed Conflict, State, Information War*

INTRODUCTION

Since the term “propaganda” was used for the first time in the official documents dated back to the middle of the sixteenth century (Pontifical missionary congregation “The Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith” or simply “The Propaganda Fide” was founded in 1622 [Skulenko M. 2009]), religious and secular authorities often use verification, manipulation, falsification, pamphlets etc. to form and strengthen canons, to shape opinions and fight against “heresies”. For a long time this art has been improved and today has risen to a level of excellence, using the methods of scientific modelling and analysis.

However, in Ukraine the outlined activity continues to be a set of dogmas as the trends of the past are still affecting it. Meanwhile, in Europe and the USA it is not only divided into the following segments such as propaganda itself, public relations and advertising but it is also classified by “shades”: white (official and open to verify), grey (with fraud, faked expert examinations, suggestiveness) and black (completely deceptive and pretentious). The academic “Large Explanatory Dictionary of the Modern Ukrainian Language” gives the following definition: “propaganda is propagation and constant, deep and detailed explanation of any ideas, views, and knowledge” [Busel V. 2005] (the lexical item “explanation” here should apparently be replaced by “intrusion”). In fact, propaganda is the ageless art of manipulation through psychology, minds and instincts of individuals and the masses.

Similar to ideology, propaganda is not considered as factual real information, because, no matter how it emerged: artificially or spontaneously, it is still not meant to be checked and does not require any verification (on the contrary, fact checking deprives it of any meaning) and does not explain the word in scientific terms. It is biased, unfair, simplistic and pseudo realistic and does not imply abilities of rational thinking. However, it is mainly related to strategies of its perception and in fact, the capabilities of recipients. As for the creators of propaganda, they create and design a highly anticipated multifunctional product made according to the transmission model of communication [Kosiuk O. 2012: 84–86].

The toolkit and methods of propaganda are particularly relevant not only in religious, political, economic and other cultural spheres but in the area of mass communication. It is here that they traditionally form the most sophisticated possibilities to influence the public consciousness, although most often contrary to the current legislation and modern media standards [Zakon Ukrainy Pro informaciju, Article 28 2021]. Information wars can be extremely “bloody” [Pocheptsov G. 2006: 556–559].

Besides, in contrast to sensual propaganda, information warfare as its integral part is quite rational. Communication strategies, in fact, arose as transformations of the military sphere and have always been aimed to have a parallel impact on speedy solutions to armed conflicts: crusading wars, revolutions, wars etc. During the time when sermons, historical folklore, biographies and other forms were modified into newspaper publications media strategies have also changed [Kosiuk O. 2012: 51–71]: propa-

ganda increasingly involves performance, psychology and tries to minimize straight impositions and avoids identification markers. However, Joseph Goebbels's main rule "A lie repeated a thousand times becomes truth" [Bohatko J. 2006] is still relevant today: when a thousand of media write as if someone was flayed alive or someone was killing babies, the vast majority of population will believe it at least for a while.

Propaganda is closely connected not only with ideologies of societies that have an active communication according to the appropriate models such as authoritarian, libertarian, socially responsible, communist-fascist etc. [Siebert F. 1984], but also with global intercontinental processes. According to experts, "Peace of Westphalia, the epoch of world wars, Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (signed at Montevideo), decolonization, Helsinki Act and globalization" significantly affected international relations and propaganda strategies. However, "territorial integrity and sovereignty are often challenged". "Internal competitors of the states are groups that consider themselves as excluded from political communication and claim their own statehood and international recognition" [Minakov M. 2019: 4].

According to M. Minakov, "the collapse of the USSR led to the emergence of fifteen recognized states and four unrecognized polities such as Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Dnisterian Moldovan Republic". "These political entities have their own particular type of legitimacy and their own political economy that is system dependent on the sponsoring states (Russia and Armenia)". These "de facto polities have become a source of secession practices and ideologies extending far beyond their region" [Minakov M. 2019: 5].

To maintain objectivity in this research, we consciously take the problem of modern propaganda strategies of the mass media beyond the national military problems and, in general, beyond the information space of Ukraine to the territory of Transcaucasia because it is the latest, painful and current story that, in our opinion, is directly related not only to Armenia and Azerbaijan but to Russia, Turkey, our country, in general to the USA and Europe, West and East. It means that we assume that the armed conflict in Nagorno Karabakh is suitable to show the latest propaganda methods in the global information space and to witness the presence of unexpected contextual manipulations not only in opposition Armenia vs. Azerbaijan, but also in oppositions Azerbaijan vs. Russia, Armenia vs. the USA, Ukraine vs. Russia, etc.

We agree with the statement of media expert Roman Horbyk that the combination of historical knowledge and numerous media platforms for its sharing opens up "an era in mediation of history which made the memory archive more network-based and more hybridized". However, we are going to check carefully whether it really leads to vulgarized, simplified multimodal narratives [Horbyk R. 2019: 129].

We also share Svitlana Chumikhina's ideas that while studying the media special attention should be paid to processes and events that "take place in real time and are of great importance for social development and well-being, but for some reason they turn out to be pushed out to the periphery of the collective consciousness". In this

case, politics is really “aimed at preventing the pathological processes of otherization and can be considered as a metaphor or a certain analogue of collective psychotherapy” [Chunikhina S. 2020: 317].

Doing the research by applying content analysis, comparison between fixed propaganda and modeling of its possible interpretations etc. we will try to examine the most top-rated independent media of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Ukraine and Russia consistently and identify their level of freedom of speech and compliance with journalistic standards amid production and dissemination of information about war in Nagorno Karabakh.

1. PROPAGANDA IN THE AZERBAIJANI MEDIA

In Azerbaijan the situation with independent mass media is dramatic; this fact is attested by 168th place (out of 180) in the international rating of freedom of speech [Gumanitarnyj portal 2021]. However, for us this info space is a very appropriate study object, because, as a rule, the less journalism there is, the more propaganda they have.

Almost all mass media in Azerbaijan are financed by the state. Consequently, there is no strong opposition or free-will voting (it is out of question). Dissenters are still able somehow to make public and post via social media, but their opinion does not get into traditional media: any discussions are even technically impossible and comments are shut down.

In the national information space the following agencies are mainly operating such as “Vesti”, “Day”, “Interfax-Azerbaijan”, “ECHO”, “Aze”, “Minval”, “Zerkalo”, “Sputnik”, “Sputnik Azerbaijan”, “Trend”, “Turan”, “1news”, “Oxu”, “Report” etc. They are those that provide services to other means of communication and control and dose ideological influence.

The national agency Azer Tag [Azer Tag 2021] as the mainstream media provides its services in the national language, Russian, English, German, French, Spanish, Arabic and Chinese and offers a wide range of information. It has its branch offices in 21 countries of the world. Along with the established sections on health, politics, economy, regions, world, culture, education, sports the agency offers some unconventional ones, for example, “Blood Memory” [Pamjat’ krovi 2021], which contains stories without authorship but with the possibility of a covert discussion at the link below. The section is rarely updated; the last publication “Montenegro media outlet published an article on the anniversary of the Azerbaijanis’ genocide” was on April 1, 2021 [Montenegrinskoe izdanje opublikovalo...2021]. It is about the 103rd anniversary of “indiscriminate killings” of Azerbaijanis who died during the military operation, committed by the Armenian terrorist party Dashnaksutyun, in particular, it is emphasized that “the genocide of the Azerbaijani people committed by armed Dashnaks and their followers claimed the lives of tens of thousands of civilians whose only guilt was their ethnic and religious origin. Murders and bashing were committed not only against

Azerbaijanis but also against other peoples. Muslim houses were engulfed in flames in Baku, Shamakhi, Quba, Khachmaz, Lankaran, Hajigabul, Salyan, Kurdamir. All that then continued in Karabakh, Sangezur, Nakhchivan, Geiche and other regions” [Montenegrinskoe izdanie opublikovalo...2021].

In general, the original project “Blood Memory” contains data not only about the modern “self-proclaimed” Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, but also about more long-standing Khojaly genocide in 1992 [Kryvavi storinky istoriji 2021] and other debatable issues. However, the ambivalent crusher effectively overlaps with the president’s quotations, addresses to the nation, official records and is used exclusively in the interests of the head of state and the ruling elite. The above mentioned publication “Montenegro media outlet published an article on the anniversary of the Azerbaijanis’ genocide” also ends with the words: “By the Decree of the President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev from March 26, 1998 “On the genocide of Azerbaijanis” these crimes received a political and legal evaluation and were called genocide. Since then, March 31 has been commemorated annually as Day of Azerbaijanis’ Genocide [Montenegrinskoe izdanie opublikovalo ...2021].

The section “Blood Memory” is not intrinsically valuable. It contains carefully collected materials from all media of Azerbaijan which “properly” cover conflicts with neighboring states, chiefly with Armenia. In other words, it is the propaganda in its most traditional form.

The three-language agency “Turan” (the national, English, Russian) seems to be the least dependent in Azerbaijan [Turan 2021]. In addition to news, it produces analysis and allows having a discussion in comments; however, it gives a side note that the opinions of readers and editors are not always identical. Last year in May after the publications about violations of opposition rights the site was first cyber attacked and later it was completely closed. However, in November the international organization Reporters without Borders protested the decision and forced to unlock the resource immediately.

Yet production by Turan, in our opinion, is also not balanced enough. For instance, recently they released the biased article “Joe Biden distorted the historical truth about the events of 1915 – the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan”, in which with reference to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan it is said that “the events of 1915 should be studied by historians not politicians. However, Armenia which wants to hide what is happening and try to present itself as oppressed, did not accept Turkey’s offer to investigate the events of that period by a joint historical commission. It is unacceptable to falsify history, try to “rewrite” it and use it for political pressure. Joe Biden distorted the historical truth on the occasion of Armenian Remembrance Day” [Dzho Bajden iskazil... 2021].

The agency “Trend” also positions itself as independent [Trend 2021]. Supporting the communication in five languages such as Azerbaijani, Persian, Turkish, English and Russian, it is really all-encompassing. However, its political and ideological de-

pendence is noticeable immediately and very clearly, even at the level of chaotic editorial classification which at first sight creates an illusory perception of many voices, in fact, it is full of para-governmental information that is repeated and overlapped with publications covering Ilham Aliyev's activities. This observation is supported by the following headings such as "President Ilham Aliyev: Turkey and Azerbaijan have strengthened their capacities in the region, our role, influence has increased and will grow further" [Aliyev I. 2021]. There is also a special section called Exchange of letters with the President ("Prezident yazırlar") which is overfilled with epithets and comparisons with Allah [Prezidentu pishut... 2020].

"Trend" produces over a hundred news items per day (what's interesting is that international news are released at night and the national events are during the day). Some of them (it is not hard to guess which ones) are highlighted with bold black and red fonts. Of course, commenting features are deactivated. The situation is not even improved by existence of official pages on social networks like "Facebook", "Twitter", "Youtube", "Telegram", "LinkedIn", RSS distribution (because there are no discussions there either) and access to digital distributors Android and iOS that are active only on the territory of Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, not all publications are available. Some of them are the object of the sale-purchase and the price of the annual subscription (at the exchange rate for January 2021 it costs 46956 UAH) speaks for itself. Since the beginning of the resumption of Karabakh conflict, on September 27, 2020 international computer network "Internet" stopped working in Azerbaijan. Consequently the slightest chances disappeared to discuss freely these issues on social media pages and in the blogosphere. As a result, it was impossible to obtain reliable information about the participation of Turkey, Syria, Russia, etc. in the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict.

Now you can see that "Trend" provides information only on the number of victims and casualties among the Armenians. You get the impression that the Azerbaijanis have not been suffering and are immune to bullets because "they are righteously fighting against the hated enemy of the human race". The approved pseudo-patriotic strategy applies to all stories and publications, even foreign news. Thus, on November 8, 2020 there was a publication under the heading "Dirty provocations of Armenians in Estonia – unknown put pig heads in Islamic center" [Kochneva N. 2020], in which journalists note that this is not just a reckless act of a radical, but a well-planned provocation to incite inter-religious and interethnic hatred which offends all "true Muslims".

On October 30, 2020 Asif Mehman published an article "The war showed Pashinyan's true face" [Mehman 2020], in which the Prime Minister of Armenia is depicted as a follower of Hitler, who seems to be writing a "new history of fascism". The material is accompanied by an editorial cartoon (obviously it was done to enhance the effect) with the face of fascist leader superimposed on the face of the head of the Armenian government. Needless to say, such publications immediately discredit the "independent" media.

Pro-Turkish publications are fraught with quite different markers (by the way, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is the only world leader who has openly been supporting Azerbaijan since the escalation of the Karabakh conflict started). For example, on September 8 “Trend” quotes Mahharam Aliyev, Assistant to the President of Azerbaijan, Head of the Military Affairs Department, making a point that he is proud of having such a reliable partner as Turkey [Aliyev M. 2020] and in the process somehow he recalls the Greek-Turkish confrontation in the Eastern Mediterranean emphasizing that “the Turkish government is the guarantor of regional security for the Turks living in Northern Cyprus”. “In this case, as Aliyev specifies, each of us certainly stands in full solidarity with our brothers and the whole Turkic world is proud of the President of Azerbaijan who gives answers with diplomacy to those who are trying to use language of threats” [Aliyev M. 2020]. So, quoting Aliyev’s words and deftly manipulating the public consciousness in this publication Trend shows loyalty to both presidents and demonstrates its propaganda “patriotism”.

One can immediately feel the attitude to leaders of other countries on the site pages. For instance, besides the Armenian leader, the President of France Emmanuel Macron and his relations with the Turkish guarantor are negatively marked. On March 2, 2021 in the publication without authorship Trend makes a point that “in autumn and at the beginning of winter France repeatedly demanded that Turkey should clarify its role in the Karabakh conflict as Macron claimed that Paris had information about sending Syria’s fighters by Ankara to Nagorno Karabakh. He also threatened with imposition of sanctions against Turkey, if it did not abandon unilateral actions against Greece and Cyprus” [Prezidenty Turcii i Francii... 2021]. There is an ambiguous position concerning Vladimir Putin. Obviously, it’s the results of economic dependence, the common Soviet past and Russia’s long-standing ideological protectorate.

To create the effect of “world unity and conspiracy”, the site does not shun faked expert reports, particularly with links to unreliable sources. Sometimes fake creativity borders on the comic elements. Thus, on September 27 it published a piece of news (with reference to itself and social networks) that the Defence Minister of Armenia David Tonoyan emigrated from his own state. Interestingly, the news was spread by Minval.az, Salamnews.az, 1news.az, Zerkalo.az, Usavat.az and others. After the fake was identified, no denials were given [David Tonojan provel... 2020].

In the Ukrainian-Russian conflict “Trend” openly supports Russia. At the beginning of the Maidan protest movement in 2013 the agency intensively quoted Viktor Yanukovich and his press-conferences from Rostov-on-Don with links to RIA Novosti. Russia’s involvement in the Maidan Revolution and the war in eastern Ukraine are widely denied, Trend points out that “mass protests, so called “Euromaidan” occurred throughout Ukraine, and in January they took shape of clashes between the armed radicals and law enforcement authorities. The street clashes during which the opposition used fire arms and Molotov cocktails resulted in human losses” [David Tonojan provel... 2020].

The site interprets and represents the outbreak of war in eastern Ukraine as rallies of federalization followers arranged by “Donbas’ rebels” [David Tonojan provel... 2020] and they occurred without any external interference [Lidery stran ES... 2020]. As it is reported on the pages of Trend that “Russia constantly emphasizes that it is not involved in the internal Ukrainian conflict”, so it is inefficient to speak to it by means of the “language of sanctions” [Lidery stran ES... 2020].

Among all the current conflicts “Trend” (and apparently Azerbaijan) is the most impartial of the Arab-Israeli one. As a result all events are neutrally described and mostly given in the form of posts. On Trend’s pages the militant group “The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” is featured as “terrorists from the extremist group ISIL”. The explosion in the port of Beirut on June 4, 2020 is called “a freak accident”, “emergency”, “calamity” etc. They are actively publishing the denials of the Lebanese government about Israel’s complete nonparticipation in terrorism. In general, the number of victims is briefly presented, humanitarian aid is recorded and condolences are expressed by world leaders. However, they could not hold from focusing on the significant damage to the Armenian embassy or mentioning the participation of the Armenian-origin Lebanese in the Karabakh conflict (all these remarks and anything like that are completely inappropriate, because official diplomatic missions of the Russian Federation and other countries were also damaged no less, even the Netherlands’ ambassador’s wife perished, but Trend did not even mention those facts [Rezultaty poiska po: “Bejrut”... 2000–2001]).

As you can see, there is practically no journalism in Azerbaijan, instead, there is complete and utter propaganda, it is obvious and undisguised. Of course, these are not posters and postcards as it used to be in the last century, but the power of influence is similar. Social networks could have become the only mouthpiece of “independence” but in the extreme situations they simply do not exist.

2. PROPAGANDA IN THE ARMENIAN MEDIA

The current Armenian strategic problems are adversarial relationship in Nagorno Karabakh and non-recognition of Genocide in the Ottoman Turkey by the world community at the beginning of the last century.

Armenia as all ex-USSR countries adhered to a single ideological doctrine for a long time, for this reason even freedom of speech, multiparty system and emergence of advertising did not reverse the situation immediately. In addition, majority of Armenia’s mass media are abroad (Turkish-language weekly newspaper “Agos Turkey”, American newspaper “The Armenian Mirror-Spectator”, Armenian-Persian newspaper “Arax”, published in Tehran, Russian-language “Noah’s Ark”, “Newspaper of the Armenians in Russia” etc.). The Armenians of the Diaspora outnumber the citizens of Armenia three to one. Since 2012 prices of service providers have fallen sharply, so the Armenians as almost all peoples of the world are actively turning to the virtual reality.

The information space of the continental Armenia is represented by the following mass media such as “Herq”, “Mamul”, “1News”, “Armenpress”, “First Armenian Informational”, a subsidiary of Sputnik information agency “SputnikArmenian”, “PanArmenian” etc. At the beginning of escalation of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict these sites were suffering the most from cyber-attacks of the Azerbaijani hackers [Ob#javlenie o nastrojke... 2020].

In general, the Armenian web-based media are divided into Russian-language (“Novoe Vremia/New Time”), multi-language (“Herq”, “Mamul”, “1news”, “Armenpress”, “Aravot”, “Yerkir”, “Arka”, “MediaMax”, “First Armenian Informational”, “Tert”, “ArmInfo”, “Pan Armenian”, “Sputnik Armenian”) and Armenian-language (“AZG”, “Noyan-Tapan”, “Armnews”).

Since the declaration of Independence almost all media have been controlled by the state, political parties, entrepreneurs, although it is not recorded in any national register. The powerful media holding “Pan Armenian” (including TV channels “Armenia” and “Shant”) was initially connected with the family of ex-president Serzh Sargsyan. In early 2019 the holding announced the termination of activities due to a change of shareholders. As a result the channel “Shant” became the property of a financial mogul Mykhail Bagdasarov and now “Armenia” belongs to the pro-Russian leader of Prosperous Armenia Party Gagik Tsarukyan [Bedevian A. 2020]. “Yerkir Media TV” is associated with the revolutionary federation of the Armenian diaspora Dashnaksutiun. “H2” is sponsored by acting Prime Minister Armen Gevorgyan, “Yerevan” is supported by ex-Prosecutor-General Aghvan Hovsepyan [Law on Not... 2020]. “AP TV” is owned by “The Grand Candy”, the oligarch Grant Vardanyan’s family company. And only public TS such as “Public service television Armenia”, channel “Armenia” of media group “Pan Armenian” and the religious channel of Armenian Apostolic Church create fair competition in the media market.

The state’s influence on media became particularly tangible after on October 27, 1999 TV channel “A1+” “improperly” showed the act of terrorism during which the Parliament of Armenia was shot away and the Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan was assassinated in the parliamentary chamber [Drachuk S. 2021]. Then the harassment continued. On April 2, 2002 the channel was closed. Since then “A1+” has steadily taken part in competitions for the right to broadcast but without result. In 2018 the editorial group switched over to an online platform, creating a YouTube channel that nowadays have more than 170 thousand subscribers [A1+... 2021].

The 2017 elections were an enormous strain on Armenia’s media. Threats, reprisals, lawsuits and acts of violence were constantly listed on the reports of world human rights organizations. According to Reporters without Borders, 17 Armenian journalists became victims of physical violence at that time [Law on Not... 2020].

As a result, a number of legislative initiatives were implemented that have severely restricted access to information. Namely, according to the amendments, adopted by the Parliament on March 23, 2017, journalists are not allowed to attend the government

sessions and the Ministers are banned to give interviews without the Prime Minister's consent [Baghdasaryan L. 2019]. The changes also oblige journalists to obtain the consent of all, without exception, persons to publish any data [Bedevyan A. 2020]. Surprisingly, against the background of a very discouraging situation in which even Armenian public television is a supporter of government ideas and initiatives, investigative journalism continues to function and its highest-ranking implementation established in 2001 is online media "Hetq" ("Trace") [Hetq 2021].

The internet newspaper, by the way covering events in the Armenian, Russian and English languages, is controlled by the following international organizations such as Global Investigative Journalism Network, Association of European Journalists, Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. Two-thirds of Hetq's budget is funded by the OSCE. Editor in Chief Edik Baghdasaryan simultaneously performs the duties of the head in "The Armenian Association of Investigative Journalists".

The newspaper is open for communication with readers: it gives an opportunity to make comments under publications (with a request to provide your personal data: name, e-mail and actually a text) and on social networks such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google+, RSS-feed works, the contacts of the staff and management are available.

The issues considered by "Hetq" are also available for public comment and they include offshores, privatization of land, illegal building activity, enrichment of influential people's relatives etc. More practical aspects of economic activity are investigated and discussed including suitability and condition of water, quality of ice cream, sour cream, cheese, bread, chicken and others food as well as operation and production of precious metals, export of animals, devastation of forests etc.

