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*Ukraine – Russia – Syria
Conflicts at the Gates of Europe*

Guest editors

Prof. Tetyana Nagornyak
Donetsk National University, Ukraine

Dr. Przemysław Sieradzan
University of Gdansk, Poland



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Editor-in-Chief

Tamar Gamkrelidze

Europe Our House, Tbilisi, Georgia

tamuna@hotmail.co.uk

Co-editors

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University of Gdansk, Poland

modrzejewski@ug.edu.pl

Dr. Tatiana Tököllyová

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Public Affairs in Bratislava, Slovakia

tokolyova.ba@gmail.com

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Editorial

The following volume of „European Journal of Transformation Studies” is dedicated to the potential and actual conflicts, which pose a serious threat to the structure of international security. During last year the turbulence of international political affairs dramatically increased. According to numerous analysts and commentators, our planet is not a relatively safe place as many thought it to be. Francis Fukuyama’s notion of “The End of History”, tantamount to the final victory of the model of state based on liberalism, democracy and capitalism, which used to be quite widespread in the early 90s of the 20th century, seems nowadays like naïve delusion or rather more or less sophisticated piece of black humor. Indeed, wars, conflicts and ideologically motivated violence seem to be everything but a part of burden of the past that the humanity has left behind.

The international collective of authors, most of whom are specialists in different fields of political science, decided to take up the challenge of the analysis of some of the events that recently has shaken the world public opinion’s feeling of safety. All of the authors are conscious of the fact that writing about current political processes from the scientific perspective is very difficult due to limited data available, contradictory reports and the necessity to separate the wheat of facts from the chaff of propaganda. Forecasting the future evolution of ongoing events is always very risky, especially in the uncertain times we all live in. Despite the fact mentioned above, the authors decided to try to comprehend the current conflicts and tensions, because of their deepest belief in need of scientific, *sine ira et studio* analysis of political and social phenomena that shape the contemporary world but are often described by biased journalists and ideologically motivated commentators.

The first five articles are dedicated to the recent events in Ukraine and cover different aspects of the ongoing conflict: the relations between the state and society, modeling of political instability, openness of society, development of the Ukrainian party system and the media coverage of the crisis in Slovakia. The second part of the current issue is dedicated to the contemporary Russian state. It consists of two articles: one about the Siberian separatism and the other containing philosophical reflection on “dissimilarity”. One article presents the analysis of the ongoing conflict in Syria. The final part of the volume contains two essays. First of them is an attempt to understand recent events in Ukraine from the point of view of the relationship between the society and the state, while the other is dedicated to the problem of lack of truth in contemporary international relations.

ARTICLES AND STUDIES

Ukraine – 2014 Through the Prism of Relations Between The State and Society

Tetyana Nagornyak

Donetsk National University, Ukraine

Abstract

The maturity of a state always correlates with the strength of the national (not ethnic) community's identity. The quality of such correlation becomes crucial and often improves during the trials. Peace has never existed without war, but worldwide development is constant in its changing cycles of colonization (confirmation of Empires/confederations, movement towards bipolarity, strengthening of military-technogenic human potential, globalization of economics and identity) and decolonization (territorial reconstruction of the world, development accent's shift towards the social equity, branding "comfort places", peripherality of capitalism). Each socio-political developments (war and a coup d'état, terrorism and AIDS, natural disasters and changes in social display) as attractors of such cycles actualize the question about the maturity of relations between a state and society. The form of such relationships could be designed by religion, political regime, social contract and establish systematic game rules. It converts political support for public institutions by masses into increasing of various incomes among the population (economic stability, legal, financial and social population security, distribution of capabilities and software and growth prospects system on the whole, it's symbolic and social equity). The chosen format of relationships between a state and society is the core of the system modernization, key actor's responsibility (government, community, business and media-environment) and the correspondence of their activity with a single strategic model (which system aims at) is a major factor in its successful renewal.

Key words: *Ukraine, Ukrainian society, state*

Methodology

Control points of relations between a state and society are reflected by media-space. Its quality (both national and global - external to the system, which is being transformed) establishes the roles among media-representatives from professionals, who are able to create an adequate picture of the world, to "vultures", who are against all, and maintenance of individual actors, their mouthpieces and writers. Multidisciplinary researches of the relationship between state and society prove that they are caused by the principles that have been formed:

- historically (form of the relationships between state and individual, territorial structure, administration, historical memory) and civilisationally (mental

features of the population, its ethnic composition, model of outlook, the ability to self-organization and authentic forms of political geno-text (authentic set of mental people's values that are reflected in verbal and non-verbal discourses)[13-14; 18];

- geoeconomically (factors of original nature (resources, location) and development factors, which are made by human (traditional capitals of system [8] (financial flows, agglomeration effect, human equity, infrastructure, type of Economics and Management) [11];

- by the current social display (social stratification of the population, groups of interests, social roles, priorities and character of interactions in society, social codes [10], intellectual and cultural resources of the nation, the maturity of territorial communities);

- by political and informational environment (political discourses and feno-text systems (modern manifestations of political text in the form of messages and speeches which are produced by the authors and text's moderators in order to control the center of the political text's structure)[14], authority's organization and developed civil society, transparency of elections and justice system, the maturity of the political market, the quality of the media-field, ensuring political rights and citizen's freedoms).

The groups of principles-conditions (which are above)are the "territory", where the values of political nation are produced. Principles (or defined conditions) are not values. «Principles are the territory. Values are the maps. If we appreciate the true principles, we will come to the truth - to the understanding of the phenomena as they really are. Principles are similar to the lighthouses that point the path. These laws are natural. It is impossible to break it. Principles are guiding light for human behavior. They definitely have a stable and constant value» [Stephen Richards Covey, „The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People” (1989)].

The nation-state with the principles, which are foundation for a dialogue between society and the state, has to accumulate values and engrain them in the Center of the Society Text's structure (it is principal, system-value-core, which is the guiding light for nation- the set of social values that are positively perceived by an absolute majority of the population) [20]. It would be equally crucial lighthouse both for in government institution's activity, media-representatives and society. It should be the measure of each election campaign, information propaganda, social demands, social movements, business projects and government efficiency.

The events of late 2013 - early 2014 in Ukraine became the culmination of the confrontation between the State and Society in the format of "the top" did not want, but "lower classes" could. *This paper is an author's effort to understand the essence of Ukrainian events within late 2013 - early 2014 along the axis of the conflict - State and Society in the context of further Ukraine's modernization.* Confrontations between State and Society in Ukraine are interpreted by the author as a result of "system achievements" in the context of its modernization in 2013, including objective and subjective (according to the current key figures) factors:

- historical - objective (centralized etatism in management and social demand for a "strong hand" among the population, inherited territorial-

administrative structure from Soviet system, misunderstanding between Eastern and Western Ukraine concerning the symbols which are contained in historical memory) and civilizational (superpolyethnical composition of the population (more than 130 ethnic groups), the tendency to "steading", freethinking, sincerity and family-oriented nature, self-organization in small groups);

- geo-economical objective (the country is rich in natural resources with a location at the crossroads of European routes, as a result of governance, the outflow of assets abroad (both financial flows and human capital assets), high agglomeration effect with depressed border empty territories, slight infrastructure, manual control of the economy, harmful ecology);

- current social display of Ukrainian society (flattening of the social stratification pyramid of the population (the marginalization of the middle class), opaque social elevators, forming the cliques, coalescence of financial and political capitals, primitive social codes, a high level of intellectual capital of the nation and qualitative changes in the direction towards the strengthening of social capital groups territorial community's immaturity);

- current political and information environment (emptiness of Ukrainian Center of the Text's structure, the contradiction between political discourses and feno-text in Ukraine, opaque organization of the government and the elections, judicial system, recruited mass-media and ICUs, immaturity of the political market, the violation of political rights and freedoms, the monopolization of power by the President Yanukovych, multiparty system in reality, slight national branding [16], controversial steps in foreign policy, information warfare from outside, creation of simulacrum in basic meanings of Ukrainian nation).

In consequence of the irresponsible State's activity concerning the overcoming of contradictions (which are highlighted above), Ukraine demonstrated an unprecedented example of self-organization of society "from below" to the whole world. In its socio-political substance, the events of late 2013 - early 2014 in Ukraine and especially the military conflict in Donbass are the most important part of the global phenomenon of self-organization of society against politics unable to represent the interests of society and take responsibility for citizens.

Geopolitical aspect of protests from the end of 2013 till the first half of 2014 in Ukraine

There is a geopolitical conflict between the imperialist system of the USA and the EU on the one hand and Russian subimperialism on the other. One of the subjects of the conflict is control over Ukraine and attempts of economic weakening of the opponents by involving in the conflict (sanctions from the EU to Russia, in Ukraine - from Russia and former Soviet countries that support it, the interests of the energy industry of the USA and the Russian Federation, information war with a world scale, evidence of Ukrainian and Russian sides been involved in the downing of the passenger aircraft "Boeing 777" Malaysian airlines).The escalation of geopolitical conflict along with intensification of the political crisis in Ukraine acquires both the open forms of public condemnation of the Russian role in the military conflict in Donbass and element of conspiracy concerning Ukraine (determination of influence zones in the so-called "federation" under the common

protectorate). Geopolitical conflict between USA / EU and Russia has a real implementation in military operations in Ukraine late 2013 - early 2014 and in controlled incitement to a full-scale world war.

As a consequence of geopolitical trend of world aspiration towards the bipolarity, peripheral capitalism and transition societies become fragile primarily. Preterstates of the world pretend to control these territories and resources, national governments are unable to resist due to many reasons (corruption and treason are not the last), societies are self-organizing for the sake of national interests, territorial integrity and social justice, coping with national spirit's tests. Russian politician T.Vorozheikina claims: "In 2011-2014 protests of this type, though with varying degree of intensity, spread from the Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Caracas to Madrid, Tunis, Cairo, Sofia, Istanbul, Moscow and Bangkok. All these protest movements were united by acute dissatisfaction with the institutions which do not allow people to achieve their goals through legitimate political channels. This also affected authoritarian (in Venezuela, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and Arab countries) and democratic (Brazil and Spain) political regimes. In most cases, a protest against corruption that runs through the state institutions and the ruling group became an important factor which united those who took to the streets. This protest mixed variety of requirements - from social justice and increasing equality to democracy and fair elections. Such movements cannot be described adequately with the help of the traditional "left-right" coordinate system. Tens and even hundreds of thousands people took the streets because they were driven primarily by acute sense of rejection of the political system in which they were having no actual voting rights... Until now Ukraine poorly used the opportunities that opened up in front of it after independence in 1991 and after the "Orange Revolution" in 2004 [The Economist, May 31st 2014]. Perhaps this change of government and society and the relationship between them will not end up as a "great illusion" of the Ukrainian revolution; and the Russian government, the main strangler and destroyer of its democratic potential, will finally understand that it confronts the opponent with extremely strong spirit" [9]. The connection between geopolitical and socio-economic factors of confrontation between a state and society in Ukraine is tight. Demonstrative is the fact that there are about 60% debt obligations to the United States and 30% to the Russian Federation in the structure of Ukraine's debt. And it can be used by them to put pressure on the political leadership of Ukraine.

Socio-economical aspect of protests from the end of 2013 till the first half of 2014 in Ukraine

It should be noted that, regardless of flags and slogans, all Maydans late 2013 - early 2014 in Ukraine had an economic component and primarily rebelled against power's oligarchisation, social injustice, lumpenization not only professional strata, but also the whole territories, washing out the middle class of society. Each Maydan has its own tycoon (government of Viktor Yanukovich from the one side, "Kiev junta" - from the other). Maydan late 2013- early 2014 is a mass and prolonged protest action in the center of Kyiv which began on 21st of November 2013 in response to the suspension of preparation for the signing of the Economic Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union by Azarov

government. The economic strikes against policy of the government of Azarov started in small towns (Krasnodon, Krivoy Rog, Thorez). In process of spreading of mass protests and its transforming into EuroMaydan/AntyMaydan, and then into the war in the Eastern Ukraine, rate's increasing and flirting with the tycoons of the new government A.Yatsenyuk, aggravating escalation of conflict between the center and the regions, between Donbass and other part of Ukraine, between migrants from the East and those, who remained in the area of ATO (anti-terrorist operation) became more noticeable (for all regions). Protest movement articulated on the socio-economic basis has always been transferred into the political field both by geopolitical actors and representatives of Ukrainian politicum, who aspired to get dividends with the help of self-organization in society. However, the amount of black economy sector was 50% (according to official statistics) [21]. There is almost no positive in this index, but it should be mentioned that specifics of Ukrainian black economy – is the possibility of informal gains not only by tycoons, but also ordinary people. At the first stages this fact saved the monopolization of the shady economy (in 2010) with constant increase of unemployment in the industrial cities and villages of Ukraine. The practice of state's deception at all levels was formed in a society. It is logical that centralization of the economy in "Family" hands, its returning to the beginning of the 1990s with "observers" in regions, external management of companies and corporations led to additional tax, banking, financial and humanitarian schemes, and eventually to the "death" of small and medium business, increase of unemployment segments, increase of a number of those people, who live below the poverty level in Ukraine (officially - 35%, unofficially - 55% of the population) [15]. Under these circumstances, civil protests and military operations in Luhansk and Donetsk transferred economy into the wartime mode without formal establishment of martial law, which resulted in the following:

- Since October 2013 local currency (UAH) was devalued more than 50%. Since the beginning of 2014 inflation was more than 30% in annual terms.
- Standard of living dropped approximately by 25%, decline of real incomes - almost by 20% (up to \$ 250). In reality - much worse (- auth.).
- Fuel prices have risen up to 35-40% for different types of bread – from 30 to 70% [22].
- Migration of Donbass people led to the fact that Donetsk - a leader in corporate governance efficiency, in the accessibility of new technologies and in the development of business in Ukraine - not only almost ceased its commercial and financial activities, but became empty and dying due to focus of separatism, the location of hired militants. It became a front-line area of ATO.

Ukraine is called:

- one of the poorest countries in the world, equally with Africa [5],
- the state with partially authoritarian regime equally with Kosovo [4],
- place of unhappy people, equally with Zimbabwe and Sudan [*The Happy Planet Index* [5],
- corrupt country (equally with the Congo and the Central African Republic) [3].

Both the official Kyiv and self-proclaimed government of "People's Republic" "DNR" and "LNR" have tried to use articulation of protests in Donbass around the

socio-economic problems. At the stage of its realization, neither implementation of declared points in Maydans, nor community integration without politics in a single antioligarchic breakthrough for Ukraine has happened. Official Kyiv - represented by A.Yatsenyuk head of the Government - (in the context of decentralization by M.Hroysman instead of federalization) offered an experiment concerning the economic independence of Donbass, which has to feed itself (the direct subsidy from budget is 34 billion on 180 thousands of miners)during the Kharkov round table. Among the solutions of socio-economic nature, which were declared by "people's governor of Donetsk region" P.Hubaryev, property's nationalization of large private capital is a prior purpose. Effectuation of both offers in reality would have enormous consequences for Ukraine and for the whole former Soviet Union capitalism. The situation, which is one of a kind "mind tricks", could happen. Hegel called it a setting own course of history through various subjective actions.

Ultrareactionary Russian nationalists ("Russian World", "Yzborsky club", "Eastern Front") supported by the UOC-MP formally began social (not socialist) antioligarchic revolution that became clear and acceptable for most people in the region. However, after the arrest of P.Hubarev- its ideologist ("second" after the Russian A.Dugin and V.Krylov) revolution was transformed into a military operation with professional mercenaries aimed at "rescue Russians in Donbass" under the guidance from the Moscow by O.Boroday, I.Strelkov, O.Hodakovskiy and other [19]. Eurointegration slogans of ideological leaders from Maydan were also transformed into state power's reformation, mobilization and quick recreation of an efficient army involving community, preterm presidential elections and ATO in Donbass. This transformation was contributed to by a complicated situation in relations between the regional political elites and FIG (financial-industrial groups) with «DNR» / «LNR». Firstly, elites were interested in enforcement on Kyiv in order to redistribute powers and financial flows, but certainly the situation got out of hand after the military wing of separatists got on top (Boroday- Hodakovskiy). A vivid image of this is both a conflict between "the host of Donbass" R.Akhmetov and "DNR" and castling in separatist's leadership (Zaharchenko - Mikhailov).The wars between tycoons in Ukraine and locally in Donbass are also the components of transforming social movement into the military conflict. The key players are: - "Dnepropetrovsk residents" headed by I.Kolomoyskiy (he has a prolonged confrontation with Akhmetov Rinat and demonstrates nationwide claims after returning to Ukraine and obtaining the post of Dnepropetrovsk governor (battalions "Dnepr", strengthening of the state border, business-conflicts with Russia in the Crimea, participation in parliamentary elections and local control of South-eastern regions); - inhomogeneous "Donetsk residents" - R.Akhmetov, Yanukovych entourage (V.Pshonka, V.Zaharchenko etc.),group of revanchists from PRU (O.Yefremov, T.Bahtyeyeva, M.Lyevchenko), the group of "young reformers" (V.Homutynnik, O.Klymenko, S.Arbusov etc.), "Kiev residents who have their own interests in Donbass" (V.Medvedchuk, P.Poroshenko, A.Yatseniuk et al.).

Under these circumstances economically beneficial scenario for Ukraine was possible, but it ended up in history as a missed opportunity. Clash of the new economic policy in official Kyiv and "People's Republics" could become not so much of a State (center) and separatists conflict, than of a class one (which was suppressed by all its sides, by transformation the socio-economic struggling into political-territorial war with serious armored vehicles and mass casualties (because of the threat to their own

oligarchic system in the Russian Federation and Ukraine, including the Donbass). Purely conditionally, such union of progressive components from Maydan and AntiMaydan based on socio-economic program concerning Ukraine's disoligarchization "from below" and the rejection of external influence is that improbable chance of "miracle" for Ukraine, which did not happen. As a result, at the end of July 2014 Ukraine, which is in the conditions of war, political and economic crisis and humanitarian catastrophe, is preparing for parliament's re-election.

Political aspects of protest's prerequisites and consequences late 2013 – early 2014 in Ukraine

The presidential and local elections in 2010 launched the strengthening the power vertical of "Donetsk residents" in the capital and in the regions. The level of "nepotism" in the Viktor Yanukovich policy considerably exceeded the Viktor Yushchenko policy. "40 persons from the nearest entourage of the President (brothers, sisters, children, godfathers) obtain various positions in state agencies, courts. They are members of the Verkhovna Rada and work in local councils. All together they form the large group (almost 100 people)"[21]. In early 2011 a phrase "I'm from Donetsk" is included in the Ukrainian part lexicon. It has the format of threats and large claims. Revenge of the PR after a defeat in 2004 was fast and comprehensive. In 2011 Ukraine turned into a pyramid with a single point of management, where "loyalty to the leader of the party" and "party feasibility" - were the highest criteria for involvement in the president team. Both criteria included territorial affiliation. Migration of "Donetsk residents" in Kyiv, along with demographic indicators in 2011 deprived Donetsk of a "city millionaire" status. 2012 was the parliamentary year, which came into political history of Ukraine as an election year without a choice, because all five political parties that got in the Parliament were the President project. They were not going to create opposition to (CPU, PRU, "UDAR", "Batkivshchina" and "Svoboda").

"Top" control and willfulness of the courts and the police, fiscal services and mass media led to political protests. The first one was called "Vradiyevskiy Maydan" – a protest action in Vradiyevka (Mykolaiv region) and in some towns of Ukraine, including Kyiv from 30th June to 15th August 2013. From 7th to 17th July 2013 Vradiyevka residents (including the representatives of political parties "UDAR", "BYT", "Svoboda") initiated a "march to Kyiv" (400 km). Rallies against the lawlessness of the police were in Donetsk and Lviv, Odessa and Ivano-Frankivsk, Kiev, Simferopol and Kharkiv. The main requirement was to punish the guilty in Vradiyivka crime, other police crimes and resignation of Minister of Internal Affairs V.Zaharchenko. Vradiyevskiy Maydan was suppressed by "Berkut" and other forces of the Interior Ministry, but it was the beginning of protest's actions that started in the capital on 21st November 2013 in response to the suspension by Azarov government of preparation for the signing of an Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union and were supported by public performances in the majority of Ukrainian cities. After the Vilnius summit "Eastern Partnership" (28 – 29th November 2014), dispersal of oppositional tent camp and the law adoption on 16th January 2014 that provided tougher sanctions for participating in mass protests Maydan took fundamentally anti-government and antipresidential nature.

February 22 2014, after Yanukovych's escape from the country, Verkhovna Rada adopted the Resolution "On self-withdrawal of the President of Ukraine from performing his constitutional duties and setting early elections of the President of Ukraine" on 25th May 2014. Since February 23 the duties of the President of Ukraine were assigned to the Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Turchynov. Presidential elections were preceded by the annexation of Crimea by Russia on the referendum basis, Ukraine's secession from the CIS, "Russian Spring", returning to the Ukraine's Constitution 2004, mass deputy's withdrawal from the Party of Regions, parliamentary reformatting and some rather hasty laws adopted by Parliament, terrorist attacks in Odessa and Mariupol, which increased the amount of those who came to the "referendum" in Donbass in order to stand up to the "fascists, who kill people", who caused PR-campaign of R.Akhmetov and assignment of I.Kolomoyskiy entourage on positions in public authorities in the East of Ukraine. The power of the former opposition and the attempt to cancel the Law "On Language" by new Ukrainian leaders that provoked a political crisis in the Crimea and the mass protests in the South-eastern regions of the country escalated into an armed conflict.

Several fronts were formed in Ukraine:

1) Institutional. An external vector of development could be considered as formalized subject of the first front. Supporters of Eurointegration – Maydan's Institutes (The headquarter of national resistance, All-Ukrainian union "Maydan", National Council of Ukraine), fractions in the Verkhovna Rada ("Batkivshchyna", "UDAR", "Svoboda"), individual deputies, The Cabinet of Ministers (since 02/27/14), party Democratic Alliance, civil organizations (Mezhlis, AvtoMaydan, Ultras, CPFD (Committee of Patriotic Forces of Donbass), CVU (Committee of Voters of Ukraine), Congress of Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainian platform "Sobor", UNA-UNSO), regional councils (Zakarpate, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, Rivne regions), detachments of self-defense, "Right sector", "National Guard"). Supporters of the pro-Russian vector of Ukrainian development - Ministry of Internal Affairs, The Cabinet of Ministers (till 02/22/14), The Internal Troops, "Berkut", "Grifon", "Tiger", traffic police, Security Service of Ukraine, the General Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, the Party of Regions, The Verkhovna Rada of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the pro-governmental political and civil organizations ("Eastern Front", "Russian World", "The single choice"). "Ukrainian Front", the detachments of nomocracy, the Don Cossacks. The regional councils in Kherson, Donetsk, Lugansk, Kharkov, Dnipropetrovsk, Kirovograd regions, DNR (D.Pushylin), LNR (V.Bolotov), "Novorosiya" (O.Tsarov), official representatives of Kremlin in Donbass (O.Hodakovskiy, O.Boroday etc.).

2) *Armed* (official military groups and self-created military groups by the community). The subject of military conflict that is located in Lugansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine is administrative and territorial status of Donbass. Representatives of the State, who defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Donbass is the National Guard, regular army of Ukraine, the General headquarter of ATO, battalions "Donbass", "Dnepr 1", "Dnepr2", "Aidar", "Azov", "Mykolayiv" "Polissya", "Cherkasy" and others. The military groups, who believe that Donbass should be an independent state formation or Federal Subject of the Russian Federation are - "Oplot", "East", "Slavic militia" (I.Girkin), "Zorya",

"Donbass People's Militia Donbass" (I.Bezler), "Alpha" and the GRU - Main Intelligence Directorate (Russian Federation).

3) *Socio-political* (participants of mass protests and social groups of interests) front was called "Maydan" and "AntiMaydan." As noted above, Maydan and pro-Russian protests in Donbass (AntiMaydan) by its nature are similar phenomena, because the majority of people were dissatisfied with socio-economical system, power's corruption and insecurity of the population. It is possible to claim that the Maydan was not homogeneous and eventually acquired different forms of struggling.

The first Maydan was unprecedented (before the resignation of Viktor Yanukovych and his government). Intellectuals and representatives of large and medium businesses, students and pensioners - all segments of the population with Ukraine in heart came there. After the power's re-election, they returned to their homes and jobs. The other Maydan was created in Khreschatyk Square. It expressed its opposition in more extreme and primitive forms - a kind of nationalism or geopolitical orientation through archaic and aggressive reactions, patriarchal of political culture. The community of Kyiv did not notice that the capital turned into a dirty city, where unemployed people and those who did not want to work found refuge in tents. They called themselves the Maydan. The situation in Donbass was different. First AntiMaydans were formed under the influence of administrative resources of the Party of Regions (which covered not only the local authorities, but all managers and a significant number of businessmen) and the Russian media. Donetsk Maydan was full of intellectuals, students and European-minded people. In one place on the neighboring platforms there were two different communities that did not want to hear each other. Every time such public actions ended with fights and civilian's casualties which took place due to non-interference of police and other law-enforcement agencies. Last front of social contradictions was beyond the boundaries of peaceful protests and territorially - beyond the boundaries of Donbass and Ukraine. Each of the socio-political groups received support. Maydan got it from other regions of Ukraine, AntiMaydan - from the Russian Federation. The ideological confrontation between residents of the one region turned into a war between the Ukrainian army and foreign militants with their supporters (citizens – adherents of the state's split).

Under these circumstances snap elections took place in Ukraine. It was the "way out" for the majority because there was the one who could take all the responsibility. This was supported by the residents of both the West and East of Ukraine. The victory of P.Poroshenko in the presidential election was confident - one round (54.7%) -against the background of a systematic crisis, the occupation of two regions of Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea by Russia and external pressure. Crimea did not take part in the voting, 9 of 34 polling stations were opened in Donbass because of separatist's control. June 27, 2014, he signed an Association Agreement with the European Union (economical part).

The most radical residents of Donbass call the state power "Kiev junta" and protesters - "Maydanuty", "benderovtsy" and "fascists of right sector." Radical representatives of the Western Regions believe to call the residents of Donbass "vatniki", "colorady" and "rashysty." As a matter of fact, "DNR" and "LNR" are military juntas ("LNR" from the very beginning, "DNR" after the coup, which took

place on 11th May 2014 referendum) with ultra right clericalism (extreme nationalist ideology) that guided by separatist idea of Russian World's victory in the world. They thwarted presidential elections, launched persecution of their opponents using a wide range of antisocial methods (terrorist attacks, shelling the housing areas till the destruction of the whole regions, kidnapping people/children, racketeering, marauding and intimidation of civilians).

Nowadays Ukrainian state has the most right government in Europe. There are extremely dangerous signals (an attempt to ban the Communist Party and PRU, sanctions of the State Committee in Television and Radio-Broadcasting of Ukraine concerning the mass media, which broadcast the direct speech of "DNR" and "LNR" representatives, etc.). They transform into the trend coalescence the repressive apparatus with extreme (ideologically) organizations. In case of these trends prevalence, the reproduction of situation of Latin American dictatorship is possible. It should be noted that the beginning of this trend was initiated by Yanukovich government, when violence towards the Maydan's protesters was used not by VSU (Internal forces of Ukraine), but by "titushky" – fighters-mercenaries, when fighting against dissidence was prosecuted by SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) and profit of "Family" grew directly proportional to the exhaustion of small, medium businesses and the marginalization of the middle class in Ukraine. Confrontation between institutions and their structural units is caused not only (and not so much) by ideological positions or "skeletons" in cupboard of elected Maydan's representatives, but by redistribution of large capital in Ukraine. Informational and political field of Ukraine turned into a "war" between I.Kolomoyskiy, R.Akhmetov and S.Lovochkin. Parliament, The Prime Minister, mass media as well as the fiscal, banking, media and economical system of the country became hostages of oligarchic misunderstandings. Nothing personal - just business. As a result, broken destinies of ordinary people, who lose their jobs (due to closing of enterprises or changing the mode) or have to move to other areas, where the companies are moved by their owners, broken psyche and demoralized social comfort in the sequel of oligarchic battles on central Ukrainian TV channels, excluding even the Internet.

Unpopular decisions of A.Yatsenyuk (CMU) and lobbying by President P.Poroshenko issue of parliament's dissolution and snap parliament elections 10/26/14 are features of two tendencies which become the disappointments of Maydan now. The first –is the centralization of power in a president (the desire to have obedient Parliament and Cabinet of Ministers and to be rather independent from the oligarchs). Tendency is not new and it was the reason of protests in Maydan. The second trend -is the dependence of State's solutions (government institutions). Such tendency was formed as a result of actual absence of independent bureaucrats who do not execute someone's commandments, play up or are not the representatives of FIG. Therefore, the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers acquired features of the scales between the leaders of big business. Accordingly, the fractions in parliament, which support their patrons, vote or do not vote for them. The presidential pressure on the Parliament led to non-adopted government initiatives. The solution is nationalization of business of all major oligarchs in wartime (it would absolutely correspond with the requirements of all Maydans in the country and it would reconcile the society and give carte blanche for the State). It remains the dream of an ordinary Ukrainian. Meanwhile, the

government "sanctions" apply partially, taking into account the owner. Ironore sector of R.Akhmetov is the president's bargaining chip. On the contrary, it seems that A.Yatsenyuk plays on the field of "master of Donbass". The proofs are his fiscal initiatives (which were hastily created contrary to the tax initiatives of I.Kolomoyskiy) that contradict to the policy of the president. Voting for this draft law "On Amendments to the Tax Code of Ukraine ...," in which the mining business of SCM remained immune in contrast to other sectors of the economy, also confirms the game for the benefit of R.Akhmetov that received support from the fraction of S.Kurchenko and C.Arbutov "For peace and stability" (ref. voting in Verkhovna Rada).