Hetq logo presents a target. Obviously, it is a hint: everything that gets in the cross hairs of journalists will be revealed. In addition to investigation files, the online newspaper offers breaking news, picture shots, and interviews. The newspaper is particularly active in criticizing the team of ex-president Serzh Sargsyan and is diligently investigating unlawful acts of his supporters.

They keep a prudent balance in presenting information about the new government, for example about the prime minister Nikol Pashinyan, they highlight the lawyers' protests demanding to institute criminal proceedings against Pashinyan [Mamulyan A. 2016], but official PR is also provided which is pre-printed on the government website [Pashinjan N. 2020].

A large selection of materials is dedicated to Nagorny Karabakh on the site. There are 76 publications as of 04.05.2021 [Rezultaty poiska po: "Nagornyj Karabah"... 2021]. It is possible that at the height of the crisis the publications form a separate section. By the way, the website offers more than a thousand publications with search word Artsakh [Rezultaty poiska po: "Arcah"... 2021], that is the national equivalent of lexical item Nagorny Karabakh. It is no coincidence that the online newspaper is one of ten Armenian media outlets that suffered cyber -attacks on September 27.

News about the armed hostilities is delivered more or less as unbiased and informed stories. The headlines are without manipulation unlike Azerbaijan's Trend. There are no links to social networks or unreliable sources. Writing about settlements after the latest shelling, journalists give only cold facts: "Private and other buildings and cars were damaged as a result of artillery shelling in the capital of Artsakh Stepanakert", "citizens suffered from the shelling", "the child was injured" [Kazarian D. 2020]. However, the newspaper also mainly covers Azerbaijani military losses ("Six Armenian servicemen were wounded in the resumption of hostilities as a result of the Azerbaijani provocation. On the part of the enemy, there are dead and wounded [Protivniku udalos'... 2020].), although, as a rule, the information is reduced to citing official sources ("The Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia strongly condemns the provocation carried out by the Azerbaijani armed forces. The current situation has nothing to do with the key requirement for a ceasefire signed by the presidents of Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan, and threatens the fragile peace achieved through the direct efforts of the Russian president," the statement of the Defense Ministry said [Protivniku udalos'... 2020]).

Nagorno Karabakh is not the only a hotspot of tension in Armenia. A similar "dispute" over the region exists with Georgia (Javakhk is a territory of Georgia which is 97% inhabited by the Armenians). There is a large collection of news stories devoted to this conflict on the site [Rezul'taty poiska po: "Dzhavahk"... 2021]. After the resumption of the Nagorno Karabakh confrontation, the section came to life and was filled with materials about the Georgian government's obstacles to the citizens of Javakhk who took part in the Second Karabakh War [Sargasjan M. 2021].

Territorial conflicts continue on the borders with Turkey. Investigations into the Turkish government's illegal activities often appear on the site, for example, about transport of terrorists and weapons to Karabakh via Turkish airports [Sarukhanyan V. 2021].

In "Hetq" propaganda is sometimes present where it "should" not be noticed, particularly, in the publications devoted to the Ukrainian Euromaidan. The editorial board unequivocally and uncompromisingly condemned the Russian intervention, calling it "a desire to restore the empire within the Soviet "Eastern bloc" and published an open letter "Long live Ukraine!" [Khaj zhyve Ukrayna... 2013], signed by influential representatives of international organizations. Thus, the editorial board expressed support for the protesters, although it apparently violated journalistic standards at the same time.

But there is a manifestation of certain intransigence on the site. For instance, in Marine Madatyan's photographic report "Between Maidan and European luxury" (Madatyan, 2013): the journalist simultaneously shows the difficult situation with provisions for the Maidan and in contrast, a lavish press conference at a five-star hotel.

Hetq covers the Israeli-Lebanese conflict objectively with operational reference links to official sources of opposition states. For example, the newspaper also reports in detail on the explosion in Beirut on August 4, 2020, it conveys different narratives operating with official sources [Martirosyan M. 2020].

Obviously, the Armenian media will have a long way to go in the struggle for independence and transparency, but it is worth noting the positive transformations: from 2018 Armenia rose by 19 steps in the ranking of freedom of speech and received 61st position in 2020.

3. PROPAGANDA IN THE UKRAINIAN MEDIA

The Press Freedom Index of Ukraine is 96 (it is one point higher than last year). The representatives of the national media activism at the international level are “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia” (Mirror Weekly), “Ukrainska Pravda” (Ukrainian Truth) and its sister projects as well as conglomerates like radio “Svoboda” (RadioLiberty) etc.

On February 18, 2021 one of the most top-rated news sites in Ukraine “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia” offered 186 news stories on the topic “Nagorno Kharabakh” by internal search [Rezultaty poshuku za: “Naghirnyj Karabakh”... 2021]. The latest news dated 02.02.2021 with the heading “Armenia makes a complaint against Azerbaijan to ECHR” is a small news item that contains the lead “Baku is accused of violating a number of conventions” [Khmylevsjka, V. 2021]. It gives reference links to official sources (Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan... 2020) and obviously big expert publications “The Price of Peace” by Volodymyr Kravchenko and “Prisoners in the Caucasus” by Yevgenia Haber.

In the newspaper story “The Price of Peace” the main figure of insights made by V.Kravchenko, the international policy columnist in “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia” is neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia, but Russia and its role in resolution of the conflict. The core statement of the story is “Moscow still managed to push through its plan and save the CSTO ally, to strengthen its influence on Yerevan and Baku as well as shore up the position in the Southern Caucasus” [Kravchenko V. 2020].

The columnist is trying to find out what arguments the Russians put forward to convince Azerbaijanis and Turks: “Prospects for increasing international pressure on Baku in the event of a continuation of the military operation in Karabakh? Compromising dirt about the Aliyevs? Promises of new arms supplies? Or threats to stop the import of Azerbaijani fruits and vegetables?” Being unable to find answers to the questions, V. Kravchenko states: “Russia still managed to gain leverage over Azerbaijan and almost completely make Armenia dependent on itself, discrediting Pashinyan and punishing the Armenians for the 2018 revolution. But the price for this was the deterioration of its image in the Armenian society. However, this is insignificant for the Kremlin. After all, they think that Armenia will not get anywhere from Russia” [Kravchenko V. 2020].

Another topic is activated simultaneously that is about the election victory of the new US President Joe Biden, who, according to Kravchenko, “is ready to struggle for support of democratic ideals rather than helping Russia destabilize the world situation”. Then the examination becomes even closer to the problems of Ukraine: the columnist makes a point that “Putin’s Kremlin has been claiming for a long time that Russian opposition activists like Navalnyi are just tools by means of which the hostile West is implementing its “anti-Russian program”. The Russian media often say that the United States stimulated “color revolutions” throughout the former Soviet Union” [Kravchenko V. 2020]. Thus, Ukraine comes into focus of discussion “effortlessly”.

The article “Prisoners in the Caucasus” written by Y.Haber, Vice-Principal at Hennadii Udoenko Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine, also starts with the lead “Are there winners in the war for Nagorny Karabakh and what role Turkey plays in the Southern Caucasus” [Haber J. 2020].

The article seems to be about the role of Turkey. But it is also mostly about Russia. The author makes a point that “in the statement on ceasefire in Nagorno Karabakh there is not a single word about Turkey’s role and its further presence in the region, in contrast to the deployment of the “peacekeeping contingent of the Russian Federation along the line of contact and along the Lachin Corridor” [...]. The presence of Russian military men “along the barricades” can hardly be considered a victory for Azerbaijani (and Turkish) diplomacy” [Haber J. 2020].

According to Y.Haber, taking into account the complete defeat of the Armenian army on the battlefield, in order to reach such a compromise, the Kremlin had to use “arguments from various negotiating baskets”, “there is no shortage of which in the region”. Still, “the question remains open to what extent the expulsion of NATO allies from the region and Moscow’s growing military-diplomatic presence meet Ankara’s far-reaching interests” [Haber J. 2020].

As we can see all the discussions in the “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia” are reduced to the ambivalent policy of the Russian Federation. And it is related not only to the context of the Second Karabakh War. We offer you more detailed information about it in our author chapter “Transformations of military journalism from the perspective of the present time” in the Ukrainian-Polish multi-authored monograph “The role of technology in the socio-economic development of the post-quarantine world” [Kosiuk O. 2021: 54–65].

4. PROPAGANDA IN THE RUSSIAN MEDIA

Four years ago there was the Russian-language publication by Oleksandr Zhelenin but with the heading in Ukrainian “Are there any independent media in Russia and why does Putin need them?” at news website LB.ua and the story runs that journalists got together in one of the western diplomatic missions in Moscow to discuss the problem of Russian independent media. First of all, they announced a list of a limited number of media outlets that can still be considered independent, namely “Novaya

Gazeta”, radio “Echo of Moscow”, “Novye Izvestia”. However, it immediately became clear that the last outlet had already gone into liquidation, because it did not survive in difficult conditions [Zhelenin A. 2017].

It is further stated that, if desired, the list can be expanded including the information agency “Rosbalt”, newspapers “Kommersant” and “Vedomosti”, because these media are quite objective, although limited in their ability to function. They are “allowed” to present accurate information but in a measured graduated way: without a direct criticism of Putin but instead use “the Kremlin”, “authorities”, “the Russian leadership” as an alternative; or in the following manner “well that’s good that we occupied the Crimea. But [...] we should have moved further!” [Zhelenin A. 2017].

International experts compared Putin’s Russia to fascist states, because “both here and there we are dealing with the regimes pursuing repressive policies inside the country and expansion ones outside”, “at the head of both regimes are unchangeable authoritarian leaders”, “in both cases democratic scenery is used” [Zhelenin A. 2017]. However, according to experts, keeping in mind the experience of predecessors and the new “fashion”, the Russian president no longer wants to really look like a despot. “Putin needs the remnants of “independent” media to maintain this reputation pulling the carpet out under his more ideological opponents”, and they, by the way, occasionally also “create a positive image of the regime abroad” and in Russia: “information “leaks” made by the Russian leadership via them always look much more convincing and less fake” [Zhelenin A. 2017].

According to “Ukrainska Pravda” with reference to Novaya Gazeta and DW, a year ago 25 media united for independent broadcasting in Russia such as Novaya Gazeta, TV channel “Dozhd”, web portal “Takie Dela”, radio station “Echo of Moscow”, online media outlets “Meduza”, Znak.com, “Bumaga”, “Taiga.info”, TB2, “YuGa.ru”, 7x7, Chernovik, “Severopost.ru” and others and they established “Syndicate-100” [V Rosiji 25 ZMI ob’jednalysja... 2020].

It is difficult for us to objectively assess the situation, so, focusing on both of the above lists, we are going to analyze the current content of Novaya Gazeta because it is the very media that is the visible initiator and leader of positive transformations of Russia’s information space. Let’s see how this media covers the events in Nagorno Karabakh.

Per request search “Nagorno Karabakh” Novaya Gazeta offers 400 publications on February 27, 2021 (06.05.2021 for some reason there are only 20). The last but one publication is interesting, it is a satirical article by Irina Petrovskaya called “Our Fatherland calls for heroic deeds” (Big group concerts on TV as an act of patriotic upbringing) [Petrovskaya I. 2021], which in a peculiar form represents Russian propaganda and ideological underlying message of Nagorno Karabakh’s problems as a “relay” phenomenon. At first the author cites Volodymyr Voinivych’s anti-utopia “Moscow 2042” and draws comparisons between strategies of the Soviet state and “independent” Russian Federation, then she makes a point that “Big group concert is not

just singing and dancing but a serious act of patriotic upbringing, demonstration and affirmation of the main state staples in the minds of Russian citizens” [Petrovskaya I. 2021]. Later on there is a comment and the beginning of the main text: “on the big screen heavy wheat stalks are sprouting, spaceships are rocketing up, latest aircraft carriers are sweeping the sea”. “The President of the Russian Federation is personally welcoming the combat units. The domes of cathedrals, the ringing of bells, and the bright face of Jesus Christ were added to the traditional symbols of power. ... On the stage, there are military bands, the Russian flag and... completely unexpected for the action of this genre announcers appeared” [Petrovskaya I. 2021].

Before moving to Nagorno Karabakh, in the songs performers mentioned Aleksander Nevsky as he embodies all the best that is in the people of Russia, Peter the First who, as we should expect, “opened a window to Europe”, Gagarin who opened a road to space for mankind. Afterwards a “peacekeeping” contingent from Nagorno Karabakh contacted the concert hall and shared a report on the work done, and Tamara Gverdtsiteli and Lev Leshshenko devoted them a song “We are the prolonged echo for each other”. Finally, the “connection of time” is illustrated by portraits of veterans and the song “My dear, if only there was no war”.

Between the concerted items young presenters “sincerely” talk about how peaceful, friendly and full of universal love the Russian people are (unfortunately other people don’t understand it because “Russia is baffling to the mind”) and after the high phrase “... it is only possible to believe in Russia” the military choir sings “The steppe is wide” and the Kuban Cossack Choir performs the song “My Grass, Grass” (as the author of the article points out that the name of the song “seems to be a bit innuendo within the context of other staples”).

The “grand action” ends with lyrical “hits” performed by completely “societal glue” Rostorguyev, Rozenbaum and Valeria, “it is impossible to imagine the cultural life of modern Russia without them”. By the way, entry into the territory of several “friendly” states, including Ukraine, is prohibited for them. Finally, the author of the publication literally exclaims: “My God, could it be that nothing will really change in this country” [Petrovskaya I. 2021]?

As far as it can be understood from the report of Novaya Gazeta on March 6, 2021 [Ministr prosveshhenija... 2021], that on the whole territory of Russia the access of schoolchildren to “harmful” information was technically blocked. Having no doubt, any truth about East Ukraine is implicitly “harmful”, consequently the younger generation will not obtain it, although information about the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and related political problems (for some reason mostly Armenian) appear on the pages of Novaya Gazeta constantly.

In particular, the “News stories” section deals with low-quality Russian weapons as the reason for Armenia’s recent defeat in Nagorno Karabakh and as a result, the resignation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is possible. However, at the end of the publication, with reference to the Russian Foreign Ministry, a conclusion is drawn

that “none of this type of missile system was used during the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and all missile ammunition is in the warehouses of the Armenian Armed Forces” [Pashynjan protiv voennyh... 2021].

Each article in the newspaper ends with a request for financial assistance: “In the country where the authorities constantly want to ban something, including the ban on telling the truth, there must be media that continue to do real journalism. Your support will help us that Novaya Gazeta will continue to be such a real news outlet. Make your contribution to the independence of journalism in Russia right now [De-laem chestnuju zhurnalistiku... 2021].

Thus, objective journalism and independent thought exist in Russia, although it is often necessary to read the truth from contexts. As a consequence, the press freedom index is 149 out of 180.

CONCLUSIONS

As we can see, propaganda has not disappeared – it has only been modified to the urgent needs of today. In the field of media, its simplicity still strives to be maximum (as, for example, on the pages of Azerbaijani media outlets), however, it is no longer absurd for intellectuals, because with the development of new technologies the percentage of those who think critically is growing rapidly. As a result, high-quality Armenian and Ukrainian journalists do not work for state-building policy, and Russian journalism is forced to resort to forms of allusion and indirectness.

The information space of the states directly or indirectly involved in the Second Karabakh War is radically different. And it is confirmed by annual press freedom index (Armenia – 61, Ukraine – 96, Russia – 149, Azerbaijan – 168). Propaganda is closely dependent on expert labels, but the correlation, as we see, is inversely proportional: the higher press freedom index is (which means a clearer separation between propaganda and balanced journalism), the worse situation with functioning of state-building ideologies is and it is no use in denying it with independence of these states as agents under international law and players in the international arena.

Thus, the problem of distinction between journalism and propaganda remains open. As experts in the field of mass communication do not cope with it, in our opinion, it would be appropriate to involve philosophers, historians, political scientists and legal theorists in finding its most optimal solution.

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SUSTAINABLE-RESPONSIBLE TOURISM VALUES AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT: ISSUES AND CRITICAL REFLECTION

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Abstract:

In recent years, the world has undergone major changes in terms of economic, technologic, and touristic development. With the constant emergence of crisis situations, it is evident now more than ever that these changes need to be addressed and tackled with in a way that would ensure long-term stability and prosperity. As a result, the concept of sustainable-responsible tourism has emerged, which, among other things, addresses many important and complex issues, such as mass tourism, natural and social heritage preservation, environmental change, global warming, pollution, etc. SRT values also refer to a responsible and sustainable approach to crisis management, which is the topic of this paper. In order to keep up with the constant changes and establish a healthy tourism development that would be in line with ethical and responsible behaviour, an experienced and qualified destination management is of great importance. Sustainable-responsible tourism should therefore not only be considered a new trend in the tourism industry, but also a new norm.

The methodology used in this paper consists of an analysis of secondary data sources such as academic articles, documents, and reports relevant to the topic of the paper, all written in the period between 2004 and 2021. The purpose of using this methodology is not only to highlight the transfer and dissemination of knowledge about tourism with the goal of adding to the already existing knowledge. By focusing on both academic articles and practical reports of work experiences, as well as official documents, this paper also aims to promote critical thinking about the already existing knowledge. The ultimate goal of the paper is to promote the creation of knowledge in designing sustainable tourism development strategies, agendas, and monitoring the implementation process of sustainable development in tourism.

Key words: *Psustainable-Responsible Tourism; Sustainomics; Crisis Management*

INTRODUCTION

Even though the perpetually developing and growing world we live in, in terms of technology, economics and lifestyle creates a positive impact on the society, it also leads to instability, feelings of insecurity, and non-sustainable actions. Feelings of instability and insecurity, in turn, might cause frequent crisis situations that can have a negative impact on the development of touristic destinations and tourism in general. This can harm the general perception of the destination, which lowers the destination's attractiveness and safety, causing potential tourists and stakeholders to avoid certain locations and invest their resources elsewhere. As a result, economic growth and the development of tourism are suffering. In order to tackle crisis situations, destination managers need to plan ahead so as to mitigate consequences of current and potential crises and to accelerate the recovery process. A responsible and sustainable approach to crisis management is therefore needed, which offers various benefits oriented towards a greener and more sustainable future.

By reading numerous research papers on sustainable-responsible tourism (SRT), it was noticed that crisis management is rarely mentioned as a part of the SRT model. Unless discussed in a broader and more general sense, a connection between crisis management and sustainable-responsible tourism has not been successfully established yet. There evidently lacks research and sufficient experience that would connect the two concepts and study them in a joint context, rather than separately. The goal of this paper is to explore existing theoretical knowledge and practical application of the notion of sustainable and responsible tourism (SRT), as well as to provide new insights into the field by connecting SRT with crisis situations and management, offering a perspective that sees the SRT model as an integral part of crisis management. Since this is a conceptual paper, the goal is to integrate and synthesize existing theoretical and practical understandings of the notions of sustainable and responsible tourism, as well as to provide potential new theoretical perspectives to help understand those theories in a more coherent manner. The findings of the study show that sustainable tourism encompasses a set of principles, policy prescriptions, and management methods which focus on tourism development in such a way that a destination's environmental resource base (including natural, built, social and cultural features) is not drained, but rather preserved for future development. A sustainable destination needs to offer a range of different activities and "tourism experiences" which both enhance the well-being of the local population and offer new experiences to tourists. The implementation of sustainable development in tourism depends greatly on the involvement, cooperation, and interests of all stakeholders within a tourism system or destination. Stakeholders and their interests are therefore an important necessity when thinking of the implementation of sustainable development in tourism.

Tourism is vulnerable to a wide range of crises. This paper highlights how difficult it is to establish what form crisis management provisions in tourism should take. It

also suggests that regular monitoring of tourism trends and prompt action on the received information tend to keep the sector healthy, diversified, and well-regulated, which makes it more resilient in periods of crisis. Another major factor to the resilience and, should a crisis occur, rapid recovery of the tourism sector are good media relations, the diversification of tourism products and offers, and competitive travel options. An important challenge for sustainable development is developing regional planning to improve urban services, regulate the pressure on the land, and reduce the impact of tourism on the natural environment. Public sector recycling services and better waste management are also central to any sustainable development plans. As the paper points out, all professionals who work within the industry (employees, industrialists, traders, and elected government representatives) need to be fully informed about potential issues and need to convey necessary information to tourists, as good communication is central to the survival and development of a destination. The analysis in this paper shows that, through close monitoring and experimentation, methods to increase system resilience can be learned, which are central to maintaining the tourism system in a productive state for as long as possible and resisting a potential decline by adapting to changing circumstances in a timely manner. In the first chapter of this paper, the general concept of sustainable-responsible tourism is described, as well as the important Triple-A model. The second chapter deals with sustainability as an aspect of destination management, whereas the third chapter discusses destination crisis management from the perspective of SRT values. The literature this paper is based on are secondary data sources available online which helped develop a critical perspective on this field of study as well as broaden the already existing understanding of this field by learning from both the academic and practical side.

1. SUSTAINABLE-RESPONSIBLE TOURISM (SRT)

Sustainable tourism is a type of tourism based on principles of sustainable development, which strives to make all aspects of tourism sustainable. It identifies the needs of local communities, industries, different stakeholders, and potential visitors and addresses the current and future impacts on the economy, culture, society, and the environment. Taking the needs of various parties into account as well as trying to reduce negative impacts of crises requires a lot of work and is often a great challenge for touristic destinations and their management. Therefore, it is important to note that sustainable development is a long-term process of bettering the tourism branch which is based on the combination of sustainability pillars and triggers.

When looking from the perspective of responsibility, sustainable tourism is based on environmental knowledge, ethics and being aware of the notion of sustainability and what it encompasses. It also includes a political aspect which requires all destination stakeholders and their leadership to participate and move towards a more sustainable and responsible society. In addition to that, sustainable tourism should also

focus on tourist satisfaction as well as catering to their needs. Responsible and ethical behaviour is a shared responsibility and “includes concerns of firm consumers, employees, shareholders and the community” (Mihalic, 2016). Only when all of them act accordingly, can sustainable tourism exist.