Due to that fact that while writing this paper the resignation of the Government was not adopted and it would be supported only by CPU and PRU (this is not constitutional majority), we can conclude that it is a lesson of emotional harm in the political career for A.Yatsenyuk and a challenge for Deputy Prime Minister V.Hroysman, who would lead the government until snap parliament elections. Irrespective of the figure-head of the government, the policy of the State will be aimed at the interests of the United States (via IMF loans) and four personal actors - P.Poroshenko, S.Lovochkin, R.Akhmetov and I.Kolomoyskiy. The confrontation between last three figures provides independence and the right for president to influence on the market in Ukraine (political and financial). Among the key players, there are no society and the interests of those who brought these people in power, and those who could become the focus of a new separatism in the sequel of returning to Ukraine in PreMaydan times, but with new faces. The intellectual elite, which was a significant part of the first Maydan, (in November 2013 - February 2014 in Kiev) is aware of it. Against the background of long defective systemic transformation and irresponsible government, the crisis of state administration in Ukraine led people to the streets and forced the majority of ordinary citizens to look for external patron for solving internal problems. This well-organized error and step away from self-consciousness of unity and self-sufficiency of the Ukrainian nation, which is being tested by weapon. The time will come when the majority of Ukrainian will be sure that interests of society will be paramount if the government becomes a simple performer.


Sociocultural aspect of protests late 2013 - early 2014 in Ukraine

The historical memory, which transforms into a social display and specifics of social role's interactions with local dominants during large crises, is important for description of the misunderstandings between State and Society in socio-cultural aspect. The dominance of the ruling class (official duties + financial and economical levers of influence), which effectively used the regional socio-cultural differences in order to get rid of socio-economical and political issues, is typical for multiethnic, multicultural, ideologically and socially heterogeneous Ukrainian society. However, it could not last forever. For a system that is transforming it is extremely important to understand on whom the power relies. If a State is based on the oligarchs and acts in favor of them, the character of regime's hybridity will move towards the autocratic or total control over the system by Center (regardless of the President's

person). If a State is based on society, democratic tendencies will aspire to its parity with State. The model of Lifecycle of Ukrainian Society looks like following:

Confrontation between Government of Kuchma Leonid and President Kravchuk , 06/08-06/23– general and long strike of laborers in Donbass. The session of Donetsk Regional Council adopted the Resolution of mistrust to President of Ukraine. They required to hold a national referendum about mistrust of President, Verkhovna Rada and all councils of people's deputies at all levels till October 1, 1993. Result - snap presidential elections with the support from FIG. Formation of NPGU (Independent Trade Union of Miners of Ukraine)	Confrontation between Government of P. Lazarenko and President Kuchma , ideological disputes in Parliament: pro-presidential centrist parties with radical part CPU and NRU. The death of V. Chornovil and P. Lazarenko deportation abroad on the eve of the presidential election. Result - a presidential election with the support from FIG. Creation of building polarized party system, double-directional foreign policy.	Confrontation between Government, Verkhovna Rada and President Kuchma , ideological disputes in Parliament as a result of redistribution of big business. Result - a victory of right parties at the parliamentary elections and the presidential elections in 2004. Protests throughout the country. The confrontation between East and West. Formation and the victory of the opposition "People Power". Conflict of external actors in Ukraine = Orange Revolution and First Maydan in Ukraine. The European integration Ukraine.	Incapacitated Parliament, government and president. The confrontation of FIG. The tension in society and opposition Tymoshenko vs Yanukovych. The course on Euro 2012 (war inside the FIG for budgetary subventions). Result - The victory of Viktor Yanukovych in the presidential elections, the Russian vector of policy, centralization of power and economy. The highest level of social differentiation.	The confrontation between government and society. Protests throughout the country. The confrontation between East and West. Self-organization of Maydans 1) Vradiyevskiy against lawlessness of the police; 2) EuroMaydans; 3) Maydan against the government of Viktor Yanukovych in Kiev; 4) Maydan "DNR" and "LNR" for "Malorosiya". External factors and military conflict in Donbass. Result - the early presidential and parliamentary elections. The European integration in Ukraine. Decentralization.
1993-1994	1998-1999	2001-2004	2010	2013-2014
9 - 11years – 1 cycle – 1993 – 2004			9 - 11 years – 2 cycle – 2004 – 2014	
1991 -1994	1995-1999	2000-02 2004	2005 2008-10	2011-2012 2013-14

The life-cycle model of relations between State and Society



Analyzing the surges of public protests, it is obvious that they arose against a background of misunderstandings inside the authorities (the opposition to the

government or the parliament with the president) and were used by the oligarchs in order to redistribute resources in the country through their "own" president. In this context, Ukraine has already gained an experience of conjunctural Maydans and strikes. Maydans for integrity of the country in the end of 2013 –are the first protests in the Ukrainian history that demonstrated high level of self-organization of the community. They demonstrated that a Society could be a real political actor. For the first time Maydan arose against the oligarch's power itself, which led to lumpenization of Ukrainian and attempted to interfere with the realization of civil rights and freedoms and to decide the country's fate. According to Dahrendorf, the effectiveness of systemic transformations, [2] is gradual changes. His "theory of the three times," specifies that the temporal characteristics of duration of socio-cultural (two generations per 26 years), economic (in average - 6 years), political (consolidation of social innovations in the new constitution - 6 months) changes are fundamentally different. Therefore, the modernization of the political system should be started with reforms in sociocultural aspect through economic changes to the consolidation of updated system with young political elite with constitutional establishment of modernization model. Proceeding from the cycles, we can assume that in 2017 we should expect the birth of a new passion, dissemination of activist political culture in scope and amount of participants, and the ending of the cycle along the axis of State - Society. The results of military conflict in Donbass and parliamentary elections - 2014 will become the requisite for subsequent protests (the graph-model demonstrates that public protest will increase during 2014-2017). The life-cycle model of state power in 2014 is in bifurcation phase. Its development is possible in two scenarios: a reiteration of the previous cycle (autocracy with a focus on oligarchs) or a new cycle of compromise dialogue between Society and State in Ukraine).

Conclusion

It is necessary to realize the social assets and liabilities of Maydan for subsequent modernization of the country:

1. During the years of independence, Ukraine has almost never carried out *the policy of forming a unified national (political) identity*. Foreign ideological centers (such as the "Russian World", Centers of NATO and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, Romanian movements) were allowed to form a wide range of own supporters among youth and intellectual elite, civic associations and news agencies. Their activity was notably successful in areas with border identity (Crimea, Donbass, Bukovina) that were the heart of separatism. The state should reconsider the policy of recreating the Ukrainian's political nation, including ethnic and regional specifications in order to overcome these trends.

2. *Holding the ATO and its information accompaniment*, including civilian casualties, destruction of infrastructure, blocking the supply of products and medicines in localities, propagandistic negative effect of Russian mass-media that explains the support of separatism in a referendum. All this things are capable of creating a new foundation for confrontation between East and West in the public consciousness on the axis of "you (Donbass) are guilty that we died for you and for presence of terror in your territory," while in Donbass (especially in small industrial

cities of Donetsk region and frontier territories in Lugansk region) the sociocultural unity with "Ukrainian" will be buried even if the administrative capacity of Ukrainian state in the Donbass recovers. Such level of hatred, which exists nowadays between the representatives of different ideological or geopolitical positions, is inconceivable. There is a world picture with rejection of opponents. The opportunity to see the same person (like you) in oppose disappeared. On the contrary, people start to demonize contradictors, enjoy their physical death of (not only gunman, but also those civilians that adhered to other positions). Now this exaltation exists on the both sides. This indicates that the Society is already operates in the mode of civil war. It is ready to exist in mode of guerrilla warfare and denunciations. Under such circumstances, State is responsible for the subsequent peaceful resumption of mentally united Ukraine. A new *information policy, rearrangement of professional workforce, restoration of the state order on their first workplace throughout Ukraine, interprofessional stratification of the regions and common social projects* can alleviate the given trend.

3. In the context of feeling *the new cycle of decolonization*, the fall of empires, which seemed to be invincible a few years ago, the sacred integrity of Ukraine is the value. It is necessary to *work on the Center of the Ukrainian Text's structure* in order to fasten the Ukrainian unity. The primary thing in the transformation process is the clarification of a model society, on which is aimed to achieve, and strategies that institutionally constitute the multidimensional socio-cultural space and its authentic features with the help of Center of the political Text's structure in Ukraine - in other words, by those values, antivalues that would be identically perceived by the majority in Ukraine. This concept is not being implemented currently in Ukraine. The core essence of this modernization model lies in the geno-level of this political text, in other words, in a deep, archetypal, authentic layer of socio-cultural values of the people.

4. *Donbass in Ukrainian discourse* always felt itself as chosen. Close interweaving of historical development, interests and economy in two Ukrainian regions - Donetsk and Luhansk - led to an informal association in their general historical, cultural and economic Donbass region (Donetsk coal basin). The phrase "Donbass feeds the whole country", which was justified at the end of 1960 – early 1970's. in times of USSR, transformed into myth and germinated in the consciousness of the region's inhabitants as stereotypes "miner and metallurgists - are the pride of the country", "black gold is the power of Donbass", "Donbass is able to feed itself", "Donbass is Ukrainian strength and beauty". In order to understand why the Donbass residents demonstrate frontier self-identity, which is different from all Ukraine, it necessary to know the following: 1) this is the region, which is bordered by the Russian Federation that did not stop its propaganda since 1991! Consequently, a territorial identity ("I am from Donbass") became a higher priority than citizenship due to absence of state policy formation of a unified political nation. Starting from the Soviet years, Donbas was the place, where huge amounts of money were rotated. Budgetary shadow schemes attracted criminals in the region. Residents of Donbass (both the top and the working class) were respected and prosperous according to the Soviet indicators of welfare state. Society felt itself as important element of government processes. Since the mid 1970s, coal resource of financial circulation demanded large foreign investments and government

subsidies. Receiving dividends from these "deposits" is a complicated, long and unreliable process. That is why the Soviet government began to minimize all governmental programs of the coal industry development. It was entirely closed due to the collapse of the USSR. The era, when coal was a fuel, finished in the world. Ukraine gained problematic Donbass with deprivation of the population. The discrepancy between desired and actual exists even nowadays here. In Donbas 33% of people are aged over 60 (as in any other region). Originally, they are from the Soviet Union. In other words, they associated best moments of their life with the Soviet period. This illuminates the reason of the priority of Russian mass-media, a high level of trust in Putin - President of the Russian Federation, close economic, cultural, familial, academic relationships with the Russian Federation and mainly it's Southern Federal District, Russian-speaking population. They are not as pro-Russian as pro-soviet, but against the background of recent political changes, together with the first category, they "made" pseudo-referendum on 11th May 2014. They voted against the "fascism" represented by Ukraine; 2) Along with those, responding to specific questions, the idea of the separation of area (region) from Ukraine and joining the other state was *supported only by 8%. Only 17% of Donbass residents would like to see their region as an independent state (DNR or LNR)*. The researchers emphasize that the separatist sentiments are mostly supported by senior people in Ukraine. Among the young people up to 30 years, 13% would like to detach their region and join to another country, among the people older than 55 years - 29%. At the same time, significant amount of people (32%) believes that there are deep political contradictions, language and cultural differences, differences in economic development between Western and Eastern regions of Ukraine. Moreover, these people are sure that in prospect these regions can be divided in order to create their own states or to join other states. Such ideas are the most popular in Donbass (58%) and in the South (48%), less popular at the Center (20%) and West (20%). In Donbass this idea of essential contradictions between regions is particularly common among the senior people - 66% of people older than 55 years, and 49% - at the age of 30 [12]; 3) According to the amount and population density, Donbass is superpolyethnical platform (representatives of 130 ethnic groups live here), Donetsk region - it is just approximately 4% of the territory, 10% of the population, 15% - GDP and 25% of export. However, nowadays this region is subsidized. Because of the fact, that the population makes this region a significant electoral card, Donbass always gets its political representation and state funding. Donbass is completely different from almost all regions of the country according to the circulation of capital, the level of business-administration, the number of international offices and global events. Consequently, "Donetsk residents" (FIG and elite) during the years of independence were always the mediator between the State and Society, writing the plot of performances in their favor. Residents of the region have become the hostages of their oligarchs, claims of the Russian Federation and official Kyiv. Unfortunately, Ukraine had periods when Donbass became a more serious player than the State. One of these periods is the subject of this research.

5. *The control points in relations between the State and Society* are fixed by blood of peaceful citizens in Donbass today. Ukrainian soldiers and officers from all parts of the country leave their lives here for a united and strong, free and

sublime Ukraine. Here the representatives of the Russian Federation with extreme cruelty try to establish a "gray zone" called Novorosiya. The point of no return has been already passed. Rationally, Ukraine before the protests in winter 2013 could be characterized as: monopolization of the country, impoverished people, marginalization of the middle class, the increase of external debt, dependence on foreign players, betrayal of national interests by state officials, "party feasibility", blank political text, primitive social lifts, a high percentage of urbanization, bare boundaries, manual regulation of elections, political parties, civil rights and freedoms, the vulnerability of the community. Current Ukraine- is the loss of territorial integrity, the damaged infrastructure, disabled economy, impoverished people, dependence on foreign players, the increase of external debt, "party feasibility", primitive social lifts, biased political text, the vulnerability of the community, the mobilization of the population without a declaration of war, migration and emigration, aspiration to the monopoly in the country through military actions, redistribution of business and information warfare between personal internal players and their "products" – parties, odious persons, battalions and territories.

The fundamental difference between Ukraine "before" and "after" - is cohesion of community. And now it is community's time. Ukrainian people will either fix a course towards a free European country together or will allow the government to decide on the future of their children. Donbass and the war in the East will remain in the political history of independent Ukraine as a test on the integrity and strength of the national spirit. The confirmation of victory and renovation of peaceful life in areas of ATO is possible only in case of military governor's assignment (for instance, like in postwar Germany) and the prevention of old elite's assignment in local authorities. Donbass community is regenerating. For the first time, Donbass realized the value of a State and power of Society, which is capable of protecting the country. The control point of Ukrainian people's victory and establishment of a compromise (Society with the State) path of development will be the practice of understanding by local communities as a real political actor that requires transparency in government decisions, able to protect the interests of the city and reproduce the prospects of free and self-contained state by real actions.

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Simulation Modeling of Political Instability and Maydan of 2013/2014 in Ukraine

Nick Polyvovyy

National University "Odessa Academy of Law", Ukraine

Abstract

The article analyzes the reasons for inadequacy of the model prognoses to the actual events of winter 2013-2014 in Ukraine. The most productive models are described. The promising measures to modify the models of political processes in political transition countries are defined in order to obtain more adequate predictions of political instability in future. It's proposed pass on to the search and verification of synergetic order parameters that determine the duration of the period of "deterministic chaos". The estimation of the duration of such periods and the duration of bifurcation points for modern Ukraine is made.

Key words: *prognostication of political stability, Maidan, synergetic models*

Introduction

The events of November 2013 - February 2014 in Ukraine (respecting the already established tradition, we call these events the revolution, although aware of the conventionality of the term) came as a surprise to many, not to say, for all observers - both for the philistines and so for the scientists. A few basic parameters became unexpected:

- The political incandescence,
- The degree of citizen participation in the anti-government struggle,
- The cruelty and meanness of pro-government forces, and finally,
- The result of the confrontation, culminating with an escape of V.Yanukovych.

Should be noted that serious structural problems in organization of government and in the economic sphere were pointed out by many, but no one predicted such a sharp intensification in political struggle and such an active civil participation. Habitual additional indicators of onset of political instability - the impoverishment of the population, the overproduction and the bundle of the elites and the financial crisis - although showed a certain dynamics, but didn't alerted the researchers before the occurrence of events and did not convince of the inevitability of a revolution in the post factum analysis [Cirel 2014; Goldstone 2014]. That situation actualizes many issues and, in particular, the question of the fundamental capability to predict the crisis. We believe that the best methods for prediction of social and political instability are offered within the framework of the simulation

modeling. At the same time the events of 2013-2014 Maidan showed high inaccuracy of the structurally-demographic dynamics methods in the construction of forecasts for occurrence of periods of political instability. In particular, we know of no study that predicted the onset and the radicalization of political protest in Ukraine at that time. Alas, the strengthening of social and political instability also was not predicted by those models that have been developed by us, what we perceive as a personal academic failure.

Therefore, the goal of this text is to analyze the reasons for the inadequacy of the model prognoses to the actual events of winter 2013-2014 in Ukraine and the determination of promising measures to modify the models of political processes in political transition countries in order to obtain more adequate predictions of political instability in future.

Analysis of the peculiarities of some existing models that provide prognoses of political stability

The most well-known and carefully developed models of social and political processes that allows to receive prognoses about the periods of instability, are, in our opinion, the models of structurally-demographic dynamics, going back to the works of J. Goldstone, P. Turchin, A. Korotayev, S. Nefedov, D. Halturina, L. Grinin, S. Malkov etc. [Turchin, 2010; Korotayev, 2007; Halturina, Korotayev 2010: 5]. These researchers position themselves as supporters of mathematical history. They have built a series of very interesting models of historical and political processes. These models associate socio-political development of a separate state and their groups with a dynamics of a certain parameters of demographic development.

One of the first models of this series is a model of structurally-demographic cycles of J. Goldstone. Pivotal idea of J. Goldstone model, devoted to the analysis of the interconnection between demographic and political changes, is the thesis about a decisive influence of demographic development of the country on its socio-political development [Goldstone, 2002: 11 - 12]. Building on idea of neo-malthusianism theory that limitation of resources in traditional societies periodically led to overcrowding and crises, J. Goldstone suggested that population growth causes a crisis of the state indirectly by influencing on the social institutions which, in their turn, affect the social stability [Goldstone 2002: 11 - 12].

This view, as, in fact, a model was developed in the works of S. Nefedov and P.V. Turchin, who suggested a number of mathematical models that are based on cognitive model of "structurally-demographic cycles" of J. Goldstone [Nefedov, Turchin 2007; Turchin 2010].

Basic concepts of "structurally-demographic cycles" based on the thesis that "the main force that destroys the state is a population growth, which leads to a gradual decline in per capita income until the excess is insufficient to satisfy the ruling class despite a hungry existence" [Turchin 2010: 196]. The second most important thesis may be considered the idea that "the collapse of the state caused by fractional struggle among the elite, which opens the way for a popular uprising" [Turchin 2010: 196]. P.V. Turchin formulates this idea as follows: the number of elite grows when per capita income is greater than a certain threshold rate required

for the preservation and reproduction of one aristocrat [Turchin 2010: 189]. Thus, structurally-demographic crises are, according to scientists quoted, are as a result, the resource crises.

Various modifications of this model have been reproduced by S. Nefedov, L. Grinin, S. Malkov, A. Korotayev and some other scholars on the historical and political material for a long period of time from the Ancient Empires of the East until the early twentieth [Nefedov 2009; Nefedov 2008; Korotayev 2007; Grinin, Korotayev 2010; Malkov S. 2010; Malkov A., Malineckij, Chernavskij 2010; Nefedov 2010; Nefedov 2008a; Korotayev 2010].

Obviously, political and prognostic potential of many modifications of this model is slightly limited in time in societies in which the action of demographic and resource order parameters inherent to traditional societies, is not corrected or is not substantially corrected by other factors such as industrial production or computer social networking. As absolutely true the cited authors claim, currently it is considered proven that a stage of danger of a malthusian trap (the essence of this trap inherent to the pre-industrial societies, that population growth periodically outstrips the growth of food production), more or less is successfully passed by most countries of the world except perhaps some countries of tropical Africa [Grinin et al. 2009: 189]. Consequently, these models help to clarify the political past, but require substantial modification for use in prediction of political future.

A definite answer to the need for actualization of such "political-demographic" direction of synergetic modeling of socio-political processes presents a model for predicting social and political unrest, proposed by A. Korotayev (which is co-author of the malthusian trap theory) and U. Zinkina.

The essence of the model of A. Korotayev and U. Zinkina is expressed with the phrase "trap at the outlet of the malthusian trap." Recognizing the problem of malthusian trap, recognizing also the existence of a certain political measures for the least painful way out of this trap, A. Korotayev and U. Zinkina go further and say that the outlet of the Malthusian trap the appropriate country faces a new danger that also known as "trap at the outlet of the malthusian trap" [Korortaeu, Zinkina 2010].

The mechanism of this new "trap" seems for quoted authors as follows.

At the beginning of the outlet from "malthusian trap" the mortality sharply decreases, which leads to a rapid acceleration of population growth in case of enhancement in health care and life quality improvement in general.

This acceleration is accompanied by a particularly strong decline in child mortality, which leads to a sharp increase in the number of youth in the general population. This phenomenon is known as so-called "Youth hill" on the demographic pyramid.

Increase in the share of that part of population that is most prone to aggression and radicalism, is often an important factor of political destabilization. Add to that the inability for timeous provision of this young population by a sufficient number of jobs, and a country in which there is a similar demographic situation, faced with a whole army of young unemployed who are potential members of any political unrest. So far as usually the output from malthusian trap is accompanied with (or rather, was accompanied with) the rapid growth of urban population, added with marginalization of huge former peasant masses who are no longer farmers, but the locals of "second class" who are forced to work in the worst conditions for lowest

salary (in parentheses should be noted that here comes up the problem of occurrence and destructive political activities of so-called mass man, studied in detail by José Ortega y Gasset and his followers). The additional factors of political instability for all of the abovementioned conditions may become a military defeat or protracted economic crisis [Korotayev, Zinkina 2010: 102].

In the case of the above-described development the major factor of social and political stability of the country is the growth rate of the number of urban youth. According to scientists cited, if the number of urban youth is increasing with a speed of more than 30% for a five years, we should expect serious political shocks inside the country, if the growth rate of urban youth begins to exceed 45% for a five years, these political problems are almost insurmountable [Korotayev, Zinkina 2010: 102].

In the paper specifically dedicated to the events in the beginning of 2011 in Egypt, A. Korotayev and U. Zinkina significantly changed their approach [Korotayev, Zinkina 2011]. In this paper, the authors virtually abandoned the univariate interpretation of political process and passed to multivariate interpretation. This conversion is fully expected, since the growth rate of urban youth in Egypt for the last five years does not fit into the scheme previously proposed by A. Korotayev. According this factorial approach, the authors draw attention to a wide range of demographic factors, including the reducing of child mortality, the increase of the absolute number of young and unemployed youth (especially in cities) etc. Among the other factors, which according to A. Korotayev and U. Zinkina, became additional operating forces should be remembered the presence and widespread availability of the Internet with social networks, which enabled rapid unification of people dissatisfied with the regime, and the speed and bloodless revolution in Tunisia, which gave some example to the citizens of Egypt. It should be noted that the abovementioned scheme is quite explanatory, but it does not give any prospects for a prognostic plan. Needless to say, that neither the events in Egypt and in the rest of the "Arab spring" countries nor Maidan in Ukraine in 2013-2014 were not predicted by mentioned scientists and/or their disciples.

The listed models tend in fact to the type of synergistic models. Recall that unlike, for example, the "standard" multivariate approach there is another approach in synergetics to the selection of information about a particular process for its analysis and modeling. Instead of a large number of factors that affect the state of the system during ordinary multivariate simulation, such as finite-difference modeling for example, the synergetics considers a few order parameters that affect the components of the state vector of the system and that, in turn, affect the order parameters. In fact, an inverse dependence of order parameters from the components of the state vector leads to what is called circular causality or feedback. Thus, synergistic method requires figuring out that nonlinear order parameter which dynamics leads to the risk of a bifurcation point in the political process. Indeed, precisely the model reproduction and further study of the dynamics of this order parameter allows to provide the forecast of the political situation in the country.

Delighted with the synergistic approach and models of A. Korotayev and J. Goldstone we developed in 2011 own synergistic model of political stability in

Ukraine, which reflects the period from 1989, and provides the possibility to give the prognosis of a threat to political stability till 2031 [Polyovyy 2011: 217 - 244].

Mentioned above the main factors of political dynamics, invented by our predecessors, are in a fairly narrow physical interspace around demographic and resource indicators. The argument presented in the fundamental work of academician S. Kapitsa [Kapitsa 1999: 189 - 193], also confirms the fidelity of searching of the order parameter among demographic factors. It is known that S. Kapitsa formulated and substantiated so-called demographic imperative, according to which large-scale social, economic, cultural and political processes adapt to the dynamics of population size. It is this value plays a leading role of synergetic slow variable - the order parameter of socio-political development [Kapitsa 1999: 189 - 193].

In view of aforecited and many other reasons, our model predicted that the order parameter, which determines the stability of the political process in modern Ukraine, is advisable to consider the rate of annual growth in the number of young people mostly with higher or incomplete higher education in large and medium cities on the background of rapid annual increase in coverage of population by means of effective communication not mediated by government intervention (mobile communications, and especially the Internet). The actual index of this order parameter for Ukrainian political process of the first and second decade of the twenty-first century should be considered an annual growth rate of urban youth age range 21 - 25 years. The model was verified for the conditions of the Internet penetration less than 50% (relatively to all population) and mobile penetration of more than 50% (also relatively to the total population).

On the verbal level this means that the youth of large and medium cities are the "firewood" which support the fire of mass street political participation.

Algorithm for computing the function of political stability depend on the rate of growth of urban youth were built in such a way that in the result a conditional integer status indicator of political stability was obtained. The value of indicators of political stability condition possible in the model could vary from 0 (minimum level of political instability) to 10 (maximum level of political instability in the country, for example social revolution).

The materials of 1990 - 2010 years helped us to find out that spurts in growth rate of urban youth aged 21-25 years in large and medium cities of more than 2% per year were related to periods of political instability associated with mass political participation. That is a model coordinated with already well-known events: growth rate of over 4% accompanied the Orange Revolution and, at the same time, almost zero growth rate in 2001 did not give any chance for winning of the action "Ukraine without Kuchma» [Polyovyy 2011: 238].

Moreover, analysis of the growth rate in the number of young people aged 21 - 25 years in Kyiv and urban youth in Ukraine as a whole showed that for the period from 1990 the dynamics of urban youth growth in Ukraine in general is smoother than in Kyiv, but it has higher amplitude in Kyiv.

So, making a retro-prognosis we can confidently assert that the actual base of the Orange Revolution, its main performers were young people in age from 21 - 25 years, which growth rate in the capital was 3.8% in 2003 and 5.5% in 2004, that was significantly faster than previous and the following years. Should be recalled

that the closest previous "splash" of such rapid annual growth of the youth population in Kyiv falls in well known for its turbulence 1991 in which it was 4% (as of January 1, 1992). Thus, in these years, there is a presence in Ukraine in general and in Kyiv particularly of a certain "surplus" of young people that is out of the infantile age, most of them graduated or had incomplete higher education, and already faced a problem of employment that is quite natural for slowly developing countries. Therefore, quite employable population with above average level of knowledge (at least with a faith in such a high level of own knowledge), face legitimate labor market rigidities and thus obviously get a real view of life. They receive, therefore, three motives for participation in any of the riots:

- Firstly, they have something to take offense at the existing political regime - it barely managed to ensure their education and did not provide them decent work,
- Secondly, they have nothing to hold on - they have not neither worthy of that sorry to lose or large (usually - any) property. In addition, statistics show that they have maximum no of families and children. In this sense, this category of young people in their social condition are close to the proletariat from the Communist Manifesto: "the proletariat has nothing to lose but their chains, and he can get the whole world."
- Thirdly, they have access to the means of effective communication and during training and social interaction they acquired sufficient skill to use them (as evidenced by a study of American scientists, this last factor is becoming increasingly important). Along with a greater degree of conformity of youth and, again, preferably greater degree of conformity of Internet users, the presence of similar access to mobile networks and the internet enables super-fast consolidation of the category of youth around any ideas or even certain activities. Such socio-political situation provides as this age group of young people basic human resources for conscious participation in the events of the Orange Revolution.

Thus, the data of our model confirm almost one hundred percent certainty of getting state like modern Ukraine to the phase of political instability in case of increase of over 3% per year growth rate of urban youth. And since a major role in serious political unrest that can at least change the ruling elite play events in the capital city, increased political instability potentially possible in the case of a local increase in the growth rate of young people in the capital. As they say, the revolutions are made in the capitals. Ukraine in this regard has an additional risk factor, because Kyiv has more than 20% of the students of the country. And this figure is growing: in 2004/2005 academic year in Kiev attended 21% of all Ukrainian students and in 2010/2011 year - more than 25% [Gorstat 2011; Ukrstat 2005].

Statistical data on urban population of different age groups in Ukraine [Stat6 2011] made it possible to calculate the forecast growth rate of urban youth in the whole of Ukraine aged 21 - 25 years, and build a forecast dynamics of political stability for the period until 2031

It was stated that since the growth rate of urban youth is always negative to 2024 inclusive, then *ceteris paribus* in Ukraine for the period 2011 - 2025 occur serious political problems caused by the synergistic internal order parameter. However, a sharp increase in the growth rate of urban youth in 2026 - 2030 years will

necessarily become the detonator of serious political perturbations associated with mass political participation.

In view of pointed above it remained only sadly to observe the complete "cleaning" of public political field by team of V.Yanukovych which only confirmed the conclusions of our model.

Therefore, we seemed almost impossible the victory of Maidan in 2013-2014, because, on the assumption of the model, we assumed that without an objective slowly variable synergetic condition, which during the last 20 years was the number of young people in cities, the attempts to change the course of the political process radically through a mass movement is doomed to failure.

These prognostic failures became a good occasion for rethinking some of the approaches to the construction of models to predict the dynamics of political stability in the political transition countries.

Promising steps to modify the prognostic models of political stability

In our opinion, the task for prognostication the onset of periods of political instability in the modern transitive societies should be divided into three separate sub-tasks:

1. *The prognosis for formation of an objective socio-economic and political possibility for the appearance of periods of instability (the conditions for the onset of "revolutions")*. It should be recognized that the structurally-demographic approach is of little to help here because except of poverty and financial crisis, which can be identified, except of the number of the middle class, which is more difficult, but still possible to calculate, the structural differentiation of the political and financial elite remains very elusive and often becomes apparent only after the fact. And we can agree with and A. Korotayev and J.Goldstone that it is not a sufficient condition for modern revolutions.

Ukrainian revolution shows that the possibility for an explosion still lack something (clearly beyond the structural and demographic explanations). After the fact, we may say that the additional indicator (indicator of the desire of power seriously to change the status quo) could act as attempts to "clean-up" the media space, as it was in 2013 in Ukraine and how it takes place in the early to mid-2014 in Russian Federation.

This does not cancel the effect of the growth rate of urban youth on the emergence of political instability factor, but clearly assigns to it a non-exclusive role.

2. *The prognosis for a moment/period of occurrence of a social explosion, detonating the advent of political instability*. To solve this problem - the most important from our point of view – it seems a productive hypothesis about an assumption that the time of advent of a possible explosion (the bifurcation point) is determined by a kind of order parameter that defines the duration of the deterministic development of the country. Recall that in the opinion of recognized experts in the theory of synergy I. Prigogine, a complex social system, which, with no doubts, is a political process in any country, is chaotic periodically. Recall also that an important quality of synergistic modeling, which makes it able to answer the questions about the nature of the onset of bifurcation (states of not determined chaos) can be considered the possibility of establishing the likelihood of occurrence a prolonged process of

chaotic regimes, including those that will occur "without any significant" external reasons, but simply because of the nonlinear development process [Andreev 2003: 434 - 485].

Pretty good a historical example of this synergistic interpretation of socio-political processes can serve history of the Russian Empire in the nineteenth - early twentieth century and later the Soviet Union and its fragments. Indeed, the death of tsar Alexander I and the Decembrist uprising in 1825 has a certain analogy with the bifurcation point in the development of the Empire, when the choice of the trajectory of its further existence depends on several steps. Under well-known circumstances the line to continue the tradition of autocracy won, the development of which could prevent neither reforms of Alexander II, nor peace, terrorism and armed resistance of populists. Even the murder of Alexander II only tempered the regime and stopped "revolutionary ferment" for a time. But the complex of small compared with the scale of the country, events like the end of an unsuccessful Russo-Japanese War and Bloody Sunday leads to a revolutionary explosion. So we have a situation of a termination in a period of stable trajectory of socio-political system in the Russian Empire and the beginning of its entry in the uncertain period called the bifurcation point. On the other hand, if as the value of essentiality of social and political changes to take the change of the system of governance, so the undisputed evidence of the onset of the bifurcation point becomes the February Revolution in 1917, when the monarchy was replaced by a republican form of government headed by the Provisional Government. Recall that according to the synergetic interpretation the origin of the bifurcation point in the development of a system shows the situation of inadequately great resonance from relatively small perturbations. Indeed, contemporaries and many researchers have noted a "sudden" appearance of many problems "without any discernible cause". Next bifurcation point in the development of a descendant of the Russian Empire - 1991 - does not need any explanations.

That is we propose to pass from consideration of conditions (they are important in the decision of the previous problem) to some kind of "objective predetermination" emanating mainly, if not exclusively, out of the internal conditions in the development of state mechanism. Events in Ukraine, in our opinion, prove that in the result, it is the internal conditions and the actions of internal forces lead to the situation of preparedness for "fire" and to detonation of this readiness to social and political explosion. In the case of authoritarian regimes dubious honor of being the detonator should be given to the power vertical.

As the order parameter, which determines the duration of the period of "deterministic chaos" and, accordingly, the approximate time of onset of a period of instability may be selected multiple indicators. For example, A. Dobrocheyev justifies the assertion that the cycle of social and political development is proportional to the square of the state [Dobrocheyev 2002]. For example, for Russia he cites of such calculations. Since the area of Russia is approximately about 17 million km², the length of cycles for it is to make $50 * 1.7 = 85$. According to A. Dobrocheyev, this assessment of the typical cycle correlates well with cycles of about 80 years, describing the political development of the last century (1825 - 1905 - 1985) [Dobrocheyev 2002].

However, if we take as the basis these calculations of A. Dobrocheyev, and calculate the duration of the typical cycle of political and economic development in Ukraine, you can get somewhat illogical result: based on the territory of Ukraine in 0.6 million. km² cycle should reach $50 * 0.06 = 3$ years. So we have a situation where a significant decrease in the scale of the country almost completely eliminates the calculations for the duration of the characteristic development cycle, since it is clear that 3 years is clearly not enough for the full range of political and economic cycle. However, there is a merit in this hypothesis.

Rather superficial everyday observations suggest that modern Ukraine is unlikely to expect a 85-year or even 50-year periods of deterministic development without bifurcation points. Rather, we can speak about an expression over the last two decades 9-10 year period deterministic chaos that changes short-lived, for several months, the bifurcation point. Obviously, in such a reduction of the development period also appears much smaller population: 45 million people versus 300 million people in the late USSR. However, we note that the current leadership of Russian Federation also should not relax, because the current population of Russia is only about 140 million people. So bifurcation point in the political development of Russia will occur much earlier than 85 years, expected by A.Dobrocheyev, will pass.

Thus, we seem plausible and requiring a verification next order parameters, which determine the duration of deterministic development: the ratio of "power density" (the number of officers per population) with the territory of the State; ratio of the territory of the State with the population. Perhaps it is worth for consideration the proportion of state employees and employees of state coercion.

And here we speak about a slow change of this index and therefore slow gradual change of the length of the next period of deterministic development (as well as the life expectancy of the individual changing from birth (at the time of birth the average life expectancy is one value) for life (when a person turns 20 or 30 or 40 years, etc., the average expected for the country life of the people also be slightly modified). It seems obvious and it is correlated with survey data of P. Turchyn [Turchin 2010] and A. Korotayev [Korotayev 2007] that an increase in the level of political power density should increase the duration of deterministic development and thus remove the onset of the next bifurcation point. Acceptance of this assumption can explain why approximately regular intervals of relatively stable (deterministic) development within a single country over the past two thousand years have not been singled out - because the size of these spaces has slowly changed as the specified ratio between the total population and the number of officials changed. Consequently, these assumptions allow quite logically explain the differences in the intervals 1825 - 1917 and 1917 - 1991 for the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, or 2005-2013 and 1992-2004 for Ukraine. Adopting a similar assumption can explain the relatively greater stability of authoritarian regimes: an additional "compression of power" enables to provide government coercion within sustainable political system without any social and political changes, even if those changes are already objectively necessary.

One can also assume that the characteristic time of deterministic development is compensated by the acceleration of historical time (according to P. Kapitsa).

3. The prognosis for the character of flow of the interaction between the government and the protesters during the explosion. In solving this problem, obviously, only a

short-term forecasting is possible, and an ideal base for it is an algorithm proposed by J. Goldstone in the article "On the theory of the revolution of the fourth generation» [Goldstone 2001]. While this algorithm is used as part of an explanation of the processes, but perhaps its association with the elements of the game theory (dynamic variant of one prisoner's dilemma), or Markov's chains will help to obtain reliable model predictions.

Conclusion

The existing models of political processes do not give reliable prediction about the occurrence of periods of political instability yet. Promising steps to modify the most advanced - synergetics - models is to break the problem of prognostication on the following three parts:

1. The prognosis for formation of an objective socio-economic and political possibility for the appearance of periods of instability (the conditions for the onset of "revolutions").
2. The prognosis for a moment/period of occurrence of a social explosion, detonating the advent of political instability.
3. The prognosis for the character of flow of the interaction between the government and the protesters during the explosion.

Synergetic model theoretically are able to forecast the onset of the emergence of a social explosion, which calls for search and verification of the order parameters, which determine the duration of periods of deterministic development of the country.

Political practice of independent Ukraine gives some guidelines for assessing the duration of the period of "deterministic development" (or "deterministic chaos"): for Ukraine may be considered designated two such periods - 1992-2004 and 2005-2013, and if you remember the above model, we can expect the third period - 2014-2025 (26), which also should be end with a point of bifurcation. Thus retains its value predicted by us worsening of socio-political situation in 2026 and, at the same time, we must recognize that the model we have described above "does not catch" "intermediate" bifurcation point.

The duration of the bifurcation point in the modern transitive society is also determined by the Ukrainian political practice of 2004 and 2013-2014 and is about 3-4 months.

Taking to the account the importance of the development of modern Russia, we note, for Ukraine, that there is every reason to expect the onset of objective, due to internal reasons, the bifurcation point in the political development of the Russian Federation not later than at the end of the second decade of the XXI century.

Extremely interesting is the task of verification of the order parameters of political dynamics proposed in the article.

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Openness of Society: Maydan's Experience

Katerina Yastura

V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, Ukraine

Abstract

From the beginning of formation as an independent state, Ukraine has set a goal to become a part of global open society. The young state at that time was going through the process of rebuilding the social and political principles, which were established during the Soviet regime and managed to take root in the mass consciousness. The Ukrainian society, while it was staying in the ideological toils of Soviet authorities for considerable time, was subjected to restriction not only in the choice of lifestyle, but also got used to fear punishment for attempting to think freely and critically. Consequently, it is quite logical to form the public desire to change the old social and political way of life and create a new state model, which would be drastically opposite to pre-existing pattern. In this context there are two examples of two large public bursts - the Orange Revolution (2004) and Euromaidan (Fall-Winter 2013-2014 years). The main reason for it was the community's desire to get rid of the Soviet totalitarian past and to implement the idea of democracy, which was based on Western experience.

Key words: *Ukraine, Maidan, transforming society*

Methodology

This paper includes a systematic methodology, in which context of the phenomenon of an open society is considered as coherent multidimensional occurrence. Concerning the systematic understanding of the research subject, the author used the historical method for studying social manifestations, which are typical for open societies in their time development and identification the specific formation of an open society. The evolutionary method is used in the analysis of the basic forms and features of an open society to compare the views regarding the principles and priorities of open society in different periods of time and in order to detect its specific. In addition, the research includes comparative historical method and modern empirical information. It has revealed the readiness of implementation of the open society principles at the level of social consciousness during the first and second Maidan in Ukraine. Observance of this methodological synthesis has provided an opportunity to carry out a complex analysis of assigned tasks and formulate corresponding theoretical conclusions and recommendations.

Introduction

The relevance of conceptualizing the notion of "open society", revealing its nature and key features are primarily caused by the fact that the formation of open society - one of the major social and political problems of the twentieth century.

Practical implementation of the basic ideas of open society provides an opportunity to stop fighting for the priority of certain political institutions and unite for the prosperity of certain people, which became the research subject of many theorists (A. Bergson, J. Horer, K. Popper, J. Soros, F. Tonnis etc.). In addition, the concept of social organization, in which some ideas became the main principles of an open society, could be distinguished in the social and political thought (J. Locke, Sh.-L. Montesquieu, J. St. Mille, A. de Tocqueville, etc.).

Ukraine right from the beginning of its existence as an independent country and strengthening its positions in the international political arena on the rights of self player has tried to build public policy, following the ideas and principles of an open society. However, in practice it became clear that the newly created democratic institutions are not able to develop in Ukraine according to the values of an open society. This occurs because the ruling elite often adhered to the view that implementing a model of an open society in Ukraine should be based only on the experience of countries, which have confidently stand on way to the "openness". Ukrainian society during the Soviet regime got used to depending on the everyday, the same set of circumstances. In other words public consciousness got accustomed to the fact that there is no need to know something superfluous that can make life difficult. It required only the specific information which could convince that everything happens exactly as it should. Such type of thinking is peculiar for societies, which are classified as closed or traditional by Karl Popper [Popper, 1994].

The Soviet government programmed social consciousness on that kind of thinking, which characterizes exactly a closed society. Society had to remain unchanged, reminding living organism by its unity. The members of such community cannot and have no right to live outside of the society, and inside of it there is only clearly defined area of self-expression for each person. There is no place for free individual in invariable society. Unity of traditional society means that its members entirely belong to it. They cannot have their own interests, but only those that fully coincide with the interests of the whole society. Getting rid of such unfair enslavement is possible with the help of ability to think critically.

The critical mindset is typical for open and democratic societies. People acquire skills of effective solving a number of social, political, social and economic problems, when they start to think independently. Moreover, they will face with plethora of ways, how to cope with these problems. In an open society, individuals are free in decision making.

A freedom of each member is provided by open society. One of its goals is to protect freedom. The notion "freedom" (of speech, thought, creativity, etc.) takes a priority position in the concept of an open society. According to this fact, we can suppose that an open society cultivates liberal values. Primarily it concerns the values of individual freedom, specifically making their own decisions and its realization. Solutions, which are taken by individuals, would be not only independent, but responsible, if they were justified and based on a rational understanding of the real situation. Thus, the open society - it is not only community of the liberal freedoms, but society, in which "a spirit of rational criticism" [Lektorsky 1995, pp. 27-36], free discussion of taken decisions and the methods of their reasoning is cultivated deliberately. Everyone is free to express

their own views in an open society. Therefore, a point of view, which will become prior as a result, has an opportunity to get closer to the best expression of the interests of all its members in case of effective critical process. This is the democratic principle with a specific "form of political system, which allows adapting the government to the desires of controlled masses without a violent struggle" [Myzes 2001, p. 45]. K. Popper remarked that democracy is the best political system which can protect an open society from all known to mankind

F. Tonnies suggested his own classification of societies. He selected two ambivalent categories: community (the analog to closed society) and society (the analog to the open society). However, F. Tonnies preferred community -the equivalent of a closed society in contrast to classics, who researched famous dichotomy of "closed / open society". Community meant a family, where consanguinity and emotional ties had a special place. Also, community can be defined as a variety of professional or intellectual union. Close, friendly relationships occupy leading positions in both cases. According to the author's view, society is characterized by excessive impersonal formality and high degree of individualism [Tennys 2007]. At the same time, it should be noted that such relations emerge on the basis of personal, individual interest. In other words, individuals by themselves decide what is best for them. Individual's freedom of actions and independent choice –are the main key to an open society. Therefore, F. Tonnies characterizes his model of an open society in the same way as principal researchers of this phenomenon do. Though, F. Tonnies describes open society as a negative phenomenon, which destroys any emotional ties – resistance to humanity.

Ukrainian society, while it was staying considerable time in the ideological toils of Soviet authorities, was subjected to restriction not only in the choice of lifestyle, but also got used to fear punishment for attempting to think freely and critically. When Ukraine got an opportunity to change the way of life, social and political life dramatically, it decided to choose the public model, which is strongly opposite to the previous one. Originally the idea of an open society was put forward as the antithesis to the notion "totalitarian society". Subsequently, the notion "open society" was used as the definition of social conditions in order to achieve freedom. The emphasis was primarily focused on the explication of open societies as free. The collapse of the Soviet totalitarian system led to the formation of new democratic institutions which are typical for an open society, such as: multiparty system, parliamentarism, constitutionalism, civil society and the legal state structures, freedom of speech and press, etc. In Ukraine these institutions were developing in general. They were not based on the values of an open society. That is why some of them remained on the initial stage of its formation.

The concept "open morality", which was supposed by Bergson, is another theoretical category that brings us closer to a deeper understanding of an open society [Bergson 1994]. Such morality "describes individuals who are able to find creative life impulse despite of the prohibitions and social prejudices (closed morality)" [Zhyulya 2000 p. 307]. According to the Bergson's logic of considerations, we can conclude that an open society requires individuals, who possess morality, which is open to universal human values. Open or dynamic morality dominates in an open society. Consequently, regarding to Bergson's opinion, there is no place for the intellectual domination in an open society (K. Popper, by the way, pays

particular attention to it). Morality highlights the principle of the inviolability of the individual, personal freedom, equality of all people.

These principles are not compulsory, they have motivating (urging) nature. In other words, these values are universal. Religion is dynamic in this society. It preaches the mystical love for all people, but at the same time it is directed on a specific action. According to Bergson, Christian is corresponding to these conditions the most. So the dynamic (open) religion is the religion of mystics. Bergson emphasizes that modern society is in need of mystical genes like never before. Tremendous human impact on nature suggests that "the human body" is growing. This body does not have such an enormous soul. [Reale 1997 p.500]. Bergson claimed that ideal of an open society is the unity of the people on the basis, which has no limits in spiritual commonality with divine power. Closed society, meanwhile, became a springboard to an open society (transition process, according to Bergson, was launched during the biblical times). One would not exist without another.

We can follow the expediency of the concept, which was discovered by Bergson, about the transition from a closed to an open society on the sample of Ukraine. The fact that young Ukrainian state sought new direction in foreign and internal politics has become clear on the eve of the 2004 presidential election. There is a possibility that exactly a desire to get rid of the Russian vector of policy implementation influenced on the Ukrainian citizen's choice in many ways. On the assumption of the objection of the Soviet totalitarian past, cooperation with the West, which promoted democratic values, has become the main idea the vast majority of Ukrainian society. Exactly Yushchenko (candidate for presidency at the time) promoted Western values in the eyes of the publicity. However, the desired results were not achieved. Instead, people started to be disappointed with democratic reforms. This frustration was clearly demonstrated by the results of the next presidential election (2010), when preference was given to the former rivals of Viktor Yushchenko. One of the reasons for such events was the fact that Ukrainian politicians tried to place the Ukrainian community in the form of western standards. As a result, they got an effect of "Procrustean bed". Therefore, it is important to realize that implementing changes in the outlook of the whole society should be launched gradually, from the youngest generation.

The second attempt to start the mechanism of unobstructed and free expression and critical thinking by Ukrainian society was made in late fall 2014. The protest actions began after the suspension of the process of preparation for the signing the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union. Protests against corruption, social inequality, outrage by law enforcement authorities, as well as the support of the European vector in foreign policy became an important step during the implementation the idea of an open society. The main requirement of the demonstrators was to form a new government, to elect the country leadership, which would adhere to the liberal-democratic values and the principles of openness in its policy.

However, the problem of Ukrainian politics is primarily about the matter of choosing the authorities, which is decided not only by the will of the people, but through the financial fraud and backstage agreements. Such tactics in state management does not correspond with the requirements of open societies.

In our opinion, exactly authorities are capable to implement a reorientation of public consciousness according to liberal-democratic values and the principles of openness. This is explained by the fact that the state power elaborates and adopts slew of laws, which define the further development and existence of society. That is why authority's ability to understand and feel the significance of building state policy based on the principles, which correspond with open communities, is extremely important. In general, legislative activity - it is very substantial and laborious process where the slightest mistake can lead to the inevitable social disasters. If legislators are people, who are unable to develop appropriate laws based on the ideas of freedom and equality, society will inevitably degrade legally and then spiritually. Subsequently it will die.

In an open society, people elect government representatives, using critical discretion in accordance with their needs (freedom and the protection of fundamental inalienable rights). The newly created ruling elite must support state and social development towards the openness. Otherwise, the life support system of an open society is gradually becoming incapacitated and, therefore, society does not receive an opportunity to think and create freely (it is important for individuals in an open society as well as getting oxygen). So it begins to decelerate in development, until the complete stop (returning to the closed societies). On the contrary, if the authority is transparent and it is ready to support the development of society according to the main liberal-democratic principles, humanity will have a chance to create its own history, which will be aimed at achieving progress.

The distinguishing of openness properties is equally important. J. Soros suggests his own classification model of openness degree of societies: regular, free, fair elections; free, pluralistic media; supremacy of law, which is supported by an independent judiciary; constitutional protection of minorities; market economy in which property right is respected, equal opportunities and safeguards for underprivileged are provided; commitment to the peaceful settlement of conflicts; existence of laws which allow restraining corruption [Soros 2001].

In our opinion, the following list of properties of "openness" is optimal:

- ❖ substitutability (the ability of individuals to operate with certain ideological constructions, which are used on different levels of society with the ability to exchange information between them);
- ❖ interoperability (the aptitude of cooperation, ability to interact);
- ❖ modularity (ability to modification by adding, subtracting or replacing separate modules (components, elements) of the system without influence on other parts of it);
- ❖ zooming (the ability to use the same components for systems of different levels and dimensions).

Also it is possible to select the positive features of "openness", which appear in the case of effective using and disclosing its properties:

- ❖ integration's simplifying of different social levels;
- ❖ comprehensive use of innovations in key life sectors;
- ❖ continuing of society vitality due to substitutability and increasing of functional capabilities among particular individuals.

Conclusion

In our opinion, Ukraine has overcome a certain path towards the openness. But still, society, which got used to the fact that it is constantly limited in ideological, cultural, political and social spheres, requires not only time for awareness and adopting to granted freedom of action and thought. It demands for better samples of learning all new things. Ukrainian society lacks the ability to interact both at the level of relations between authorities and society and at the level of relationships between individual members and groups in society. A significant problem for Ukraine is critically low transparency of governance activities in comparison with Western countries. The Community mostly has an opportunity to get access to surface information. It is necessary to achieve the maximum level of publicity, accountability and transparency in the process of mutual information exchange for effective interaction between all social groups.

An open society is characterized by maximal cultural variety. It is open to all cultures and systems. But at the same time the basic values of an open society prevail over others and, moreover, ensure their existence. There can be no limits in an open society. However, the process of their disappearance is very slow now. Each step of complex creating process of openness includes formation developments in culture. This process could occur only in such conditions, when the ability of people to generate positive innovation, to enter into dialogue concerning these innovations and their acceptability to the public is increasing. Consequently, an open society exists and it is changing as a result of individual's self-improvement, creating new relationships, production, values and solutions.

We believe that an open society - as an absolute model - cannot be achieved through the implementation of strict gradual steps. P. Feyerabend claimed: "an open society cannot be constructed ... it can be grown on ourselves and our children" [Feyerabend 1978 p. 15]. It means that any attempt to force the idea of an open society in a particular country and command to follow specific rules in order to implement it into practice will fail in most cases. Namely such errors were made by supporters of socialism, communism and fascism - the main utopias in the past century.

Any changes, the transition to a new status without reference to the sphere and level of social relations are accompanied by losses and reconstruction of the former structure. In our opinion, The Orange Revolution and Euromaidan in Ukraine became a decisive factor, which indicates about the willingness of Ukrainian society to take the path of building an open society. However, there are many obstacles for Ukraine, which impede the development of the state towards the openness (mainly cultural factors).

Summing up, it is possible to describe the "open society" as a free community with a dynamic structure in which individuals are inclined to innovation, critical thinking and capable of making their own decision. Such society is characterized by a sufficient level of transparency in public authorities that allows each of its members to have public access to relevant information. In an open society government transparency actions are supported. The main condition of such activities is the principle of publicity and accountability of all decisions at the

regional and national levels. The openness of the society does not deny or limit its members in their own actions, only if they take the responsibility for them.

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Aggregative Factors of Development of the Party System of Ukraine

Pavlo Molochko

Yurii Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University, Ukraine

Abstract

The contemporary party system of Ukraine is characterized by a number of factors that have a negative impact on the development of political parties. The main factors that prevent the formation of an effective political system have been scrutinized in the very article. The level of public credibility for the political parties in Ukraine is one of the lowest in Europe. The author draws attention to the fact that there is no rational voting at the parliamentary elections, which affects the development of not only the political parties but also other political institutions. It is emphasized in the article that the lack of effectiveness of the political parties of the present-day Ukraine casts doubt on the democratic potential of the existing party system.

Key words: *political parties, party system, ideological positions, Ukraine*

Introduction

Recent political processes in Ukraine are characterized by contradictory phenomena due to the continuation of the process of formation of the political system and the institutionalization of political institutions. Return to the parliamentary-presidential form of government in February 2014 once again is able to change the already unstable institutional design of the political system of Ukraine. An important place in this process will belong to political parties. Parties must not only become involved in the election process (from the number of which representatives to parliament will be elected), but also, if elected, will become responsible for the formation of the parliamentary majority, and as a result, the government. In other words, the parties will have the opportunity to be responsible for the development of the state. On the other hand, the experience of the development and activities of the political parties of Ukraine show that the parties are not always able to fulfil their functions.

One of the reasons for the lack of effectiveness of political parties lies in the fact that while the institutions were getting older the renovation of the elites in Ukraine did not occur. Formation of the elites, as a rule, took place on the closed principle, namely the principle of conformity to formal features, and not on the basis of professional qualities. It can be assumed that a certain cementing of the main core of the political elites caused a certain reversal in the development of political parties in Ukraine.

The aim of the article is to examine the major factors that have a negative impact on the development of the party system in Ukraine. Over the past 10 years the question of the need for a qualitative transformation of existing institutions has been on the agenda of the political reality in Ukraine. The revolutionary events of 2004 and 2013 – 2014 attest that the request for institutional change is being formed on behalf of the society, although the question about the readiness of formation of such a proposal, both by political elites and society itself, remains unresolved.

Political parties: democratization versus dedemocratization

Influential normative approach in the contemporary political science examines the political parties as an absolute factor for democratic development (S. Lipset), equating "modern democracy" to "party democracy" (R. Katz). It is not surprising that for many scholars the existence of political parties is essential for democratic consolidation.

In the context of modernization of society there occur various, often unpredictable phenomena – from the confrontation of the parties to considerable changes in the nature of functioning of party systems. Against this dynamic background the evolution of political parties and party systems takes place. In particular, new trends are being distinguished in intra-and inter-party relations, in relations between the parties and the state, as well as political parties and civil society.

Modern science has achieved a lot in understanding the nature of political and social phenomena, and not only in the development of science itself, its methodology and techniques, but also in the increasing complexity of society. Therefore, for a more detailed understanding of contemporary phenomena and processes one must take into account plenty of factors. Applying it to the analysis of political parties, this means that they are strongly influenced by not only the conditions of institutional design, but also chaotic factors that are quite difficult to analyse. According to A. Vengerov, in the sphere of politics everything changes from the contiguity of the necessary and random phenomena. There are a lot of volatile and unstable processes in it, and also synergistically unequal social institutions [Vengerov 1993 : 58]. Especially in politics some seemingly minor on the historical scale random political actions lead to the upheaval of state foundations.

However, changes in the political institutions and political parties in particular are affected by changes in the modern society, which gives reasons to talk about a radical change in the purposes and functioning of the institutions. One of the important characteristics that affects both the modern development and the understanding of the political parties is the alteration of the social structure of society. Social transformation has a significant impact on the political sphere; in particular, it has influenced the relationship between a citizen and a political party. It is the change in the social structure that arises the question of what type of parties should represent the interests of modern society, which Z. Bauman calls "liquid society" in the first place because of the blurring of clear social and political identities, which are characterized by frequent change [Bauman 2000]. In terms of

class contradictions in society mass parties had a tendency to develop, in the transition to a post-industrial society – encompassing ones, and in modern society, the question about the type of parties remains vexed.

Nowadays, the researchers are faced with the reality, which is defined by a particular set of dominant parties, which in their turn are difficult to distinguish from each other through the prism of their basic visions of politics and which are closer to each other in the style of work and organizational culture than any of them to the society. In different studies, this new configuration of party politics has been discussed in the context of erosion of the representative roles of parties and preservation of procedural ones. It is also claimed that in the absence of the ability to combine both roles parties are at risk of losing their legitimacy. If the parties aren't able to represent the society as successfully as they rule, it will be increasingly difficult for them to legitimize their right to dispose the state institutions and appropriate their resources [Katz, Mair 2010: 97-98].

Present-day development of political processes is characterized by sometimes directly opposite tendencies. If according to one of the approaches the availability of parties is considered a prerequisite for democratization, then, according to the American researcher K. Lawson, political parties tend to turn into agents of dedemocratization [Lawson 2010: 44-45]. In our opinion, this statement is true, because if we consider parties to be the agents of democratization in the ancient understanding of democracy as a government of the people which was embodied by the mass parties, it is not surprising that with the transition from the mass parties they depart from the ancient interpretation. Parties evolve as the very notion of democracy does.

In the most simplified form modern democracy is understood as the rule of the majority, in the interests of the minority. However, the current development of the institute of political parties calls this thesis into question. On the one hand we have a regulatory approach that sees parties as a necessary element of democracy, on the other hand the crisis of political parties becomes more and more obvious, it manifests itself in the growth of public distrust in the parties, and thus in a small public participation in party activities. Despite the negative attitude to the parties, their role in the political system of society, with all the existing advantages and disadvantages, is beyond question. A. Heywood notes that other than through the parties public interests are not expressed, because it is the parties that have the closest connection with the state, as they are the source of formation of the various authorities [Heywood 2004 : 316-317]. However, the other problem arises, people are forced to form government organs from the institutions that are losing support. This, in turn, becomes the basis for the emergence of the prevailing distrust in authorities. Judging from all the mentioned above we may conclude that societal majority, which is presented by the voters, is forced to obey the minority represented by political parties.

According to sociological studies (during the last 15 years), the number of members of all political parties in Ukraine ranges from 2% to 5% of the population, depending on the period: during elections the citizens are more active [Gonukova 2014 : 2]. Given the small proportion of party members from the total number of voters and the lack of state funding of political parties, logically the question regarding the funding of parties arises. Even though classical structures of political parties

suggest that there are sponsors and patrons at the same time they do not disclose obligations of parties to the sponsors. Ukrainian practice does not involve disclosure of the sources of parties' financing by the representatives of political parties which may be the evidence of the lack of transparency and corruption in the formation of the financial resources of the parties. Opacity of party financing ultimately leads to neglect of the interests of voters after the election of parties to parliament.