However, responsible tourism should not be mistaken with sustainable tourism. By acting responsible one is heading towards being sustainable. Responsible tourism therefore depends on sustainability-based strategies and actions. In order to tackle the notion of sustainable-responsible tourism, a new approach called *sustainomics* emerged, which offers an interdisciplinary (including natural and social sciences, engineering, and humanities), comprehensive, and practical framework to make development more sustainable. According to Mihalic (2021), the key principles of *sustainomics* include the balanced and consistent consideration of the social, economic, and environmental sustainability, a better integration of discipline, space, time, stakeholder viewpoints and operational needs, as well as the practical application of sustainability into the real world.

According to Guerreiro (2019), sustainable tourism is a concept approached from different perspectives that reflect economic interests, ethical beliefs of different actors and the strength and effectiveness of various lobbies. UNWTO’s definition of sustainable tourism and its development lies on the economic, socio-cultural, and environmental pillar, which became the main focus of many scholars and the base of many tourism strategies and policies. It addresses the economic, environmental, and social responsibility tourism has, as well as its responsibility towards tourists. The popularity of this theory resulted in a positive and responsible approach towards touristic destinations, communities, visitors, and the environment, and, according to Mihalic (2016), include energy savings, recycling, a reduction of waste and emissions and attempts to improve the livelihood of the local population. Irresponsible behaviour, however, slows down the process of being responsible and therefore sustainable.

Sustainable development emerged as a solution to optimise the residents’ standards of living conditions by promoting local economic benefits, protecting the environment, and meeting visitors’ needs to have a high-quality experience. Responsible tourism uses tourism for sustainable development and focuses on what people, businesses, and governments do to maximize the positive economic, socio-cultural, and environmental impacts of tourism. Operators, hoteliers, governments, locals, and tourists need to take responsibility and actions to make tourism more sustainable. Because the main objective of responsibility is to promote sustainability in all its dimensions, the discourse on responsibility is searching for implementation triggers that should lead to sustainable tourism in practice.

The first, so-called socio-political implementation trigger, refers to ‘Awareness–Agenda–Action’ implementation phases (TSG, 2012). Tourism must recognise its responsibility to the environment, host community and economy. Environmental benefits include support for preservation of the landscape and a stimulus for the preser-

vation, protection, and improvement of the natural environment (Sedaghat et al., 2015), while the other two pillars aim to provide sociocultural and economic benefits. In order to reach the state of responsibility, destinations must act according to the Triple-A model: Awareness –Agenda – Action, which is a part of the SRT-model. It is a pyramid-shaped model that presupposes that the starting position is placed at the bottom and moves towards the top. It consists of three pillars of sustainability which address awareness, agenda, and action in the economic, environmental, and socio-cultural areas of tourism. Mihalic (2016) explains the model and its stages as follows: “First stage is environmental awareness, where destinations are sufficiently aware of tourism impacts that cannot be longer denied. Next is the conceptual inclusion of sustainability issues or agenda which includes specifically defined actions, meaning that it codifies the sustainability principles into a strategy and policy and offers policy instruments.” The Triple-A model emphasises the fact that all of us are dependent on each other and underlines the responsibility each being has towards the environment and others.

To sum up, sustainable - responsible tourism which goes towards responsustainable tourism connects two existing terms and shows that the understanding of responsible tourism behaviour is based on the concept of sustainable tourism. Concept of “more responsibility” includes alternative tourism forms which have many names, such as alternative, soft, quality, eco, responsible, minimum impact tourism, green and ethical tourism, where all of them present an opposite concept to mass tourism, which is environmentally, socially, ethically, and politically intolerable. Responsustainable tourism or SRT strives to make tourism more sustainable by implementing certain responsibility triggers. Responsibility implies mutual dependency and responsible behaviour is based on the Triple-A model.

2. DESTINATION MANAGEMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY

A destination is a “group of actors linked by mutual relationships with specific rules, where the action of each actor influences those of the others so that common objectives must be defined and attained in a coordinated way” (Klarin, Krce Miočić & Razović, 2016). Nowadays, the sustainable development of tourist destinations is the goal of tourism and since it is a fast-growing industry that exists in almost every part of the world, there needs to be awareness of the negative impact it may create. Downsides of tourism include “overcrowding, waste generation, depletion of wildlife, damage to vegetation, human rights issues, and unfair trade practices” (Ibid.). The actions of tourists can also intervene with the everyday lives of locals and local species. Damaging the natural habitat of plants and animals, as well as polluting the environment pose a serious problem for a tourist destination and its development. Being unaware of how one’s actions affect the world can have long-term consequences for the one being affected, in this case destinations. Tourist destination develop-

ment depends on environmental and cultural resources that need to be maintained in a responsible way in order to achieve sustainability (Su & Swanson, 2017).

Sustainable development of touristic destination depends on the responsible behaviour of local organisations and the support of tourists. The end goal of sustainable development is the protection of resources and the local environment. Naturally, different destinations are faced with different problems, which means that each destination needs to embark on the sustainability journey by catering to the specific needs of their natural resources, local community, and potential visitors. Sustainability strategies and policies cannot be universal and should be created by having a specific destination and issue in mind.

It is important to mention the economic value of tourist destinations. Every natural resource and cultural heritage in a destination can lead to economic gain. Therefore, it is crucial not only to preserve the natural environment and the cultural and social heritage of tourist destinations, but to exceed the expectations of visitors. Economic sustainability plays an important role in catering to tourists' needs and achieving satisfaction. "This general view of economic sustainability is closely related with destination management. This management represents a tourism strategy which deals with the destination with aiming a long enduring improvement" (Genç, 2014). Only when all involved parties act together towards bettering their behaviour, can a destination achieve economic and general sustainability in the long run.

Tourism management is an important link in the tourism chain that aims at connecting and coordinating stakeholders with different interests in order to achieve competitiveness and sustainability of tourist destinations. Moreover, "tourism needs to be managed in order to minimise negative impacts and to maximise positive ones by balancing between environmental, social, and economic considerations." (Unforgettable Nature Experiences, n.d.). Destination management needs to take several aspects and characteristics of the destination and stakeholders into account to be able to boost the economic and social progress, as well as create sustainable competitiveness of a destination. Destination management "implies a long-term process of change management, which includes optimal economic development of a destination, a higher level of life standard, ecological preservation, social and cultural heritage preservation and its valorisation with the aim of economic and general development of a tourism destination" (Klarin, Krce Miočić & Razović, 2016). Both tourists and stakeholders need to be aware that their actions matter and that only by (re) acting responsively can tourism thrive on sustainability. All stakeholders have the common task to preserve the resources and heritage to boost the attractiveness of a tourist destination. "Sustainable management looks toward a holistic and integrated level where the individual performance contributes to the greater goal of the destination as a whole" (Conaghan, Hanrahan & McLoughlin, 2015). This means that every action and reaction, no matter how small or insignificant it is, can contribute to the sustainable development of the destination. The integrated level of sustainable man-

agement aims at providing for the needs of visitors, protecting the economic interests of the industry, reducing negative impact both from stakeholders and tourists, and protecting the natural, cultural, and social heritage of a touristic region.

Furthermore, “destination management represents an activity at the micro regional level, where all stakeholders have individual and organisational responsibility to undertake measures and efforts to create future vision contained in the policy and development at the macro regional level” (Klarin, Krce Miočić & Razović, 2016). It implies different planning tools and strategies, approaches and problem-solving tactics that shape the management and daily activities related to tourism. Sustainable management also presupposes transparency in who is managing a destination and in which way. The only way to reach sustainability is through cooperation between the private sector and the community. Sustainable decision-making on a regional level also requires expertise and volition in order to prevent possible problems and reduce risks, and to be aware of the possible consequences of every decision.

In short, everyone taking part in tourism management is required to be informed and proactive, as well as involved in the planning process and its implementation. Leadership and management ensure the continuing sustainability of the tourism industry and local environments. This also affects future planning and actions involving scanning of the environment, identifying threats and problems, and dealing with them in order to establish long-term sustainability.

3. DESTINATION CRISIS MANAGEMENT FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF SRT VALUES

The previous chapter tackled the issue of sustainability in destination management and how to establish it. It was concluded that establishing sustainability is a long-term process that requires great expertise, effective teamwork and good planning skills. The following two subchapters discuss the topic of how to ensure and maintain sustainability in crisis situations.

3.1. Crisis management

Crisis management is a proactive process which involves dealing with the crisis before it happens, during the crisis and its aftermath. As a process, crisis management comprises a variety of mutually connected activities. Its purpose is to protect the destination and stakeholders from damage and to prevent or diminish the negative outcomes of crises. Crisis resolution requires informative communication and actionable procedures. In order to act quickly, destinations need to prepare a crisis management plan with flexible, pre-identified responses and actions. Therefore, it is crucial that a basic crisis management framework, response measures, and communication strategies are in place and exercised before a crisis actually occurs. Most successful responses result from a prepared strategy, with a cooperative understanding of response roles and responsibilities, where there is minimal threat to life,

property, or the environment and minimal estimated property damage to company facilities or equipment (Jensen Hughes, 2013). The situational crisis communication theory should strategically respond to a crisis situation based on an understanding of how the public attributes responsibility for the crisis. If the public perceives a crisis to be more intentional, more responsibility to a destination is attributed and *ceteris paribus*. Managing a crisis in a positive manner requires a deep understanding of the local cultural environment and its characteristics, as well as the values and ethics of the society to which they belong which is a part of ethical leadership. The ethical aspect of crisis management is one of the most important components, knowing that the ethical element is crucial to the mental image rebuilding process. Thus, ethical rationality is a habit that must be integrated in the culture and daily operations of the destination.

Crisis management process requires many skills and expertise because it is the process of changing reality and convincing. Moreover, it requires crucial social, legal and communication knowledge in searching for possible solutions. Knowledge includes collecting information, analysing the information gathered, sharing what is learned and decision-making. Process of managing crises also requires some basic knowledge in psychology, mainly because managing some crises needs a great extent of controlling emotions and sentiments, self-control, patience, calmness and keeping away from anxiety and carelessness. Secondly, knowledge of the surrounding environment is necessary as well as the knowledge related to the specific cultural, social, and political system of the community. In addition to that, crisis managers should be familiar with the nature of local laws and regulations related to libel, defamation, disinformation, and copyrights which are connected with moral and value aspects of the society (Serra Gorpe & Zamoum, 2018).

Crisis situations are, unfortunately, always present and the need for crisis management is constantly on the rise. It helps stakeholders to identify imminent threats and successfully mitigate them. Although every crisis or threat is unique to the region at hand, theoretical frameworks help guide stakeholders and everyone involved towards correctly responding to crisis situations by mitigating damage and speeding up the recovery process. Crisis management models help prepare for, prevent, cope with and recover from crises. Models are actually representations of the structure or application of crisis management (Marker, 2020). Only when plans are developed in advance, can a destination physically prepare for a crisis and without proper knowledge or understanding this is not possible. Since crises are unpredictable, an already formed crisis management plan can help elevate the confidence of the team and lower the feelings of uncertainty and helplessness. Therefore, a crisis team should be formed in advance - before it is even needed. In this way, the team can prepare for any damaging situation and decide the roles of every member. Team-working is fundamental to effective crisis management as a commitment to shared situational awareness, clearly defined roles and responsibilities, shared visions and values, a commitment

to learning what they are doing, the ability to cooperate well and to be flexible and adapt quickly when the goals have to change (Leigh, 2016). In this case, teamwork and advanced communication and managing skills play a very important role. Crisis management is coming more and more into focus of scientific research. Globally, it can be analysed from different approaches, e.g., a historical, ethical, and societal that is comprehensive for all aspects of crisis, including leadership, ethics, and communication (Serra Gorpe & Zamoum, 2018). Learning from previous crises can lead into recovering and rebounding more efficiently in the future. Strong government commitment to the tourism industry, as well as leadership in terms of strategy, policy, and understanding of the market trends, is essential for the success and sustainability of the sector. Countries that have developed tourism specific contingency or emergency plans, or that have included tourism as a key part of Disaster Risk Management (DRM), for example, have more effectively addressed unexpected challenges (Levy, 2020). Governments that adopt a holistic approach to tourism development and management will be more likely to develop coordinated policies in support of the sector. Close collaboration between the public and private sectors and general public support is a must and it is imperative that governments work and engage all tourism-related businesses and trade associations in the preparation, implementation and monitoring of emergency policies and other procedures in times of crisis. In addition to this, it is very significant to have regular training programs in order to build human resource capacity and social awareness. They should be developed not only to enhance preparedness, but also to increase awareness and improve understanding of risks, promote capacity building and ultimately change attitudes and behaviours concerning security. Diversification of tourism products, for example, shifting from sun-and-beach models to cultural models where beaches have been affected by natural disasters can enhance cultural and natural heritage-based tourism (Levy, 2020). Contexts of crisis inevitably open the doors for “rethinking development”. The crises have sparked a global awakening and an acute awareness of what a crisis looks and feels like. By focusing time and energy on identifying and changing destructive behaviours and patterns that contributed to current crises, managers can learn to lead a productive post-crisis life. A future crisis cannot be prevented if there is no change of the behaviours, processes, habits and environment that created the current one. Most important is consistent and dutiful action. Individuals and employers need to make mental and emotional wellbeing a priority to avert or minimize the potential of a future crisis. This requires a targeted strategy to provide actionable information and training to change the habits, behaviours, and attitudes of those dealing with significant mental and emotional issues. Ability to manage a crisis requires learning new behaviours and a relentless focus on transformative change (Forbes Councils, 2020). For example, a crisis may induce a reliance on prior beliefs and cognitive rigidity, which may reduce innovative thinking and creativity.

Crisis managers establish situational awareness and impose effective strategy, direction and action in situations that are exceptionally volatile and uncertain. Shared situational awareness implies creating and maintaining a common understanding of what is going on, what that means (in terms of its implications) and what it might mean (in terms of reasonable deductions that can be made about future developments). Any mechanism, process or tool used by the crisis manager to achieve these things needs to be applied sensitively, using reflective, analytical, and structured thought processes. In many cases, managers understand situations by looking for things in them which match their past experiences and comparisons between them and the current situation. Since crises are likely to be “flashbulb” moments, they have implications for their long-term memory, and therefore for what they come to regard as the learning experience they draw from them (Leigh, 2016).

From all of the above it can be concluded that crises raise a number of issues related to responsibility, fairness, trust, and justice where learning can be achieved only through effective multilevel relational management (Bundy et al., 2017). Preventing or dealing with crises is a means of stabilising the environment in its widest sense and moving towards a more sustainable situation. Complex adaptive systems are unstable, unpredictable, multidimensional and in a state of constant change. Stability in the system indicates a lack of resilience and an inability to adapt easily to change that results in vulnerability to unexpected events, such as a crisis. It aims to provide benefits to all stakeholders and to protect host communities and habitats (De Sausmarez, 2007). Crisis management focuses on how the core paradigmatic views on management and business can be flawed and ultimately fail, thus challenging notions of control, and questioning the validity of core destination assumptions about performance. High moral awareness is necessary because crises prompt questions about the legal and ethical responsibilities of corporations and managers to their immediate stakeholders as well as to the larger social system, the natural environment, and even future generations. However, management also implies a comprehensive, strategic worldview that we believe is fundamental to understanding crisis. Any crisis is a function of the interaction between the destination, its core capabilities and resources, and the environment in which it operates (Fischbacher-Smiths, 2016).

3.2. SRT and crisis management

Sustainable tourism as a concept, and responsible tourism as its successful implementation represents a popular sustainable-responsible tourism (SRT). Sustainability is a paradigm for thinking about the future in which environmental, social, and economic considerations are balanced in the pursuit of an improved quality of life. Sustainable tourism development also requires the informed participation of all relevant stakeholders, strong political leadership and consensus building and should maintain a high level of tourist satisfaction (Mihalic, 2016). The concept has emerged

with the aim of reducing the negative effects of tourism activities, which has become almost universally accepted as a desirable and politically appropriate approach to tourism development. Its purpose is to make a balance between protecting the environment, maintaining cultural integrity, establishing social justice and promoting economic benefits, meeting the needs of the host population in terms of improved living standards both in the short and long term. Sustainable tourism requires both the sustainable growth of tourism's contribution to the economy and society and the sustainable use of resources and the environment, which will be gained by a deep understanding and proper management. Making optimal use of environmental resources is the key element in tourism development, and maintaining essential ecological processes and helping to conserve the natural heritage and biodiversity are the core foundational concepts for sustainable development.

Nowadays, tourism is faced with new challenges and crises. Thus, in order to become sustainable, tourism must take full account of both, current and future economic, social and environmental impacts, addressing the needs of visitors, the industry, the environment and host communities where a suitable balance between these three pillars must be established to guarantee its long-term sustainability. Sustainable tourism can be achieved only by constant planning and monitoring of both positive and negative impacts and actions. Maintaining positive stakeholder relationships is essential, as negative relationships can cause or escalate crises (Welford & Ytterhus, 2004). It is important that both stakeholders and the members of the management team work together since both of them have a common goal and that is to mitigate and prevent crisis situations. Moreover, total responsibility management approach is focused on the importance of recognizing destination responsibilities to stakeholders in order to enhance crisis detection and prevention. Only by communicating important information to stakeholders, can they adequately prepare for any imminent situation, be it positive or negative.

Destination is a complex system that articulates various stakeholders seeking to develop a set of natural, cultural, built and intangible resources within physical and administrative boundaries. It is a network of actors more or less articulated, dependent upon them in a political, economic, technological, environmental, cultural and social system which relies on collaborative, flexible and learning-based approaches or adaptive destination co-management. Tourism destinations are facing numerous crises caused by climate change, natural disasters, economic recession, political instabilities, internal turmoil, and terrorism. They considerably affect inbound tourism flows and consequently the tourism industry (Fabry & Zeghni, 2019). When tourism destinations are well managed, skill development can provide important benefits to local communities and contribute directly or indirectly to nature conservation (Sedaghat et al., 2015). Tourism stakeholders in destinations are responsible for sustainable tourism planning, policies, actions, and outcomes. During the phase of reconstruction and returning to normal activities, the promotion of destination resilience and

the adoption of ethical and responsible behaviour are the two key skills. Lessons may be learned about the strengths and weaknesses revealed during the crisis and there may be a review of errors committed that should be avoided in future. Even more importantly, the acknowledgement of these shortcomings will truly raise the stakeholders' support and confidence. Training sessions, as well as coaching and mentoring, are interventions that could be designed specifically with the goal of developing communication skills of managers, as well top management, to deal with the public and media nature of the crisis (Lalonde, 2014). Therefore, educational and training programs are of great importance. Main priorities are to minimise the negative economic, socio-cultural, and environmental impacts of tourism through awareness raising and more effective management of resources and infrastructure and to develop alternative forms of tourism that will have less impact on ecosystems than the '3S tourism' (sea, sand and sun) model. Emphasis is on raising the awareness of all the stakeholders, introducing green incentives, adopting standards and strategic plans that take into account all aspects, enforcing sanctions for non-compliance and rewarding efforts through labels and environmental charters. Triple A regarding crises and its management is presented through: crises force us to change our thinking and explore new ways of governing and doing business (awareness), combating crises in general requires effective partnerships between governments, the private sector and civil society at the global, regional, national and local levels (action); commitment to implementing the 2030 Agenda and the 17 sustainable development goals by making progress on the global roadmap for a more inclusive and sustainable future, enabling the world to respond better to future crises (agenda).

Croatia, for instance, by developing the special interest tourism (e.g., rural, cultural, gastro, nautical...) should respond to the specific needs of specialized tourism segments by creating unique experiences through responsible and sustainable tourism based on protected nature and local culture. As a sustainable alternative to mass summer tourism, SRT should help address the key challenges of Croatian tourism: extreme seasonality and concentration in coastal areas, sustainability issues and low tourist expenditures. Crisis represents a chance for special interest tourism, which disperse tourist demand from the coast to the continent: e.g., rural and agrotourism, which also strengthen local economies, offering the possibility of marketing agricultural products. Ecotourism also shows a tendency to grow because tourists will avoid crowds when traveling and choose destinations in protected areas that allow distance and isolation (Kravarscan, 2020). It can be concluded that the crisis also can be a positive opportunity as it can be a basis for innovation, reset and a new beginning - this has the potential for development tourism on SRT values.

The current COVID-19 pandemic has drastically changed the tourism industry and the strategies and policies on how to deal with crisis situations. Moreover, it also created an opportunity for a greener and more sustainable tourism development. The crisis made tourism almost non-existent, and by starting from scratch, destinations

can implement new policies that can steer them towards sustainability and a greener environment. “Rebuilding destinations and getting the tourism system back up and running, stronger, more sustainable and more resilient, will require a concerted and integrated effort by government across policy areas and levels, and with the private sector” (OECD, 2021). Backed up by the government and the private sector, rebuilding destinations and restoring the tourism system can lead towards a more sustainable and resilient industry. Various destinations recover at different speeds and in order to mitigate the potential consequences this can have for the tourism industry, it is important to prioritise destination management and develop a long-term plan and strategy. “The importance of effective governance and destination management, including marketing and product development, has been increasingly underlined in country strategies to promote sustainable tourism” (OECD, 2021). Therefore, teamwork is of crucial importance in managing destinations to be more sustainable.

CONCLUSION

All things considered, the destination management must act responsibly in order to become sustainable in the long run and, not only set an example for other destinations, but also reap the numerous economic, social, and environmental benefits of sustainable development. Such development minimizes the negative effects of the already established socio-economic system and positively impacts the local natural and social heritage. Acting responsibly means preserving natural resources of a destination as well as being prepared for potential crises and long-term recovery-processes. Responsible-sustainable tourism offers an opportunity to act in line with nature and to recognize what is truly important.