Juan Linz listed contradictory qualities, which, according to modern public views, a political party should possess. In this sense, a party is seen as a necessary evil: they serve as a tool it is impossible to do without at the time of collection and expression of voices and demands of the citizens, but at the same time are perceived as capricious and expensive machinery plenty of ambitious people, parasites and lovers of gain took refuge in. According to T. Poguntke, political parties in consolidated democracies since the last decade of the twentieth century began to lose their appeal, and the anti-party moods commenced to intensify [Molochko 2014 : 211].

The party system of Ukraine is primarily characterized by a large number of parties, the division of parties based on personal, regional, economic, financial and other factors. By the end of August of 2014 the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine had registered 225 political parties. Despite this number of registered parties, another notable feature of the party system of Ukraine is that the dominant majority of registered parties have absolutely no influence on the political system, remaining formal participants of political processes.


Studies of the electoral process in multiparty systems have found out that not all parties influence the course of elections and not all of them are important for the voters [Smorgunov 2002 : 327]. In its turn, the distribution of seats in parliament modified the distribution of power and influence of parliamentary parties on the activities of the representative bodies. In fact, the impact on public policy and legislative process is limited by the effective number of parties, which is much smaller than the total number of parties participating in elections.

A. Lijphart, R. Taagepera and other researchers calculate the effective number based on the electoral process and the distribution of seats in the parliament. They suggested the rates of effective number of party votes (ENPV) namely of those parties that have the greatest impact on the political process [Smorgunov 2002 : 328].

As seen in Graph 1, during the 10 years of the research of the effective number of parties: for Ukraine this figure was reduced in more than two years, namely from 7,76 in 2002 down to 3,314 in 2012 [Molochko 2014 : 215].

The obtained results show a tendency for the level of the effective number of parties to decrease with each successive election. Compared with other countries, in which the transition from a one-party to multiparty system also took place, the index of the effective number of parties in Ukraine does not reduce as rapidly, but still the tendency is evident.


Graph 1



These results give reason to believe that the laws of the inter-relationship of the party and electoral systems, formed by M. Duverger, do not work or rather act up "to the contrary" under conditions of Ukrainian political reality. In our opinion, this paradoxical result can be explained by several factors: firstly, the presence of a high "barrage" barrier (5% for the elections to the Verhovna Rada), which inhibits the excessive fragmentation of the party system; and secondly, the high and quite stable rate of the winner-parties in the post-election period compared with similar indicators of political parties that have lost.

At the same time the tendencies in the party system of Ukraine have registered a significant reduction in the influence of the political parties and electoral institute on the development of democratic processes in Ukraine with the subsequent parliamentary elections.

Graph 2




The performed analysis of changes of the index of democratization in Ukraine over a time span from 1998 till 2012 clearly demonstrates the decrease of the index of democratization, which is distinctly seen in Graph 2 [Molochko 2014 : 224]. Given the fact that the indicators, which parties have a direct bearing on, lie in the basis of calculations of the index, it can be claimed that nowadays the impact of the institute of parties on the processes of democratization in Ukraine is significantly reduced.

This conclusion is positively correlated with the data provided in the article by P. Ignazi, that among the 20 well-established and new democracies, the greatest distrust in the institution of parties is manifested in Ukraine. In 13 countries the share of those who consider that there is no need in parties is no more than 10%, in 6 others - from 10 to 20%, and only in Ukraine the figure considerably exceeds 20%.

According to R. Dalton, M. Torcal, J. Montero and other researchers present-day image of political parties in the public consciousness remains purely negative. In the 15 old EU democracies parties receive a positive assessment of less than 20% of the population, the level of credibility for them is much lower than in other political institutions and organizations. Even more compelling is the fact that such sentiments are not limited to consolidated democracies, which would allow to attribute them to the effect of fatigue. Such tendencies are common not only in the new post-communist European democracies, but also in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Despite the fact that the institute of political parties there has much modest tradition [Dalton 2005].

Credibility for political parties, and thus for other institutions that are formed from the representatives of political parties, is one of the key factors in the effectiveness of the political system of society. According to the results of the research conducted by the "Democratic Initiatives Ilko Kucheriv" Fund and the sociological office of Razumkov Centre in May 2013 political parties were mistrusted by 69.2% of respondents, while only 17.6% put their trust in them. A share of those who completely trusted the political parties was only 2%, and of those who utterly distrusted - 32.1% (See Table 1).

Table 1



Source: *Riven doviru gromadyan do socialnuh ta derjavnuh instutytiv (2014).* – Access: <http://infolight.org.ua/charts/riven-doviri-gromadyan-do-socialnih-ta-derzhavnih-institutiv>.

It is indicative that the distrust of the parties applies to both pro-government political forces and the ones in opposition. Understanding the public perception of the institute of political parties, parliamentarians were offered to abandon the system of proportional representation in the parliamentary elections of 2012 and

return to the mixed one. That distrust in parties and party lists was used as one of the arguments for such a return, although experience has shown that the parties acknowledging their low rating, making such a decision pursued completely different goals. Primarily behind this decision was a purpose of preserving and even increasing their representation in the parliament in case of party rating getting lower. For this reason many candidates participating in the elections in the single-mandate constituencies consciously omitted indicating their party affiliation during the election campaign, and having won the election entered the parliamentary factions of large parties during the formation of factions in the parliament.

A small level of credibility for the political parties also causes low trust in other political institutions, especially in the government and parliament. It is significant that among all the political institutions of Ukraine the parliament has the lowest level of credibility (1,6%), which is formed of representatives of political parties. Such a low appraisal of the efficiency of the work of political institutions is a component of the overall level of mistrust of the population.


According to European Social Survey the level of credibility for political institutions in Ukraine is one of the lowest in Europe. Specifically, of the 26 countries involved in this study, according to the level of credibility for political parties in 2011 Ukraine together with Bulgaria (1,99 points on a 10-point scale) were ranked 23rd, with only Greece and Croatia behind. However, the level of credibility for the parliament was the lowest in Europe. Analysing these data Eugene Golovakha remarks that if for a European country distrust in its government and politicians is almost a disaster and evidence of major problems with maintaining a normal life and democracy, in such countries as Ukraine, it sometimes proves that the human potential has not been exhausted, but rather on the contrary. "Because our post-Soviet reality is so," - explains Eugene Golovaha, "that the higher the credibility for the government in the country is, the less political and other freedoms for citizens exist there. And it turns out that sometimes something that in the world is considered to be a determining factor of integration, stabilization and positive sustainable development of the contrary, in our environment turns out to be a way to stagnation, deflation and hopelessness" [Golovaha 2014].

Blur of ideological positions

Another factor that provokes distrust in parties in the Ukrainian society could be the absence of clear ways of solving social problems or clear ideological positioning of political parties. Nowadays among the parties represented in the parliament only the Communist Party of Ukraine and the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" have clear ideological positioning, the rest of the parties do not indicate their position distinctly. Similar tendency is characteristic of not only parliamentary parties, but also of all registered parties in Ukraine. L. Gonukova provides the data that out of all the registered political parties it is difficult to determine the ideological positioning of 20% of parties, as the information about them is not available in the public domain. The greatest number of parties of Ukraine, the ideological position of which can be determined from program documents, represent popular-democratic

ones, and the least represented are environmental and Christian parties (see Table 2).

Table 2



Compiled from Gonukova, L., (2014) Politichni partii Ukrainu: sychasnist' ta perspektivu rozvutky, in Analitichni zapusku, May 2014:5-8

And although ideological vagueness of political parties currently is a worldwide tendency, an unambiguous stance on a specific set of problems has to be an indispensable element of any party. For example, despite the public support for the ideas of European integration in the revolutionary events of November 2013 - February 2014 by the representatives of Batkivshchyna, Svoboda and Udar parties, none of them spelled out its positions in the election programs in the parliamentary elections of 2012.

For example, there is no clear position in the programs of the party "Batkivshchyna" and the union of opposition parties "For the Batkivshchyna." They denote the desire for European development and adherence to democratic standards. The goal of the party is the integration of Ukraine into the European Union, global structures and effective, mutually beneficial cooperation with Euro-Atlantic structures (NATO and others) which is a foreign policy priority. However, the mechanisms of implementation of the tasks set aren't at all explained.

However, during the discussion of the section of the programme of the Joint Opposition "European Ukraine. Foreign Policy Priorities in the Programme of the Joint Opposition" Vladimir Vasulenko said that the foreign policy strategy of the Joint Opposition "Fatherland" can be briefly formulated in one phrase: restoration of full integration course of the state and Ukraine's withdrawal from CIS.

"Ukraine cannot plan its domestic and foreign policy, as any European country does, as it has a neighbour who calls into question and does not accept the independence of our country" [Vasulenko 2012]. Only Ukraine's membership in NATO will create conditions for improvement and normalization of relations with Russia. At the same time it is not specified in the programme.

Parties are rather diverse and multivector-oriented. Their programmes include a list of accurate goals, if we consider each of them separately, but they are incompatible

and inaccessible, if we assess the programmes in a complex. Such uncertainty in the stance of political parties, after all, makes the possibility of the rational choice by the voters harder. One can assume that one of the reasons for the reluctance of the population to allow the political parties to actively participate in the Revolution of Dignity was the lack of a clearly declared viewpoint of the parties which have always left a room for manoeuvre for themselves.

We should agree with the standpoints of S. Kononchuk and O. Yarosh, that the definition of ideological identity of parties allows to make predictions about the formation of coalition as situational, within one political action, such as voting for a certain law, and sustainable, requiring from the participants at least a short-term coordination of political positions and strategies [Kononchuk, Yarosh 2013 : 48].

The lack of a clear party stance eventually forces the voters to choose emotionally, giving their preferences not to the programme of a party, but to the personality of the party leader. As a result, elections are transformed from the fight of ideas of state development to the fight of preferences or even antipathies of the voters when choice is made not "for" but "against".

Reasons for the “poor choice” of the voters

A distinctive feature of the party system of Ukraine is that there the so-called mechanical and psychological effects described by M. Duverger are presented in the full. The reason why small Ukrainian parties do not overcome the electoral barrier is the fear of voters, and especially that their vote given not for the leaders of the electoral campaign, will be lost. Because of such fear, voters are forced to resort to strategic voting giving their vote for the less attractive political force, but which has real chances to be included in parliament.

Regarding that R. Dalton says that possible explanation of the greatest declines in political support is that voters are making poor choices and paying for these choices in diminished policy performance, it all means that politics is becoming candidate-centred, more voters may be making electoral choices based on personal characteristics or video style instead of policy congruence [Dalton 2004: 142].

Dalton's “poor choice” leads to the continuation of the struggle of personalities in the parliament and government. Consequently, there emerges distrust of the citizens in political institutions, and especially when the fight of personalities is presented to the public as a fight of concepts of society's development.

Transition to proportional representation in combination with a big importance of constituency and decrease of the barrier from 4% to 3% in 2006 was to facilitate the way average and small parties entered the parliament, and not to contribute to the reduction of the number of effective parties. According to O. Fisun and T. Mosentsova, this paradox can be explained by political traditions, which are manifested in the ideological positioning of parties within the election campaign [Vlasjuk 2006 : 53]. In our opinion, such an effect in Ukraine can also be explained by the fact that political parties together with parliamentary elections happen to be too personalized. Giving votes for this or that political force, the majority of Ukrainian voters do not vote for the party itself and its programme, but for its

leader. A striking example of this is the formation of blocs of political parties whose names included the names of political leaders, such as "Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc" or "Lytvyn Bloc." Before the parliamentary elections of 2012 the new election law was adopted, according to which only political parties were allowed to participate in the parliamentary elections which made it impossible to form a name block and use the name of the leader in the ballot. In the first place such an initiative was directed against the "Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc" participating under that name in the parliamentary elections in 2002. Despite the fact that the adoption of such a law was of solely technological character, in order to reduce chances of a bloc to win, it can be stated that it had an impact on the entire party system. Experience of the election campaign of 2012 showed a tendency to continue the formation of new parties or re-branding of the existing ones with a clear focus on the new leader. A vivid example of this is the formation of a new party "Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reforms," better known as "Vitali Klitschko UDAR." And although V. Klitschko in his public speeches on occasions emphasized that the new party offers a new format of its policy and would not use the name of the leader to promote the party, the party managers did not desist from using his name during the election campaign of 2012.

One of the results of the revolutionary events of November 2013 – February 2014 was a partial departure from a traditional fight of personalities which manifested itself during the presidential elections in May 2014. Despite the effort of presidential candidates from political parties to preserve the strategy of voting for a personality instead of voting for the programme, survey results showed that Ukrainian society has the prospects of rational voting. Rational voting can assure predictability of actions of political institutions, based on the initial programme positions of the parties and their candidates. In order to implement this, apart from the demand of society, which must become increasingly noticeable, there is a necessary proposal from the political parties, which should start functioning in a new coordinate system.

Conclusions

Low level of credibility for Ukrainian political parties has many reasons. Among them – the problems of intra-party democracy, vagueness of positions of political parties, lack of transparent funding and others. Low level of credibility for political parties has resulted in the lack of rational voting during elections. Consequently, after the election day the majority of parties and voters lose touch and the interests of voters are no longer maintained.

The formed party system is characterized by a large number of parties, the vast majority of which do not take part in the political process, although declare their existence only on paper. The estimates of the ENPV may serve as verification of the mentioned above. As a result we may observe the decrease of the influence of political parties on the democratization processes which is confirmed by the Index of Democratization.

Nowadays Ukraine is facing an extremely difficult situation as to the need of

reforms not only of the economy, but of most of the political institutions. Political parties should not keep themselves aloof in this process. The gradual elimination of the main deficiencies in the functioning of political parties should favour the formation of a more effective party system, which in its turn will have a direct impact on the renovation of other political institutions.

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CONTENT ANALYSIS OF MEDIAL NEWS ON THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE IN THE MAIN NEWS OF PUBLIC TELEVISION RTVS IN SLOVAKIA

Ivana Polakevičová

University of Constantine the Philosopher in Nitra, Slovakia

Abstract

In the first half of 2014, the crisis in Ukraine has become one of the most publicized issues of foreign policy. Anti-government riots lasting from autumn 2013 in the centre of the Ukrainian capital have escalated into tragic bloodshed on Kiev's Independence Square (Maidan). Prolonged mass civil protests accompanied by escalating violence even spilled over across the very borders of Europe, while several world powers joined together to try to solve the Ukrainian problem. The presented partial research of rather extensive research studies deals with media news reporting on the crisis in Ukraine in the main television news on the public television RTVS in Slovakia. Through quantitative content analysis method it charts chosen aspects of publicized content, which were communicated to the audience in the first week since the specific incident on Maidan.

Key words: *Ukraine. Maidan. Television. Television news. RTVS*

Introduction

The beginning of anti-government riots that grew into a modern Ukrainian crisis can be considered to be the failure to sign the association agreement and the agreement on free trade zone with the European Union by the Ukrainian government delegation at the political summit of Eastern Partnership Policy in Vilnius, Lithuanian, which took place on November, 29, 2013 [ČTK, 21.2.2014]. This refusal and adherence to deepening economic cooperation with neighboring Russia sparked a wave of criticism in the country. The opposition made no secret of its great concern about the orientation of the then Ukrainian leadership towards Russia and its growing dependence on it. It demanded the resignation of the government, early presidential and parliamentary elections and the continued integration into European structures [TASR, 14.2.2014]. The protests in Kiev on November 30, 2013 were broken up by police troops, and 79 people were injured. The protests continued in the following days, when thousands of Ukrainian opposition supporters demonstrated on Independence Square against the resignation of President Viktor Yanukovych. The riots were renewed on February 18, 2014, when in there occurred in the Kiev government district bloody clashes between police and protesters [SME, 18.2. 2014]. There were hard street battles despite national mourning and an agreed ceasefire at the central square in Kiev also on February 20, 2014, when the Ukrainian police used live ammunition [IHNE

20.2.2014]. The protests in Ukraine didn't calm down even after President Viktor Yanukovich was deposed on February 22, 2014, the Ukrainian crisis continued with subsequent events on the Black Sea peninsula of Crimea, and further with the downing the Malaysian Boeing 777 on July 17, 2014.

The presented study is a partial output of extensive empirical research dealing with media coverage of the events in Ukraine. The main goal of the below presented partial research was to chart the extent of publicized reports on events in Ukraine in the main television news on public television RTVS in Slovakia in the period from February 18 to 25, 2014, when the news on the incident on Maidan was resonating. At the same time, the research also monitored the media coverage of political leaders within specific differentiations (Ukrainian politicians, Russian politicians, Slovak politicians, other foreign politicians) in relation to the content of the researched news format and the specific issue in Ukraine.

Research material

Selection of research material was implemented at two levels: 1. determining the research period and 2. selection of the mass media. In the case of the on-going, current crisis in Ukraine, we chose to examine media coverage related to the events on Maidan on February 18, 2014. The research period we mapped covered one week from the incident. With regards to media coverage, we focused on the public television RTVS, specifically on its main format of television news - RTVS News. The TV format mentioned is broadcast at 7 p. m., while it is a part of prime time, so-called "prime-time" (with regards to TV this term refers to the time between 7 p. m. and 11 p. m.), during which there is the highest number of viewers. 8 broadcasts – of RTVS News became the subject of the research, they were broadcast at the same time from February 18 to 25, 2014.

The research method

We implemented the research using quantitative content analysis, developed by Bernard Berelson in the 1940's. Berelson defined content analysis as a research method that allows for an objective, systematic and quantitative description of apparent content of the text [Gulová, Arrow 2013]. "Content analysis is a quantitative, objective analysis of the content of any kind" [Disman 2011: 168]. In the most general sense, however, content analysis can be seen as a method for evaluating the content of different kinds of communications, also taking into account the communication of a media nature [Šagát, Fandelová 2011, Szabová, Szabo 2013]. The essential image, in which the content of the document is presented, is the text, therefore, content analysis is the most relevant analysis of the text - written, audio or audio recorded.

The essence of content analysis is to examine the content of the communication through a system of established categories, in which the subject of content analysis is expressed in a simplified way and measurement units are designed [Kollárik, Sollárová et al 2004]. Based on the stated objective of the

research, which was to map the format of the media coverage of the public Television - RTVS News relating to events in Ukraine in the time period from February 18 to 25, 2014, we set the following categories for evaluation:

- 1.) Reports with media coverage on events in Ukraine in the time period from February 18 to 25, 2014

- a) Total number of broadcast reports
- b) Number of broadcast live reports
- c) The time duration of the reports

- 2.) Media coverage of politicians in the reports on events in Ukraine in the time period from February 18 to 25, 2014

- a) Media coverage of Ukrainian politicians
- b) Media coverage of Russian politicians
- c) Media coverage of Slovak politicians
- d) Media coverage of other foreign politicians

We operationalized the stated categories of evaluation into analytical units, while we were monitoring their frequency of occurrence in the format of the media coverage of RTVS News. The recorded unit was the item for analyzed content, which was then assigned a particular category.

Results of the research

We present the results of the research findings in individual visualized tables and graphs. The first specified category of evaluation charted the frequency of reports with the media coverage content on the events in Ukraine in the time period from February 18 to 25, 2014 within the news format of the public television - News RTVS. The number of total broadcast reports relating to the issue of Ukraine was 49. From this number we observed that 9 of them were live reports (Tab. No. 1).

Tab. No.. 1: Reports with media coverage on events in Ukraine in the time period from February 18 to 25, 2014


RTVS NEWS (media format of the main television news of public television RTVS)		
Date	Evaluation Category	Frequency
02/18/2014	Number of reports	1
	Live coverage	0
02/19/2014	Number of reports	8
	Live coverage	1
02/20/2014	Number of reports	8
	Live coverage	2
02/21/2014	Number of reports	10
	Live coverage	2
02/22/2014	Number of reports	5
	Live coverage	2
02/23/2014	Number of reports	7
	Live coverage	1
02/24/2014	Number of reports	5
	Live coverage	1
02/25/2014	Number of reports	5
	Live coverage	0
Total number of reports (02/18/2014 - 02/25/2014)		49
Total number of live reports (02/18/2014 - 02/25/2014)		9

The following table No. 2 and Chart No. 1 reflect the time duration of each report on the media coverage of events in Ukraine in the time period from February 18 to 25, 2014. The length of each report was recorded in minutes and seconds. At the beginning of the specified period of the researched time, that is February 18, 2014 the duration of the report was the lowest, which is evidenced by the fact that in the media format only one report on the events in Ukraine was broadcast. In the following days, the total length of medialised content kept increasing in time, the longest one was recorded on February 21, 2014. After this date it began to decrease again, which was directly proportional to the decreasing frequency of publicized reports on Ukraine, which were presented in the broadcast reports.

Tab. No. 2: The duration of reports with media coverage on events in Ukraine in the time period from February 18 to 25, 2014


RTVS News (public RTVS)			
Date	The total length of the news format	Evaluation Categories (time duration reports)	Length of time in minutes
2/18/2014	0:51:52	total time length of reports	3 minutes and 37 seconds
		total time length of Live reports	0 minutes and 0 seconds
2/19/2014	0:52:29	total time length of reports	13 minutes and 2 seconds
		total time length of Live reports	1 minute and 35 seconds
2/20/2014	0:52:28	total time length reports	18 minutes and 28 seconds
		total time length of Live reports	5 minutes and 21 seconds
2/21/2014	0:52:46	total time length reports	21 minutes and 51 seconds
		total time length of Live reports	5 minutes and 57 seconds
2/22/2014	0:51:23	total time length reports	18 minutes and 33 seconds
		total time length of Live reports	11 minutes and 8 seconds
2/23/2014	0:51:40	total time length reports	18 minutes and 24 seconds
		total time length of Live reports	5 minutes and 26 seconds
24/02/2014	00:46:42	total time length reports	10 minutes and 32 seconds
		total time length of Live reports	2 minutes and 19 seconds
25/02/2014	00:47:51	total time length reports	13 minutes and 1 seconds
		total time length of Live reports	0 minutes and 0 seconds

Graph. 1: The time duration of reports with media coverage on events in Ukraine in the time period from February 18 to 25, 2014



The survey focusing on the media coverage of politicians in the format of news reports on the events in Ukraine in the time period from February 18 to 25, 2014 was closely differentiated with regards to Ukrainian politicians, Russian politicians, Slovak politicians and other foreign politicians. Graph No. 2 illustrates the frequency of their occurrence each day. Most media coverage was given to Ukrainian politicians (N = 160), followed by Russian politicians (N = 28), Slovak politicians (N = 17) and the least other foreign politicians (N = 11).


Graph No. 2: Differentiation of media coverage of politicians in the time period from February 18 to 25, 2014 in news format of RTVS News.



Graph No. 3 points out the fact, that among the Ukrainian politicians most most media coverage by far was given to Viktor Yanukovych (the then and later abdicating President of Ukraine) with a rate of 53%. Following him was Yulia Tymoshenko (the former Ukrainian Prime Minister) with 21%, Vitaly Klitschko

(Chairman of the Ukrainian Party UDAR) with 6%, Oleksandr Turčynov (after the resignation of Viktor Yanukovych, the temporary President of Ukraine) with 5%, Vitaly Zacharčenko (Home Secretary) with 4 % and Arseniy Jaceňuk (Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Ukraine) with 3%. Viktor Pšonka (former Attorney General of Viktor Yanukovych) with 2%, Volodymyr Rybak (municipal politician, city councilor of the eastern-Ukrainian town Horlivka) with 2% and Pavel Lebedev (Defence Minister) with 1% were covered with a significantly lower proportion.


Graph No. 3: Media coverage of Ukrainian politicians



* names are referred to as they occur in the Slovak media most frequently

The results of the media coverage of Russian politicians illustrated in chart No. 4 shows that most attention went to Vladimir Putin (President of Russia) with 57%. A significantly lower percentage of coverage in the television news RTVS was given to Sergey Lavrov (Foreign Minister) with 15%, Dmitry Medvedev (Russian Prime Minister) with 14%, Alexei Uljukajev (Minister of Economic Development) with 7% and non-politician Alexander Lukaševič (Foreign Ministry Spokesman) who was included in the overall mapping, since he was paid a great deal of media attention.


Graph No. 4: Media coverage of Russian politicians



* names are referred to as they occur in the Slovak media most frequently


The graph No. 5 shows Slovak politicians with the most media coverage in connection with the events in Ukraine included Miroslav Lajčák (Foreign Minister) with 59%, Robert Kaliňák (Interior Minister) with 12% and Robert Fico (Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic) with 11%. Less represented, but with the same percentage of media coverage, 6%, were Maroš Šefčovič (Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner for Institutional Relations and Administration), Ivan Štefanec (member of the European Parliament) and František Šebej (Member of Parliament from the political party Most-Hid).

Graph No. 5: Media coverage of Slovak politicians



* names are referred to as they occur in the Slovak media most frequently

Graph No. 6: Media coverage of other foreign politicians



* names are referred to as they occur in the Slovak media most frequently

The results of graph No. 6 show that among the foreign politicians most media coverage was given to American leaders, that is Barack Obama (the U.S. President) with 55%, and Susan Rice (Adviser of the Office of National Security)

with 18%. To a lower extent, the politicians János Martonyi (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Hungary), Evangelos Venizelos (Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece) and Catherine Ashton (Commissioner for Foreign and Security Policy of the EU) were also covered by the media.

Conclusion

The media has become one of the main factors, which determines what aspects of social and political life are brought into focus. It is an important phenomenon in defining social problems as well as an important variable for social change in society. On the basis of journalistic selection and the processing of information itself, the recipient, as beneficiary of the news, creates a picture of the world. Presented media reality is only a reflection of the real world. The media reflection of the world can be, however, distorted, deformed, or intentionally modified. News and journalism have acquired an important role since the development of a democratic society in Slovakia and a dual media system. News should inform, supervise, evaluate critically, it should be true and factual, and pluralistically reflect current problems of society. These aspects should be the dominant key elements of news formats in public media, which are in Slovakia represented by RTVS.

Our overall goal in the presented research, which is a partial output of a comprehensive empirical research on media coverage of the crisis in Ukraine, was to chart the extent of media coverage of events on Maidan in the main television news in the public television RTVS in Slovakia in the period from February 18 to 25, 2014 through the content analysis, and we monitored which political leaders, thusly differentiated - Ukrainian, Russian, Slovak and other foreign ones - were covered.

The research findings point out the fact, that during the studied period, the main news format RTVS News provided the public audience information on events in Ukraine in ascending order. Total time length of the reports kept increasing, as did the time length of live reports. The most media coverage was given to Ukrainian and Russian politicians. Among Ukrainian politicians it was the former president Viktor Yanukovich. Among Russian politicians Vladimir Putin. Among Slovak politicians the media attention was focused on Miroslav Lajčák and among foreign politicians Barack Obama. Generally speaking, the media coverage was dominated by the top political representatives of each country. The acquired results of the implemented research subsequently were used to make comparisons with the results, which were related to Markíza, the most watched commercial television in Slovakia. Comparing them, we found that public television RTVS in its main news format RTVS News provided more information about the events in Ukraine than the commercial television Markíza. Television audience in Slovakia has been better informed from the main television news by public television RTVS, which were of a high professionalism nature.

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Siberian Separatism and Russian Post-Imperial Statehood

Przemysław Sieradzan

University of Gdansk, Poland

Abstract

The following paper is dedicated to the emerging phenomenon of Siberian separatism. The author analyzes the reasons of the emergence and rise of popularity of Siberian regionalist movement, which can potentially evolve towards separatism, which is a long tradition of treating the Asian part of Russia as a colony and the huge reservoir of the natural resources by the authorities in Moscow. Another reason is the hybrid structure of contemporary Russian state, which has some features of empire and nation-state. Even though Siberian separatist movement seems to be weak, Russian authorities use very harsh measures to prevent its rise. It is clear that the government in Moscow perceives potential separatism of Siberia as a serious threat to its security and territorial integrity. It is unclear whether Siberian regionalist movement gains support and prominence within next years, and whether it evolves towards a more radical, openly separatist movement. What seems to be clear is that bad policy of regional development and quasi-colonial attitude towards Asian part of Russia is very likely to foster the emergence of a strong protest emotions.

Key words: *Russia, Syberia, separatism, regionalism, federalism*

Introductory remarks

Ethnically-motivated separatism is nowadays one of the most widely discussed political topics in Russian Federation. Securing the territorial integrity of the state and preventing any attempt of secession is seen as one of the main goal of current authorities in Moscow. In most of the cases, the actions taken by Russian federal center just help maintain the status quo in the actually or potentially unstable regions instead solving systemic problems. Siberian separatism may become a crucial challenge for contemporary Russian statehood in future.

After the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1991, many analysts express the view that the likelihood of the emergence of new sovereign states on Russian territory was very big. The first president of Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin at first fostered the centrifugal tendencies and supported the process of so-called "Parade of Sovereignties" by saying "Take as much sovereignty as you are able to swallow" (*Bierite stol'ko suverenitieta, skol'ko smozhetie progлотit'*, 1990). He greatly changed his attitude, however, when Chechnya declared its

independence and the other subjects of Russian Federation were likely to follow this example. His successor Vladimir Putin adopted a hard stance towards any manifestations of separatism. Preventing the state from dissolution and securing the territorial integrity is seen as one of the main reason of his popularity among Russian citizens.