Furthermore, emerging crises pose an opportunity for reimagining the tourism industry and existing policies so as to achieve important environmental goals. Responsible recovery leads to a better future. In spite of the negative impact emergency situations have, one needs to adopt the stance that every situation, no matter positive or negative, is a chance to increase knowledge, reassess the already set rules and redirect the management to a more sustainable future. Since it may take years to establish sustainability, it is important to begin with the process of transformation as soon as possible and to raise awareness of how the existing non-sustainable tourism system cannot be maintained. Sustainable management contributes not only to the environment and local communities, but to economy as well, and in order to reap the benefits of responsible behaviour and sustainable tourism, destination managers need to constantly work on educating themselves and their team to improve the quality of destinations and to mitigate the effects of emergency crises.

Economies and communities cannot possibly thrive when nature is suffering. Therefore, sustainable tourism should be the new norm and not only an aspect of the industry. Changing our actions and attitudes might not be easy, but only through

cooperation and advocating for the common good can we inspire others to follow suit and better our future.

This article highlights that tourism has outgrown its limits in many places around the world, and local communities are suffering as a result. Crowded places like Venice, Barcelona or Reykjavik are the result of unsustainable development. The need for tourism growth continues constantly because the dependence of local communities on tourism “locks” them into a system in which they survive solely off this industry and its related branches. Such a view of tourism is part of the cultural ideology of constant, never-ending growth, and tourism is an important pillar in the campaign to achieve that goal. However, in recent times more sustainable forms of tourism have started developing throughout Europe. Such has also been the case in Croatia, where isolated cottages, nautical tourism, as well as camps that allow social distancing and offer an active vacation in nature have already emerged as a very popular model for tourists from Germany, Slovenia, Austria, and neighbouring Central European countries, who rushed to take their place under the sun as soon as the borders opened. It would be worthwhile to conduct future research on this topic, which could benefit not only the tourism industry in Croatia, but also in other tourist destinations throughout Europe.

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MIGRATION-CAUSED QUALITATIVE CHANGES IN HUMAN POTENTIAL OF THE STATES IN THE TERRITORIAL MIGRATION LABOUR MARKET “UKRAINE – POLAND – GERMANY”

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Abstract

The paper deals with political and economic dimension of the quality changes in human's potential within territorial migration labour market (TMLM) – a stable polycentric system of labour's force turnover, which geographically combines the territories

of two countries (Ukraine and Germany) with the potential impact of cross-border one (Poland). In circumstances of Ukraine's war with Russia, Ukrainians are primarily focused on these countries while looking for temporary asylum, obtaining a European educational document, getting employed, emigration.

The method of principal components is used for finding out the system-forming factors of the territorial migration labour market. This makes it possible to identify the relevant prerequisites for qualitative changes in human potential at the levels of the individual, households and macro-level. Depending on the depth of asymmetry in the development of the territorial migration labour market of participating countries and the nature of the migration policy, the donor country, especially at the macro-level, will irreversibly suffer from qualitative losses. Preventing them and mitigating these effects is the task of donor country policy. Instead, solving the problem of the qualitative losses of immigrants and their families becomes more a task for the host country. An important and indispensable tool in this task is entrepreneurship, especially social one.

In addition, the state program of Ukraine's reconstruction after the Victory should take into consideration the vector of return of its citizens and strengthening of its human capital. This should happen not only due to the patriotism of Ukrainians, but also through the implementation of the system of concrete measures to support small and medium businesses, quality educational trajectories, flexible governance practices, restoring trust among people and ensuring security of life and self-development.

Key words: *State Policy of Donor-Countries and Recipient-Countries, Labor Migration, Territorial Migration Labor Market (TMLM), Qualitative Changes in Human Potential, Ukraine, Germany, Poland, Asynchrony (Nonlinearity) of the World Order, Reconstruction of Ukraine After the Victory.*

INTRODUCTION

Migration has become an integral part of the globalized world. As a result of the systemic crisis and the war with Russia, Ukraine has intensified its status as a donor-country. Today, almost all countries provide support programs for Ukrainians who were able to leave the country looking for/in search for temporary asylum, continuation of their studies and/or research, getting employed or permanent emigration. But Poland and Germany remain a priority for Ukrainians. Features of migration aspirations in Europe is stipulated by deepening of economic asymmetry of development, military-political conflicts, liberalization of visa regimes (and at the same time necessity of making compulsory regulatory decisions aimed at increasing national, epidemiological security), imbalances of labour markets, increasing competition for labour resources. In such circumstances, countries task is to obtain the maximum benefits from objective migration processes at minimum losses [Brzozowski, 2006, p. 473]. At the same time, the main valuable criterion should remain the right of every migrant worker for harmonious human development, decent work, access to the benefits of modern civilization, guaranteeing respect for human and labour rights, "acceptance" of an immigrant as an equal in a new society. That's why the state program of Ukraine's reconstruction after the Victory should take into consideration the vector for return of its citizens and strengthening of its human capital. This should

happen not only due to the patriotism of Ukrainians, but also through the implementation of the system of concrete measures to support small and medium businesses, quality educational trajectories, flexible governance practices, restoring trust among people and ensuring security of life and self-development.

Peculiarities/special features of state migration policies of recipient-countries, differences in mentality of citizens and migrants, as well as other objective reasons are the characteristics of a separate territorial migration system. This creates dual polycentric labour markets, where the peculiarities of the turnover of labour within such markets are formed. In general, due to the asymmetry of world development, one of the countries becomes a donor and faces some qualitative losses of human potential. At the same time other countries turn into recipients. The recipient-country falls into the trap of social tensions due to the urban overpopulation, emergence of potential conflicts because of interethnic or interfaith issues, differences in mentality, and imperfections in the migration legislation. Therefore, it is necessary to identify mechanisms of functioning of territorial migration labour markets (TMLMs). The potential consequences for both countries should be taken into account.

Ukraine has become one of the most active donors of human resources in Europe in recent decades. Diligence, professional skills and abilities, commitment to European values, the similarity of mentality – these characteristics have resulted in competition among EU Member states, Canada and the United States for Ukrainian labor and educational migrants.

Historical, geographical, political, socio-economic reasons have led to the formation of sustainable migration flows and corridors. One of these flows connects Ukraine with Germany, and geographically it goes through Poland. The systematic nature of the migration vector “Ukraine – Germany” and the established patterns of redistribution of migration potential within this direction give a reason to speak about its viability and further development. Considering the influence of Poland, including as a competitor for the labour force, students and young scientists as well as the identification of differences in the migratory labour markets, it is possible to investigate deeper the possible qualitative changes in human potential.

The purpose of the study is to identify multilevel trends in qualitative changes in Ukraine’s human potential, caused by the formation of the Ukrainian-German migration market, and to seek same opportunities for social entrepreneurship (SE) to prevent them. To achieve this goal, a wide range of issues were investigated:

- setting the trend of migration processes and some features of the migration policy of Germany and Poland;
- identification of factors of “attraction” and “ejection” in the Ukrainian-German TMLM taking into account the influence of the transit market in Poland;
- systematization of qualitative changes in the human potential of Ukraine.
- identifying specific features of the use of migration work of Ukrainians and on this basis systematization of qualitative changes in human potential at different levels;

some opportunities of the SE to prevent the consequences of these changes have been identified.

The main hypothesis of the study is that the qualitative loss of human potential, especially at the level of migrants and households, is caused by the peculiarities of each TMLM, which can be adjusted by improving the state migration policy of donor countries and implementation of programs of human capital preservation for each TMLM. Some possibilities of the SE should be considered/evaluated/studied among the measures to prevent human potential losses.

1. MATERIALS AND METHODS

Identifying the causes of population migration, including labour, vastly determine the nature of qualitative changes in human potential. In the interdisciplinary discourse of migration research, numerous publications are devoted to the search for patterns of migration, its causes, and consequences.

In the discourse of migration studies of the search for patterns of migration, its causes and consequences numerous studies are devoted. In particular, Zelinsky (1971) relates migration primarily to demographic processes. Sceldon (1997) extends the approach and calls labour demand and development necessity as one of the important determinants. De Haas (2014) explains migration by the existence of a gap between the desire of the population to have access to goods and the opportunities to obtain them. This approach, in the context of human development, resonates with the concept of Amartia Sen (1993) that formation of the population's well-being as compliance of human potential and possibilities, which give external environment. In later work, de Haas and a team of authors [de Haas et al., 2018] developed a comprehensive approach to the migration study. In particular, it indicates, that it is important to distinguish between causes of migration at different levels: global, international, domestic and regional, where inequalities in development can lead to displacement. At the same time, two-thirds of all movements in the world is labour migration [UN DESA, 2019a; ILO, 2018]. This division is of particular importance in the study of the different levels of migration-caused qualitative changes in human potential.

According to research by Ukrainian scholars [IDSS 2018], socio-economic inequalities in development, especially labour and educational migration, are among the first reasons for migration. Even E. Ravenstein (1885) and J. Hicks (1932) pointed to the primary role of wage differences in stimulating human capital mobility. However, in later studies have been found that the reasons are not as unambiguous, as residents of the poorest countries do not have the resources to move abroad [Hatton and Williamson, 1998, 2003]. And the relationship between the number of labour migrants and their country's poverty rate is parabolic by nature [Massey et al., 1998; Hatton and Williamson, 1998]. Even more complex reasons of the formation of migration systems are named by Ukrainian scientists [Sadova et al., 2013]: the sustainability

of migration entities, the maturity of the labour market and economic relations, access to labour and others.

Academic discourse of political science contains evidence that migration processes, as an objective indicator of nonlinearity of the world order, are political by nature and caused by the specifics of public policy of the country, where the motivation for migration is born, and purposeful political practices of the countries, interested in the new human capital. [Bezugly, Nagornyak, Pachos, 2020].

An unstable political system is vulnerable to the loss of human capital. Political scientists are eager to find out the reasons of the migration of Ukrainians and their search lies within the study of political system of the donor country. Thus, P. Bezugly, [Bezugly, 2019] argues that in a systemic crisis in the country the intensification of external factors that cause emigration of the best through specific individual proposals and opportunities for those who are focused on success (professional growth, quality education) and medical services, favorable conditions for starting a business, decent employment) is expected. In hybrid societies and political systems with economies in transition, economic and social factors of public policy will have the greatest impact on the formation of motivations and migration. The more difficult the socio-economic situation of the certain stratum of the population is, the more representatives of labor migrants this stratum has. Their personal motivations are based on (seasonal earnings, loyal tax system for small businesses, accumulation of money to buy real estate in their country or financial support to relatives). In case of state power changes in transitional systems, social and economic factors of migration will give way (concede) to political ones, which will promote forced migration of the political elite, although its impact on the development of the donor state may remain unaltered. The factor of war in migration processes is one more interdisciplinary research which is being widely studied [Nagornyak, 2017; Parkhomenko 2022].

In the context of globalization and partial liberalization of movements, centres of world (or continental) development have become more accessible for employees from different countries, and the motives for deciding on labour migration have become more complicated. Such decisions can be affected by the comparison of the taxation system, social protection, and work and living environments for the migrant and his or her family. This approach is inherent in synthetic migration theory [Massey, 1990]. According to this approach, the decision on migration is made at the household level and aims to maximize individual income and minimize the risks. The decision can also be influenced by many situational, behavioural factors, and the family's efforts to diversify risks [de Haas, 2010]. According to the approach of Stark and Bloom (1985), a person's sense of deprivation in incomes in comparison with the social group to which he or she is included may be a stimulating factor of migration. Moreover, the migration decision is not individual but collective (within the household). It has also been proven that decisions on migration of scholars are influenced by the tax rates in the destination countries [Akcigit et al., 2016].

The study [Kněžáčková & Volejníková, 2015] demonstrates the impact of unemployment and household incomes on migration decisions, as well as the limiting impact of transaction costs associated with migration movements.

In this context, it should be noted that the differentiation of social security systems and social protection systems in different countries has begun to have a greater impact on migration decisions. The amount of benefits provided by the social insurance system can be a stimulating factor if it includes a function of protection against social risks in addition to higher wages. Therefore, the study of TMLM markets should take into account additional migration risks, in particular the risks of poverty in the country of destination. Obviously, that in the origin country, they are high enough as ejecting factors.

In our view, the intensity of migration flows, including labour, their orientation may also be conditioned by past political and economic ties – for example, colonial ones (I. Walerstein's *theory of world-systems*); previous migration waves that create information exchange systems, capital and form the diaspora and cultural centres (*theories of migration networks, social networks*). According to the *theory of cumulative cause and effect relations, and the basic principles of gravity theory*, migration potential is increasing: each new migrant increases the likelihood appearance of the next due to ties between compatriots, within families. Therefore, all these patterns should be taken into account to some extent in the study of migration labour markets and their impact on human potential changes.

According to the approach of M. Piore (1979), the founder of the dual labour market theory, the primary reason for deciding on labour migration is not so much the shortcomings and underdevelopment of the donor country's labour market as the activation and peculiarities of labour demand in the destination country, which can solve the problem of labour shortages, including the highly skilled. In this way, not only the force of "ejection" but also the greater degree of "attraction" is acting. Although the Piore theory has received some criticism (for example, Wachter, 1974), it has, along with others, underpinned the concept of labour market segmentation. Segmentation of the labour market can occur on various grounds, one of which can be particularly important in the discourse of migrant labour markets. According to the theory of ethnic enclave [Portes and Bach, 1985], the migrations of individual nationalities form "parallel" labour markets, which mostly operate in the grey area. In our view, such processes are quite dangerous, but they will be formed in those labour markets where the migrations of individual nationalities are widespread, the migration policy is liberal, while the receptive nature of the titular nation to other ethnic groups is, on the contrary, conservative and restrictive. Therefore, this approach also should be taken into account.

In the context of the study of the impact of the transnational labour market in Poland, it is important to refer to the work of Okolski (2001), whose research shows the processes of marginalization of temporary migrants both in the host society and in the

country of origin. Such migrants are characterized by higher mobility, easier to move to other countries, but may also have some losses in qualification.

Therefore, due to the “gravitational” forces of “ejection – attraction”, as well as many other reasons, *TMLM* are formed, which are characterized by all features of any local or national labour markets. However, at the same time, such labour markets are characterized by *polycentricity* – combinations in one characteristic of several national labour markets and duality – by the formation of separate segments of the labour market. The polycentricity of the *TMLM* leads to the formation of an “imbalance” of forces, and may manifest itself in the bigger or lesser asymmetry of the two centres of attraction (for example, the national labour markets of the two countries), as well as in the indirect influence of the cross-border territory (of another country). Based on the above-mentioned theoretical references, the definition of *TMLM* is based on the *geospheric approach, the theory of the dual labour market and the theory of migration systems. TMLM is a system of relatively stable connections and regulatory mechanisms in the labour field within territorial migration systems. The characteristics of the TMLM primarily are caused by the socio-economic differences in the territorial development, the historical-economic reasons and institutional factors of public policy, the product of which TMLM is. The emergence of TMLM should be preceded by the formation of conditions for the appearance and intensification of migration flows. Such processes according to synthetic theory [Messey, 1990] in the modern conditions of globalization and deepening regionalization is, in particular, a consequence of the uneven economic development that leads to objective shifts in the labour markets, as well as to the search for the household’s “best strategy” for well-being. The implementation of such decisions often leads to changes in the qualitative characteristics of actual and potential participants in the labour markets in the present and the future. Qualitative losses of the existing labour force during migration may be reflected in the inconsistency between employee’s qualifications and performed job (“over qualification”, which most often occurs at *TMLM*). Also, this leads to a decrease in migrant’s incomes. Despite the efforts of governments and international organizations, the problem of discrimination against labour migrants still exists. This concerns wages, conditions and labour protection, the availability of unregistered employment (especially in some countries, which are characterized by a quite liberal migration policy). For example, in Germany, the wages of people with their own migration experience are 250 € and that of Ukrainian migrants is 350€ less than the average in all households [SB, Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund, 2020].*

Qualitative losses may relate to a reduction in the reproduction of human potential and a deterioration of its characteristics in the donor country. A wide range of loss manifestations can occur on a personal level: from feelings of discomfort and to loss of identity, health and more.

In the context of SE, this research is based on social networks theory [Granovetter, 1973], according to which the inclusion of a migrant in the social network supports

him, especially in the early periods, increasing his chances of getting a better job. Entrepreneurship as a form of realization of the immigrant's potential is one of the ways to adapt more quickly to new conditions, given the fact, that active people, which accept risks, are usually prone to movements [Kosała, 2016]. SE acts as a form of realization of social responsibility of business to the community, united either on a territorial basis or on other grounds – for example, by migrant's origin country.

Methodically, the study relies on the principal components method. In the context of large data sets, it solves the problem of: 1) reducing the number of factors in the factor model (reduction); 2) building the relationship structure and classifying factors in the model. When conducting factor analysis, rotation techniques were applied to facilitate interpretation of the data.

It should be noted that the factor model included household spending on education in Ukraine. This has been done for several reasons: 1) based on estimations of International Labour Organization experts, 27% of the savings of Ukrainian migrants are used for children's education [IOM, 2016a]; 2) on the theory of cumulative causality of family migration, the likelihood of moving children who have been educated in Ukraine to the country of residence of their migrant parents is significant; therefore, the accumulation of human capital, investment in it, is taking place in Ukraine, and its use – already in another country; 3) According to the neoclassical theory of human capital [Sjaastad, 1962], the growth of high qualified migration leads to an increase in education investments.

2. RESULTS

Ukraine has been in the list of countries with the largest diaspora for many decades. Particularly in the last century, Ukraine has been characterized by significant migration movements – both voluntary and forced. In recent decades, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic declaim and, later, the liberalization of borders and visa regimes have been the impetus for the activation of migration. In this case, the western regions of the country are traditionally migration-oriented, usually for labour reasons. In 2019, 5.9 million Ukrainians (2.17% of all emigrants) live outside Ukraine. 81% of them are localized in European countries [UN DESA, 2019a]. Ukrainians are most interested in closely located labour markets – Russia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, as well as countries with relatively liberal migration laws and simplified naturalization procedures – Italy, Spain, Portugal. Germany does not belong to the countries of mass migration of Ukrainians, but at the same time, the migration flow is quite stable. 12% of Ukrainians residing in the EU are concentrated in Germany [IOM, 2016b].

In 2015, Germany became the leader among European countries in terms of number of the population born outside the country. In 2019 the total number of migrants was 13.1 million, or 15.7% of the total population of the country (for comparison, in Europe – 11%, in the world – 2.5%) [UN DESA, 2019b]. According to the Federal

Statistical Office, in Germany lives 131 thousand citizens of Ukraine (as of December 31, 2018) and 323 thousands of ethnic Ukrainians (0.4% of the total population) [SB, Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund, 2020]. In 2018, there were 255,000 Ukrainians in Germany; the number of annual official arrivals to the country are on average double the number of disposals [BMF, 2019]. In dynamics, the number of Ukrainians in this country in 2019 has increased 15 times more since 1990 [UN DESA, 2019b]. Especially rapid migration growth occurred in the 1990s, with some recovery after 2014, with growth rates in average 10% annually.

According to the United Nations [UN DESA, 2019a], the number of Ukrainians in Poland in 2019 was 218.7 thousand people and increased by 5.9% compared to 2015. At the same time, according to the Polish evaluation studies, at the end of 2015, 283.7 thousand citizens of Ukraine, aged 18, and 455 thousand in 2016 were permanently and temporarily resident in Poland [GUS, 2018]. Since then, the additional migration balance of Ukrainians arriving in Poland for permanent residence is 1.3-1.9 thousand people annually [GUS, 2019].

In the polycentric TMLM for Germany, Poland plays the role of the donor. According to the Polish Statistical Office, 342.7 thousands of Poles immigrated to Germany since 1991 and the annual average loss (negative migration balance) of Poland is 10 thousand people [GUS, 2019]. At the same time, according to German statistics, the annual increase of Polish citizens in its territory is 10% and in 2018 the number of Poles in Germany amounted to 1.668 million people respectively [SB, Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit, 2020].

In such circumstances, Poland is forced to carry out a favourable migration policy and attract a sufficiently high-quality Ukrainian labour force to replenish the ranks of workers and meet the demand in the labour market. Accordingly, Poland issued 238.3 thousand of work permits for Ukrainians in 2018 (73% of all permits), of which more than 50% – for more than a year [MRPPS, 2019]. Importantly, in the context of this research, the highest concentration of permits for Ukrainians is in the central and western regions of Poland (in particular, in the Lubusz Voivodeship – more than 85%). Also, employment under simplified procedures is much more common: seasonal work permits, applications of foreigner's assignment (up to 2018 - declarations of intent to outsource) to citizens of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine [Lypchuk, 2017]. Such applications provide for short-term labour migration (up to 1 year), but their number is 6.6 times higher than the number of regular work permits [MRPPS 2019]. Thus, in 2018, 1,446 million of declarations of assignment for work were approved for Ukrainians (91.4% of all) and 119.9 thousand of permits for seasonal work (98.8%) [MRPPS, 2019]. The high likelihood of illegal employment of Ukrainians in Poland, which can take various forms of seasonal, circular, circulating, episodic, cannot be overlooked, since the law allows a foreigner to stay for 3 months without giving any official grounds. Such volumes can only be approximately estimated.

Therefore, Poland is trying to pursue a policy of competition the labour shortage by attracting labour migrants, while this large cohort of Ukrainians creates a strong reserve for replenishing Germany's labour market. In this context, Poland plays the role of a transit labour market. The acquired migration, including labour, experience, additional skills, proximity to countries contribute to this. The barrier remains the knowledge of the language and the institutional obstacles of the German selection policy on labour migration, which is, however, gradually being eased.

Germany has been particularly interested in Ukrainians in recent years for several reasons:

1. geopolitical: since the beginning of the military conflict in 2014, the eastern-oriented vector of migration interests of Ukrainians (Russian Federation) has changed in priority to a western one;
2. socio-demographic: a significant influence on the stable dynamics of migration flows to Germany has a migration potential formed in previous years. Thus, of all issued to Ukrainians in 2018 residence's permits, 46% of them were because of the family's reunification [BMF, 2019];
3. structural and economic: the attractiveness of the German labour market for Ukrainians;
4. cross-border market: the special importance of the transit labour market of Poland.