Although the Chechen secession was prevented by military force, the ethnopolitical situation of Russian Federation is very far from stability. The new generations of the ethnic minority activists are more radical than their predecessors. Many ethnic conflicts have been not resolved, but frozen and can be resumed in every moment. Long-forgotten Apart from the traditional zones of ethnic instability, like the North Caucasus and Volga Region, new separatist movements appeared. Some of them are quite weak and are rather post-modern city intelligentsia protest phenomena (like Kaliningrad, Pomor or Ingria independence movements) (Sieradzan 2013). The other may potentially evolve into a large political forces. One of them is Siberian regionalism that may potentially evolve into Siberian separatism. The main reason of the emergence and rise of popularity of this movement is a long tradition of treating the Asian part of Russia as a colony and the huge reservoir of the natural resources by the federal center. Another reason is the structure of contemporary Russian state, which is not an empire anymore, but is not a national state either.

Contemporary Russian Federation is an extremely complex ethno-cultural space, inhabited by people of different nationalities, ethnic and subethnic identities, tribes, clans, religions and traditions. Numerical and cultural dominance of the Eastern Slavs is indisputable in the central part of the state, which is the geographical nucleus of historical empire, but the peripheral areas extraordinarily heterogenic in the ethnic and cultural aspect.

The border between Europe and Asia was always a matter of collective imagination about anthropogeography of the world rather than a physical geography. There are no obvious major natural barriers dividing both continents. According to ancient Greeks, it was Don river that separated Europe from Asia. As late as in the 18th century, Swedish military officer Philippe-Johann von Strahlenberg suggested the Urals as a border. This concept was very convenient from the point of view of power-wielding circles of newly (and forcefully) westernized Russia, who wanted the world to acknowledge the European status of the core areas of the Empire and the Siberian lands as a pseudo-foreign territories suitable for colonial exploitation (Lewis 2012).

In the structure of the contemporary Russian state, which is a legacy from its imperial past, Siberia undoubtedly is a periphery. Siberia has developed like colony for many hundred years. Russian settlers and troops moved into areas populated by indigenous peoples, unable to effectively resist the invaders' military force. Russians created new administrative systems to govern the newly acquired lands, built settlements and strongholds, violently imposed Christianity, and benefited from the trade with rare goods. The indigenous population shrank as a result of the colonial-style rule, though not as rapidly as in the Western colonies in the Americas. The territory was used as a place of exile and penitentiary area. Transportation was intended to link regions with Sankt-Petersburg and Moscow rather than with each other (Ryzhkov, Inozemtsev, Ponomarev 2012).

Today, the concept of Siberia has no meaning from the point of view of Russian administrative division. Siberian Federal District encompasses only the central part of historical Siberia. The western part of the enormous territory belongs to the Urals Federal District, while eastern part forms Far Eastern Federal District. Those divisions are, however, completely artificial and are a result of a governance pragmatism than any geographic, cultural or ethnic factors.

The territory of Siberia is so large that it could accommodate any country of the contemporary world. Although Siberia encompasses almost three quarters of the territory of Russian Federation, it is inhabited by about 38 millions of people, which makes about a quarter of its population.

Siberia is contemporarily associated with its harsh and inhospitable climate. Indeed, the conditions of living there are much more difficult than in the

Siberia is one of the most sparsely populated regions in the world, comparable probably only to northern Canada. About 96% of the Siberian population concentrates along the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

Siberia and the Post-imperial Character of Russian Statehood

Russian Federation, legal heir of the USSR, is not an empire anymore. However, it cannot be considered as a nation-state. It is not a superpower, but it undoubtedly is one of the greatest powers of the contemporary world. The power of Soviet Union was so vast that the Russian Federation, which inherited the largest part of the "bankruptcy estate" of the former communist empire, is still able to exert significant influence on the international reality (Potulski 2010: 19-21).

Sovereign Russia inherited from the Soviet Union not only debts and claims, but also some attributes of a superpower - the strategic nuclear forces, strong army, skillful diplomacy and a permanent membership in the UN Security Council. This legacy of the fallen superpower, coupled with the unique geopolitical location and huge, rich in natural resources area, make Russia an international power. International position of the Russian Federation decreased due to internal problems - uncontrolled privatization of industry, economic collapse, disastrous demographic situation and the crisis of leadership, and, last but not least, ethnic separatism (Sieradzan 2011: 73-96).

Extremely important feature of any imperial-type state is the heterogeneity and complexity of its inner structure, which is based on the dichotomy between "the Center" and "the Peripheries". This dichotomy does not necessarily have the spatial dimension. The "peripheral" status of administrative, political or territorial entity being a part of a wider imperial structure is not always the result of a geographical distance from the sovereign Center of, but rather a certain degree of autonomy, yet little ability to influence decisions regarding the entire structure. The proximity to the center means more opportunity of co-deciding about the fate of the empire as a whole, while reducing autonomy. The large geographical distance or the vast area of the territory, however, makes the governance by the Center an extremely difficult challenge.

Slavic people are a major part of the population contemporary Russian Federation, but in many peripheral areas of this state the majority of the population is ethnic minorities. While a superficial reading of the results of the last Russian population

census of 2010 may suggest that contemporary Russia is almost a mono-ethnic state, the importance of nationalities living in peripheral areas is much greater than would appear from the look at the statistics (*Itogi vserossijskoj perepisi naseleniâ – Nacional'nyj sostav naseleniâ rossijskoj Federacii*). Non-Russian ethnic groups inhabit (and often constitute the dominant part of the population) in a substantial part of the territory of the modern border of the Russian Federation, including the borderlands which are particularly important from the point of view of strategic interests of the state.

In terms of the administrative structure, Russia resembles empire much more than the nation-state. Artificially created concept of *rossiyanie* (Russians as a non-ethnic, political nation, tantamount to the total population of the Russian state), meaning, has not adopted in the spoken language. *Russkie* (ethnic Russians) are indeed about 80% of the inhabitants of the federation, but are not mentioned by name in any important legal document. Ethno-nationalistic circles have long postulated formal and legal recognition of ethnic Russians (*russkie*) as a state-building nation, but the concept has few proponents among the Russian elite. The postulate of giving ethnic Russians a special legal status is commonly associated with xenophobia. The formula of "multinational people of Russia" suggests a non-national, but imperial or quasi-imperial model of statehood (*Konstitucija Rossijskoj Fiederacii*).

Russian Federation, which is a post-imperial state, is now standing at crossroads. The model of its statehood identity is forming. Contemporary Russia is faced with a choice between building a nation-state and an attempt to restore the empire. The choice of the model of the nation state will mean giving up great power ambitions, the loss of part of the territory and military capabilities; while allowing integration with the political structures of the Western world. The choice of attempt to restore an empire would be tantamount to issuing a challenge to the contemporary world order and may awaken frozen border conflicts. On the other hand, Russian authorities may try to retain some feature of multi-ethnic model typical for imperial statehood, but not adopt the policy of military revisionism. This way would be impossible without granting various regions a large degree of autonomy. In every other scenario, Russia is deemed either to accept the secession of some regions or ensure the loyalty of peripheries with brute force.

In Russian culture, Siberia is a powerful symbol of a peripheral territory. The policy that Moscow adopts towards the emerging Siberian regionalist movement that may potentially evolve towards separatism may be a touchstone of the general trajectory of the evolution of Russian model of statehood.

Geopolitical Role of Siberia

The geopolitical role of Siberia is usually downplayed by many prominent analysts and political scientists. Many of them perceive it only as a territory full of energy resources and a massive land barrier, protecting the civilization center of Russia from the invasion by one of the Eastern powers. Siberia is usually seen as a inhospitable, barren space, which is a burden for Moscow in the same extent as an asset.

One of the geostrategists who disposes of Siberia as a major strategic concern is chief executive of STRATFOR private intelligence company. In his paper dedicated to the geopolitics of Russia he writes:

“There is only one rail line connecting Siberia to the rest of the empire, and positioning a military force there is difficult if not impossible. In fact, risk in Russia’s far east is illusory. The Trans-Siberian Railroad (TSR) runs east-west, with the Baikal Amur Mainline forming a loop. The TSR is Russia’s main lifeline to Siberia and is, to some extent, vulnerable. But an attack against Siberia is difficult — there is not much to attack but the weather, while the terrain and sheer size of the region make holding it not only difficult but of questionable relevance. (...) The period without mud or snow lasts less than three months out of the year. After that time, overland resupply of an army is impossible. It is impossible for an Asian power to attack Siberia. (...) But exploiting the resources of deep Siberia, given the requisite infrastructure costs, is prohibitive to the point of being virtually impossible” (Friedman 2008).

However, this point of view seems one-sided. The geographic location of Siberia is very important. This gigantic territory is a bridge between Europe, Far East, and North America. The development of Siberian railway and automobile road network would greatly facilitate the inter-continental transport of goods and people between Europe, Russia, and three biggest economies of the contemporary world (United States, Japan and China). This project remains a vision for future. Siberia remains a underdeveloped region. This unique, gigantic territory requires large-scale investments which are impossible without government’s orientation towards long-scale planning.

Currently, the most important sector of Russian economy is extraction, refining and export of natural resources, most of which are located east of the Urals. The natural resources of Siberia are very abundant, which makes this region extremely important for a largely raw materials export-driven economy of Russia. The region contains 7% of the world’s known reserves of platinum, 9% of coal, 10% of oil, 21% of nickel, and 30% of natural gas. The reserves of the adjacent offshore fields remain largely unexplored. Forests in the Asian part of Russia are larger than the Amazon rainforest (Ryzhkov, Inozemtsev, Ponomarev 2012). Even though the region provides most of country’s resources, it does not benefit from it sufficiently.

There is another important natural resource of Siberia, which is often neglected by geopolitical analysts: water. It is quite likely that in the near future the rivalry between global superpowers for hydrogen oxide may overshadow the race for the energy resources. The further existence of civilization without petroleum is possible, while water is the most basic prerequisite of the existence of any form of life. According to numerous reports made by both independent analysts and UN agencies, drinking water may be one of the crucial and the most wanted resources of the 21st century. According to 2007 Food and Agricultural Organization prognoses, in 2050 more than two thirds of the world population will suffer of drinking water shortages. Desertification is one of the primary concerns not only of African and Central Asian states, but also of China and Russia. Russian Federation is one of the very few countries in the world that is not likely to suffer any water shortage. Most of its abundant water resources (97 mile km³) are located in Siberia, which has 1.15 times more fresh water than the U.S. and 2.3 times more water

than the European Union. The emergence of Russian “water superpower” and creation of a network of aqueducts delivering fresh water to China seems a very likely scenario for the future (Valvo 2009).

The civilization identity of Siberia is very complex. This large area is a home of many peoples and ethnic groups, including Buryats, Komi-Peremics, Yakuts (Sakha), Dolgans, Tuvans, Khakas, Evenki, Evens, Khanty, Mansi, Chukchas, Yukagirs, Itelmen, Selkup, Ainu and many other (*Narody Rossii. Atlas kultur i religii* 1999). The indigenous dwellers of Siberia nowadays constitute only about 5% of the overall Siberian population. Their unique spiritual and material culture, including the holistic outlook and sacral attitude towards nature, is a very precious value. Unfortunately, the indigenous population of Siberia currently faces many dramatic challenges, including poverty, climate change-related problems and acculturation, which is a threat for their cultural identity.

The overwhelming majority of 38 million contemporary Siberian population are East Slavs – descendants of Russian settlers. Though most of them consider themselves to be ethnic Russian, the separate Siberian identity has developed on the territory beyond the Urals. There are various extents and degrees of this identity. Some of East Slavic dwellers of Siberia call themselves “Siberian Russians” (sub-ethnic group), while the others (still not very numerous) claim to be a completely separate Siberian nationality.

Siberia was also a sphere of influence of Far Eastern powers for a long time. Chinese Tang Dynasty (618-907) ruled over territories of contemporary Mongolia, Tuva, Khakasia, Altay and large part of contemporary Russian Far East (Primorye) (Michałowski 2009). Kublai Khan, the Mongolian emperor who conquered China and founded Yuan dynasty in 13th century, took control over large portions of South-Eastern Siberia. It was only in 17th century when Russian started to oust China influence from the region. After treaties of Nerchinsk (1689), Kiahta (1727) and Aigun (1858) which are perceived as unequal by Chinese historiography, the border between both empires was set along Argun, Amur and Ussuri rivers (V. S. Mâsnikov 1980). The alleged Chinese revanchism is a main reason of anti-Chinese sentiment among contemporary Siberian Russians, which might be seen as a modern version of “Yellow Peril” xenophobia (A. Bezzubcev-Drokanov 2011). There is also a widely spread notion that overpopulated China might take over depopulating Siberia just by means of massive migration, which is not confirmed at all by demographic data (Adomanis 2014). Despite the geographical proximity, Chinese *soft power* seems so far not very attractive for Siberian Russians, which might change in future due to rapid socio-economic development of the Middle Kingdom. On the contrary, the influence of Japanese culture (including popular culture) and technology on life of Siberian Russians is immense (Pajon 2013).

The Birth and Rebirth of Siberian Regionalism

As it was already mentioned, for a very long time (over 4 centuries) Siberia was a subject of quasi-colonial exploitation. It did not become officially a part of Russian state until 1763. The region was not ruled by governor-generals, but by the Posolsky Prikaz (a kind of Ambassadorial Office) until 1596, and subsequently by the Siberian Prikaz from 1615-1763, which was a kind of equivalent of colonial

affairs departments of the Western powers. Moreover, a very large number of Siberian settlers had connection to the military service (Ryzhkov, Inozemtsev, Ponomarev 2012).

In the 50-s of the 19th century, a regionalist Siberian movement (*sibirskoe oblastnichestvo*) emerged among university students in Sankt-Petersburg. The movement, led by geographer, ethnologist and explorer Grigori Potanin and scholar and writer Nikolay Yardintsev, was based on ideas of democracy, federalism and self-governance. Siberian regionalists criticized tsarist autocracy and colonial model of rule in the peripheries. They condemned the persecution of indigenous cultures and denationalization of Siberian peoples (Sesūnina 1974). More radical members of this movement advocated full independence of Siberia and perceived their struggle as anti-colonial. Some of them joined Polish exiles during the Siberian uprising of 1866 (Skok 1963). A famous Yardintsev's book *Siberia as Colony in a Geographic, Ethnographic and Historical Sense* claimed that Siberians have different national identity than subjects of tsarist despotism and should strive towards their own statehood based on the principles of liberty and equality (Ārdincev 2004). Many regionalists were persecuted for alleged participation in underground "Society for Independent Siberia".

The further activity of Siberian regionalist was tightly connected with anti-tsarist and democratic *narodniki* movement, and later with agrarian, anti-feudal and anti-capitalist Socialist-Revolutionary Party ("eser"). The popularity of the idea of Siberian regionalism has reached its peak during the revolutions of 1917 and during the civil war in Russia.

The regional conference in Tomsk that took place in August, 1917 has adopted a resolution *About Autonomy of Siberia*. The resolution proclaimed the autonomous Siberia within the federal Russia and adopted a green-white flag, which is a symbol of Siberia's autonomist and separatist movement until today. The further 1st Siberian Regional Convention decided that Siberia should have full sovereignty, and its own parliament and government.

After October revolution many Siberian regionalists supported different factions of anti-Bolshevik resistance. From February 10th, 1918 until October 22nd, 1918 a short-lived Provisional Siberian Government existed. This governing body had its seat in Tomsk (later in Harbin and Vladivostok), was dominated by the Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries and led by a young lawyer Piotr Derber. Many members of this government were Siberian regionalists. In November 1918, the Provisional Siberian Government merged with the Ufa Directory and formed Provisional All-Russian Government (Šiškin 2009).

From 1920 to 1922, there existed Far Eastern Republic in the southeastern part of Russian Far East. It was a buffer state which divided Soviet Russia from Japan. In the beginning, its capital was Verkhneudinsk, but from October 1920 it was moved to Chita. The government of the state was controlled by moderate socialists (Wood 1997). In May 1921, Japanese-backed Russian officers organized a coup in Vladivostok. They proclaimed The Provisional Priamurye Government which existed until October, 1922 and was the last enclave controlled by anti-Bolshevik resistance during the Russian civil war, called "the Black Buffer" in Soviet historiography (Šiškin 1957). In November, 1922, the whole of Russian Far East was included into

Russian Federal Socialist Soviet Republic by a resolution adopted by National Assembly of Far Eastern Republic.

In Soviet Union, the Siberian regionalism was perceived a democratic and progressive current und thus officially praised. It did not apply though to the radical, separatist current of the movement, which strived towards the independence of region. Any separatist activity was banned and persecuted in Soviet Union. There is no evidence about any Siberian separatist underground movement in USSR.

The rebirth of regionalist movement took place on the wave of many national, ethnic and regional identity rebirth phenomena, which occurred during Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika campaign in late 80s of the 20th century. Small groups and cultural centers of Siberian regionalists started to emerge, especially in the big cities with universities. The process of the rebirth of Siberian identity reawakening was much less spectacular than the "national renaissance" in autonomous republic. Siberian regionalism, not to talk about separatism, remained weak and unknown to broader public.

In December, 2008 Russian government rose import fee for used foreign cars. This decision evoked a large-scale protests in Russian Far East, where driving used Japanese cars is immensely popular. Many Russian in Vladivostok and Primorye region participated in large-scale demonstrations, including blockades of main traffic lines. The protesters created a pressure group called TIGR (Tiger), which was an abbreviation of "Fellowship of Proactive Citizens of Russia" which strived towards the abolition of import fees and advocated the freedom of speech. The protests, which continued until the end of 2009, were economically motivated, but had regionalist and anti-government character (*Voditeli Primoria protestuût protiv povyšeniâ pošlin na inomarki* 2009).

During 2010 all-Russian population census, the takers refused to enter Siberian ethnicity when respondents declared it. Self-declared Siberians, together with Cossacks and Pomors, were counted as members of the sub-ethnic group of Russian nationality and thus included as ethnic Russians in the official statistics (*Perepisčiki massovo narušaût pravo graždan na nacional'noe samoopredelenie*, 2010).

From Regionalism to Separatism?

Siberia is still perceived as a peripheral space by urban population of European part of Russia. Indeed, after the restitution of capitalism its position within the Russian statehood has decreased. The process of de-industrialization took there even a larger scale than in another regions (apart from North Caucasus). The demographic situation of Siberia is particularly disturbing. From 1989-2010, the population of Siberia and the Russian Far East has dropped by 3.57 million due to low birth rates, high mortality and the migration to the big cities of the European part of Russia. While the economic and social situation in Russia improved in the 2000s, Siberia did not benefit from it in a sufficient extent. About 69% and 83% of investment in railways and road network respectively was concentrated in the European part of the Russia in 2001–2010. The share of new housing built in

Siberia and the Far East decreased from 18.1% in 2000 to 13.9% in 2010 (Ryzhkov, Inozemtsev, Ponomarev 2012).

The actual and potential threats for territorial integrity became an often discussed topic in the last years. In December, 2013 State Duma adopted a law project put on the agenda by Communist Party of Russian Federation, which introduced a criminal responsibility for public support of dividing Russia (*Pât' let lisheniâ svobody grozit za prizyvny k separatizmu v Rossii* 2014).

The Russian public opinion became particularly interested in Siberian regionalism after the incorporation Republic of Crimea by Russian Federation on March 21st, 2014 which was followed by a Moscow's support for the federalization of Ukraine and granting Eastern Ukraine a wide degree of autonomy. Some supporters of Siberian autonomist movement perceived this situation as a unique opportunity to acquaint wider Siberian and Russian audience with their postulates.

Artem Lokustov, a 1987 year-born controversial artist and activist from Novosibirsk, became the most prominent advocate of Siberian autonomy. He was the one who invented the idea of "Stop Feeding Moscow" march, which name is an obvious allusion to a well-known Russian nationalist slogan "Stop feeding the Caucasus". According to the organizing committee of the demonstration, the main reason of the march was the expression of protest against the breaking the constitutional principles of federalism and mismanagement of the Siberian territory by Moscow, which treats it as source of raw materials and does not invest in its development (apart from building the infrastructure necessary to transport the raw materials to European Russia). The campaign gained some prominence in another regions of Russia, where movements for fair redistribution of national wealth between regions and federal center started to emerge (*Dviženie za federalizaciû Sibirii* 2014).

The mayoral office of Novosibirsk, however, refused to grant permission for the march, which was due to take place on August 19th, 2014. Russia's prosecutor general has sent warnings to all the media which were covering the protest under the anti-extremism law, and blocked an event internet pages. The editors of websites were forced to remove an interviews with Loskutov. In the end, the march in Novosibirsk did not take place, nor did similar events planned for the same day in Russia (Luhn 2014).

The degree of radicalism of Siberian autonomists varies. Most of them would not support secession, but would back wider autonomy, including measures forcing resource extraction companies to pay taxes in the regions where they operate instead of Moscow. Some of the activists are more radical and openly issue anti-Moscow and pro-independence slogans. Siberian sovereign statehood advocates claim that their region would develop much better after throwing off the yoke of Moscow's exploitation thanks to its vast natural resources. As a sovereign state, Siberia would be by far the world largest country, almost as big as Canada and India combined. According to them, Moscow needs Siberia for its development, but Siberia does not need Moscow (perceived as an obstacle and exploiter) at all.

Even though Siberian separatist movement seems to be weak, Russian authorities use very harsh measures to prevent its rise. It is clear that the government in Moscow perceives potential separatism of Siberia as a serious threat to its security and territorial integrity. It is unclear whether Siberian regionalist movement gains

support and prominence within next years, and whether it evolves towards a more radical, openly separatist movement. What seems to be clear is that bad policy of regional development and quasi-colonial attitude towards Asian part of Russia is very likely to foster the emergence of strong protest emotions.

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Russia in the perspective of *unlikeness* – a philosophical reflection around the idea of *difference*

Anna Kurkiewicz

University of Security in Poznan, Poland

Abstract

The Russian 'sphinx' phenomenon is based on a scale of difference. The difference stemming from the history abyss, the complexity of historical processes formed by political and cultural entanglements, translates to particular self – identical construction. The key to understanding the 'other' appears to be, to a great extent, the language itself or, to be more precise, fossilized in the shape of notions, defined by tradition. An attempt to understand, and to achieve insight in the constitutive elements of the other, to reach its roots, to read it from the perspective of contemporary common understanding of the notion's tradition, becomes an open possibility of dialogue with others. Others, meant as 'strangers', but not necessarily 'hostile'. To resign the attempt to understand the complexity of entanglements, of what 'unlike' may shorten the way to the other, and usually does it, however at the same moment opens the dimension of prejudice, aggression, of what is mutually hostile.

Key words: *Russia, understanding the other, identity, philosophy of dialogue, truth*

The Russian 'sphinx' phenomenon is based on a scale of difference - what differs the way of perceiving reality and, in consequence, leads to the construction of its specific models. The difference stemming from the history abyss, the complexity of historical processes formed by political and cultural entanglements, translates to particular self – identical construction. Being a part of Europe and, at the same time transcending borders of what is perceived as truly European (both geographically and culturally), Russia becomes a dimension where two opposite ways of thinking, two visions of reality clash with each other. The key to understanding the 'other' appears to be, to a great extent, the language itself or, to be more precise, fossilized in the shape of notions, defined by tradition. An attempt to understand, and to achieve insight in the constitutive elements of the other, to reach its roots, to read it from the perspective of contemporary common understanding of the notion's tradition, becomes an open possibility of dialogue with others. Others, meant as 'strangers', but not necessarily 'hostile'. To resign the attempt to understand the complexity of entanglements, of what 'unlike' may shorten the way to the other, and usually does it, however at the same moment opens the dimension of prejudice, aggression, of what is mutually hostile.

A possible safety guarantee becomes deepened by understanding of other founding a dialogue free of prejudices or oversimplified thinking schemes.

To reach deep to the core of the difference, to reach its essential content it is only proper to stop at the border of the difference determined by the fringe of the notion (the sign). In the case of the category introduced one may want to refer to the philosophical tradition of interpretation of this category. Including the question on the phenomenon of difference's (Fr., *differance*) of conceptual and ontological entanglement in his researches, Jacques Derrida points out two possible levels of this notion meaning. One, when the word takes on the form of a noun (Fr. *difference*, Lat. *differentia*) – expressing the existence of something different to a specific thing or process, and used also as a verb, what causes the introduction of specific activity (dynamic, built over confirmed presence of some difference and over an ascertainment that it actually exists), with other words: to give to the notion 'difference' the verbal form ("to be different") translates to a statement that the difference, in fact, occurs. Derrida points out that: "*the verb differer (Latin verb differre) has two meanings which seem quite distinct*" [Derrida 1982: 4]. One of them indicates that something is to be delayed, postponed. The second one suggests something is being drawn apart. A delay is meant as a shift in time needed to see through and analyze all the complex factors behind single and particular act. It translates to a specific function of difference and introduces it to the time -temporal horizon. To drawn apart, as Derrida underlines, means *non – identity*, separation or being afar from itself of that, what non – identical or different [Derrida 1982: 5]. Referring to both evoked meanings the Philosopher says that the difference itself, on the plane of existence, appears often as its own border hiding behind itself. Derrida says: "*us, as inhabitants of a language and a system of thought, to formulate the meaning of Being in general as presence or absence, in the categories of being or beingness (ousia).*" Or in other place referring to understanding of difference stemming from De Saussure's inquires into a sign: "*the play of difference, which, as Saussure reminded us, is the condition for the possibility and functioning of every sign, is in itself a silent play. Inaudible is the difference between two phonemes which alone permits them to be and to operate as such. The inaudible opens up the apprehension of two present phonemes such as they present themselves. If there is no purely phonetic writing, it is that there is no purely phonetic phone. The difference which establishes phonemes and lets them be heard remains in and of itself inaudible, in every sense of the word*" [Derrida 1982: 3]. The difference invokes a phenomenon of 'disappearing' [Derrida 1982: 3], hiding itself in what 'differs' (in what is different).

In such discussions the most visible are two opposite features of the 'difference'. First one is different (distinct, alien) and the second one is being 'drawn apart', separated and situated on the other side of the difference. If such reflections are going to elucidate this particular 'other' and at the same time to reveal the mystery of the Russian Sphinx, then on the one side of difference one should place a description of what is truly Russian - what defines being Russian, and on another - what makes it different (distinctive). This way we obtain what is characteristically Russian as different from what was distinguished from, in other words: what non – Russian (different from previously defined distinctive features said to be specifically Russian). The difference, or to be more precise that, what differs and that what is

different, creates an inseparable dialectic concatenation and these opposite elements build together a self-identical construction of what, on their ground, becomes self determined. What is important, though and what we are to point out here, in such described dialogue, that the accent is being put on two opposite forms of the notion of difference – the differing elements, the difference itself, however is – to be said – omitted or hidden under the distinction that ‘takes the stage’. But to be able to express this two distinctive elements (among which one is important as an exemplification of Russianness), we should stop by what seemingly is covered – the difference itself, or as Derrida says is ‘différance’, what happens between the surface of a mirror and the reflection depicted on it, or between the one looking in the mirror and his reflection. The mirror, used here as a rhetorical figure of reflection, will not - in simple terms - represent ‘what is the same’ but will serve as a distorted mirror. To look at it will mean to see something what is non-identical – looking through different. Therefore, if we are to take what is going to be ‘reflected’ as something different (here: non – Russian), then what is looking into the mirror (Russian) will self – determine by looking at something different (distinctive, non-self) and this way it will create itself at the same moment as the ‘other’ (taking into account the relation’s feedback). The mirror itself – what happens ‘between’ oppositions will be the figure of difference. Perceiving oneself as the other in described picture translates to defining the difference as a factor contributing to the construction of an identity (as particular non – identity). The identity which is internally coherent towards non – identity, which discerns from what is exterior. A unique philosophy is being created this way, philosophy based on difference perceived dialectically, philosophy underlining this particular “*the same, which is not the identical*” [Derrida 1982: 13]. While the difference (Derrida’s *différance*) is treated here: “*as the displaced and equivocal passage of one different thing to another, from one term of an opposition to the other. Thus one could reconsider all the pairs of opposites on which philosophy is constructed and on which our discourse lives, not in order to see opposition erase itself but to see what indicates that each of the terms must appear as the *différance* of the other, as the other different and deferred in the economy of the same*” [Derrida 1982: 13-14]. The ‘other’ needs ‘another’ (different than himself), as possible reference and in order to self – determine.

One may say that in the process of constituting self – identity, both: an individual (a single human being) and given group, which is inevitably made of individuals and which, with the help of individuals expresses and constructs itself (the group creates its self-identity structure and self-identifying complexity out of individuals). The individuals and groups need a ‘difference’, as their constitution’s foundation in time-space as well as an expression for themselves in the given space [Giddens 1991, 58-62]. The *différance* is, therefore an important constructing factor, as Derrida says: “*since it is only on the basis of *différance* and its "history" that we can allegedly know who and where "we" are, and what the limits of an "era" might be*” [Derrida 1982: 3-4]. Of course the question lingers, if ‘the era’ is actually the foundation for us? It is impossible, as it may seem to grasp the present without the reference to the time that passed and is currently hidden behind the doorstep of past and without the relation (and reference) to the future, to what is going to happen, to emerge (being just and only an open possibility, a possible development

of the present). As Derrida underlines, the *différance* is possible precisely because of those live reference to this, what is absent, hidden behind the curtain of both: past and the future. To understand what will happen – what “is” to be made present, given to us it is absolutely necessary to reach for which is hidden, which is directly unavailable [Derrida 1982: 8-9]. So the *différance* is being written in time (temporal horizon) and with it in what serves as its description and what is expressed by a sign, word – notion.