The combination of these factors and the environment of formation of the Ukrainian-German TMLM determines its specific features, which are manifested in quantitative-qualitative (for example, structural) differences in labour demand, other labour costs, etc. TMLM traits are formed, that are not inherent to the national labour markets of the donor country and destination country. In fact, within the territorial borders of Germany, there are discrepancies in employment and unemployment characteristics for migrant workers from different countries. For the research, an array of indicators is formed, which form the factors of TMLM. The influence of these factors will determine the specificity and orientation of flows (especially migration, as well as others). The intensity and direction of some of these flows may indicate a qualitative loss of human potential or the possibility of increasing quality.

The indicators characterizing the presence of Ukrainians in Germany, including for employment, as well as comparing them with some indicators of the Ukrainian labour market, were concluded in 4 blocks. Dynamic series of indicators for 2007-2017 has been formed to build the model. For the principal components method, factor analysis was performed for each block. The analysis identified two factors in each of the blocks (three in the first). The results of the analysis are shown in table 1.

Table 1. Blocks of indicators, which characterize the peculiarities of Ukrainian-German TMLM, and the results of its factorial analysis

Blocks of indicators	Indicators	Factor loadings		
		F ₁	F ₂	S
1. Demographic and institutional	General quantity of Ukrainian population in Germany, persons		0,887	
	Population number of Ukrainian origin with a migration background* in Germany, thousands of people	0,939		
	Population number of Ukrainian origin with personal migration background in Germany, thousands of people	0,986		
	Number of Ukrainians, who stay in Germany, accordingly to work permissions issued, persons		0,965	
	Naturalization rate of Ukrainians' in Germany, the number of naturalizations relatively to the number of foreigners with 8 or more years of stay			-0,992
	Contribution of main components in dispersion within block, %	59,2	23,4	16,0
2. Possibilities and deprivations of migration labour market in Germany	Fraction of Ukrainians 25-35years old without professional qualification among the population with own migration experience, %	0,904		
	Fraction of Ukrainians 25-35years old with university education among the population with own migration experience, %		0,916	
	Differentiation of levels of Ukrainian's economic activity on the German labour market and economic activity of people with own migration experience, p.p.	0,844		
	Differentiation of the level of employment of Ukrainian's on the German labour market and level of employment of people with own migration experience, p.p.	0,929		
	Differentiation of the level of Ukrainian's unemployment on the German labour market and level of unemployment of people with own migration experience, p.p.	-0,907		
	Differentiation of levels of Ukrainian's economical inactivity on the German labour market and the same indicator among people with own migration experience, p.p.	-0,818		
	Contribution of main components in dispersion within block, %	71,8	17,1	

3. Financial and safety	Correlation of Ukrainian's employee wage in Germany and the average wage in Ukraine's economy	-0,946	
	Fraction of Ukrainians with own migration experience in Germany, who are at risk of poverty, %	-0,832	
	Fraction of working Ukrainians with own migration experience in Germany, who are at risk of poverty, %		-0,825
	Household's expenses in Ukraine on education, \$ millions, based on commercial as for December of the respective year	0,857	
	Transfers of Ukrainian migrants from Germany to Ukraine, \$ millions		0,924
	Contribution of main components in dispersion within block, %	67,7	20,5
4. Conjecture of TMLM	Differentiation of the level of Ukrainian's economic activity on the German labour market and level of economic activity of people with own migration experience, p.p.	0,953	
	Differentiation of the level of employment of Ukrainian's on the German labour market and level of employment of people with own migration experience, p.p.	0,980	
	Differentiation of the level of Ukrainian's unemployment on the German labour market and level of unemployment of people with own migration experience, p.p.	-0,852	
	Differentiation of levels of Ukrainian's economical inactivity on the German labour market and the same indicator among people with own migration experience, p.p.	-0,937	
	Differentiation of the level of Ukrainian's economic activity on the German labour market and level of economic activity of population in Ukraine, p.p.		0,986
	Differentiation of the level of employment of Ukrainian's on the German labour market and level of employment of the population in Ukraine, p.p.		0,857
	Differentiation of the level of Ukrainian's unemployment on the German labour market and level of unemployment of population in Ukraine, p.p.	0,726	
	Differentiation of levels of Ukrainian's economical inactivity on the German labour market and the same indicator among the population in Ukraine, p.p.		-0,986
	Contribution of main components in dispersion within block, %	65,7	25,7

Source: Authors' results.

* population with migration background – persons, who had either personal migration experience or at least one of the person's parents had such an experience

In the next stage, all indicators characterizing the effect of the first factor (F1) were included in the analysis. As a result, the factors that characterize the differentiation of the labour market status of Ukrainians in Germany and the labour market of all migrants, as well as the level of education of Ukrainians, remain. Therefore, in the mechanism of formation of TMLM, the leading role belongs to the factors of “attraction”. Thus, in-depth analysis made it possible to identify the main system-forming factors of Ukrainian-German TMLM and the relevant prerequisites for qualitative changes in human potential.

2.1. Socio-demographic and institutional characteristics (Block 1 from Table 1)

The main factors in this block are Ukrainian population with a migration background and personal migration background (factor loadings 0.94 and 0.99 accordingly). This is a consequence of the peak of migration activity of Ukrainians in the 1990s that led to a dynamic rate of naturalization, which required living in Germany for at least 8 years. Germany’s geographical remoteness, migration policy and living conditions in it, shape the specific of the socio-demographic composition of migrant families and the formation of cumulative migration potential. The composition of Ukrainian migrant households is characteristic. In 2018, the average Ukrainian household was larger, but with fewer workers than, for example, Polish families in Germany [SB, Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund, 2020]. The migration rates of young people are also high – among the 11 countries with the most mass migration from Ukraine, Germany ranks second in terms of the fraction of young people under 34 [SSSU, 2017]. This creates the basis for the demographic reproduction of the Ukrainian population in Germany [Baranyak, 2016]. There are high rates of migration of Ukrainians due to the family’s reunification. At TMLM, this reflects in lower rates of economic activity and a higher risk of poverty.

2.2. Opportunities and deprivation of the labour market. Conjuncture TMLM (Block 2 and 4 from Table 1)


2.2.1. Educational and qualification features

Labour migration is an objectively determined choice of a person who cannot find a decent use of his knowledge and skills at homeland. According to the results of factor analysis fraction of Ukrainians 25-35 years old with university education among the population with own migration experience is a separate factor of block 2 and explains 17.1% of the dispersion in this block. And the share of persons without professional qualifications (factor loading 0.904) together with the lower levels of economic activity of Ukrainians in the German labor market is the main factor in this block (71.8% variance in the block). This is an additional confirmation of higher volumes of family migration. A comparative analysis should be used to assess the depth of loss of educational-professional potential. The specifics of this analysis include: 1) a comparison of the educational structure of migrants in general and by country of destination; 2)

a conformity assessment of the migrant's qualifications and the level of work he or she will perform in the country of destination [Sadova et al., 2020]. In dynamics, the wave of labour migration of highly educated Ukrainians to Germany came in the early 2010s, when the specific weight of migrants with higher education reached 90%. In the future, the part of people with higher education, who were going to Germany was still higher than in average. Such a structure of labour migration indicates existence among migrants, persons with the necessary set of traits, social competences for entrepreneurial activity, and able to carry out effective social communications.

The likelihood of loss of professional-qualification potential of employees is estimated by comparing the level of qualifications of Ukrainian migrants and the complexity of the work they do in Germany, as well as by analyzing professional areas of activity (Fig. 1).

Fig 1. Employees professional areas of activity in Ukraine, labour migrants in general and in Germany in 2015-2017 years, %



Source: built based on State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU, 2017)


In this perspective, we can conclude that in the German labour market, some Ukrainians are expanding their capabilities compared to other countries of their work. Germany offers them fewer jobs in the simplest professions. Along with the relatively high rates of arrival for educational and family reasons, these tendencies indicate an increase in the human potential of Ukrainian origin with higher education in Germany in the present and the future.

2.2.2. Market conditions and geographical (cross-border) features

Typically, migrant workers are characterized by higher labour market activity in the host country than the authentic population, which indicates the prevailing reasons

for their arrival in the country. However, in the context of the Ukrainian-German TMLM, there are other trends: the highest activity among the surveyed population is noted by the Poles, and the lowest – by the Ukrainians (Fig. 2). Such patterns are largely explained by the proximity of Germany and Poland. After all, similar features characterize the work of Ukrainians in neighbouring Poland.


Fig. 2. Dynamics of a) employment rate; b) unemployment rate of different groups of population by migration status and origin on the labour market of Germany in 2006-2018 years, %



Source: built based on the Federal Statistical Office [SB, Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund, 200]

The estimation of the stability of the TMLM in comparison with other labour markets, its sensitivity to risks and threats, give the indicators of variation in labour force participation of different migrant backgrounds in the German labour market as a common environment (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Indicators of variability (oscillation coefficients) of participation levels of labour force of different migration origin in the labour market of Germany*Source: calculated based on the Federal Statistical Office [SB, Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund, 2020].



Source: calculated based on the Federal Statistical Office [SB, Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund, 2020].

* oscillation coefficient shows relative fluctuations in a row of years' (2006-2018). Its higher value indicates bigger variability, instability of an indicator. The highest values of variations are inherent for the labour market of Ukrainians and indicate instability TMLM and respectively sensitivity to risks.

A distinctive feature of Ukrainian migration in Germany is the much lower levels of economic activity of Ukrainians. In fact, it is on the verge of the lowest values among European countries. One explanation for this is the large volume of family and educational migration. Therefore, they are a potential Ukrainian labour force in the German labour market, and in the context of the TMLM, this forms the constancy of the trend of non-return to Ukraine. The downside to the lack of activity of Ukrainians is the high risk of poverty among them.

Thus, there is a clear difference between the countries of origin of the TMLM, both in terms of economic activity and sectoral distribution of employment (Ukrainians are more involved in trade, hospitality, services, and Poles instead in manufacturing and construction). According to the concept of a dual labour market, this outlines the formation of the primary and secondary sectors of the TMLM. At the same time, due to Germany's filtration policy, this trend is not as apparent as in other host countries. Thus, as of December 31, 2018, in Germany, about 20% of all current employment permits of Ukrainians at that time were Blue Cards (employment permit for highly skilled workers) [Graf, 2019].

The transboundary impact of Ukrainian-Polish TMLM is significant but not prevalent. As of September 3, 2019, the Personnel Service listed on the website that there exist high risks of Ukrainians movements to Germany. However, it is unlikely this flow will be massive, and furthermore uncontrolled. Specificity of the Ukrainian-Polish TMLM is very different – it is dominated by short-term, seasonal, non-qualified, circulating work. According to World Bank experts, flows of migrants between neighbouring countries are much less qualified than average; they have a 65% lower qualification coefficient [WBG, 2018]. Another important factor in Ukrainians choice between Germany and Poland is not only the distance of movement, but also linguistic, cultural affinity and social ties. This to some extent alleviates the issue of social adaptation


even in the case of long-term emigration, while in Germany this issue will be more acute for Ukrainians. There is an opinion that the practical emphasis in German migration policy is shifted to a better “adaptation” of immigrants than to their full integration, as declared [Cieślińska, 2012]. Therefore, the opportunities of the Polish labour market to supply the Ukrainian labour force to the German labour market are somehow limited. To a greater extent, this influence reflects in the further movement of the Poles to Germany and the need to overcome the labour market deficit at the expense of the Ukrainians.

2.3. Financial and security features (Block 3 from Table 1)

The results of factor analysis within the block 3 (Table 1) show a stronger influence of factor 1 (67.7% variance in the block). This factor includes higher earnings of Ukrainians in Germany compared to their motherland (factor loading -0.946), as well as the risks of their poverty (factor loading -0.832), in particular due to low economic activity. Let’s analyze these factors in more detail.

Among the important factors that usually attract migrants are high wages. In Germany, the incomes of Ukrainian migrants at 6.15 exceeds the average wage in Ukraine. If to assume that Ukrainians working in the respective years would move to Poland or Ukraine, they would receive lower incomes at times (Fig. 4).

Fig. 4. Incomes which Ukrainian labour migrants receive (or could receive in different countries, in euro)



Source: calculated based on webpages [SB, GUS, SSSU]

Fig. 4 demonstrates the relative attractiveness of the Polish and German labour markets for Ukrainians. This confirms the above-stated conclusion that Poland’s influence on the German labour market is reflected not so much in the possible mass influx of Ukrainians, but in the desire of the Poles to move to Germany. This deepens

the labour shortage and encourages the Polish authorities and employers to further promote the involvement of Ukrainians in work. This creates a sort of extra filter.

At the same time, the results of the comparison of labour markets of Germany and Poland gives a reason for conclusions that more highly-educated migrants are attracted to the higher economic development of the country. For those with higher qualifications, the values of productivity, standards of living, career, social security, etc., come to the fore. However, as a major factor, the wage gap is more likely to be an attractive factor for lower-qualified or unqualified labour migrants. In doing so, the question of distance between countries is also a loss factor of primary and circular movements.

As a result of identifying the system-forming factors of the Ukrainian-German TMLM, the next step in the study is the compilation of a matrix of qualitative losses and benefits of human potential at the level of Ukrainian society (macro-levels), households in Ukraine, and migrant (Table 2). Thus, the conclusion that arises is that countries with selective migration policy have greater benefits from migration, and therefore the donor country suffers losses.

Solving the problem of significant macro-level qualitative losses is a priority task for Ukraine's policy and can only be solved in a fragmentary manner by lower-level policy instruments. At the household level and personal qualitative changes are combined, but the losses are also quite significant. Not only migrants and their families but also the states, including the donor country, are interested in overcoming or mitigating them. Therefore, European governments and intergovernmental organizations are making considerable efforts to solve the problem of integrating migrants into the host society. In particular, the European Commission's 2016 Action Plan on the Integration of Migrants from Third Countries identifies 5 priority areas for integration, among it there is employment and vocational training, including the promotion and support of migrants' entrepreneurship [EC, 2016]. The toolkit for achieving such goals is diverse and an important role in this, in our view, belongs to entrepreneurship, especially social. The EU Economic and Social Committee is convinced that SE plays a decisive role in integrating migrants in key aspects of health and care, providing housing, education and training, as well as employment and social inclusion [EESC, 2018].

SE is playing an increasing role in the development of the European economy, first of all by filling a gap where traditional business does not receive sufficient profitability and state social institutions are inefficient. At the same time, having specific features and goals of the activity, SE is a special form of traditional entrepreneurship [Roelants, 2002]. It should be noted that the prevalence in the European economy of social values has led to the fact that every fourth start-up in Europe is a social enterprise [Janecek, 2018]. Therefore, trends in entrepreneurship and SE are interdependent.


Table 2. Directions, essence and conditions of establishment of qualitative changes of human potential in the context of formation specifics of formation Ukrainian-German TMLM*

Peculiarities	Levels of qualitative changes of human potential			
	Ukraine (macro-level)	Migrant's households (meso-level)	Migrant (personal level)	
Predominance of long-term, educational, family, youth migration	+ Irreversible loss of demographic potential; Loss of the people of working age; Population loss; Risks of non-return; Loss of identity	+ Expansion of possibilities of access to higher living standards for young people, who emigrated	+ Expansion of possibilities of knowledge acquisition, professional experience, including entrepreneurial, in the conditions of advanced work and management technologies; Development of social capital; Acquisition of social competencies	- Difficulties in adaptation; Some loss of contact with homeland, family, national community
Higher indicators of education and professional-qualification level of migrants	- Loss of educational potential; Growth of tension on the market of high-qualified and professional-qualification labour force	- Unjustified expectations for family development (i.e., «social lift»), low payback of investments into education for households	- Possibility to implement educational professional-qualification potential in conditions of decent work; Higher work productivity	- Necessity to build a career from the start; Risks of losing qualification; Gender discrimination in employment
Low values of illegal migration	- Increases the possibility of non-return and loss of demographic potential	- Involvement into the system of social insurance and welfare both employee and household's members (in case of migration)	- Involvement in the system of social insurance and welfare	- Difficulties with adaptation, inclusion in the labour market
Relatively low economic activity of Ukrainians on TMLM	- Insufficient benefit from transfers; Decrease of consumer demand, investments into education	- Poverty risks and insufficient income diversification	- Possibilities of studying and retraining during the time of inactivity	- Poverty risks; Qualification loss; Gender discrimination in employment; Socio-psychological difficulties in adaptation
Growth of wages faster than migrants transfers amounts into Ukraine	+ Possibilities of involvement of investments into economic development	+ Possible increase and diversification of the incomes; Formation of a household's investment capital, including investments in human capital	+ Enhancement of motivational component of labour	-
Transboundary impact Ukrainian-Polish TMLM	- Shortage of labour force in Ukraine; Informal employment**	- Increase and diversification of the incomes	- Realization of a person's labour potential	- Possible loss of qualification, «over qualification»; Difficulties in moving to the German labour market; Marginalization of temporary migrants; Informal employment**

Source: author's research. * with colour are highlighted those conditions of occurrence and negative qualitative changes of human potential, which can be prevented with SE measures, ** informal employment has an indirect impact on Ukrainian-German TMLM and increases qualitative losses of human potential, as it reduces barriers of movement in the same sector in the other country, even though exist higher restrictive measures and controls in migration politics.


Migrants as risk-takers are more likely to be entrepreneurial. However, the realization of entrepreneurial abilities depends to a large extent on the capabilities of the host country environment. The prevalence of entrepreneurship among migrants and EU citizens cannot be fully estimated due to some differences in statistics, data is not always available for all years. We have compared this with the levels of self-employment in Germany and Poland among individuals of different nationalities (Fig. 5 and Fig. 6).

Fig. 5. Self-employment in Germany among the whole population and persons with migration experience in 2007-2018 years, %



Source: built based on the Federal Statistical Office [SB, Bevölkerung mit Migrationshintergrund, 2020]

Fig. 6. Self-employment in Poland, EU countries among citizens and migrants y 2013-2018 years, %



Source: built based on Eurostat [Eurostat, 2020]

The increase in entrepreneurial activity among Ukrainians in Germany, while its decrease in Poland, creates a reserve of entrepreneurial activity for Ukrainians, which can be realized in Germany when overcoming existing barriers. In this case, the German economy will benefit, as migrant entrepreneurs are the drivers of innovative development for its economy – 49.9% of third-country migrant start-ups were based in knowledge and technology-intensive services [NCFM, 2018]. Competition for human resources and their entrepreneurial capacity is forcing countries to improve their labour market migration policies. In 2018 in Poland was launched the pilot project «Poland Prize» for supporting foreigner's start-ups and innovative firms [OECD, 2019]. This reflected in the dynamics of the level of self-employment of migrants (Fig. 6).

Migrant entrepreneurship has some features. It will rather be directed to groups of relative to its origin (“Ethnic entrepreneurship” – enterprise, established within framework, by efforts (including employees, suppliers and clients) of certain group of immigrants and oriented to fulfil their needs [EC, 2008]), and from this point of view already bears signs of sociality. Migrant entrepreneurship acts at the same time both as an economic activity for the migrant and as a mechanism for job creation, especially for persons of related origin (71.2 % of migrants companies in Germany want to employ refugees, and 16.3 % were doing this for the last 3 years [NCFM, 2018]).

On this basis, the effectiveness of entrepreneurship, especially the “ethnic” one, will be higher if it is based on the economic culture of the ethnic group and its values. Thus, for Ukrainians, the fundamental values are the individualism of entrepreneurship and the propensity for cooperative work [Stepura, 2019], which in itself should encourage them to self-organization.

Germany is one of the countries with the most developed system of SE and its support, with has tens of thousands of such enterprises, although it does not have a single legislative stated definition [EC, 2020]. The task of ethnic migrant communities is the ability to take advantage of these benefits, and this requires the creation of a network and structural ties in the diaspora. This is an unrealized challenge for the Ukrainian community in Germany, and the activism of immigrants should become a driver for this. As a note, it should be noted that in Poland SE is much more institutionalized: national programs for the development of the social economy for 2014-2018, 2019-2023, legislative acts that define and regulate SE are being developed. At the same time, the number of enterprises of this type in Poland is 768 per 1 million inhabitants and is not far behind Germany, where there are 936 enterprises per 1 million inhabitants [EC, 2020, p. 21-22]. This is Poland's significant competitive advantage in the race for migrant's labour.

The development of SE has led to the emergence of many of its forms, each characterized by higher efficiency in a particular field. We believe that some of them (for example, social cooperatives, self-help enterprisers, socio-cultural centres, work integration enterprises, self-managed enterprises of women and eco-movements [EC, 2014; Birkhölzer, 2015]) may be especially effective in solving immigration problems

that lead to a deterioration in the qualitative characteristics of human potential at different levels.

3. DISCUSSION

Due to the continuing difficulties of economic, political, and since 2014 even military nature, Ukraine is providing a not enough systemic socio-economic policy. Ukraine is becoming a supplier of labour to stronger economic systems that compete for its labour force. In doing so, Germany applies a selective migration policy. This leads to rather high professional-qualification rates of labour migration and low volumes of illegal migration. Quite different characteristics of the Ukrainian-Polish TMLM, which are characterized by high rates of informal, illegal, short-term labour migration. The impact of the cross-border labour market will depend on the behaviour of all parties involved, so its assessment in the perspective remains a matter of debate.

Finally, the future changes in Europe's migration policy, which will follow the end of Ukraine's war with Russia, are being discussed and are not easy to predict. It will focus on preserving the EU and its impact on the world economy, tackling socio-economic and financial recovery, and further preventing uncontrolled and illegal migration, which, given the fragility of the EU structure, can do significant damage.

4. CONCLUSION

The European Union countries face the same challenges in the field of migration. Today, the EU is not a homogeneous entity and every day of Ukraine's war with Russia makes it more vulnerable. The United Kingdom, with the support of the United States, is gaining a new status that can act as an attractor in the formation of a new world order, changing the TMLM of Europe in general and the TMLM of Germany and Poland in particular.

EU policy is aimed at social economy development while respecting its core values: equal access, dignity, social justice, social responsibility and diversity. However, within the framework of the proclaimed course, each country develops its own approaches to migration policy, which causes the formation of TMLMs, each characterized by specific features. Gravitational polycentric forces are formed, which determine the qualitative characteristics of the migration flows between the two countries. Prerequisites for qualitative change arise.

Depending on the depth of asymmetry in the development of the TMLM of participating countries and the nature of the migration policy, the donor country, especially at the macro-level, will irreversibly suffer from qualitative losses. Preventing them and mitigating their effects is the task of donor country's macro policy. Instead, solving of the problem of the qualitative losses of immigrants and their families becomes more a task for the host country. An important and indispensable tool in this is entrepreneurship, especially social one. Its importance is recognized at the level of Eu-

ropean intergovernmental organizations, it is actively developing in the EU countries, and according to our research, it also plays the role of Poland's competitive advantage in the race for the labour force.

The most important task of preventing the qualitative loss of human capital of Ukraine is to maintain victory in the middle of the country and gain a new status of a victorious state in the world. Achieving these goals will be possible under the conditions of a moderate and consistent state program of Ukraine's reconstruction, which should include a deep and multi-sectoral audit, a targeted state program to support internally displaced persons and return of its citizens - forced migrants. Strengthening and restoring Ukraine's human potential must begin today on the territories beyond active war/combat zone. The return of Ukrainians should take place not only due to their patriotism, social discomfort in donor countries, forced circumstances, but also owing to the implementation of specific anti-crisis and security policies, effective post-conflict peacebuilding through the deployment of management practices in transitional justice and social administrative services, flexible educational legislation, broad instruments of public diplomacy, policies to restore trust among citizens, building "economic dialogue" at the levels of economic security, attractive government proposals to support small and medium-sized businesses, social entrepreneurship, investment practices, effective practices of governance and mediation, psychological assistance, etc. The process of rebuilding trust among people and providing security of life and self-development should involve the diaspora and sister cities via joint social activity, development of network and structural ties, sustaining of basic values of national economic culture and collective senses of Ukrainians.

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SMART CITIES` DEVELOPMENTAL CAPACITIES IN THE FIELDS OF SPATIAL PLANNING AND CONSTRUCTION - LESSONS FROM COPENHAGEN TO BELGRADE

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Abstract

This paper focuses on smart cities` capacities to improve quality of public services and decision making in all policy fields, with open data and co-production. Spatial planning and construction are chosen for research as vitally connected with economy and sustainable development¹.

Research methods are: the analysis of existing studies, the comparison of Copenhagen as smart city, and Belgrade, which can learn from good practice (case studies). Main recommendations: change in values, in priorities and patterns of behavior.

Key words: *Smart Spatial Planning, Construction, IT Applications, Participative Decision Making, Evidence Based Policy Making*

INTRODUCTION

Spatial planning and construction policies are very complex policy fields, vitally connected with economy and development, and also are very lucrative. The quality of data, their public availability, and public debates on spatial plans and construc-

¹ Serbian Ministry of Education, Science and Technology financially supported this research, through Scientific Research Plan implemented on FPS, Belgrade.

tion projects (participative creation and corrections) are of a huge importance for the quality of citizens' life in city ("First we build city, and then city build us"). (e.g.: [Gehl, 2014:]);

Copenhagen as smart city with democratic procedures, transparent way of work, good accessibility of data basis and good practice of co-production of data² (e.g.: [Fugini, Bracci, Sicilia, 2016:30]); represents good practice for these two policy fields. These lessons will be useful for Belgrade and other cities in the world. Although Belgrade uses some of IT instruments and devices in these public fields, it often misses transparency in creation of public documents and projects (rare public debates), lacks good data bases, and practice is often burdened with corruption.

1. SMART SPATIAL PLANNING MATTERS?

Denmark changed its traditional, hierarchical and centralized system of spatial planning as excessively bureaucratic, too technical and engineering. In the period from 1990 to 2010, spatial planning is decentralized, created from the bottom up as a partnership and participatory. The precondition for these changes was provided by the local government reform (2007) which meant: amalgamation of municipalities (from 270 to 98 municipalities with the increase of average population to 30,000), increasing competencies, fiscal and financial autonomy, as well as development capacities. 14 districts have merged into 5 regions. Municipalities have gained far greater independence in the field of spatial planning. Hierarchical practice in which state and districts must confirm local government plans was abolished. Denmark, like Finland, other Scandinavian countries, then the Netherlands and Germany, has opted for *a comprehensively integrated approach to planning* (e.g.: [Damsgaard 2014: 21-41]); and therefore municipal officials and servants are specially trained in integrated planning.

New planning system introduced a certain flexibility and simplified procedures. Municipalities have a major role in that process. They have the obligation to discuss the plans each 4 years, with three possibilities: just to extend them without corrections, to make some corrections and finally to make other plans (flexibility). Regions create a regional plan together with the municipalities (partnership) and it is a more basic strategic document that inspires all municipalities in the region to be innovative with their plans. Municipal plan is an important strategic and developmental instrument based on reliable and accurate data and always participatory created (good quality databases).

State creates a spatial plan in cooperation with local governments and it is in a form of strategic plan with main guidelines. State steer the development of Copenhagen as a metropolitan region (capital region), and care for: trade and sales, the regulation of the coastal zone, the water regime (implementation of the EU Water Framework

² Co-production means voluntary citizens participation in planning, designing and evaluation of public services, making possible that these services were created according citizens' needs.

Directive) and the conservation of biodiversity. It cares also about the development of the cross border region, such as the Oresund Region (includes northern Zealand and southern Sweden). (e.g.: [Damsgaard 2014:31-33]);

Copenhagen develops its planning system as contextual, opening up the questions like strategic, sustainable development, climate change, environmental protection, biodiversity, etc. In this process, the city has, like all other municipalities, the support of the Danish Association of Local Authorities. Special attention is paid to stimulation of local and regional economic development in which the city includes civil society, NGOs, business, university, etc. (e.g.: [Laage, Blok, 2020]); Copenhagen has overcome the problem of industrial decline quite well and has successfully grown into a city of service economy, reducing unemployment while raising the standard and well-being of the city. This city, like other Danish cities, pays great attention to the development of tourism, the economy of experience, sustainable and smart development which include combating climate change, commitment to green energy, smart use of IT and fostering citizen participation. (e.g.: [Agger, Poulsen, 2017]);

Copenhagen leaders focus on creating functionally mixed spaces (residential, commercial and business), and on “condensing the city” around a transport system that provides more efficient traffic, while reducing car use (relying on public transport) with the affirmation of pedestrians and cyclists.

Copenhagen has ambitiously included the goal of becoming a zero carbon city in its strategy, suppressing the use of fossil fuels and dirty technology, which raises the quality of air, water, soil, thus raising the quality of housing, work and the general standard of living. (e.g.: [Fraker 2013: 43-69]); IT sensors monitor and measure the quality of water, air and level of noise, presented them through various indicators. Copenhagen is dedicated to the production and consumption of green energy, so in that context it has built over 100 wind generators, a power plant - a waste incinerator and a biomass power plant. (e.g.: [Fraker 2013: 11-43]); There are sidewalks in the city that transform the kinetic energy from the movement of citizens into electricity, which is used to illuminate the streets.

Copenhagen has achieved results in the development of green transport, which puts it among the leaders in the world. The purchase of electric cars or the eventual use of mixed energy sources is encouraged (by subsidies), cars on gasoline and gas are taxed and cars on diesel are completely eliminated. A rich network of for-free battery chargers for electric cars has been developed. Public transport vehicles are battery-powered and functionally fit with the use of bikes (trains have a bike section). There is a sensor for identification of free parking spaces, which shortens the search for parking and reduces CO2 emissions. Sensors also identify the real flow of traffic for its more efficient regulation and direction (reduction of congestion). This city has a long tradition of cycling as a basic way of transport, considering it as a useful form of daily recreation. Copenhagen has a huge network of wide bike lanes all over the

city and the light system allow cyclist a green wave, enabling them permanent ride, without stopping.

1.1. Belgrade

Serbia does not pay enough attention to cities (the problem of centralization), although they are important drivers of economic development. Despite the implemented reforms, it is not a sufficiently decentralized country and a number of important factors are missing to ensure a good urban policy. The strong mayor model was introduced in 2002, in order to strengthen leadership and professionalism, to reduce party voluntarism and improve the quality of final policy results. However, in 2007 the model of a weak mayor was returned, due to political party conflicts with “their” strong mayors. A part of the reform package has been preserved, and therefore municipalities have the right to have a city manager (as an economic developer) and cities – a city architect to care for the quality of urban design (e.g.: [Djordjevic 2014: 16]). Although the law on local finances provided a fiscal and financial autonomy to local authorities (2006), in practice, since 2008, the state, using bylaws, has limited the amount of transfers from the budget for local governments, justifying itself by economic crises.

Partnerships and cooperation in the creation of missions, strategies, public policies and projects have not yet been established between the state and local self-government. The principle of subsidiarity as an instrument of bottom-up policy-making is not accepted (e.g.: [Djordjević 2017: 27-28]). Instead, the right of the state to decide and control beyond legal limits is persistently preserved practice. Occasionally, the state and cities (Belgrade as well) establish a partnership based on belonging to the same political party or coalition, ensuring good results. Sometimes, some cities, thanks to a great leadership, despite the bad environment, gain great results, but these are exceptions. It often turns out that when the state and local self-governments are in a conflict, the price is always paid by the citizens.

A legally stipulated system of employment and promotion in the public administration (of the city or state), according to merits which strengthen professionalization and the creation of knowledge-based policies, has not been applied in practice. The spoilt system prevails with a strong influence of political parties and nepotism on employment, job evaluation and promotion.

Political institutions work by role, pretty isolated (role driven government model), and poorly cooperate through partnership and teamwork. Policy making is not led by mission, it is not cross-sectoral (this way of work as innovative is rarely implemented), it is rarely participatory, indicators are rarely created and only sometimes the results of the implemented policies and projects are actively measured. Political elites in state but also in cities, create ad hoc projects, and consequently there are often no positive, cumulative effects of development in sectoral policies.

Therefore, databases are slowly being developed, enriched and were scarcely open to the public.

The spatial planning system is modern by regulation. The last changes were made in 2018, when the system of integrated urban development was established together with the same named Strategy until 2030. This democratic and modern way of spatial planning includes a participatory, multidisciplinary approach to planning, affirms the flexibility of plans, focusing on problems and actively solving defined priorities. (e.g.: [Colic, 2015]);

Despite a good legal solution, the practice of creating strategies and plans in Serbia (and in Belgrade) is essentially neglected. These documents sometimes do not even exist, generally they are created in closed groups, deprived sometimes even from expert discussions. Citizens are not involved in planning process, unless it is a pilot project, although participatory planning has been a very well developed practice in Yugoslavia for 4 decades (1950-1990). In this way, an important resource for good landscaping, achieving sustainable development and community satisfaction, is lost. (e.g.: [Stojkov, Damjanovic, Krizanic, Petrovic 2015:53-57]);

A bad practice of the poor availability of these plans, projects and clear information in this area, as well as suppression of good practice of public debates, was introduced in the 1990s. The reason for hiding the data is in opening space for various abuses and procuring great financial benefits for certain interest groups, primarily from the construction process. Some of the types of abuse are: earnings through a change in zoning (for example, from an industrial zone to a residential - commercial one) and from trade with plots, whose price increases after the construction of valuable facilities (the practice of internal trade with information is not punished). In Belgrade, which is particularly attractive due to the high value of land, there are many examples of these abuses and there is no political party that has not used this generous resource.

When it is asked why plans and projects are made out of the public eye, it is explained that "citizens are not interested in public discussions on these issues." Authorities simply ignore the fact that their job and legal obligation is to procure public debates on spatial plans and urban projects, which have existed as a good practice for decades: to invite citizens to debates, to make good and clear information on spatial planning and projects, to formulate clearly alternative proposals, and to leave enough time for debates.

There are rarely public discussions about a change of zoning in public space and about the way of land use. One can hardly find genuine eagerness of public authorities to enrich the use of existing public space or buildings (streets, sidewalks, bridges, parks, river banks, islands), but also future facilities (multifunctional recreational and cultural-entertainment centers, etc.) in participatory way to fit to citizens' needs. So, a lot of lessons can be learned from Copenhagen about participatory and innovative design of space.

1.2. The importance of using databases and IT applications

Copenhagen has developed good databases and IT application packages (most with the state support) which is very important for good quality of city management and the provision of good public services in all policy areas. All large systems in the city (transport, heating, cooling, water supply, sewerage, waste recycling, energy production) but also other activities (education, health, social support, economic development, etc.) use these databases that are open to citizens in order to inform them and to hold public debates about quality of services (evidence based policy & participative decision making), problems, possible improvements. Copenhagen's political leaders point out that a holistic strategy in planning and implementing policies and projects is a crucial factor that enables good quality of services and satisfaction of citizens. (e.g.: Holden, Airas, Larsen, 2019));

In Serbia, state and local authorities (Belgrade too) have been more actively developing IT applications and digitizing in various areas since 2016 (the cadaster, land books, digital spatial plans, GIS, etc. have been digitized). A number of administrative affairs were digitalized (registers and public documents, taxation, pension system, etc.). Parts of the education and health system have been digitized (from enrollment in kindergarten, school, college, through online classes and exams during Covid 19, over applying for medical examinations, obtaining all relevant information regarding Covid, scheduling examinations, tests, obtaining results, scheduling vaccinations, issuing certificates, etc. Citizens were surprisingly easy accustomed to the new way of working. IT can (and should) be used to involve citizens in decision-making processes, and special attention must be paid on prevention of any form of IT abuses like: widening insufficient, confusing or inaccurate information, endangering personal data and human rights, etc.

2. SMART BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION

In Copenhagen, the practice of violating laws, decisions and building standards is almost never encountered. City authorities have shown great leadership potential, raising enthusiasm for innovative and participatory problem-solving process. (e.g.: [Agger, Poulsen, 2017]); In that sense, *the Laboratory for Smart Solutions in City Projects* has been established as a new governing body that encourages citizens, civil society, companies, educational institutions, art associations and other interested actors to get involved in creative problem solving. There is a *permanent program of involving citizens in designing and adapting urban solutions* to their daily needs. Citizens have all the necessary data through IT platforms and programs created for these purposes, and can report a problem, send suggestions, requests and offer some good solutions. (e.g.: [Ebsen, 2022]); An important collaborator in this process is the *Danish Architectural Center*, which has so far enabled the emergence of great spatial, urban and architectural solutions.

Copenhagen has an inspiring practice in the field of design and construction and a long tradition of creating pleasant living spaces that are characterized by simplicity, functionality and a beauty, procuring good balance of form and purpose (it has the brand of “city of architecture”). Lovely urban design is a result of long-term efforts made to create “city for people”, which feel good, pleasant and comfortable in it. It is characterized by smart design of *roads*: streets, sidewalks, bicycle lanes, functionally designed cross sections of sidewalks and streets, with the principle that pedestrians and bicycles have priority in traffic.

Every aspect is taken into account in the construction of *buildings*: use of natural materials, use of good technological solutions for heating and humidity maintenance (passive houses, active solar facades) with rationality and economy (recycled materials, frequent renovation instead of demolition of old settlements to preserve the community - model of sustainable Housing Transformation, SHT). (e.g.: Holden, Airas, Larsen, 2019)];

The implementation of the zero CO₂ strategy has provided beautiful, innovative and creative solutions that are both environmentally friendly and highly functional: the recycling and energy production plant is also a beautiful building, a hill for walking, skiing and ski jumping. An ecological, central cooling system was built as a new necessity for this city, caused by global warming and hot summers. This central system is affordable, effective and ecology-friendly, covering 90% of the facilities in the city. It was created by innovative technology of using the cold currents of the North Sea, and in several years save tones of CO₂ which would be cost of fuels. For Denmark and its capital, achieving the zero CO₂ goal is possible until 2025, and for Serbia and Belgrade it remains a distant goal (e.g.: [Djordjevic 2019: 724]).

Pictures: 1.a. Copenhagen Incineration and 1.b. Sport and Recreation Hill



Source: 1.a. <https://www.azuremagazine.com/tag/urbanism/page/5/>

1.b. <https://www.archdaily.com/925966/copenhill-the-story-of-bigs-iconic-waste-to-energy-plant>.

2.1. Learning from good practice

Copenhagen is one of the most beautiful cities in the world. Its nice classic and modern buildings are skillfully combined, high buildings are avoided (“little is beau-

tiful”) and the city is a real oasis of functional solutions. Copenhagen has a status of comfortable place for living (livable city). It has beautifully arranged public spaces for meetings and gatherings, lovely buildings, well arranged settlements and rich cultural and artistic life. (e.g.: [Cariglio, Delbo, Nijkamp 2011: 65-82]; [Gehl 2016: 1-41]); Pictures 2a and 2b show Nyhavn Street running along the canal. The warm colors of the facades of the buildings, a beautiful and functional space, dynamic entrances with cafes, restaurants, taverns, shops, a beautiful promenade full of walkers and a canal with various boats on which boards people often enjoy, add a cheerfulness to this space.

Pictures: 2.a. and 2.b. Street Nyhavn



Source: 2.a. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nyhavn_MichaD.jpg
 2.b. <https://www.flickr.com/photos/mariaeklund/29326535852/>

Copenhagen is a city on the water, and urban planners skillfully integrated entire space of canals, footbridges and bridges, which are often enriched with symbols of the sea. Pictures 3. Presents first, the moving footbridge, constructed to let larger boats pass, and people enjoy looking its movement. Then a footbridge enriched by masts, gives both pedestrians and bikers a feeling of walking and riding over the deck of a ship (located a cross of Black Diamond - National Library). Last photo shows a very common ambience of attractive residential buildings along a canal full of boats

Pictures: 3.a. Moving footbridge, 3.b Footbridge with masts and 3.c. Canal with boats.



Source: author

The streets and sidewalks are carefully and thoughtfully designed, adapted primarily for pedestrians and cyclists, and cars are largely “pushed out of the city.” The space of the streets (they are wide and large) consists of wide sidewalks, wide bike lanes and the same widths of car lanes (for cars is allowed mostly slow traffic).

In designing the public space, special care is taken that they are attractive and accessible to all age groups (young, middle-aged but also old) and pleasant for meetings and socializing (picture 4a). Sidewalks, squares, parks, but also walkways and bridges are designed so that people can recreate and engage in various sports (jogging, parkour, skating, etc.). On the sidewalks, small elastic trampolines are placed at ground level, on which you can jump, which is done by both young and old. Copenhagen is a real “city of the game”.

Some fountains are moved out of the pool and placed at street level (picture 4b). On warm days, sitting on beautifully designed spaces, children, young people, parents, the elderly are sprayed, played and refreshed, which creates a relaxed and cheerful atmosphere.

Pictures: 4.a. Superkilen Park quarter and 4.b. Fountain in city centre



Source: 4.a. <https://www.re-thinkingthefuture.com/architectural-community/a3115-20-thesis-topics-related-to-community-architecture/2/> and 4.b.author

Sensors connected to IT applications, monitor the patterns of people’s movement in various parts of the city. These data are used in urban planning to optimize and enrich the use of space and resources (multi-functionality), to offer a variety of content and to increase traffic safety. A good example is a renovation is the Dronning Louises Bridge, as one of favorite places where people enjoy lovely view on city. It was renovated, car lanes were narrowed, bicycle paths and sidewalks for pedestrians were extended and even benches have been installed.


Danes are very attached to the nature and the health of the population is very important to them. In that sense, Copenhagen has many parks, with a variety of plants, often with small lakes, spaces for recreation and cultural and artistic performances. (e.g.: [Laage, Blok, 2020]), [Engberg, (2018)];

City procures various recreation installations for all citizens, regardless of age, gender, ethnicity or richness, as one of social democratic values. A good example is

Prism Sport and Community Center in southern Copenhagen as a multi-purpose facility and community center with: theater, spaces for conferences, cultural performances, flea markets, street culture but also various spaces for sports and personal exercises. This public facility designed all in glass, is open to the green areas that surround and it is always for free at the service of all citizens, enriching the quality of life in the community and contributing to social cohesion.

Since the 1950s all baths in harbor have been closed due to pollution. Since 2000, after purification, it has been possible again for people to swim in water. A lovely *Islands Brygge Harbor Bath* project (established in 2003) unites the harbor and the citizens again. It has 5 pools (2 for children), two diving towers (3 and 5 meters high) for jumping, offer possibility for open air swimming on increasing number of hot days in Copenhagen. Even in the winter period there are regular swimmers and visitors (pictures 5a and 5b).

Pictures: 5.a. Islands Brygge Harbour Bath in summer and 5.b. in winter



Source: 5.a. <https://www.visitdenmark.com/denmark/things-do/authentic-experiences/harbour-baths> and 5.b. https://medium.com/@siobhan_farmer/open-air-swimming-copenhagen-style-d74567b5b649

2.2. Belgrade

In Serbia and Belgrade, the cadaster, land books and the system of issuing permits have been digitalized. Good indicators of increasing the speed of issuing permits (from 189th position in 2012, to 9th in 2019) still do not mean that corruption in this policy area has been seriously reduced, because it is preserved on other points of procedure. (e.g.: Djordjevic, 2019: 727-729));

In construction policy in Belgrade there was identified the practice of forgery with digital recordings, shadowing upgrade the old building with 2-3 floors in order to enable the demolition of old building and construction of a new one higher than the prescribed standard in that settlement. Beside this tolerance to violation of *height and number of floors of buildings*, investors are still allowed to violate other construction standards like *construction on plots where zoning plan forbids* it, as well as the standard of occupancy of the plot. Investors often do not leave the obligatory space for green spaces or parking, but use the entire plot space for the building. This decreases green spaces in settlements, creates an overcrowded urban space with excessive load increase of infrastructure networks in the settlement (electricity, heating, water supply, sewerage, IT network, parking places etc.).