The language appears as a complex system of differences, “*subject (in its identity with itself, or eventually in its consciousness of its identity with itself, its self-consciousness) is inscribed in language, is a ‘function’ of language, becomes a speaking subject only by making its speech conform—even in so-called ‘creation’, or in so-called ‘transgression’—to the system of the rules of language as a system of differences*” [Derrida 1978: 10]. Through the language, the subject becomes itself and is able to self - define and to express, to articulate. The subject therefore is directly bound with language but the language leads us or rather introduces us to specific systems of concepts. What is understandable in a specific structure of the language, or in the wholeness of the language structure it is being described as something “owned”, “possessed”, and at this moment becomes a simple determinant for a subject which, thanks to the ‘simple fact’ is able to self - define. What is incomprehensible appears as different (*différance*), alien. Alienation of speech, its incomprehensibility is not founded only on alienation or disability to understand the language sign, but on the meaning behind it and on its content. The sign is not only the one factor that appears here to be the source of distortion disabling the ability to understand and as the consequence to communicate. The factor causing understanding difficulties or, in the worst case, making understanding impossible appears to be a specific discrepancy in meaning which is being commonly assigned to a notion. A confrontation with ‘differer’, alien, introduces an element of experiences’ reconstruction into a plane of the very experience. It may be seen as the “*alienation of the experience itself*”, the feeling of alienation (differer) transfers back to the one, who is actually immersed in the experience [Derrida 1982: 12]. The one, who encounters another language, culture, different than the content of his own, past experience, conceptualizing them as different, alien (differer), incomprehensible, his own language and all its features introduces him into the plane of the alienation’s dialectic. Everything seemingly owned, known becomes in a specific dimension different than everything previously described as incomprehensible, different and alien. This way emerges before our eyes specific dialectic of something owned and something alien, of comprehension – incomprehension. As the author of the “*Topography of the other*” underlines: “*Listening to someone speaking language we do not know, hearing something incomprehensible, forces us to realize we are unable to understand it. In this moment, we are able to realize, there actually something slips away.*” [Waldenfels 2002: 3] Comprehensible becomes incomprehensible, merging with the observation of the moment of not being able to understand. The other located behind a curtain of difference, alienation, emerges before us becoming a part of our own experience.

What is important, drawing apart the worlds’ space, which becomes the domain of present time [Giddens 1991: 40-46] nullifies, on one hand alienation in favor of universality – abundance of possible plains of humans’ factual presence in

the world on the other, however transforms alienation in constant and common element of our reality. Meeting the different (language, culture) becomes something inserted into modern humans' condition as well as modern societies. Waldenfels says: *"the other openly and inevitably penetrates the very core of reason and the core of what owned. The challenge presented by everything radically alien means a world where we would be totally by ourselves doesn't exist and there is no subject who would be fully a lord in his own house."* [Giddens 1991: 12] Accessibility or rather alienation universality becomes the domain of our age. Transgressing borders of the human understanding description clashes with doubled alienation. One may say: it alienates from 'tamed' reality, from known and owned reality elements and, at the same moment, clashes incessantly with what is different, alien. Self – description loses the right to be in simple identity with specific sphere of belonging (group, language, culture) for these are constantly confronted with 'the other' and this way, they remain in the process of constant reinterpretation. As Waldenfels points out: *"...there is not ... 'an alien', there are just different styles of alienation. The alienation is being described, as would Husserl say, occasionally by a reference to every here and now when human speaks, acts and thinks."* [Giddens 1991: 19] The experience of 'other' - so to speak, as the experience of something alien - becomes a challenge. It is not only and not necessarily a call to confrontation but in most cases it should become a call to start a dialogue. In contemporary world where the reality tends to wipe out borders between notions, concepts and ideals, reshaping even morality, reality tends to set itself to generate more and more information, incessantly multiplying possible ways for the information's flow and in consequence multiplying possible communications' channels - the idea of dialogue with 'other' (meant as a specific incorporation/insertion of 'other' into anything known, tamed) emerges as inevitable consequence of tangible presence – closeness of the 'other'. It appears at this moment that one may feel general problem with grasping and understanding the essence of 'other' – different. For the other/different/alien, being seemingly in the reach of our hand has the tendency to constantly slip away. *"The other as available in its unavailability does not denote some unidentified X still waiting to be described. The other appears to us as something that constantly slips away"* [Giddens 1991: 41]. As Waldenfels underlines *"(...) the experience shows some ambivalence from the very beginning; it appears as a temptation and a threat, and may increase in intensity up to the horror and alienation"* [Giddens 1991: 42].

Here a specific threat emerges. The threat takes on a form of a reduction which simplifies the reality, in such reality 'the other - alien' is being brought down to a hostile being. This phenomenon is clearly visible in politics [Giddens 1991: 45]. The very structure of a 'difference reduction', where other gets the name of hostile (potentially hostile) [Giddens 1991: 45] negates the possibility for 'other' to enter the space of dialogue with another 'other' in favor of incessant confrontation. This way the dialectic of 'other' becomes its own opposition, the dialectic of hostile which leads to thinking only in categories of possible conflict and defending own being against the 'threatening other'. The dialectic reduces, in a very dangerous manner, even the possibility of dialogue with the 'other' or to minimize the possibility of a potential conflict. The 'other', meant as hostile, becomes separated from what is understandable, what – potentially – is being threatened by the other.

But does the distinguished dichotomy of the surrounding reality (both in close and further plane) prove to be an inevitable factor of this particular dialectic of 'other'? Is the 'difference' by the definition something to provoke 'alienation' to the ultimate end reached in hostility? Here any kind of simplification of events, for example: domino effect provoked by the move of first, single piece, wipes out or pushes behind the curtain all the complexity and entanglements of the 'other' problem and of its difference. Comparing to reality in which a modern human being is founded on only one reality breaks apart this interpretation. Such approach tears asunder the interpretation as it does not align itself to the complexity of this reality system and elements of human activity becomes scattered and incompatible with each other. The reality we face appears to be a reality of many parallel orders. The world isn't divided by simple dichotomies anymore. It is impossible to draw its picture or explain it by binary just oppositions. The world breaks apart into many different, but not excluding one another, systems. The division of the world is being followed by breaking apart the language denoting reality and with it the possibility to start the dialogue between separated systems is being broken (but only in its simple form). For the dialogue itself *"breaks apart into single discourses, in Foucault's meaning, which are being bound with their relevant systems"* [Giddens 1991: 30]. The dialectic of what 'other' (different, alien) and owned (native) intervene with each other, the alienation as the opposition of being owned, becomes the "structural alienation" [Giddens 1991: 33]. The alien becomes the environment, becomes all what is known. Owned is submerged in, along with the culture, language and life, what was peripheral and what now enters the very centre of events. The 'other' appears different and at the same time identical with 'owned' (known, tamed). The difference – what is being different loses the role of the foundation for itself – identifying constitution of self, separated from different. Rather thanks to the difference it becomes possible to grasp oneself as the other and to understand and see oneself as other, and to perceive the other as incarnation of a non – hostile.

The approach to grasp the phenomenon of differences, of what differs and being made different allows reference to the whole structures they are functioning in and in this case to grasp the phenomenon of difference in reference to what is being enclosed in a specific concept co-constituting difference, (here: in the concept of Russian Sphinx, and Russia as 'the other'). This way, before us emerges rich tradition of shaping notions, meanings and normative systems. A tradition different from the West or Middle European one and at the same time closely intervened with them, looking through them. The tradition without the attempt to thoroughly understand and analyze, makes impossible to leave the confrontation stand and enter the sphere of coexistence. It is, at last difficult to start dialogue with such culture without putting the difference into the space of dialogue, a dialogue where the 'other' doesn't transform straight into "incomprehensible", "alien", and ultimately – "hostile".

If language, with the sign system complexity included, is - as it was stated before - a system of dialectically connected differences (sign – as a factor bringing out and distinguishing meanings, as something what creates a relation using as a domain the wholeness of language, existence or social structure) then, in order to reach the basic structure or differences and of constitution – what we describe as 'different' (here: Russia as the 'other') it is necessary to use as a supportive notions

shaped by the tradition, functioning in the space of Russian language and culture. Notions which are, along with their rich content and meaning, able to help to understand distinguished 'difference' – diversity. Working in different, diverse traditions or socio – cultural contexts, notions seemingly identical appear to bear different contents, related to multicolored pattern of non – self identical meanings. Something universal at first glance or even functioning as universal in the socio – politic contexts space of sign language without relation to the multicolored tradition of grasping and understanding of distinguished ideas may lead to constant misunderstanding, animosity or hostility.

So let some chosen concepts: truth, law, justice, human, community be an exemplification of the complexity of differences in comprehending, understanding and describing the reality. The difference leads to the other, alien through attempts to grasp the phenomenon of its specific and on this way to attempt of starting dialogue with the other or, with other words, stepping in the field of possible dialogue.

First of this notions is 'truth'. It is important to underline in Russian language space there are two concepts of truth and both are translated as truth in other languages, but do not reflect the entire meaning [Степанов 2001: 435]. The 'truth' (Russ. *istina*) is an integral fusion of truth (*istina*) in ontological order expressing the absoluteness of existence (The Absolute) what transgresses humans' subjectivism. It is a 'truth' from a logical sphere, expressing and connecting existence with the dimension of normative law and order, purely human which is a law (as if it was etymologic derivation 'truth' – 'true', and impossible to translate, where Russian 'truth' sounds like Eng. 'law', where the notion of 'truth' bears both meanings and a part of sound 'truth + law' at the same time) that regulates human activity in the world. It translates to a specific dialectic entanglement of concepts, perceived quite differently than in the West European field of possible meanings. Here the 'truth' denotes purely human features, transforming in a concrete 'truth' and each time – someone's 'truth' [Апутьюнова 1991: 26]. For the 'truth' meant as such a human being is capable to conduct war and fight for right [Черников 2001] whether it will be the individual's truth or the truth of a specified group, it always remain a 'private truth'. There is a significant difference in case of the 'truth' (*istina*), which meaning lies behind the horizon of humans' world activity. *Istina* may be approved or rejected, fight not for it (as in case of 'truth') but in its name. For example – someone fights for 'true' in the name of *istina*. For *istina* refers to something in existence (to the belief of its existence) the 'truth', however refers to 'what should be'. So *istina* is bound with the Absolute (god-like), a higher plane of existence and 'truth' refers to human existence and the sphere of justice meant as correct human activity.

With the idea of truth bounds directly a notion of 'law'. It has the same etymologic root as the word *prav*, which points out to such semantic collocations as proper, appropriate in the context of directly and purely human activity [Lazari 1995: 64-66, Черников 2002: 36-37, Черников 2005: 9-13]. The upholder of law and its source appears to be the human being. What transcends beyond understanding or power of a human being, as stemming from higher plane of existence, it is placed above the law by its nature, and often the law itself. In case of human's law, because of its imperfect source and carrier, the 'earthly law'

becomes contradictory with the 'law of heavens', provoking negation of the very essence of the earthly law, as a callous form of behavior imposed on a human being by another human. Such understanding of law, shaped by tradition, translates to negation of any normative regulations of humans' life. Someone, who uses the law to legitimize the law enough to carry it out, should refer to a non – human but god – like law. This is the root of the 'anointment' of a ruler underlined so explicitly in the Orthodox Church's tradition. By the power of the ceremony a human authority becomes bound with god's law and therefore legitimized by Church's authority and the law of heaven. The law, meant this way becomes transferred from the plane of purely human 'truth' onto the plane of '*istina*' – the absolute, irrefutable truth. M. Broda in his work "To understand Russia" underlines, after Sokolow, that "*the authority upholds the truth and rules over everything in existence and is the source of innovations and laws over law (...)*" [Zydkov, Sokolov cited in Broda 2001: 34]. The authority is being treated here as an upholder of the truth and gains specific religious expression. In this notion of authority two planes are tightly intervened: human and non – human, "the truth and the righteousness" [Broda 2001: 36], the plane of existence (the surrounding reality) intervenes with the normative plane, postulated reality which is actualized by a normative system. Important is, what was underlined above, that the normative order is treated as stemming from the plane of a sacrum. The law understood as such is something that human being may only adapt and submit to in order to fight in its name with everything what purely human (meant as human order and law) which exists without proper legitimization.

In such described totality the notion of justice is also written in. Just ('*prav*') is being referred to the god – like sphere and appears as clear opposition of planes. Human justice is being put against god's justice. The first one isn't sufficiently grounded and because of that, as Zvoznikov underlines, it becomes the source of antipathy towards the institutionalized forms of life as an expression of human justice and because of that twisted by definition by its imperfection. It is rightful and desired to be just but in comparison to the justice with religious connotation one may observe, "*discontent expressed by Russian people towards law institutions (...) and their imperfection is in advance defined by its human dimension*" [Zvoznikov 1995: 91].

A single human being is unable to participate in justice meant this way. The justice may only be fully experienced by a community which becomes at the same time the expression of 'truth'. This specifically Russian way of understanding of human being and its place in the world (by the reference to the community) roots deep down in history, "*on the one hand it stems from simple communes (Russ. 'obshchina' – 'mir'; Eng.: communal, community, world), on the other it stems from the tradition of councils ('sobor'), followed by collectivity. Each time we can find there a human who acts, thinks and describes himself by a collective. The good of an individual becomes the good of a group.*"

Unless *Obshchina* was a society grounded in common customs, beliefs and faith (...) [Walicki 1980: 78], the Church Council expressed its ideal picture [Константинович 2009]. One should understand that postulated ideal unity of the members of community represented by the Church Council – Council's communal representation – the social organism, was meant – in the space of society as the

projection of Trinity (a perfect unity of three sacred persons). As T. Spidlak points out the notion of Church Council was constructed on the base of using Russian verb ‘*sobirat*’ (собирать) – meaning ‘to gather’, ‘to merge with’ [Špidlik 2000: 150], importantly it is usually being connected with old Greek word ‘*katholikos*’ (καθολικός) and translated as common, embracing all community of believers. And exactly thanks to the Church Community “*the over-individual and irrational nature of the community’s consciousness is being expressed*” [Walicki 1980: 176].

When human becomes a part of such ‘organism’ he merges with it but does not lose his individual self [Berdyayev 1925: 31-52]. A single ‘me’ transcends from the egoistic stance, where ‘he’ is only able to think about himself, to the level of ‘we’, where the energy needed to act comes from needs of community instead of an individual. Only a human being in ‘*communio*’ with other humans is enabled to experience the truth because “*the truth cannot be owned by an individual, off course now or then it may be de facto available to only limited group of people or even to one person but also he, the only one, owns the truth not as ‘his’ but common, and he was granted to have it as co-participant*” [Булгаков 2008: 81]. The community defined this way should be a perfect organism with all the co-participants becoming one being, an expression of a collective spirit. It was meant to be a foundation for not only Russian society but Russia itself. In such collective an individual would be granted the access to the truth but not the ‘human’ (individual) truth only over-individual – collective truth, directly connected to the realm of god. At the same moment the truth – or, to be more precise, the ability to experience it connects tightly with specifically understood freedom. The freedom expressed not as something exterior to a human being but as the internal ability to fulfilling oneself. Not a freedom stretching itself outside and creating around a person a space where he may act at his own free will but instead a freedom that reaches deep inside personality, creating personal reality of freedom.

This way appears before us a specific construction of the reality meaning. Inquiring deeper the traditional ways to create notions, used by specific language and culture, we encounter complex system of connections, entanglements and references. Without the attempt to penetrate deeper, attempt to grasp and understand differences between cultures or even the complex way of understanding, to look upon the ‘other’ as ‘non-hostile’ becomes a real problem. Understanding becomes the foundation, a condition needed in order to overcome hostility in favor of dialogue, the possibility to see and perceive ‘other’ in his entire complexity and beauty of his belongingness in the world.

Understanding Russia as what it is, its condition, possible paths of development appears impossible without reaching deep down the complex and multilayered tradition of forming the Russian consciousness, self-identity, without reference to the foundation of what, in the light of possible and different interpretations may be seen as different, alien.

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Crisis in Syria – Reasons and Consequences

Marwan Al-Absi¹ & Tatiana Tökölyová²

¹*University of Constantine the Philosopher in Nitra, Slovakia*

²*University College of International and Public Affairs in Prague,
the Czech Republic*

Education and Consultation Institute in Bratislava, Slovakia

Abstract

The Syrian revolution is different from other Arab revolutions because of the fact that it began without any external support, and it became a regional and global issue. The problems and consequences that it brings leave their traces in the whole Middle East region for many reasons, as for example because the failure of the Geneva negotiations led to the creation of an Islamic state having under control a large area in the northern Syria and western Iraq and therefore, the fight against the Islamic state necessarily requires the cooperation of international and regional forces.

Key words: *Syrian crisis, the Arab spring, Arab revolution, political Islam*

Introduction

The Syrian revolution is considered, in comparison with other revolutions, to be the longest one because it has lasted over three years. Since the beginning Bashar Al-Assad's view was that the slogans which he preached in support of the Palestinian Hamas and Hezbollah in Lebanon, would protect him against the revolutionary wave. The first revolutionary upheaval occurred in Syria on March 18th in 2011 in the southern province of Daraa and the revolution gradually spread to other major cities like Homs, Alep, Idlib and up to Damascus.

The revolution started after a peaceful march and demonstration, which initially called for the president to implement reforms. After six months the protesters demanded the fall of the regime [AŠ-ŠAWKÍ 2014]. They began to arm the militia and formed Syrian Free Army, which split off from the state army. On the international scene the Asad's regime received support from Russia and China, which had used their right of veto against the UN General Assembly Resolution. This resolution called for the resignation of the president or foreign intervention in Syria.

The Syrian revolution is different from other Arab revolutions because of the fact that it began without any external support, and within a few months it became a regional and global issue. The problems and consequences that it has brought leave their traces in the whole Middle East region. The Syrian revolution has

already lasted for four years and it criticizes the international community that it was unable to take a clear position and allowed the Assad's army to mindlessly bombard the country - its infrastructure, apartment houses and valuable cultural monuments. The country that gave the people the first alphabet in the world has been destroyed in the eyes of the world community and because of the foreign interests.

The revolutionary fight involves several groups. Syrian Free Army was established on 29th July 2011 and was founded by the officers and soldiers who left the government army. Gradually, it became the strongest cell of the revolution and dominated over large areas in Syria, especially in the north, northeast, in the suburbs of Damascus and in the south of the country. Syrian National Council was established in Istanbul on 2nd October 2011 and represents the opposition abroad. It includes political parties and groups of different orientation and also several significant people. It was led by representatives of different ethnic or religious groups, as Sunni Muslims, Kurdish representatives and currently is led by a Christian, George Sabra. The greatest influence in this group was held by the Muslim Brotherhood but recently the influence of moderate Muslims and secular parties has been on the rise. Fears of the West upon the Muslim Brotherhood's dominance over the Syrian National Council made the involved group to form the National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces founded in Qatar on 11th November in 2012. The Coalition brings together political parties of national and leftist orientation. It constitutes a broader coalition and represents more groups - moderate Muslims, independent west stream, secular stream as well as the Kurdish minority [AL-KÍLÁNÍ 2014]. Political Islam represents a strong group which is represented not only by the Muslim Brotherhood but also by other religious groups [GHALJÚN, AL-AWA 2004]. Radical Islamist groups and Salafi¹ groups began to appear on the political scene and they also began to participate in the fight against Assad.

It should be pointed out that the longer the conflict lasts, the more the impact of Salafi movement has increased because it is supported by supporters from Libya and other Islamic countries, on the expenses of secular forces. The world community has contributed to the promotion of radical forces due to its reserved position.

In connection with the development of the revolution, it is important to clarify the complex ethnic and religious structure in Syria. Syrian population consists of various ethnic and religious groups: the majority Sunni Muslims make up the three-quarters of the population, besides them in Syria there live also Alawites, Ismailis, Druze, Christians, and ethnic minorities as Kurds, Turkmens, Circassians, Armenians and others.

There are different opinions regarding the status of minorities in Syria. The Assad's regime promotes an idea that his regime protects the rights of minorities in the way that some minority representatives were appointed to the government,

¹ Salafists are supporters of so called pure Islam and pure religious community. According to them, Islam has significantly changed. They have their supporters in the Arab world and among the intelligence, who emigrated to Western countries. Some Islamists criticize Salafisms for its puritan approach.

political parties, security and military forces. Other opinions point out that the representation of these minorities is only formal and in fact all institutions and government segments are governed by the Alawites [KÍLÚ 2011]. The minorities are concerned about their status after the fall of the regime, particularly about the rule of the Muslims. The Kurds have in turn some demands for their autonomy within Syria and call for the right to use their language; they have founded the Kurdish National Council which consists of eleven parties. The Kurds also are concerned about the Islamists, they are Sunnis who are closer to secular orientation. At the same time, they fear that Turkey, which supports the Muslim Brotherhood, will actively participate in building the future Syrian regime.

Regarding the consequences of the fall of Assad's regime to foreign countries, undoubtedly the fall of the regime would cause large regional changes; therefore the revolution in Syria takes so long, and also because of negative attitudes of the abroad, mainly of Russia and China. Russia, China, Iran, and Hezbollah represent a group that supports the ruling regime. Iran and Hezbollah even directly participate in the armed struggle. The opposition is supported by some Arab countries, USA, European Union and Turkey. Through the development of the revolution the European Union has recognized the opposing National Coalition as the representative of the Syrian people. Currently, this coalition is called the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces. Some European countries have already accepted new ambassadors from Syria from the opposition. Russia had many opportunities to address the situation in Syria, and thus it could maintain its military and economic interests in that country. But the mistakes Russia made by this attitude can lead to the loss of the Russian position in Syria. Syria represents to Russia a "gateway" to the Middle East and the Mediterranean region with the Russian strategic naval base located there. Iran and Hezbollah after the fall of the Assad's regime will lose an ally in the Middle East.

After the end of the Syrian crisis several important issues of international impact will have to be resolved: the issue of the occupied Golan Heights (issues related to peace relations with Israel), the position and influence of radical Islamist movements, spread of chaos and revolts to the neighbouring countries (Lebanon, Iraq, Syrian- Turkish border), building of new infrastructure and economy of Syria, which was destroyed in the bombing, and not least the question of the reorganization of the structure of the Syrian army [col. of authors 2011].

The revolutionary conflict in Syria has become the core of blind ideological contradictions in comparison with the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt where from the beginning of the revolts different attitudes and opinions between the various parties involved were clear-cut. After four years of the revolution in Syria differences in opinions are even greater. The first level of the "Syrian problem" is concerned with the question "either with the regime or against it." Vagueness and chaos around the development of the revolution rose after the participants of this revolution were equipped with weapons and the media began to spread a view that fundamentalist forces dominate over the people's revolution. The idea of "peace" during the revolution was based on the revolutionary experience in Tunisia and Egypt. Fear came about after the success of the Islamists in the elections in Tunisia and Egypt and the moment when the "jihadists" entered the regional political scene.

Several questions arise here; as if that what is happening is really a revolution if the regime is really against "imperialism" as it is promoted by its media, and whether the Islamists dominate revolutionary events. It must first be pointed out that the Syrian youth who supported the revolution in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Bahrain, long suffered from social marginalization and deep social alienation. That led to their involvement in street demonstrations in order to "create" a revolution that will bring freedom and opportunity to freely express their opinions and desires. For long they have been able to express their critical opinions only "virtually" through satellite television Al-Jazeera [TABÁČKOVÁ 2008]. Social groups that participated in this revolution, wanted to set out clear requirements due to the unfavourable economic situation of the last decade. These young people were born during the totalitarian regime; the political and economic situation in the country did not provide them with work and freedom of expression in public [KÚŠ 2012]. Economic reforms implemented over the last decade have caused the masses of people falling in poor living conditions, as proved by official documents and numeric indicators. Such a situation became an ideal precondition of the revolution. Similar pre-revolutionary conditions were also in Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya [SAAD 2012]. Even in these countries the wealth is concentrated in the hands of just a "chosen" minority, and on the other hand, most of the population lives below the poverty line with a minimum of job opportunities and the growing number of the unemployed.

Economic reforms that took place under the reign of Bashar Al-Assad, gradually contributed to a sharp deterioration of the economic situation, and thus the standard of living largely of the middle-class, as well as the workers and peasants. Monopoly groups "supervising" over the country's wealth had interest contacts with the Western world, since the capital was exported from the country to the western market. It was only a matter of time when the people would protest because such domestic political situation was not acceptable anymore.

The ruling circles were aware of the power of the negative impact of the unfavourable social and economic situation and the concerns about the impact of the revolutionary events that took place in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen and Libya, on the Syrian political environment were growing [GHALJÜN 2014b]. Therefore, the Syrian government used the strategy of a "military solution" and used maximum violence to prevent the people from participating in the revolution. The Asad's regime understood that every popular movement eventually results in major armed street conflicts. Although during the first six months the people showed their dissatisfaction in relatively peaceful demonstrations (as acknowledged also by President Bashar Al-Assad and the Vice President), finally they were forced to use also weapons. This was provoked by the increase in violence by the government army that wanted to dominate the cities at the cost of killing the civilians. A specific feature of the Syrian revolution is the fact that several forces are "fighting" for the control of the revolution which is considered to be the people's revolution in which the influence of the Islamists is very strong. Struggle for hegemony also takes place within political circles, ruling security forces and clientelist groups that caused the general poverty in the country. There is no doubt that the strength of the Islamists has been increasing but the revolution is still popular despite the contradictory claims of the media.

The current international situation requires a new analysis. The situation that occurred in the region due to the Second World War, and especially due to the fall of socialism and the end of the Cold War, is a thing of the past [ZÍN 1971]. The current international situation can be characterized generally as a conflict of interest of the world powers. These conditions work for the Syrian ruling circles and against the revolution, as some Western powers have an interest in promoting the Asad's regime while others support the continuation of the conflict to weaken Syria up to the total collapse of the country.

After four years of the revolution some evidence has come up confirming that the internal development of the country has led to the revolutionary reactions against the politics of the ruling class that failed to ensure the economic prosperity of the population and its socio-cultural development, and thus a better standard of living.

Russia emerges as an important and so far successful "player" in the Syrian crisis, no matter how the military conflict in Syria will end. Adjective 'successful' is relevant because international diplomatic circles seek to eliminate Russia's support for the political regime of Bashar Al-Assad. Russia is using all political and military means to support the Syrian regime, because in foreign policy Syria represents an important partner to Moscow. Russia cannot afford to repeat the "Libyan scenario" which was a big disappointment for Moscow. Such disappointment is the UN Security Council Resolution (March 2011), which legitimized the NATO military intervention in the Libyan crisis and ended in the fall of Muammar Gaddafi, consequently causing huge economic losses to Russia. Libya was one of the main importers of the Russian weapons to the Middle East. The Russian-Libyan interests are reflected in the agreement of Russia with Libya from 2008, when they cancelled debts of the former Soviet Union against Libya. Under this agreement Russia gained a public order worth up to \$ 4.5 billion for Russian companies [BALKALÍZ 2011].

The lesson learnt from the "Libyan scenario" was one of the main reasons why Russia could not repeat the same mistake in the Syrian crisis. Therefore it used the veto and three times rejected a draft of the Resolution condemning the Asad's regime, which would help to create a space for an international military intervention to overthrow the Syrian regime in a similar way as in Libya. Russia had to prevent the loss of further regional ally in the Middle East, which would mean another direct blow to Russia's efforts in the last decade to secure a strategic foothold in the Middle East area. Syria represents an imaginary communication bridge linking Russia with an important Mediterranean region. Moreover, Syria gives Russia a military naval base in the port of Tartus, which is the only Russian base outside the former Soviet Union. Likewise, Syria is the main importer of Russian weapons. Syria is in second place in the list of countries in the Middle East (after Algeria) in terms of arms trades with Russia in 2011 [Based on data published by the satellite stations Al-Džazíra and Al-Arabíja].

The fall of the Syrian regime is still unacceptable for Russia, because it is more than likely to open political space for various radical forces. This raises understandable concerns in Moscow, which seeks to address the conflict between the regime and the opposition through dialogue and it accuses the opposition of blocking the initiative of seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict. The fall of the Assad's regime would also mean that Russia would be left with solely Iran as the

only strategic partner in the Middle East. Russia supports Iran's nuclear program, but only in the context of peaceful use, since it will not tolerate in any case the presence of nuclear weapons near its southern border. This means that the relationship between Iran and Russia is not on the "alliance" level but it is a relationship of "interests" forced by the current need to face the common threats, such as the existence of Patriot missiles at the Turkish territory. Moscow and Tehran are convinced that they are targeted directly to their country. Russia insists on solving the Syrian political crisis in Geneva and it signed an agreement with the USA on solving the crisis through political dialogue between the Syrian regime and the opposition.

Syria is a very important ally to Iran in the Middle East in geopolitical terms. Iran needs to maintain its influence in the region and Syria serves as a bridge between Iran and its main ally Hezbollah in Lebanon. Thus there was created an imaginary semi-circle of allies - Iran, Iraq, Syria and Hezbollah. Iran has invested billions of dollars in Syrian infrastructure, economy, education and other sectors. Therefore it supports the Assad's regime not only politically, but also religiously. The fall of the Syrian regime would mean weakening and later removal of the Iranian influence in the region. Here arises the question of whether Iran does not abuse the Syrian crisis to gain certain advantages for the development of its nuclear program.

Qatar played a significant role in the Arab Spring in Libya, Tunisia, Yemen and Syria. It was the first Arab country which supported the Syrian opposition forces within the Arab League, to be recognized and to represent Syria at the 24th summit of Arab States in Doha in March 2013 instead of the Assad's political regime. Qatar became the first country that left the building of the Syrian embassy to the opposition coalition and continues to support this coalition.

Saudi Arabia supports the moderate Muslim groups united in the Islamic Front, supported also by the West; since this coalition has a specific vision of resolving the crisis in Syria.

Turkey as the Middle Eastern country has played and continues to play an important role in the Syrian crisis. Not only in terms of status of the next-door-neighbour, but particularly in terms of confessional structure of the population of both countries. Most of the Syrian and Turkish population is Sunni. Turkey has ambitions to be in a permanent position of an influential player in the Middle East. Syrian opposition forces are dependent on Turkish support- political and material. Turkey is the largest centre of Syrian refugees.

Iraq as a part of a political semicircle (Iran, Iraq, Syria and Hezbollah) influenced by Iran supports the Syrian regime financially, politically and militarily as a bridge between Iran and Syria because Iran is using air and land space to support the Syrian regime with concern that the consequences of the fall of Assad will spread to Iraq, where most of the population is close to the confessional minority government in Syria.

The political stance of Jordan towards the Syrian crisis is vague as it is concerned that the Syrian tribes that rose up in the border region have their relatives on the Jordanian side. Another concern is that if the Syrian regime falls and the Muslim Brotherhood comes to power, its position in Jordan will also be strengthened. It may jeopardize the existence of the Jordanian regime. Therefore, Jordanian politics supports granting asylum to Syrian officers leaving the Assad's

army and also provides asylum to Syrian refugees. On the other hand, Jordan takes a neutral stance against the Syrian regime and is “waiting outside”, so as to find out which direction the situation will take because Jordan is a poor country and needs financial support from the West and the Gulf countries. This aspect determines the future position of the Kingdom of Jordan.

Conclusion

The failure of the Geneva negotiations led to the creation of an Islamic state (formerly the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), which controls a large area in the northern Syria and western Iraq. It expelled minorities from the occupied territories and destroyed many valuable historical monuments. The politics of these extremists threatens not only the Arab but also the Western countries. Many fighters of the Islamic State came from the West, and after their return home they could jeopardize the national security. Therefore, the fight against the Islamic state necessarily requires the cooperation of international and regional forces [GHALJŪN 2014a].

Given the current situation in the Middle East region it is expected that after the fall of the Assad's regime a widespread chaos occurs in the country, which is likely to spread to the neighbouring countries [SAJJED 2014].

All Syrian forces are aware of the loss and destruction of the country as well as the victims of the struggle for the success of the revolution. For all of them the establishment of a democratic regime is an important historical moment, which would save the country from a split. It will be necessary to create a national transitional government that would prepare parliamentary elections and also the council representatives of all political forces, which would prepare a new constitution. The Sunni majority should provide all minorities with a new political system ensuring their rights on the basis of loyalty to the common state.

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OPINIONS AND ESSAYS

Ukraine – Non-lost Illusion

Tatiana Vorozheikina

Moscow School of Civic Education, the Russian Federation

Abstract

This text represents a preliminary attempt to understand recent events in Ukraine from the viewpoint of the central problem of modern society - its relationship with the state. The meaning of the Ukrainian revolution, as it was perceived by many of its participants and observers, was not only a protest of the desperate population (or significant part of it) against the authoritarian corrupt regime, but also an obvious striving of society for establishing new relationships with the government. Civil society in Ukraine right before our eyes made enormous thrust. It attempted to move from the position of the subjects of an overwhelming state, which arbitrarily controlled the country's economy and disposed people's fate, to relations between fully-fledged citizens and authority, which would be accountable to them.

Key words: *Ukraine, Maidan, political transformation, civil society*

Introduction

The events of late 2013 - 2014 in Ukraine and around it are, without any exaggeration, the central problem of world development in the beginning of XXI century. Not only destiny and integrity of the Ukrainian state will depend on a particular outcome of the current crisis, but also the ability of Europe and the West in general to defend the values, which they proclaimed and protected after World War II, as well as the trust to these values over the world. Also, the fate of the Russian society's modernization will crucially depend on the outcome of the Ukrainian crisis: will it maintain those still weak and fragmented tendencies to self-organization and separation from the state, which have developed during the last two decades or will the revival of imperial policies and the consolidation of the population around chauvinistic autocratic power destroy these trends once again? The meaning of the Ukrainian revolution, as it was perceived by many of its participants and observers, was not only a protest of the desperate population (or significant part of it). At the end of January 2014 approximately half of the population in Ukraine supported the Maidan, the same amount perceived it negatively. 70% of respondents supported the Maidan in the North-West of the country and 25% opposed, in the South-East vice versa - 21% of respondents supported the Maidan and 73% opposed. (Vladimir Paniotto. Maidan: a view from the South-East <http://www.capital.ua/ru/publication/13648-maydan-vzglyad-s-yugo-vostoka>) From the very beginning of the confrontation in Kiev, the conscious

aim of the protesters was a radical change in the political system, the formation of transparent and permeable state institutions and the rules of the game, which would be the same for everyone. According to Yulia Mostovaja, the Maidan was an unprecedented experience in the country's history of self-organization: people who did not know each other, spoke different languages, had different political beliefs, went into the streets in order to change the nature of the relationships between people and the state. Political, linguistic, religious and other distinctions did not become an obstacle to collective civil action. The protection of the citizen's dignity and belief in democracy (as the means to defend this dignity) were the main human dominant of Euromaidan [Julia Mostovaya, the chief editor of "Zerkalo Nedeli" presentation at the Moscow Carnegie Center 02/17/14].

The Maidan of November 2013 - February 2014 in Kiev in its civil, democratic content was an important part of a global phenomenon. Its essence was self-organization of the society that confronted the political system, which was not capable to express the interests of this society. In 2011-2014 protests of this type, though with varying degree of intensity, spread from Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and Caracas to Madrid, Tunis, Cairo, Sofia, Istanbul, Moscow and Bangkok. All these protest movements were united by acute dissatisfaction with the institutions, which did not allow people to achieve their goals through legitimate political channels. This affected authoritarian (in Venezuela, Ukraine, Russia and Arab countries) as well as democratic (Brazil and Spain) political regimes. In most cases, a protest against the corruption that permeated the state institutions and the ruling groups became a crucial factor, which united those who went out into the streets. This protest combined quite different demands - from social justice and equality to democracy and fair elections. Such movements could not be adequately described within the traditional "left-right" framework. Tens and even hundreds of thousands people went out onto the street because they were driven primarily by acute sense of rejection of the political system in which they did not have a real say. The impermeability of politics for a person, his absence in political system everywhere and rather unexpectedly gave rise to mass presence of people on the streets. These people demanded that they were recognized real actors and protagonists of politics and their goals and interests were considered to be socially significant.

Nevertheless the Maidan in Kiev was a unique phenomenon inside these, global trends. Firstly, the majority of these movements, except for Tunisia and Egypt, were unable to reach their goals. According to Venezuelan journalist Moises Naim: "there is a huge disparity between the enormous political energy of these demonstrations and their extremely insignificant practical results" [Moisés Naím. Muchas protestas, pocos cambios. // "El país", 03/29/14]. The result was evident in Ukraine. The protesters overthrew the authoritarian regime and changed political authority in the country. Secondly, Maidan in Kiev was the most long-term and probably most mass of these movements: during the three months it successfully resisted the pressure and violence by the authorities. Maidan involved from five hundred thousand to a million people in its highest moments. Thirdly, in Kyiv people demonstrated exceptional tenacity and fortitude, mass readiness to go to the end and even die for their aims. This fact eventually determined the outcome of the confrontation with the regime of President Viktor Yanukovich.

Why did this happen? What were the specifics of the Ukrainian situation, which allowed the Ukrainian revolution to gain a victory, at least in its first stage and to overthrow the old regime?

Analysis

Obviously, the crisis of post-Soviet development model (a combination of electoral authoritarianism with actual privatization of the state by ruling and dominant groups, unlimited corruption, degradation of state and public institutions and increasing police rule as an instrument of government's influence on society) gained the most extreme forms in Ukraine. Ukrainian researcher Yaroslav Pilinsky claims: "After the collapse of the USSR, state institutions, which were created during the Soviet period, gradually began to degrade. Total commercialization was everywhere. During the presidency of Leonid Kuchma, when the first oligarchs began to emerge in the country, it became clear that everything could be sold - even the highest government posts and law enforcement positions. In fact, the Ukrainian State lost (or rather sold) a monopoly on violence voluntarily. Officials of the highest echelon delegated or sold part of this monopoly to the lower levels- district courts, police departments, district prosecutor's offices, Tax and Customs offices, etc. After prosecutors, courts and police turned into commercial structures, and the corresponding positions became a source of enrichment, the law ceased to protect security, freedom, property and citizen's lives, and was therefore transformed into its contrary. Thus anyone who had more money got the opportunity to encroach on the liberty, property, or even citizen's life unpunished in Ukraine" [Jaroslav Pilinsky. Maidan will not dissolve.

(<http://grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/224451.html>)].

Evidently, this pattern of universal corruption and lawlessness was not too different from Russia both in the 1990s and in the 2000s. The most important and fundamental difference from Russia, however, was the pluralism of ruling and dominant groups that survived in Ukraine during the years of independence. Executive authority was unable to control Ukrainian elites (both political and economic) – neither during the presidency of Kuchma, nor Yushchenko, nor Yanukovych. Despite all the weakness of the political system, Ukrainian elections in general carried out its important "Schumpeterian" function –namely of a mechanism of impersonal and public reconciliation of interests among the ruling and dominant groups, and competitive determination of their comparative influence in society. Therefore, the presidential elections in Ukraine became an instrument of changing, altering different political and oligarchic groups in power that had never been done in Russia. Here the continuity of government was provided in a much more rude way since 1999 – by appointing a successor by the incumbent president. Coordination of the interests of the ruling groups was provided by their vertical subordination.

The attempt of president Kuchma in 2004 to organize the power's transfer according to the Russian scenario of plebiscitary approval of designated successor turned into political crisis and the "Orange Revolution." The Maidan in 2004 was organized by supporters of Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko; changing of elites in power, in general, had seemed as a sufficient result to protest participants.

However, this did not lead to any significant reforms in 2005-2009, namely, the establishment of effective state institutions, providing legal protection for citizens and businesses [Although, according to Jaroslav Pilinsky: "pressure on businesses decreased slightly, and the "issue price" ceased to be the price of life". Maidan will not dissolve. (<http://grani.ru/blogs/free/entries/224451.html>)]. In contrast, a bitter struggle between the two main figures of the regime and the endless corruption scandals actually blocked the implementation of political and institutional reforms. The authorities tried to compensate the absence of reforms by symbolic actions; the main goal of Yushchenko was to establish the historical memory of the Hunger (Holodomor) of 1932-1933 [For more detail, see Georgy Kasyanov. Holodomor and nation building / / Pro et Contra, № 3-4 (46), May - August 2009, p.24 - 42]. The hopes of those who supported the "orange" coalition in 2004 did not come true. Consequently, supporters of democratic reforms in Ukraine were disappointed and disoriented. As a result, Yanukovych won, however with minimal advantage, the presidential election in 2010.

Ukrainian researchers claimed that corruption became unlimited and overwhelming during the Yanukovych presidency. Buying positions and parliamentary seats developed into a common practice, which provided the lucrative government contracts to beneficiaries. Moreover, the president and his family in infringement of all the unspoken inter-elite's rules and agreements began to spread rapidly its control over the most profitable areas of economic activity, as well as law enforcement authorities, the tax office, the judiciary system. The eldest son of the president became one of the five richest people in Ukraine in a year.

In the context of economic stagnation, low living standards and poverty extruded abroad tens of thousands of Ukrainian women and men in search of work, often very hard. [Ukraine is one of the poorest countries in Europe. GDP per capita by purchasing power parity was \$ 7180 in 2012 in Ukraine. In the poorest countries of the EU this index is more than two times higher than the level of Ukrainian. It was \$ 17,650 in Romania and \$ 15,450 in Bulgaria. Ukraine lagged behind the level of per capita GDP even from Serbia (\$ 11,430) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (\$ 9650). Ukraine is in advance only of Moldova (\$ 3630). For comparison - in Russia GDP per capita in purchasing power parity was \$ 22,800. (2014 World Development Indicators. World Bank, 2014 <http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1>)]. Such a barefaced enrichment of Yanukovych's clan from the state budget inevitably engendered furious and desperate discontent.

It was spreading among entrepreneurs, especially small and medium-sized, and ordinary citizens as well. According to the accurate expression of Nikolay Volinko (the head of the Independent Miners' Union of Donbas): "Maidan was occupied by taxpayers, who did not want to be robbed further" [http://echo.msk.ru/azar_i/1304646-echo/]. Not by chance entrepreneurs were one of the largest professional groups in the Maidan - in early February, nearly 17 percent of protesters (according to the survey conducted by "Democratic Initiatives by Ilka Kucheriv" and the Kiev International Institute of Sociology) [Maidan in December and Maidan in February: What has changed? "Kiev International Institute of Sociology. 02/06/2014

(<http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=reports&id=226&page=1&y=2014&m=2>)).

In general, the level of trust in government, its personalities and institutions, was extremely low in early 2014: Parliament was mistrusted by 81 per cent of population, government - 75 per cent, the police – 77per cent , courts – 80 per cent, Yanukovych – 66 per cent [Nevertheless the level of mistrust to Yanukovych was essentially different in four regions of Ukraine. 86 per cent in the West did not trust him, 79 per cent in the Center, 57 per cent in the South and 42per cent in the east. The East was the only region where the proportion of those who trusted Yanukovych (56per cent) exceeded the proportion who did not. - Vladimir Paniotto. "Authorities have the opportunity to stop the offensive and continue negotiations". Interview with "Economic News", 02/20/14 (<http://politika.eizvestia.com/full/835-vladimir-paniotto-vlast-i-sejchas-imeet-vozmozhnost-prekratit-nastuplenie-i-prodolzhit-peregovory>)).

A catalytic role that transformed the civil discontent into active political protest was played by the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union, –to be precise, by the Ukrainian authorities' maneuvers around its signing, which was expected on the 28-29th of November 2013 at the summit of the "Eastern Partnership" in Vilnius. Vladimir Paniotto, the head of the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, claimed that active promotion of the European Union started since September 2013. The leaders of the ruling Party of Regions, who were always opponents to the pro-European opposition, suddenly began to support it in the issue of Ukraine's integration into Europe. Society believed that the agreement would be signed after an active propaganda campaign of preparing this event (adoption of necessary legislation in Parliament) [Vladimir Paniotto. Ukraine. Euromaidan. / / Bulletin of public opinion. Data. Analysis. Discussion. № 3-4 (116), July-December 2013. p.17]. As a result, the proportion of those who supported Ukraine's joining the EU was 57 per cent and 43 per cent opposed it in September 2013. By November 2013, after the Russian authorities and the media under their control, held a powerful campaign of economic and political pressure on Ukraine, in order to force it to abandon the European choice, the percentage of respondents "in favor" of Ukraine's joining the EU declined to 54 per cent, of those "against" grew to 46 per cent [At the same time, in the Western and Central regions there were significantly more supporters of joining the EU in November 2013 than the supporters of joining the Customs Union (86 per cent vs. 14 per cent and 61 per cent vs. 39 per cent). In the Southern and Eastern regions there were much more supporters of joining the Customs Union than the supporters of EU membership - 64 per cent vs. 36 per cent and 81 per cent vs. 19 Per cent. Vladimir Paniotto. Ukraine. Euromaidan. / / Bulletin of public opinion. Data. Analysis. Discussion. № 3-4 (116), July-December 2013 p. 21]. According to Paniotto: "In Ukraine nearly a third of the population firmly supports the EU, the same amount staunchly supports a union with Russia, the opinion of the rest is situational. It is easily manipulated by the authority because of the high level of media's monopolization [Only 9 per cent of the population would like to form one state with Russia. Vladimir Paniotto. Ukraine. Euromaidan. / / Bulletin of public opinion. Data. Analysis. Discussion. № 3-4 (116), July-December 2013 p.21].

The very important symbolic meaning of "Europe" is obvious for self-identification and unity of that part of Ukrainian society, which opposed the growing

authoritarianism and corruption. The European choice and convergence with the EU appeared for these people as a way of gradual formation of transparent political and economic institutions in Ukraine, which would be controlled by the public, not oligarchic clans. At the same time, the Association Agreement with the EU and, in particular, the simplification of visa regime for its citizens gave an opportunity to improve economic situation for residents of the Central and Western Regions (Europe has become the main direction of labour migration from these regions). In contrast, the population of the industrial regions of the Southern and especially Eastern Ukraine perceived a threat of reducing economic relations with Russia in the statements of Russian officials. This fact meant inevitable closures of industries, unemployment and loss of livelihood in this poor and subsidized areas. Discussion about the association with the EU once more exacerbated the traditional Ukrainian split between the Centre and the West on the one hand, and South East – on the other. At the same time it became increasingly evident that negotiating with Russia and the EU about the Association Agreement represented additional opportunities for Yanukovych and his team to press on both sides. On the 21st of November, 2013 Prime Minister of Ukraine Mykola Azarov announced that Ukraine suspended the preparations to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. This decision served as a trigger for the start of the mass protest movement, which led to the overthrow of Yanukovych regime three months later. This movement - Euromaidan in Kiev- went through several stages, which differed in the nature of requirements, social composition of participants and methods of struggle. It allows us to outline three different, though related types of protest.

Young people and students were the first to come out on Independence Square in Kiev. Later tens of thousands of people, who supported European integration, joined them. This was a populous Maidan-rally. Its participants started to put up tents (following the example of 2004) in late November. On the 30th of November a few hundred fighters of special police division "Berkut" violently dispersed the rally. They not only forced out the protesters from the square, but also kicked and beat them with batons [One of the participants said at the Congress "Ukraine-Russia: dialogue": "We were not just beaten, we were being killed". 10 people were still missing by the end of April]. Reprisals against the students were shown on TV channels and spread on the Internet. It caused mass indignation. A huge demonstration was held next day in Kiev after the call of the opposition parties' leaders - Arseniy Yatsenyuk ("Bat'kivshina"), Vitali Klitschko ("Udar"), Oleg Tyagnibok ("Svoboda"). Nearly 500 thousand people came out on Maidan. They were demanding to stop the repression, punish guilty in beatings and release the arrested. During the rally, protesters occupied the building of the Kiev city administration and the House of Trade Unions.

In addition, a group of young men in masks (according to one version, the activists of "Svoboda" and "Right Sector", to the other – agents provocateurs of the regime"), armed with sticks, chains and gas sprays, attacked the guards of the presidential administration. This fact gave a pretext for "Berkut" to start beating unarmed protesters once again. As a result, the protest movement was further radicalized. According to various evaluations, between 700 thousand and a million people came out on Maidan and the adjacent streets the following Sunday of December 8th, 2013. They were demanding the resignation of the cabinet and the President. By mid-

December the Maidan had acquired the character of a stationary protesters' camp. When the situation worsened it turned into "Veche" (a kind of medieval town assembly) with thousands people.

Originally, the civil mobilization on Maidan was mainly spontaneous. According to a sociological survey, which was conducted on December 7-8 by the Fund "Democratic Initiatives by Ilka Kucheriv" and the Kiev International Institute of Sociology, more than 90 per cent were not members of any political party or association [Kiev International Institute of Sociology. Maidan-December and Maidan-February: What has changed?

(<http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=reports&id=226&page=2>)).

Selforganization did not only prevail over the leadership of the parliamentary parties, but also it was a position of principal for many social associations, which strove to highlight its independence from the leaders, parties and parliamentary opposition. Initial mistrust to politicians from the significant part of protesters was due to the obvious reluctance to repeat the experience of 2004, when mass demonstrations were used by the opposition as a route to government, but it did not lead to economic and political reforms. At the same time neither in this period, nor later new, sustainable social self-organization structures raise on Maidan. There were no organizations similar to Polish "Solidarity" or the Workers' Party in Brazil, which could effectively transform the anti-authoritarian social protest into the political one. However, the public need for such structures was very strong in Ukraine.

From the beginning of December the presence of the party opposition was strengthened on the Maidan: according to a survey, which was conducted by Kiev sociologists on 20th of December, more than 15 per cent of protesters belonged to political parties. The proportion of those, who belonged to social organizations, increased (up to 9 per cent) and to social movements (up to 6 per cent), whereas the proportion of those, who were not members of any association, decreased to 70 per cent [Kiev International Institute of Sociology. Maidan-December and Maidan-February: What has changed?

(<http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=reports&id=226&page=2>). On December 1st the Headquarters of the national resistance was created and integrated by representatives of the three opposition parties. However, this structure did not become a single center, coordinating protest movement in the country. According to a historian and columnist Vladimir Vyatrovich, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory: "[The headquarters] was not able to represent the real structure of the protest, which went far beyond the opposition parties from the very beginning. The Council of Ukrainian Union "Maidan" did not become such center either, although it included representatives of civil society along with party members. [Vladimir Vyatrovich. The long road to freedom./ "Zerkalo Nedeli", № 5, 14th-21 of February 2014.([Http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/dlinnaya-doroga-k-svobode-_.html](http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/dlinnaya-doroga-k-svobode-_.html))]. In other words, since the first month of confrontation in Ukraine, it became obvious that the level of the protest wave did not correspond to the ability of the opposition (both political and civil) to create effective structures - a prototype of a new democratic authority. ["We can see the evidence (...) of the global trend in Ukraine: public protest is ahead of opposition's consolidation. Moreover, outburst of public unrest catches the opposition by surprise as it happened in different

countries - from Turkey to Brazil, from Bulgaria to Thailand"/ / Lilia Shevtsova. Ukraine: drama continues. (<http://ej.ru/?a=note&id=24432>).

Nonpartisan, spontaneous nature of protest in Ukraine was directly connected with unprecedented latitude of social and geographical representation of different segments of the Ukrainian population on the Maidan. According to Anton Oleinik: "For the first time we can observe an instance of grassroots mobilization of such an impressive scale in the post-Soviet space. Participants of the Maidan belonged not only to the "new creative class" - the main hope of the Russian liberals. They were mixed with small entrepreneurs, intellectuals (teachers, engineers), workers and villagers on Maidan of 2013-2014. The Maidan was a true sociological sample of Ukrainian society, not a narrow interlayer of urban "superfluous people". [Anton Oleinik. Kiev "sich" changed the regime. Will it change the model of authority? / / Vedomosti, 02/24/14]. The majority of the people, who came out on Maidan, had higher education: 63 per cent on Maidan-rally and 49 per cent - on Maidan-camp. The professional composition of the Maidan was the following: specialists were 40 per cent on Maidan-rally and 22 per cent on Maidan-camp, students - 13 and 10 per cent, workers - 7 and 14 per cent, entrepreneurs - 9 and 12 per cent, pensioners 9 and 11 per cent, correspondingly. Simultaneously with the transformation of urban and intellectual protest into the nationwide movement, the socio-geographical representation was expanded: the proportion of Kiev residents decreased from 50 per cent on Maidan-rally to 19 per cent on Maidan-camp. Correspondingly, the percentage of visitors increased from 50 to 81 per cent. 32 per cent of the latter came from the regional centers, 23 per cent - from big cities (100 thousand inhabitants and more), 23 per cent- from small towns (less than 100 inhabitants), 22 per cent- from the village. 42 per cent of Maidan-camp was represented by people from Western, 34 per cent - from Central and 23 per cent from Eastern and Southern Ukraine [Kiev International Institute of Sociology. Maidan-December and Maidan-February: What has changed? (<http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=reports&id=226&page=2>)].

Despite the growing presence of various self-defense groups on the Maidan, both radical right and civic [The first group included detachments of the Party "Svoboda", "Right Sector", "Common cause" ("Spilna sprava"), the second – the so-called "public sector" of the Maidan, "Resistance" ("Vidsich"), which united the supporters of non-violent resistance], protest actions had predominantly non-violent character till the 19th of January 2014. This circumstance allowed the protesters to build up moral and political superiority over the authorities and police forces, which were opposing them. According to Vladimir Vyatrovich: "The greatest achievement of the protest until 19th January was the status of the protagonist of political process gained by the Maidan. The opposition, the authority, even distant and often indifferent world had to reckon with this protagonist. Anyone of them could hardly assume that quite an insignificant public outrage in late November can seriously change their agenda and plans for the future. Henceforth none of the three players could be sure that they could "solve" all the problems quietly and the people would swallow the results of the backstage activities. The whole of Ukraine had changed, it showed the models of self-organization, self-sacrifice and solidarity. These changes had touched people, who had gone through the Maidan (...), and those, who only observed it, and even those, who did not support it. All of them realized that neither the most pretentious,

nor the most expensive simulation of activity could be compared with the movement of idealistically motivated people" [Vladimir Vyatrovich. The long road to freedom. / "Zerkalo Nedeli", № 5, 14th-21 of February 2014. (http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/dlinnaya-doroga-k-svobode-_.html)].

Surrounded by barricades, now contracting under the pressure by "Berkut", now spreading back over adjacent streets the Maidan successfully resisted the efforts of the regime to disperse it or to confront it with a pro-government movement ("Antimaidan" in Mariinsky Park). Protesters demonstrated their readiness to resist police violence and insist on their requirements. By mid-January the regime's hopes that people would eventually get tired and the situation would be resolved by itself were buried. Under these conditions authorities made a step, which would become fatal to the regime's fate: On 16th January, 2014 the Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) adopted a set of laws that criminalized non-violent methods of resistance to authorities. [The "police laws" of the 16th of January implemented criminal liability for the production, storage and dissemination of "extremist" materials; restored criminal liability for "slander", which, in fact, banned any information in the media about activities of the law enforcement agencies; simplified the procedures to cancel parliamentary immunity as a way to dismiss opposition deputies; introduced compulsory registration as "foreign agents" for public organizations, which received foreign funding; tightened the rules for mass rallies, prohibited wearing of masks and helmets, implemented criminal liability for mass violations of public order; toughened responsibility for the calls to "bring down political system." (See Sergei Rachmanin. Fear has large rights. / / "Zerkalo Nedeli", № 1, 01/17/14) (http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/u-straha-prava-veliki-_.html)]. These laws were adopted in the rush. Deputies voted for them by a show of hands without having familiarized. Thus, authorities tried to intimidate those who obstinately resisted brutal pressure for nearly two months. This clumsy attempt caused an outburst of indignation among the protesters and motivated the most active part of them to turn to violent actions.

Several hundred of thousands of people gathered during the national rally (veche) in Kiev on 19th January, 2014. The opposition representatives claimed that the government planned to establish an authoritarian dictatorship in Ukraine and required to convene the People's Rada instead of discredited Verkhovna Rada, Yanukovych's resignation and early presidential elections. After the end of the rally, several hundred of protesters armed with sticks, stones and Molotov cocktails stormed the guard of the government quarter located on the Grushevskogo Street. During the increasingly fierce clashes police was using water cannons and stun grenades (flash grenades), protesters - stones and firebombs. There were dozens of injured on the both sides. On the 22nd of January it became known that three opposition members were shot dead. In addition, Yuri Verbitsky from Lviv was found dead with signs of beatings and torture in a forest. He was abducted by police from the hospital together with the survivor Igor Lutsenko on the eve of the incident. Since that time, kidnapping, especially of the wounded from hospitals was becoming a common practice of repressive structures [By the end of April 2014, the fate of 120 people who disappeared in Kiev from December 2013 to February 2014 was unknown]. At the same time there a video appeared in the Internet, which showed how the police had scoffed at a naked Maidan's activist. In this situation,

the radicalization of the Maidan became almost unavoidable. Clashes on the Grushevskogo and the Institutskaya streets, seizure of government buildings by protesters continued until the end of January, despite the negotiations that started between Klitschko, Yatsenyuk and Yanukovych and attempts of opposition leaders to reduce the intensity of the confrontation.

By the time when real war started on Grushevskogo the Maidan's appearance had changed considerably. Surrounded by barricades, in constant anticipation of an attack Maidan-camp turned into Maidan-sich [Kiev International Institute of Sociology. Maidan-December and Maidan-February: What has changed? (<http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=reports&id=226&page=2>)], modeled at the combat camp of Zaporizhya Cossacks. The appearance and to a certain extent the psychology of protesters had also changed: "... a typical representative was a middle-aged man in a helmet (military, bicycle, motorcycle) armed with a stick and a shield. There were people who could be called professional revolutionaries without any exaggeration - they passed the point of no return and realized that they faced with two perspectives only: a victory or a prison. It was these people that mainly generated determination" [Vladimir Vyatrovich. The long road to freedom./ "Zerkalo Nedeli", № 5, 14th-21 of February 2014.([Http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/dlinnaya-doroga-k-svobode-.html](http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/dlinnaya-doroga-k-svobode-.html))]. Correspondingly, the socio-demographic structure of Maidan's activists had changed: in early February the proportion of people with higher education on the Maidan-sich fell to 43 per cent comparing to 49 per cent on the Maidan-camp of mid-December. Nevertheless this percentage was still higher than the average in the country. The proportion of specialists with higher and secondary special education increased from 22 up to 27 per cent, there were more entrepreneurs (12 versus 17 per cent), the same amount of workers (15 per cent), but less students (10 versus 6 per cent) and pensioners (11 versus 7 per cent). Geographical composition of the Maidan had noticeably changed by early February: the proportion of Kiev residents dropped from 19 to 12 per cent, the percentage of visitors increased from 81 to 88 per cent. More than half of the visitors (55 per cent) were residents of Western Ukraine, 24 per cent came from Central Ukraine and 21per cent from the East and the South. Moreover, the proportion of small towns' (up to 100 thousand people) residents almost doubled from 23 to 42 per cent at the expense of those who had come from regional centers (their proportion decreased from 32 to 20 per cent) and big cities (from 23 to 17per cent. Thereby, the Maidan became more provincial, more "Western" and somewhat more organized - the proportion of those who belonged to the social movements increased up to 14 Per cent. However, 70 per cent, as before, did not belong to any party or public association. [Kiev International Institute of Sociology. Maidan-December and Maidan-February: What has changed? (<http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=reports&id=226&page=2>)].