Corruption is a very serious problem and construction activities are accompanied by more or less visible scandals. Citizens do not have insight and become aware of the problems later, through the construction process or, more often, after it, when little can be done.

In this area, the involvement of citizens through IT applications would be of great importance. Involving citizens in GIS (geographic informational system), digital cadaster and land registers, would allow inaccuracies to be reported on the recordings, which could eliminate accidental and intentional “errors”, which would reduce urban clutter, voluntarism in space management and abuse. In this way, citizens get used to this IT instrument. They understand the importance of spatial planning, the severity of problems that arise if mistakes are made in the process and learn why their contribution to the functionality and beauty of urban design is beneficial. The IT program should involve clear and visible standards for each plot and it should be easily visible whether a project deviates from the prescribed standards. During the construction, the citizens could indicate through the IT application where there is a problem so that the inspection (always understaffed and poorly equipped) would have a better insight into the problems and could do its job more efficiently. (e.g.: [Djordjević 2017: 101,102,104,105]);

The Belgrade authorities (city and city municipalities) could develop a permanent program to involve citizens in adapting urban solutions to their needs. In order to make optimal use of it, there must be a commitment of the political leaders to involve citizens and the community in these processes and a commitment to that goal (sustainability), which is currently lacking, at least in Belgrade (and Serbia).

Much has been done in the process of rebuilding squares, streets, infrastructure, but the biggest problem is insufficient transparency. Namely, the city authorities generally announce their intentions, presented as an already prepared project, usually without any public debate about it. Often, these projects cause a lot of trouble to citizens which leads to protests. One of such examples, is the excessively long reconstruction of “27 Marta” and “Dušanova” streets during 2018 and 2019 when it was hard even to walk along these streets.

The reconstruction of the Republic Square contributed to functional solution because space was created for larger gatherings (for the winter market, sliding spaces, performances, etc.). Yet, the space remained quite bare, without enough greenery and without any interesting, more dynamic functional units. Despite the important cultural institutions and beautiful buildings of the National Theater and the National Museum and the sculpture of Duke Michael on horseback (all from the beginning of the 20th century), as well as numerous, always full cafes, the square space at first gives the impression of some sterility and maladaptation to citizens (pictures 6a and 6b). Fortunately, later some benches with solar panels and chargers were installed with some greenery by crossroad, which mitigate these weaknesses.

Pictures: 6.a. Republic Square Before Reconstruction and 6.b. After Reconstruction

Source: 6.a. <https://www.novosti.rs/vesti/beograd.74.html:745354-Trg-Republike-Majstori-pod-kamerama-dan-noc> and 6.b. <https://beobuild.rs/zavr%C5%A1ena-rekonstrukcija-trga-republike-p2887.html>

Another example is Flower Square situated across the Yugoslav Drama Theater, developed as a pleasant meeting place, with cafes and an open space under linden trees used for sitting outside. It was framed on the other side with charming demountable open bars on a wooden platform, which gave the space a feeling of comfort and pleasure. This lovely designed place has been rearranged: demountable objects have been removed, leaving only chairs and tables outside, which leaves a feeling of incompleteness and discomfort. The part of the square heading toward the Theater, which used to be a market in the first part of 20th century (never adequately designed) again in this reconstruction left the flower shops empty and paved the whole space with stone, which further contributed to the feeling of emptiness.

In this reconstruction project, flowers could be nicely combined with water (Fountain) and trees (linden and large old oak) to enrich this area practically and symbolically making the square a favorite destination for rest and meetings of all citizens (pictures 7a and 7b). The common destiny of “urban and architectural solutions made without people” is to remain sterile.

Pictures: 7.a. Flower Square after Reconstruction without flowers 7.b. Without charming demountable bars


Source: 7.a. https://sr.wikipedia.org/sr/%D0%94%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0:Cvetni_trg_01.jpg 7.b. <https://www.novosti.rs/vesti/beograd.74.html:590659-%D0%9C%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D1%99%D1%83%D0%B4%D0%B8-%D0%BC%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%BE-%D1%86%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%9B%D0%B0>

For several decades the city authorities have had plans for better arrangement of the neglected city river banks as lovely locations with an excellent view (*City on Water on Danube bank facing Vojvodina coast and Belgrade Waterfront on Sava bank facing coast of New Belgrade*), but these projects have been delayed (e.g.: [Čamprag 2019: 187-189], [Djordjevic, 2018: 83]);. Both projects create residential, recreational and commercial zones and contents.

Since 2015, Serbian government has started intensive work on the Belgrade waterfront on Sava river bank. [Djordjevic, 2018: 82]);³ The whole space is completely reconstructed: neglected river banks were transformed with the construction of beautiful residential and commercial buildings, bike lanes, with a beautifully landscaped promenade with cascades, stairs, platforms over water, enriched with lovely vegetation, equipped with benches. There are playgrounds for children, and numerous cafes, restaurants, interesting food stores (in the form of train compartments or vans of beautiful colors), etc. The citizens quickly got used to it. Today, it is a favorite destination where citizens enjoy walking and biking along the river or relaxing on the platforms above the water.

It is also planned to build a line park (4.5 km) that would connect these two destinations (from the Concrete Hall to the Pancevo Bridge), with many recreational and cultural facilities.

Pictures: 8.a. Belgrade waterfront, and 8.b.. Panoramic view on Kosancic venac



Source: 8.a. <https://beogradzadecu.com/listings/setaliste-savamala/> 8.b. <http://wikimapia.org/1392958/sr/%D0%9A%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BD%D1%87%D0%B8%D1%9B%D0%B5%D0%B2-%D0%92%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B0%D1%86>

Belgrade Waterfront project was created in a non-transparent way and the creators of these projects were primarily motivated by the profit. The Serbian government involved a number of foreign architectural houses like: studio Libeskind, Gehl Architects, Sou Fujimoto Architects, Zaha Hadid Architects (e.g.: [Čamprag 2019, p.185]); and

³. In Serbia, political will is decisively important for the implementation of the project. The other project - the City on Water on Danube bank has been frozen, due to conflict between two parties (DS and DSS). Recently, Serbian government started slowly resuming it again.

the solutions are often beautiful and modern, but various problems necessarily arise. The public is familiar with some details of ready-made solutions. Domestic experts are only partially involved (rather because of their willingness to fix already-made solutions than with the government's intention to include them).

A number of problems remains: unclear financial calculations of the project's costs as well as future tax burdens that citizens will have to pay is one of them. Further, the groundwater problem and the poor developed solutions for potential flood problem remains as technical one. Regarding buildings' size, there is dilemma why such tall buildings, symbolically poorly designed, have been made? Having in mind that this space is very suitable to set up multifunctional facilities, especially for cultural and artistic performances and exhibitions, the public wonders why until now these contents have not been announced. The public can only hope that, in final phase of construction, authorities would understand the importance of these contents, not only for pleasure of citizens, but also for economic benefits (experience economy). It was proven once again that the dialogue between the government and the citizens is of a huge importance, however, objectively, in Belgrade it scarcely exists.

2.3. GREENING BELGRADE

Climate changes have caused very pleasant warmer winters in Belgrade, but also very hot summers (especially in August) with effects of greenhouse and urban heat islands. A general idea in all Belgrade strategies and plans, including Local Sustainable Ecological Plan, is to focus on greening spaces. Citizens are poorly informed about these plans. They are only informed about some larger projects, already prepared for implementation, and about some smaller local projects.

Belgrade has more than 40 big and medium size parks, and numerous small ones (publicly maintained). Some additional greening projects were implemented by civic initiatives like: pocket parks, vertical greenery, green terraces and roofs, all around the city. (e.g.: [Simić, Stupar, Djokic, 2017: 4-8]); Researches show us that only planting roof gardens would highly contribute to environment. One research in New Belgrade, on 132 buildings with roof space of 91 000 m² showed that planting green roofs can yearly neutralize 4500 tons of CO₂, saving 7800 MWh of energy. (e.g.: [Đorđević K., Joksimović O., Jovanović - Popović M., 2018: S1217-S1229]); Implemented on all flat roof buildings in Belgrade, these great effects can be highly multiplied, contributing greatly to good air quality and healthy environment in general.

Regarding garbage processing factories, in Vinča settlement, on the outskirts of the Belgrade, on the Danube bank, has been a land field dump for decades as an ecological black spot. The project of sanitation of land field and building a waste processing factory has been mentioned for decades, and only recently a project has started in cooperation between the city and the Japanese-French cooperation. This power plant will burn methane for energy production and further heating part of city (connected to the heating pipeline). The public received only basic information about this envi-

ronmentally friendly solution, but again there was no public debate about it. In architectural terms, the factory buildings are beautiful but there are no innovative ideas or multi-functionality, like those applied in Copenhagen's factory.

Pictures: 9.a. Belgrade Vincha landfill dump reconstruction & 9.b. New waste - electric factory (in 2024)



Source: 9.a. <https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/466824/Beograd/Preuredenje-deponije-u-Vinci-najsavremenija-tehnologija-za-preradu-otpada> 9.b. <https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/441147/Beograd/Elektrana-na-otpad-za-tri-godine>

3. CONCLUSION

Spatial planning and construction are policy fields in which researchers can identify, following various indicators, the quality of democracy (participative or not) and provision of services and goods (according to citizens' needs) as vital for people's daily life. In this paper it is proven again, that participative decision making in creation, implementation and correction of public documents, plans and projects is the main content of democratic community and satisfied citizens. Copenhagen and Belgrade are pretty different cases.

In both countries, there is a model of integrated *spatial planning*, but in Belgrade the practice deviates from legal regulation. Copenhagen has good and open databases and developed practice of coproduction and participative decision making. There are regular public debates involving the community, citizens and certainly professional associations and experts in good landscaping. Copenhagen authorities show great patience and conflict resolution skills which are very important for solving problems in decision making and finding best solutions in zoning and landscaping. [Agger, Poulsen, 2017:381-384]). The city abounds with public facilities affordable and available to all citizens and has a spirit of city created for all people.

Belgrade, does not have good data basis and these data often are not open and available for public. Public debates are mostly non-existent, or when a debate is conducted mostly it is mostly in narrow groups (members of parties, members of closed groups or friends). In this way landscaping is privatized, a number of dysfunctional and poor solutions is created in space and often citizens cannot feel a city as their own, but as "stolen" for some influential groups' needs. Belgrade government, in such a way, deprives itself from beneficial contribution of community in spatial planning

through expression of citizens' needs, useful suggestions, initiatives, and from beneficial public control.

In Copenhagen, *construction policy* is compliant with spatial planning standards (zoning) and construction standards, and there is no practice of violating these norms. The strategically adopted norms of ecological construction and the use of natural materials are followed, as well as frequent renovation instead of demolition of neglected buildings (sustainable), and application of innovative, green technologies (solar energy, passive houses, green roofs and balconies), etc. Furthermore, the city has a tradition of involving experts and the community (citizens) in creating projects and constantly adapting urban and project solutions to the daily needs of citizens. In that process, functional, beautiful and innovative solutions are created.

Belgrade does not have good quality of data bases (part of these bases is developed as digitalized) and these data are mostly closed. There are no strict standards for building style in each settlement, and there is often a great variety of solutions. Furthermore, in construction, it is allowed to violate the standards of the spatial plan often causing great troubles (construction in a forbidden area), but also to violate the standards of construction (number of floors, occupation of the plot). The cause of this situation is profit as main motive, less care for public goods and developed corruption in this very lucrative area.

Energy efficiency has only recently demanded as obligatory, while the application of environmental standards, greening and the application of new technology are not mandatory. Belgrade and its municipal governments do not organize public debates about building projects, and therefore beneficial influence of community is missing. There are not good IT applications prepared for co-production of solutions in these policy fields. Therefore, learning from excellent Copenhagen practice would be very beneficial for Belgrade government and the citizens as well.

THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author wishes to thank her colleagues in RC 05 for Local Government (IPSA, conference July 2021) for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. The debate on this paper was developed at the session: RC 05: Smart Cities in Comparative Perspective: Challenges for political Participation in Data-Driven Local Governments and I thank especially to professors Norbert Kersting and Pekka Kettunen, for their useful remarks.

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TRANSFORMATION OF EDUCATION IN CONTEXT OF THE COMPETITIVE JOB MARKET REQUIREMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE UNIVERSITY POTENTIAL IN TERMS OF DEVELOPING RESEARCH SKILLS FOR STUDENTS

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Abstract

The research paper analysis an approach to the finding of the relationship between the modern higher educational trend of research and research in practice to the modern competitive job market requirements. Research methodology considers the next steps: preparing an online questionnaire with statements/indicators for the three categories of respondents (academics, graduates, MA students), using the Likert scale, and data processing with STATA. Study shows and the results are visible that the needed professional skills creation are required to adapt and transform the teaching of research in the “Research and Research in Practice” by the subjects area of specialism that will form graduates’ practical, logical, analytical skills and creativity for the expected professional level.

Keywords: *Transformation Higher Educational Trend, Integration of „Research and Research in Practice“ Components, Formation of Specialists for the Job Market.*

INTRODUCTION

Today, the labor market demands the matching of high-level technical and professional skills of workers with their qualifications. But, such skills are associated with higher education through Teaching-Learning-Research, and Research in Practice integration [Mekvabidze R., 2016] that it is critical to developing research teaching and research in practice that provides students with critical and logical thinking as well as a practical consideration, as it is clear that resources must be mobilized to meet rising job market demands. We cannot solve the problems without research and research in practice with its statements or indicators, without the transformation of study programs, without the adaptation of higher education to the rapid development of information technology (IT) and modern competitive job market requirements as the study program provides growing knowledge with professional skills [Mekvabidze R., 2016]. It is clear, that “Research and Research in Practice” include the development of skills and professional experience and can be considered as an essential aspect of the logical thinking formation needed for the job market according to the 21st century, to the new era of an industrial age that demands and seeks a new educational environment with new approaches, opportunities, and outcomes. At the same time, students who are able to access research-related resources will be more competitive in the labor market. Graduates with a lack of the job market requirements or corresponding work experience are unlikely to be considered with expectations of employment status [Manuel Salas-Velasco, 2021]. For universities, their relationship with the labor market is an important aspect, but the excessive number of graduates and modern job market requirements are serious reasons for the high unemployment rate among graduates.

What are the aspects of graduates’ professional skills creation through the teaching of research and research in practice by disciplines of specialism?

The modern labor market changes systematically in the labor supply and demand, the requirements of labor markets, and the expectations of the developed skills of individual graduates. Today, unemployment is a significant problem to find a job as the requirements of the job market have increased due to the fast development of ICT [Provost F., Fawcett T, 2013]. The relationship between higher educational institutions (HEIs) and the labor market is an important aspect, but the excessive number of graduates does not satisfy the high requirements of the modern market. It means that HEIs have to stay competitive for effective and the needed knowledge creation with the needed requirement components of the job market [Mekvabidze R., 2020]. But, on the other hand, research requires conceptual understanding and it must be directed to discover and obtain new approaches with new results for innovation [Mekvabidze R., 2017]. However, academics’ and employers’ approaches to the relationship between HEI and job market requirements may be deemed inadequate

[Brown p., Lauder H., Ashton D., 2011]. The “Research in Higher Education”¹ is considering the situation of graduate employability with lifelong learning but such an approach is longer and Higher Education is unable to form graduates’ skills for the job market. The effect of research on the chosen field of study on finding employment for university graduates and testing the ability of graduates have been examined to meet the expectations of job positions by three universities in Brno [Stojanová H., Blaková V., 2014]. HEIs have to be able to motivate students by encouraging them to be future-orientated by encouraging students to study research to achieve their future career options [DonnellyM., GamsuS., 2019].

Current thinking about the learning environment of the 21st century is based on involving the research teaching elements more intensively and integrating them into the educational process that has to master both basic and applied skills and focus them on the job market requirements. In my opinion, the transformation of education revealed some flaws, primarily in two directions: curricula and syllabi design, which lack merged research components through ICT [Mekvabidze R., 2018]. We need answers to the question: how is it possible to develop and integrate research competencies into knowledge creation through higher education in accordance with labor market requirements that have become more competitive after the crisis with COVID-19, also. It is impossible to assess the efficiency with which the education system considers graduates as job seekers. The efficiency of graduates in meeting the competitive workforce demands, taking into account the facts that are a reality with knowledge creation flows within graduates and the job market improvement of the educational components of research by study subject area (Mekvabidze R., 2016). Furthermore, this problem cannot be considered without the content of research and research in practice teaching in HEIs, the influence of research components by subject area on graduates as job seekers, and the question of how it will be done.

An analysis of the research knowledge by the subject area on the chosen field of study on finding employment for university graduates is interesting but at the same time, we have to identify a range of new technologies with their applications to the labor market with its transformation process [Mekvabidze R., Smiatenski R., Karchevski L., 2019]. The necessity of reforms in higher education considers technological innovation for research and increases the expected professional level of university graduates because Unified Information Space (UIS) is a tool for engaging students in critical thinking and problem-solving process in the labor market and increases the demands for labor workforce [Besson, J., 2015] and The next step of technological impact on the labor market is concerned with the introduction of AI which has led to a new form of „surveillance capitalism“ [Zuboff, 2019]. This fact is a significant for high-skilled labor [Autor, Dorn, et al, 2017; Song, Price, et al., 2018] and this approach helps graduates in job by specislism to explain some of the changes that

¹ Interview with EERA Network 22 „Research in Higher Education”, accessed: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4623TRYWgl>, retrieved 28.04.2022

include the low productivity in the workforce [Lauder et al.,2019]. Some of the EU countries show high graduate unemployment rates, but in Germany, adults with upper secondary education have better employment prospects than the employment rate of tertiary-educated adults.

1. FROM THE LABOR MARKET TO HIGHER EDUCATION

Universities are trying to change the education process according to the labor market and consider this relationship more closely. The discussion under Nicolescu L., Paun C. [2009] considered a relationship between higher education services and expectations of students at graduation with employers' requirements. Among these requirements, a central one is about what the labor market wants. In this case, a question may be formulated as are: What is the relationship between research indicators studying and practice, or how graduates can be engaged in the study program that considers graduates' employment problem-solving? [Mekvabidze R., 2020]. The US education system is seriously thinking about their offer and seeing problems. In this case, a question may be formulated as are: How can be realized the relationship between research indicators studying and practice, or how graduates can be engaged in a study program that considers graduates' employment problem-solving?

2. PROBLEMS & STATEMENT

From a realistic point of view, in the frame of the modern educational reforms, important changes have to provide the knowledge formation process and how to develop the integration of knowledge, competencies, and employment skills. As the main components of education - Teaching -Learning - research -Research in Practice - have to be considered in the context of an integration process of developing new knowledge that might be realized by considering the statements below according to the coordination between Higher Education and the job market requirements:

- An analysis of the knowledge formation and its direction to the right track to the requirements of the competitive job market;
- Student's outcome with its skills as needed attributes for student's carrier in prospect.

Based on this, statements of the problem are acceptable to consider as follows:

1. The weak link between higher education and the modern job market requirements in the fast development of ICT has to be more flexible and demandable for the transformation of education;
2. Higher Education Institutions offer students academic programs and pay less attention to the inclusion of the "Research and Research in Practice" components by subject area disciplines and the demands of the competitive job market.

3. RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

Education Institutions (EIs) face a more interconnected world, in which knowledge, creativity, research, and innovation are the essential elements of society's development that have to need upgraded systematically and developed processes in time as this process -knowledge creation and individual's professional skills - are considered to be the most important sources. Today, it is necessary to use various approaches for students' knowledge creation and professional skills -improvement by subject area of specialism to respond to the competitive job market in prospect. By this approach, the transformation of educational reform has to provide students with active engagement not only in the teaching-learning process, but it has to provide students' creativity and practical skills of research and research in practice knowledge that are the main requirements of competitive job markets. Normally, universities are trying to make educational programs more flexible but it is a fact, that the educational process requires changes in the conditions of fast development of information technologies for which the indicators required by the competitive labor market should be analyzed and their implementation in the learning process. In the frame of the research we want to draw:

- The visions of academics, graduates, and MA students and what components they need to realize to be a prospective participants in the competitive job markets;
- The approaches of academics, graduates, and MA students how maybe transform the study program by subject area of specialism for research and research in practice skills development and what indicators can be considered for achieving the modern and competitive job market demands.

3.1. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

We consider, analyze and discuss the relationship between the structure of education and the requirements of the labor market in accordance with their relationship with the components of "Research and Research in Practice" through the main subject area of the countries -Poland and Georgia. instead of three aspects, our approach focuses on four aspects of the sustainability of the education system (Teaching- Learning- Research-Research in Practice) to create knowledge with their practical usage by future graduates as seekers for the job market. *The main attention is paid to the problem of usage of „Research and Research in Practice“ by studying the subjects area. The main objective is to reveal the interrelationship between „Research and Research in Practice“ teaching with respect to the modern job market requirements as the main factor for the development of the critical and logical skills, and creativity analysis that is needed for the workplace.*

3.2. THE AIMS OF RESEARCH

The research aims are to explore the graduates' success in the labor market after finishing their chosen field of study and how the teaching of „Research and Research

in Practice“ will influence their success as job seekers. In this frame we are considering:

1. Integration possibilities of students in „Research and Research in Practice“ to develop the student’s logical and critical thinking in accordance with the requirements of the competitive job market;
2. Comparative analysis of the respondents – academics, graduates, and MA students of Georgia and Poland in the context of the formation of graduates’ critical thinking, creative analysis, and practical vision that helps to address socio-economic challenges by the competitive market requirements that can drive the employment and poverty reduction and social development, because the real challenges remain and some are becoming more acute.
3. Analysis of the potential of HEIs as a major issue within the relationship between Higher Education Institutions and the competitive job market requirements.

The realization of the aims is considered:

1. Preparing the practical statements/indicators as the variables for analysis by the questionnaires for academics, graduates, and MA students according to employment skills development by field of study that attempt to answer the questions:
 - What are the aspects of knowledge and practical skills creation for the competitive market requirements?
 - Is the Modern Education System towards knowledge and job practical skills creation?
 - Is the student motivated for knowledge and the job practical skills creation in the frame of new adaption of subject study and how it will be done?
2. Can the job market indicators in a broad sense be considered as the elements of knowledge and practical skills and their relationship as a new model?

3.3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology that matches the realization of the objectives considers the activities as follows:

1. Preparing the questionnaires with the statements/indicators for three categories of respondents: academics, graduates, and MA students;
2. The questionnaires with the variables (the statements/indicators) for academics “varQ1”, for graduates “varQ2”, and for MA students “varQ3” of the Public Universities of Georgia and Poland Universities were speeded through the internet from April 2021 to July 2022
3. The surveys from academics “varQ1”, graduates “varQ2”, and MA students “varQ3” of the Universities of Georgia and Poland were collected from April 2021 to July 2022.
4. Data processing was provided for analysis and revealing the approaches of academics, graduates, and MA students accordingly to the introduction for teaching „Research and Research in Practice“ by studying subjects area that is the active

instruments for developing the needed skills (creativity, analyzing, thinking) of employability for the competitive job market requirements. Program software STATA was used for data processing.

4. An assessment of the reliability of the questionnaire statements/indicators that are measured using Cronbach's alpha.

5. Likert scale is used with 5 parameters (Strongly agree (SA), Agree (A), Neutral (N (Do not know)), Disagree (DA), Strongly Disagree (SD)).

6. The questionnaire survey was carried out as an online questionnaire. The total amount of respondents is 1784. By the category, the respondents are as follows: 341 academics, 768 graduates, and 675 MA students.

3.3.1. Questionnaire for academics "varQ1", graduates "varQ2", and MA students "varQ3" by the statements/indicators

Questionnaire for academe

varQ1-1. The teaching of the research and model-building knowledge may be considered as a basis of the research in practice for the students

varQ1-2. Research for Model-building teaching is effective for student outcome

varQ1-3. Implementation of research teaching by the disciplines helps a student to increase critical thinking

varQ1-4. An effective strategy for knowledge formation is the teaching of model-building for research in practice

varQ1-5. Practical skills of Research would be achieved by involving research in the teaching

varQ1-6. To be the job seekers in prospect, all students and all graduates need to accumulate research and research in practice as a reaction to the job market requirements

varQ1-7. Quality research teaching improves students' competitiveness for the job market

varQ1-8. ICT helps the student to promote practical thinking and professional skill

varQ1-9. Becoming a creative thinker is understanding your practical potential within the learning outcome and the job market

varQ1-10. The link between Higher Education and the labor market is considered as global according to labor market requirements.

Questionnaire for graduates "varQ2"

varQ2-1. The teaching of the research and model-building knowledge may be considered as a basis of the research in practice for the students

varQ2-2. Research for Model-building teaching is effective for student outcome

varQ2-3. Implementation of research teaching by the disciplines helps a student to increase critical thinking

varQ2-4. An effective strategy for knowledge formation is the teaching of model-building for research in practice

varQ2-5. Practical skills of Research would be achieved by involving research in the teaching

varQ2-6. To be the job seekers in prospect, all students and all graduates need to accumulate research and research in practice as a reaction to the job market requirements

varQ2-7. Quality research teaching improves students' competitiveness for the job market

varQ2-8. ICT helps the student to promote practical thinking and professional skill

varQ2-9. Becoming a creative thinker is understanding your practical potential within the learning outcome and the job market

varQ2-10. The link between Higher Education and the labor market is considered as global according to labor market requirements.

Questionnaire for MA students “varQ3”

varQ3-1. Student needs higher qualifications and skills to obtain a job within a competitive job market

varQ3-2. All academics have to be good researchers

varQ3-3. The demand for high-skilled work would be available who had the resources of a good education with research and research in practice

varQ3-4. Today, in the frame of the developing technology, employers consider a graduate degree as their possibility of possession of research skills

varQ3-5. Obtain research practice in the teaching process is a knowledge transfer for the job market

varQ3-6. Research and research in practice interact with the teaching of modeling, optimization, and job market requirements

varQ3-7. Research skills development has to begin from the bachelor's level

varQ3-8. Quality teaching of research is a benefit for students and graduates in the job market

varQ3-9. Research in practice is a basis for graduates to be the perspective participants for (in) competitive job markets

The questionnaires with statements/indicators/ of the survey were spread through the internet to academic staff, graduates, and MA students of Public Universities of Georgia and Public Universities of Poland with the aim to show their vision and challenges, and to make the possible replacements of these indicators in the frame of the modern educational situation.

3.4. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS

The reliability of statements/ indicators/ items in sections of the questionnaire was measured by how closely related a set of statements/ indicators/ items are as a group by the internal consistency using Cranach's alpha which is considered to be

a measure of scale reliability. The variables with their statements/indicators as the questionnaires and results of Cronach's alpha are given in Table 1.

Table1. Reliability analysis

Name of variables	Variable	Number of the Statements/ indicators	Cronbach's alpha
Q1	Academics' vision on the interrelation of the graduate's education degree by subject area according to the job market requirements	10	0.8657
Q2	Graduates' vision on the interrelation of their education degree by subject area according to the job market requirements	10	0.8657
Q3	MA students' vision on the interrelation of their education degree by subject area according to the job market requirements in prospect	9	0.7643

3.5 DEMOGRAPHY INFORMATION ABOUT RESPONDENTS

The demographic information about respondents (academics, graduates, and MA students) is given in Tables 2-4.

Table 2. Demography information of academics

Category	Classification	Frequency	%
Status	Professor	41	12
	Associate professor	76	22.29
	Assistant professor	121	35.49
	Teacher	71	20.83
	Invited teacher	32	9.39
Subject area	Economics	93	27.27
	Management	88	25.80
	Business	75	21.99
	ICT/IT	56	16.43
	History	5	1.47
	Finance	24	7.04
Teaching experience, year	Under 5	81	23.75
	5-10	121	35.48
	10-15	68	19.94
	15-20	52	15.25
	Above 20	19	5.58

Table 3. Demography information of graduates

Category	Classification	Frequency	%
Status	Employed by specialism Years of Graduation Work Experience	320 1-8 3-5	41.67
	Unemployed Years of graduation	448 1-4	58.33
Subject area	Economics	140	18.23
	Management	155	20.18
	Business	159	20.70
	ICT	176	22.92
	History	42	5.47
	Finance	96	12.50
Job seeker, Year for specialism	Under 6 months	41	12.81
	Under 1	108	33.75
	1-2	101	31.56
	Above 2	70	21.87

Table 4. Demography information of MA students

Category	Classification	Frequency	%
Status	I course year	247	36.60
	II course year	328	48.59
Subject area	Economics	112	16.59
	Management	101	14.96
	Business Administration	105	15.56
	IT	145	21.48
	History	50	7.41
	Tourism	87	12.89
	Finance	75	11.11

4. THE RESULTS OF DATA PROCESSING

The data processing of respondents that is around the main variable “The relationship of Research, Research in Practice, and the competitive job market requirements” are grouped accordingly to the vision of respondents’ categories, as are: Academics’ vision to graduates knowledge to the job market requirements; graduates vision to their knowledge to the job market requirements as job seekers; MA students vision

to their knowledge to the job market requirements in prospect. From these interactions, we will try to reveal a general regularity and necessity of transformation of the triangle (teaching-learning-research) into the teaching-learning-research-research in practice and accordingly transformation of research teaching by subject area disciplines. We estimate a mean of results by all five components of the Likert Scale. In the tables we estimate a mean of results by the positive answers of the respondents.

Table 5. Academics' vision: Interrelation of the graduate's knowledge of 'Research and Research in Practice' by subject area according to the competitive job market requirements

Name of the variable	Indicators/Items	Frequency				
		SA	A	N	DA	SD
Research, Research in practice, and the competitive job market requirements.	The teaching of the research and model-building knowledge may be considered as a basis of the research in practice for the students	125	149	38	15	14
	Research for Model-building teaching is effective for student outcome	95	157	44	29	16
	Implementation of research teaching by the disciplines helps a student to increase critical thinking	79	170	38	44	10
	An effective strategy for knowledge formation is the teaching of model-building for research in practice	131	141	40	18	11
	Practical skills of Research would be achieved by involving research in the teaching	191	95	31	17	7
	To be job seekers in prospect, all students and all graduates need to accumulate research and research in practice as a reaction to the job market requirements	163	129	21	22	6
	Quality research teaching improves students' competitiveness for the job market	201	97	31	8	4
	ICT helps the student to promote practical thinking and professional skill	138	126	34	31	12
	Becoming a creative thinker is understanding your practical potential within the learning outcome and the job market	140	95	45	38	23
	The link between Higher Education and the labor market is considered as global according to the labor market requirements	140	95	45	38	23

Table 5.1. An estimation of the academics’ vision of the statements/indicators by the Likert scale

Name of the variable	Mean	Std. Err	[95% Conf. Interval]
Q1-1	68.2	28.66601	-11.3896 147.7896
Q1-2	68.2	25.93338	-3.80259 140.2026
Q1-3	68.2	27.71714	-8.755125 145.1551
Q1-4	68.2	28.13432	-9.913397 146.3134
Q1-5	68.2	34.31385	-27.07051 163.4705
Q1-6	68.2	32.3379	-21.58441 157.9844
Q1-7	68.2	37.14485	-34.9306 171.3306
Q1-8	68.2	26.38636	-5.06028 141.4603
Q1-9	68.2	29.70421	-14.2721 150.6721
Q1-10	68.2	21.64116	8.11449 128.2855

Table 6. Academics’ vision: Interrelation of the graduate’s knowledge of ‘Research and Research in practice’ by subject area according to the job market requirements by the positive answers

Name of the variable	Indicators/Items	Frequency (SA+A)	%
Research, Research in practice, and the competitive market requirements.	The teaching of the research and model-building knowledge may be considered as a basis of the research in practice for the students	274	80.35
	Research for Model-building teaching is effective for student outcome	252	73.90
	Implementation of research teaching by the disciplines helps a student to increase critical thinking	249	73.02
	An effective strategy for knowledge formation is the teaching of model-building for research in practice	272	79.77
	Practical skills of Research would be achieved by involving research in the teaching	286	83.87
	To be job seekers in prospect, all students and all graduates need to accumulate research and research in practice as a reaction to the job market requirements	292	85.63
	Quality research teaching improves students’ competitiveness for the job market	298	87.39
	ICT helps the student to promote practical thinking and professional skill	264	77.42
	Becoming a creative thinker is understanding your practical potential within the learning outcome and the job market	235	68.91
	The link between Higher Education and the labor market is considered as global according to the labor market requirements	235	68.91

Table 6.1. A mean estimation of the academics' vision by the positive answers

Positive answers	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]
Frequency	265.7	7.157048	249.5096 - 281.8904
%	77.50	2.069716	72.81598 - 82.18002

Comment. Comparing tables 5.1 and 6.1 shows that academics by their positive answers 77.50% supported considering the integration of „Research and Research in Practice“ in the teaching process accordingly to the modern job requirements.

Table7. Graduates' vision: Interrelation of the graduate's knowledge of 'Research and Research in Practice' by subject area according to the competitive job market requirements

Name of the variable	Indicators/Items	Frequency				
		SA	A	N	DA	SD
Research, Research in practice, and the competitive market requirements.	The teaching of the research and model-building knowledge may be considered as a basis of the research in practice for the students	270	390	75	21	12
	Research for Model-building teaching is effective for student outcome	272	359	101	26	10
	Implementation of research teaching by the disciplines helps a student to increase critical thinking	320	390	43	7	8
	An effective strategy for knowledge formation is the teaching of model-building for research in practice	288	399	50	22	9
	Practical skills of Research would be achieved by involving research in the teaching	331	345	65	22	5
	To be the job seekers in prospect, all students and all graduates need to accumulate research and research in practice as a reaction to the job market requirements	303	370	79	9	7
	Quality research teaching improves students' competitiveness for the job market	399	279	81	9	0
	ICT helps the student to promote practical thinking and professional skill	341	295	99	19	14
	Becoming a creative thinker is understanding your practical potential within the learning outcome and the job market	324	295	108	12	9
	The link between Higher Education and the labor market is considered as global according to the labor market requirements	395	341	21	7	4

Table 7.1. A mean estimation of the academics' vision by the Likert Scale

Name of the variable	Mean	Std. Err	[95% Conf. Interval]
Q2-1	153.6	75.24799	-55.32191 362.5219
Q2-2	153.6	69.23771	-38.63469 345.8347
Q2-3	153.6	70.11819	-60.07929 329.2793
Q2-4	153.6	78.02218	-57.02429 376.2243
Q2-5	153.6	75.38674	-53.70713 364.9071
Q2-6	153.6	76.06024	-55.57708 366.7771

Q2-7	153.6	79.28405	-66.52783	73.7278
Q2-8	153.6	69.17341	-38.45616	345.6562
Q2-9	153.6	67.81932	-38.69662	337.8966
Q2-10	153.6	87.99068	-90.70133	97.9013

Table 8. Graduates' vision: Interrelation of the graduate's knowledge of 'Research and Research in practice' by subject area according to the job market requirements by the positive answers

Name of the variable	Indicators/Items	Frequency (SA+A)	%
Research, Research in practice, and the competitive job market requirements.	The teaching of the research and model-building knowledge may be considered as a basis of the research in practice for the students	660	85.94
	Research for Model-building teaching is effective for student outcome	631	82.16
	Implementation of research teaching by the disciplines helps a student to increase critical thinking	710	92.45
	An effective strategy for knowledge formation is the teaching of model-building for research in practice	687	89.45
	Practical skills of Research would be achieved by involving research in the teaching	676	88.02
	To be job seekers in prospect, all students and all graduates need to accumulate research and research in practice as a reaction to the job market requirements	673	87.63
	Quality research teaching improves students' competitiveness for the job market	678	88.28
	ICT helps the student to promote practical thinking and professional skill	536	69.76
	Becoming a creative thinker is understanding your practical potential within the learning outcome and the job market	619	80.60
	The link between Higher Education and the labor market is considered as global according to the labor market requirements	736	96.21

Table 8.1. A mean estimation of the academics' vision by the positive answers

Positive answers	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]
Frequency	660.6	17.52725	620.9506 700.2494
%	86.05	2.302912	80.84045 91.25955

Comment. Comparing tables 7.1 and 8.1 shows that graduates by their positive answers 86.05% supported considering integration of „Research and Research in Practice“ in the teaching process accordingly to the modern job requirements. But it is interesting to consider their answers according to each statement/indicator. It is interesting to compare the answers of academics and graduates on each indicator by

places that they take in the answers according to each statement/indicator. A result is given in Table 9 below.

Table 9. Assessment of the statements/indicators by the places that they take by academics and graduates answers

#	Statement/indicator	# of the place of the indicator by Academics	# of the place of the indicator by Graduates
1	The teaching of the research and model-building knowledge may be considered as a basis of the research in practice for the students	3	7
2	Research for Model-building teaching is effective for student outcome	7	8
3	Implementation of research teaching by the disciplines helps a student to increase critical thinking	8	2
4	An effective strategy for knowledge formation is the teaching of model-building for research in practice	4	3
5	Practical skills of Research would be achieved by involving research in the teaching	2	5
6	To be the job seekers in prospect, all students and all graduates need to accumulate research and research in practice as a reaction to the job market requirements	6	6
7	Quality research teaching improves students' competitiveness for the job market	1	4
8	ICT helps the student to promote practical thinking and professional skill	5	10
9	Becoming a creative thinker is understanding your practical potential within the learning outcome and the job market	9	9
10	The link between Higher Education and the labor market is considered as global according to the labor market requirements	10	1

As we see academics and graduates agree or are close to this situation according to indicators # 9,6,4,2. More interesting is their vision according to #10 and #5. In the case of #10 for graduates is very important from in realistic point of view, Higher Education has to be more flexible and have to work to the labor market requirements. From the vision of academics, this approach is not really as it is fact that changes in the educational system are not easy and it functions more under the academic style than practical. According to #8: graduates are right as it helps them to promote their skills but not create! In any case, both sides are interested that research, and research in practice develop needed professional skills that are a necessity for competitive job seekers.

Table 10. MA student's vision: Interrelation of the graduate's knowledge of 'Research and Research in Practice' by subject area according to the competitive job market requirements

Name of the variable	Statement/ Indicator/Item	Frequency and %				
		SA	A	N	DA	SD
Research, Research in practice, and the competitive job market requirements.	Student needs higher qualifications and skills to obtain a job within a competitive job market	370	296	9	0	0
	All academics have to be good researchers	401	265	9	0	0
	The demand for high-skilled work would be available who had the resources of a good education with research and research in practice	212	285	136	26	16
	Today, in the frame of the developing technology, employers consider a graduate degree as their possibility of possession of research skills	349	255	68	2	0
	Obtain research practice in the teaching process is a knowledge transfer for the job market	420	201	41	8	5
	Research and research in practice interact with the teaching of modeling, optimization, and job market requirements	375	296	4	0	0
	Research skills development has to begin from the bachelor's level	450	201	24	0	0
	Quality teaching of research is a benefit for students and graduates in the job market	390	254	28	2	1
	Research in practice is a basis for graduates to be the perspective participants for (in) competitive job markets	320	290	63	2	0

Table 9.1. A mean estimation of the MA students' vision

Name of the variable	Mean	Std. Err	[95% Conf. Interval]
Q3-1	135	73.79024	-89.87456 - 319.8746
Q3-2	135	79.76904	-98.47437 - 344.4744
Q3-3	135	52.18812	-9.897454 - 279.8975
Q3-4	135	70.82725	-61.64798 - 331.648
Q3-5	135	79.82669	-86.63442 - 356.6344
Q3-6	135	82.80459	-94.9024 - 364.9024
Q3-7	135	87.27886	-107.325 - 377.325
Q3-8	135	79.46068	-85.61822 - 355.6182
Q3-9	135	70.47978	-60.68325 - 330.683

Table 10-1. MA students' vision: Interrelation of the MA student's knowledge of 'Research and Research in practice' by subject area according to the job market requirements by the positive answers

Name of the variable	Indicators/Items	Frequency (SA+A)	%
Research, Research in practice, and the competitive job market requirements.	Student needs higher qualifications and skills to obtain a job within a competitive job market	666	98.67
	All academics have to be good researchers	666	98.67
	The demand for high-skilled work would be available who had the resources of a good education with research and research in practice	497	73.63
	Today, in the frame of the developing technology, employers consider a graduate degree as their possibility of possession of research skills	604	89.48
	Obtain research practice in the teaching process is a knowledge transfer for the job market	621	92.00
	Research and research in practice interact with the teaching of modeling, optimization, and job market requirements	671	99.41
	Research skills development has to begin from the bachelor's level	651	96.44
	Quality teaching of research is a benefit for students and graduates in the job market	644	95.41
	Research in practice is a basis for graduates to be the perspective participants for (in) competitive job markets	610	90.37

Table 10-2. A mean estimation of the students' vision by the positive answers

Positive answers	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]
Frequency	625.5556	18.09628	583.8255 667.2856
%	92.67556	2.68117	86.49277 98.85835

Comment. Comparing Tables 9.1 and 10.1 shows that MA students by their positive answers 92.67556 % supported considering integration of „Research and Research in Practice“ in the teaching process accordingly to the modern job requirements. They have more careful approaches to their answers. They know, that graduates are face-to-face with the employer and their behavior is a lesson for them and they have to consider their steps in the experience as job seekers.

According to MA students' main vision by the positive answers on the Interrelation of "Research and Research in practice" by subject area according to the job market requirements (Table 10), they indicate that Research and Research in Practice interact with the teaching of modeling, optimization, and job market requirements and Research skills development has to begin from the bachelor level (assessments 671, 96.44%; 651, 99.41%), and to obtain research practice in the teaching process is a knowledge transfer for the job market (assessments 621, 92%)

CONCLUSION

Today, the main challenge of higher education reform is the weak linkage between related study programs and job market requirements. The lack of the needed skills of graduates dictates the improving relationship between these two components for better economic performance. Research is considered for the Universities of Poland and Georgia. The research seeks to foster „Research and Research in Practice“ in study programs that link the knowledge of practical research output to the job market’s requirements which has to be the important components for the programs by the subject area. It is very important as graduates are face-to-face to employers. It means, that improving the relationship between HE and labor market requirements is necessary. The outcome of the research may be considered as one of the interesting possibilities for involving “Research and Research in Practice” for the teaching by the subject area of specialization from the bachelor to Ph.D. studying levels. The following outcomes of the research are recommended:

1. Working out the study course of “Research and Research in Practice” and its integration into the knowledge triangle for improving students’ logical and practical skills and creativity;
2. Enhancement of sustainable ties between the universities and industry for more effective collaboration with potential employers and graduates for increasing graduates’ competitiveness in the job market;
3. Generation of understanding between teachers and students for increasing student-centered teaching, on one hand, and between academics and employers for understanding the need requirements of the job markets, on the other hand.

Following the logic in prospect, it would be beneficial to analyze the effect of the HEIs in terms of a student’s pathway through the course “Research and Research in Practice” which is the importance of the student’s knowledge progress to the requirements of the labor market, in general. The first challenge facing the implementation of the course “Research and Research in Practice” at university is how much academic teaching staff really knows about the industry or about the subjects’ area of specialism or interrelation between them. Another challenge, related to the first, is using a program software for tasks’ solving. There is no doubt this course could improve student engagement with the content of industry examples, which will better prepare them to achieve learning outcomes, and that university teachers need new skills and a different perspective on course content more broadly.

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