At this time the organizational structure of Maidan was being crated: amorphous civil resistance was transformed into a military self-defense. According to Andrei Levus - Maidan's deputy commandant: "Self-defense it is rather a revolutionary army than a revolutionary militia. This is necessary because such system of authority can be counteracted in an orderly and organized way only. The time of flash-mobs and dances, which preceded the breaking up of Euromaidan had already passed. After the events on the Grushevskogo Street it is obvious that

discipline and coordination are the main requirements of the current situation [Andrei Levus. "We feel ourselves as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army of XXI Century" (4/12/14) (<http://4vlada.net/partii-lidery/my-chuvstvuem-sebya-ukrainskoi-povstancheskoi-armiei-khkh-veka-komandir-samooborony-ma>)]. Since the end of January 2014 from ten to twelve thousand fighters operated on the Maidan. They were organized in the "hundreds" (regiments) by ideological, geographical and even ethnic principles. The "hundreds" were self-governed. According to A. Levus: "During the existence of Self-Defense nobody was assigned - people were organizing themselves. They said: "Here is our senior and we want to be with you" [The commander of the Jewish "hundred" Nathan Khazin claimed at the Congress "Ukraine-Russia: Dialogue: "Even during the fiercest battles there was no centralized control: each commander knew what he should do. Andrei Levus. "We feel ourselves as the Ukrainian Insurgent Army of XXI Century" (4/12/14) (<http://4vlada.net/partii-lidery/my-chuvstvuem-sebya-ukrainskoi-povstancheskoi-armiei-khkh-veka-komandir-samooborony-ma>)].

The most and mainly notoriously known of the 40 "hundreds" acting on the Maidan was 23rd regiment of the "Right Sector" - an association of previously almost unknown radical nationalist organizations. Well-equipped fighters of the "Right Sector" were (or declared themselves) initiators and participants of the majority of forcible actions, including those that changed the course of events on the Maidan in January-February 2014. The leader of the "Right Sector" Dmitry Yarosh gave interviews willingly, Russian press included. He left no doubt that the main aim of his organization was "the State of the Ukrainian nation, which will observe the rights and freedoms of every citizen." Notably it was not about the political nation, which was meant by the leaders of the parliamentary opposition and civic movements. "The indigenous nation, the Ukrainians are the hosts, because we do not have another country, as well as Germans or the French do not have. However, we are not xenophobes. We want to ensure the conditions for national minorities, but only for those of them who respect our land"[Olga Musafirova. Ukraine now reminds a no-man's country. // Novaya Gazeta. 02/19/14]. The position of radical nationalists overtly and completely contradicted the European values defended by the protesters on the Euromaidan. "It is necessary to sign the Association with the EU. This will open new opportunities and establish a distance from Russia. But we are unconditionally against the full membership in the European Union. The bureaucratic monster from Brussels imposes too many negative things on nations: anti-Christian policy, leveling of national identities, destruction of traditional family, etc. [Olga Musafirova. Ukraine now reminds a no-man's country. // Novaya Gazeta. 02/19/14].

Despite the fact that the "Right Sector" was just one of 40 "hundreds" that operated on the Maidan, it was turned due to the efforts of the official Russian propaganda into a symbol or, more precisely, in a bogey of a "fascist-bandera" threat emanating from the Maidan. Meanwhile, many Ukrainian observers and researchers paid attention to the shadowy origins of the "Right Sector", openly provocative nature of its actions, obscure sources of quite a generous funding [For instance, refer to Joseph Zisels. Jews and Euromaidan. (<http://east-blog.de/allgemein-ru/2014/03>)]. According to various opinions in Ukraine, the real role of the "Right Sector" in confrontation with the Yanukovich regime was strongly and maliciously

exaggerated in order to distort true democratic content of the Ukrainian revolution [A participant testified that "the Maidan consisted of two parts clearly: some people came out in defense of the national idea "Ukraine is paramount" and others – in defense of universal values against the dictatorship under the slogan " Human rights are paramount". We used to go in two different columns - which one would be the loudest, liberals or nationalists".](Ilya Azar. A punitive operation or a provocation of the third party? [Http://echo.msk.ru/blog/azar_i/1314634-echo/](http://echo.msk.ru/blog/azar_i/1314634-echo/))). At the same time it is true that symbols of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, in particular, the slogan "Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!", which was previously used only by radical-nationalists lost this connotation and became a slogan of all the Maidan.

Thus, the radicalization of the Maidan gave rise to the self-defense forces, which became a main form of its military-political organization. Elements of civil self-organization (cuisine, scene, health posts) had secondary, auxiliary character. Taking into account that this course of events was natural and practically inevitable, it should be admitted that militarized structures, which were created, had very few in common with the new transparent social and political institutions originally advocated by the Euromaidan. Elements, germs of such institutions could appear only in the process of fighting against the authoritarian regime, accompanied by the process of civic self-organization. As we could see, the struggle has assumed completely different, much more traditional forms. In my opinion, the influence of the old, albeit opposite to Yanukovych's regime forces, in the crucial points and situations also contributed to this outcome. It concerned some professional politicians and deputies of the Parliament, who belonged to the Headquarters of the national resistance and would occupy key posts in the government after the overthrow of the regime. The most prominent figures of this kind included, firstly, Andrei Parubiy, the Maidan's commandant and the Head of Self-defense forces, the member of the Parliament initially from the bloc "Nasha Ukraina", and then, after 2012 –from the party "Bat'kivshina". After the victory of the revolution Parubiy became the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. [He resigned from this post in August 2014] Secondly, it was Alexander Turchinov, the Chief of the Headquarters of the National Resistance and coordinator of mass protests on the Maidan in December 2013, the former chairman of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Deputy Prime Minister in the government of Tymoshenko. Turchinov was named the Acting Ukrainian President after the overthrow of Yanukovych.

The real impact of some opposition politicians paradoxically contradicted almost universal and increasing rejection of political opposition leaders by the Maidan. The negotiations between A. Yatsenuk, V. Klitschko and Yanukovych at the most critical period of confrontation on the Grushevskogo Street on the 20th of January discredited the leaders of the opposition in the eyes of the protesters. The national veche rejected the agreement to release the arrested protesters upon condition of unblocking government district and the Grushevskogo Street. The majority of people, who gathered on the Maidan in early February (63 per cent), according to the opinion polls, opposed any negotiations with authorities; 68 per cent believed that the only requirement that could satisfy the Maidan was the resignation of Yanukovych and early presidential elections [Kiev International Institute of

Sociology. Maidan-December and Maidan-February: What has changed? (<http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=reports&id=226&page=2>)\]. On 25th January Yanukovich offered Yatsenyuk to head the government and Klitschko to become the Deputy Prime Minister on humanitarian affairs. To accept this offer would have meant a complete break with the Maidan, where 62 per cent of the protesters believed that: "A proposal of taking part in the government could not be accepted as long as Viktor Yanukovych is the President", and 22 per cent believed that "it could be accepted only in case of returning to the norms of the Constitution of 2004, which limited the presidential powers and strengthened the role of the Prime Minister and the government" [Kiev International Institute of Sociology. Maidan-December and Maidan-February: What has changed? (<http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat=reports&id=226&page=2>)\].

In other words, the opposition political leaders caused growing irritation and mistrust on the Maidan precisely at the time when political crisis in the country entered into the open phase. After having lost the support of influential oligarchic groups, including those who belonged to his "Party of Regions", Yanukovych was forced to make serious concessions at the negotiations, despite the fact that the opposition leaders refused to join the government and share responsibility with the regime. On 28th January, according to the agreement reached at the negotiations, the Parliament voted for the abolition of 9 out of 11 "dictatorial laws". Mykola Azarov, head of the Cabinet, resigned. He was one of the toughest regime figures bearing a symbolic responsibility for the refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. On 29th January the Parliament adopted the law granting amnesty to the participants of protest actions. The law would have taken effect if the protesters had left the seized administrative buildings. This deal was not even considered as partial victory by the Maidan: it could be satisfied only in case of Yanukovych's resignation and early presidential elections. By the end of January it became obvious that the protesters were ready to stand up to the end, that the efforts to disband the Maidan by force would face the resistance and lead to serious bloodshed.

Consequently, the influence of the Maidan, and in particular, of its militarized component became a decisive element in the key phase of the crisis in February 2014. The Maidan propped up and pushed the parliamentary opposition towards more radical action against the regime, which was weakening and losing support of its traditional allies. In early February, Klitschko and Yatsenyuk proposed the Parliament to restore the Constitution of 2004, which provided for a parliamentary-presidential form of government in Ukraine. On this condition Yatsenyuk would have agreed to head the Cabinet, which should have been formed exclusively by the opposition representatives. On 18th February the opposition was going to obtain from the Parliament a registration of a bill restoring the Constitution of 2004. This demand was supported by a peaceful march of thousands of protesters towards the parliament building. When the detachments of self-defense faced passages blocked with lorries, they began to throw stones and Molotov cocktails at the police, which responded with stun grenades and teargas.

From this point on the confrontation acquired irreversible character. The regime made the most serious effort to dislodge protesters from occupied positions by taking advantage of the new aggravation. During the night of 18th to 19th of

February, when the Security Service of Ukraine announced the beginning of an anti-terrorist operation, Maidan's space contracted to a minimum. The square was defended by a few hundred people hiding behind the barricades of burning tires. Having survived in terrible conditions - 25 people were killed that day, including several police officers - the protesters started a decisive offensive on 20th February. Police units and internal troops were ousted from the Maidan and the adjacent streets – Khreschatyk, Instytutska, Grushevskoho and Europe Square.

In these clashes firearms were used on both sides, nearly 70 people were killed and several hundred were wounded. Especially big losses were caused by snipers. They were shooting at both protesters and police. [Personalities and affiliation of these snipers are still unknown. Ukraine's new leadership announced that the shooting was carried out by soldiers of Special Forces "Berkut" by the order of the former head of the Security Service of Ukraine Yakymenko and ex-Minister of Internal Affairs Zaharchenko. They (together with the former President Yanukovich) claimed that they did not give such orders, and blamed the rebels, because the heaviest sniper's fire proceeded from a high-rise building of the hotel "Ukraine" occupied by detachments of self-defense at that moment. Clarification of this issue is very important. Firstly, those responsible for such a cold-blooded and deliberate massacre should be punished by all means. Secondly, the assessment of what had happened depends on this issue. Were these murders a desperate attempt of the collapsing regime to intimidate protesters or did some forces hope that after such bloodshed protesters would not stop till they overthrew the regime?].

Everybody was shocked by a bloodshed of such magnitude in a recently peaceful country, especially by the fact that doctors, who tried to help victims, were also reached by snipers. By midday of 20th February panic arose among the police and internal troops, they began to leave the occupied positions and even surrender under guarantees of protesters. In the evening, the parliament adopted a decree, which prohibited the use of any type of weapons and special equipment against citizens and stopped the antiterrorist operation. In a situation of military and especially moral victory gained by insurgent people, an agreement on resolving political crisis in Ukraine was signed between Yanukovich and opposition leaders 21st February. The agreement was mediated by the European Union and Russia."[Special Representative of the Russian President, Vladimir Lukin, refused to sign the agreement therefore making Russian official demands to observe it legally untenable].The agreement stipulated to return to the Constitution of 2004, to form a government of "national trust", to hold on early presidential elections till the end of 2014, to withdraw internal troops and special police forces from the center of Kiev and to disarm the opposition.

Klitschko was booed while informing tens of thousands of people, who gathered on the Maidan, about the terms of the agreement. He was not allowed to speak. Angry protesters shouted and pointed to the coffins of killed people, which were brought under the stage. At the highest point of this rally an unknown fighter climbed to the stage and demanded immediate resignation of Yanukovich. Otherwise, he threatened, the assault would begin at 10 am the next day [Vladimir Parasyuk, "a hundred commander that changed the course of history", was a rather typical representative of the protest movement. 26-year-old graduate of the Lviv University said in an interview with "Ukrainskaya Pravda": "I was a member of a students'

fraternity in Lviv, received military training in adequate camps of various organizations, which inculcated the Ukrainian spirit. They taught us hand-to-hand combat and shooting air guns. Moreover, we were taught to shoot firearms in shooting ranges with official permit. I was also a member of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, there was a combat unit. In the camps, I learned the truth about historical events in Ukraine, about the 1920s, about the Hunger (Holodomor) of 1932-1933 in Ukraine". At the same time he denied membership in any political organization, including the "Right Sector" ("Ukrainian Pravda", 02/24/14. <http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/2014/02/24/7016048/>)).

Despite the opposition's readiness to compromise, Maidan's reaction was decisive for the further course of events. On the night of the 22nd of February, Yanukovych escaped from Kiev and protesters took control of the Parliament, the Cabinet of Ministers, the presidential administration and other government buildings in Kiev easily. Regime collapsed, the people's revolution won. [Very important events of December 2013 - February 2014 that took place in other Ukrainian cities require separate review. They are beyond the scope of this article].

To what extent the results of this revolution coincided with the goals, which tens of thousands of people defended on the Maidan with unprecedented perseverance and sometimes at the cost of their own or other people's lives? This question might seem pointless or inappropriate in the moment when this article was written (mid-May 2014), when Ukraine became a victim of blatant aggression from Russia, which had occupied and annexed the Crimea and pursued a policy of destabilization in the Eastern and Southern Ukraine; when the very existence of Ukraine as a state was under threat.

Many people in Ukraine and not only in there believe that in emergency original Maidan's aims - the creation of transparent public institutions accountable to society - should be postponed until better times. The main goal now is urgent reconstruction and strengthening of the state by all means. The Maidan's participant, a Ukrainian artist Boris Yeghiazaryan claims: "We really appreciate the freedom of speech. We really appreciate individual liberty. But if we lose our country and become a province of Russia, we will have neither freedom of speech nor individual liberty. So our ultimate value is the Ukrainian state today [Boris Yeghiazaryan. Kyiv of 2014 should not turn into Warsaw of 1920. / / "Ukrainskaya Pravda", 04/19/14.

<http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/columns/2014/04/19/7022925/>)).

It is hard not to recognize such logic to be convincing. However, the history of all revolutions clearly indicates that the "better times" for the implementation of democratic reforms, as a rule, do not occur. The window of opportunities after the overthrow of the old regime opens for a very short period. If these opportunities are not taken, they will never reappear. Meanwhile, the enormous force of inertia reproduces the old institutions and structures of authority, the traditional type of state society relations. The questions that the Maidan raised with extreme rigidity were common for most of the protest movements in the modern world. How to bridge the gap between society and political system? How to connect people's movement, people's revolution to politics? How to avoid that old oligarchic political machines misuse public protest self-interestedly? Therefore, it is important (not only from a theoretical point of view) to try to understand to what extent the

potential of democratic transformation of the government institutions is maintained in Ukraine, and what are the factors, which work against such reform.

On 26th February, a new government of Ukraine was presented at national veche that gathered on the Maidan and the next day the government was approved by the Parliament. Representatives of the party "Bat'kivshina", as well as nonparty professionals occupied key positions –the Prime Minister (Arseniy Yatsenyuk), the First Deputy Prime Minister in control of army, police and security agencies (Vitaly Yarema), the Minister of Internal Affairs (Arsen Avakov), the Minister of Justice (Pavel Petrenko). Less important positions were obtained by members of Ukrainian Union "Svoboda". Party of Vitali Klitschko "Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform" (UDAR) refused to participate in the formation of the government. Several positions were offered to Maidan's activists: Olga Bogomolets, a doctor, who coordinated medical aid on the Maidan, was proposed to be the Deputy Prime Minister for Humanitarian Affairs (she refused). Tatiana Chornovil became the commissioner for anti-corruption policy [She resigned in August 2014], Yegor Sobolev – the head of the lustration committee, Avtomaydan's leader Dmitry Bulatov – the Minister of Sports and Youth, Eugene Nischuk – the Minister of Culture. The Maidan's approval of the government meant to stress the decisive role of the people's movement in the overhaul of authority. However, it is obvious that it had completely symbolic character: "Veche" by its nature, could not determine the allocation of power. Thus the absence of civic structures representing the protesters, as it was already mentioned, manifested itself.. The political opposition to Yanukovych that was weak and lacked influence was paradoxically able to legitimize its power through the authority of the Maidan, which the opposition did not control. Yesterday Maidan was an omnipotent actor, which played decisive role in the overthrow of the authoritarian regime. But later, at the crucial moment of the revolution it was powerless - the new authority was established without its participation.

On the contrary, the leaders of militarized self-defense entered security structures and even headed them. The commandant of the Maidan Parubiy occupied the position of Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, his deputy Levus became the deputy chairman of the Security Service of Ukraine. However, Yarosh, the leader of the "Right Sector", who wanted to be the Deputy Prime Minister in control of police and security agencies, did not receive any position. Structures of military self-defense, by definition, were not a political alternative, they were created for another purpose. At the same time, military victory brought a serious problem for the new government. By the end of February - beginning of March, after police disappeared from the streets of Ukrainian cities there surged a wave of violence, mob justice and robbery committed "in the name and on the instructions" of revolution, Maidan's self-defense, the "Right Sector", National Guard, etc [There were, in particular, attacks on the homes of the members of political elite (P.Simonenko, I.Kaletnik, A.Klyuev). In some regions, people with symbols of self-defense have tried to take away business and rob businessmen. Most of these cases were probably the handiwork of common criminals, who exploited the situation of anarchy. (Inna Vedernikova. It is time to gather stones. And bats. // "Zerkalo nedeli", № 7, February 28, 2014, (http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/vremya-sobirat-kamni-i-bity-_.html)).The police that had been demoralized by the fall of the regime

of Yanukovych could not cope with it. Law enforcement structures found themselves on the side of the "losers", they were required to change loyalty in favor of those who had been their opponents yesterday.

The new Ukrainian government wanted to integrate the self-defense forces into the Armed Forces and the newly created National Guard. In early May Parubiy dissolved the "hundreds" of self-defense and transformed them into special battalions of territorial defense. This will, probably allow to establish full control over the military self-organization of the people, but will not solve in the short term the problem of military weakness of the new government, which seems to be one of the major obstacles to its democratic transformation. Under the conditions of external aggression - the seizure of Crimea by Russia, increasing destabilization and military confrontation with pro-Russian armed groups in Donetsk and Lugansk regions - it was necessary to form urgently battleworthy units of the Army, Ministry of Internal Affairs, efficient security structures. Ukrainian government had none of these institutions. On the contrary, law enforcement structures were corrupt and still controlled by the people and oligarchic clans linked to Yanukovych's regime. It was widely believed in Kiev that many officers of Ukrainian security structures had connections with Russian special services. In the Eastern Ukraine members of police and internal troops often shared the attitudes of those, who were requiring a separation of these regions from Ukraine, which was bound to create chaos, loss of fighting efficiency. Ukrainian army, border guards, who received the main blow from armed groups, penetrating from Russia were mostly not ready to fight. They often left their units and allowed the separatists to grab equipment and armaments [Pavel Sheremet. Between shame and catastrophe.

(<http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/columns/2014/06/4/7028026/>)). Moreover, In the East soldiers were faced with a truly existential dilemma: in order to win, they had to shoot at the citizens of their own country, both armed and unarmed. Russian commentators, who usually scoffed at fighting qualities of the Ukrainian army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, crossed that line during the Chechen war and cannot understand those, who used to resolve conflicts peacefully for more than twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The Ukrainian state is weak not only in military aspect. Its administrative structures are corrupt and are subordinated to the private interests of those forces and clans, which control the corresponding regions economically. Moreover, a trend towards a coalescence of power and property, a complete fusion of economic and political control has clearly increased after the overthrow of the old regime. Accordingly, one of the biggest Ukrainian businessmen Igor Kolomoisky has become the chairman of the Dnepropetrovsk regional administration, his junior partner Igor Palitsa has led the administration of Odessa region, Sergei Taruta, who controls metallurgical production in the Donetsk region, has been named its head. The momentary expediency of such managerial decisions is clear in an extraordinary situation (according to Michail Zhvanetskiy, "what someone has, that he protects"). But they hardly encourage the creation of political institutions accountable to society. Without a doubt these decisions lead in the opposite direction.

The same problem is reproduced at the national political level: the winner of the presidential elections on 25th May is a businessman Petr Poroshenko. He is one of the richest people of Ukraine [Poroshenko gained 54.7 per cent of the vote and

became the President of Ukraine in the first round] .During presidential elections two oligarchic units confronted one another behind the scene: according to the media leaks, Poroshenko was supported by Dmitry Firtash – an oligarch (who was detained in Austria), co-owner of "Rosukrenergo" and his business partner, former head of the presidential administration of Yanukovych - Sergei Liovochkin. Rinat Akhmetov - the richest oligarch in Ukraine, the patron of the Donetsk region and a former ally of Yanukovych- supported Yulia Tymoshenko, who lost the election. The chief editor of the newspaper "Zerkalo nedeli", Yulia Mostovaya claims bitterly: "At the moment, the country can only be held together by the union of the oligarchs. The renewal of the political system which everyone was hoping for has not taken place". [The Economist, April 12th 2014, P. 20.]

However, it would be wrong to explain such a convincing victory of Poroshenko only by oligarch's union. This triumph was also connected with hopes for renewal on the part of those, who were standing on the Maidan or actively supported it, and the aspiration of the majority of the citizens to restore normal life. Poroshenko was the most acceptable candidate to different segments of the Ukrainian population. He had extensive experience in government positions - he was the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council, the Chairman of the Board of the National Bank and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Yushchenko's administration. Poroshenko supported and sponsored the Maidan, he played an important role in preventing of provocations during the events of 1st December in front of the presidential administration, he had some support in the East of Ukraine [Vladimir Paniotto Valery Khmelko. East of Ukraine. The sociology of fears. // "Radio Svoboda", 05/08/14

(<http://www.svoboda.org/content/transcript/25376829.html>)). The new president represents the Centre of Ukraine, neither the West nor the East in contrast to his two predecessors. It was very important that business, which brought wealth to Poroshenko (production of sweets and confectionery), was not connected with the most monopolized and corrupt areas of oligarchic control in Ukraine - metallurgy, engineering or gas trade. Poroshenko by no doubt appeared to be an optimal figure providing for national consensus and compromise in emergency.

Yulia Tymoshenko, the main rival of Poroshenko in this election, suffered the most devastating defeat in her political career. She got less than 13 per cent of the national vote and lost the support in all regions of Ukraine and especially in Kiev, where she gained only 4 per cent. This result destroyed the chances that Tymoshenko as the leader of the largest parliamentary party "Bat'kivshina" could qualify for the post of Prime Minister of Ukraine. Such course of events could bring the country back to the situation of 2005-2009, when the confrontation between Prime Minister Tymoshenko and President Yushchenko brought the political situation to a stalemate and blocked the necessary reforms, which the Maidan of 2004 required. It was clear that the early parliamentary elections became the most important political problem. During the presidential campaign both leading candidates called for carrying out the voting in 2014. According to Ukrainian analysts, there is no undisputable constitutional ground for early parliamentary elections [Sergei Rachmanin. And now - the parliament! We said the parliament! // "Zerkalo nedeli" №19, 30 May 2014. (http://zn.ua/columnists/a-teper-parlament-my-skazali-parlament-146448_.html)). However, it is also evident that the current

parliament has been responsible for the events in winter and spring of 2014 in Kiev, and does not reflect the balance of power in the country [The presidential candidate of the "Party of Regions", which had a formal majority in the parliament, got only 3% of the vote]. Early parliamentary elections provide an opportunity for Poroshenko to create his own parliamentary faction, which he does not have; for Tymoshenko it is a chance of returning to politics, maybe, as a speaker of the parliament, if the "Bat'kivshina" wins a majority.

To carry out early parliamentary elections under conditions of real war is even more complicated than to hold the presidential election. 15% of the Ukrainian population lives in Donetsk and Lugansk regions. If they do not participate in the parliamentary elections, it would not only mean that they are not represented in the Parliament, but also that the central government further loses control over these regions. Consequently, military victory over the separatists becomes a condition of implementing the reforms of the political system, which have been required by the Maidan and supported by Poroshenko in his victory speech. It is obvious, however, that it is impossible to end the conflict in the East in a few hours and not months, as he declared.

Despite the fact that the conflict is heated by Russia, which helps to infiltrate groups of armed Russian citizens into the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions, despite the fact that only 30 per cent of population in these areas has supported their separation from Ukraine in April [Inna Vedernikova Julia Mostovaya, Sergei Rachmanin. South-East: a branch of our tree. // Zerkalo nedeli, № 14, 18 April 2014 (http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/yugo-vostok-vetv-dreva-nashego-_.html)], the confrontation certainly has the character of a civil war, which acquires its own logic [Eugene Shibalov. A vaccination against arrogant and frivolous approach to the war. // Zerkalo nedeli, № 20, June 6, 2014 (http://gazeta.zn.ua/internal/privvka-ot-shapkozakidatelstva-_.html)].

A strong state, which Ukraine needs to survive, is primarily the state that commands the trust of the population. Reforms are the only, but insecure way to conquer this trust. Is it possible to carry these reforms out under the conditions of war, when, according to Avakov, the Minister of Internal Affairs, "the situation becomes black and white? Shades are waning. We have no other way. Otherwise, the country would turn into a burning buffer zone, where death would become a norm and we would be forced to live on the ruins of economy and civil rights" [<http://echo.msk.ru/blog/echomsk/1316864-echo/>]. Who can carry out these reforms, using the opened window of opportunities? How to create effective democratic institutions in a poor, underdeveloped country, which is torn apart by the conflict instigated from abroad? How to pass between the oligarchy and the ochlocracy? All these and many other questions remain unanswered.

Conclusion

It is quite obvious that there are much more obstacles to democratic transformation of the government institutions in Ukraine, than factors that push this transformation forward. However, the most powerful of the latter is the strength of civil society in Ukraine and the enormous potential of the movement that brought people to the Maidan and led it to the victory. The activity of members of the "Public

Sector" confirms that this potential is maintained. They demand that the current parliament pass bills providing for fight against corruption, decentralization, administrative reform, reform of the judiciary and the law enforcing agencies. After the change of power, several important laws were adopted by the Parliament under the pressure of civic activists namely: the law about public procurement, which requires that businesses disclose relevant information; the law that guarantees access to public information; the law on the lustration of judges, which can help to renew the highest legal authority. On the other hand, a bill that provides an access to the register of property and therefore makes members of the government accountable to society was not supported by the parliament. At the same time, civic activists, who are involved in this activity, clearly understand that "reforms are the tools for uniting the country. All of us have the same problems both in the East and in the West: corruption in housing and utilities, in hospitals and kindergartens, the problem of police beatings, of the courts that demand bribes [Anastasia Ringis. Engine of progress: who devises Ukrainian reforms. // "Ukrainskaya Pravda", 05/08/14.(<http://life.pravda.com.ua/person/2014/05/8/167499/>)].

Simultaneously the interim leaders of Ukraine –the Acting President A. Turchinov and the Prime Minister A.Yatsenyuk announced all-Ukrainian round tables aimed at achieving national consensus on major issues - decentralization of government, local governance reform, separation of powers, extended guarantees to ethnic minorities, reform of legal relations between state and society, including the reform of the judiciary and law enforcement system. Proposals, which would be developed by a wide range of participants, should be introduced to the Parliament to amend the Constitution and make changes in Ukrainian legislation [http://zn.ua/POLITICS/turchinov-i-yacenyuk-iniciiruyut-provedenie-obscheukrainskih-kruglyh-stolov-144696_.html].

"Ukraine has a dismal record of missing historic opportunities. It has done little with the independence it received almost by default when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. It wasted the chances created by the Orange revolution" [The Economist, May 31st 2014/]. Perhaps this time the change of authority and society and the relationship between them will not remain a "great illusion" of the Ukrainian revolution; and the Russian government, who mainly suppress and destroy its democratic potential, will finally realize that it confronts a spiritually stronger adversary.

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The New *Empire of Lies*?

Essay on Lack of Truth in International Relations

Arkadiusz Modrzejewski

University of Gdansk, Poland

Truth is treason in an empire of lies

George Orwell

Abstract

The following paper is a quite freely written essay from a normativistic position. Its aim is not to present the results of academic research but to present the opinions on threats resulting from the departure from the principle of truth in international relations. Current international situation, especially the conflict in Ukraine, is a good example. The author believes that establishing real and permanent international peace may be realised only when the principle of truth finds its due place in international relations. In present-day world there is a dominating mentality resulting from so-called realistic thinking, which in fact is the source of political cynicism. Universal truth has yielded to particular reasons and interests.

Key words: *truth, international relations, normative theory*

Events in Ukraine are not only “a local problem”. They are inscribed in a wider context of social and international issues. It is widely said that Ukraine constitutes an experimental field on which the rebirth of Russian empire is being tested. I would place these issues on the most general level. However, I would risk a guess that in fact these phenomena concern the philosophical issues. We are the witnesses of another triumph of practical philosophy, which is political philosophy, assuming the propagation of falsehood, spreading insinuations and contempt in order to realize particular interests defined euphemistically as *reason of state* or as the protection of one or the other population against alleged powers which allegedly threaten it. It is the philosophy which makes lie and half-truth the principle of social and international relations.

This philosophy forces to believe in a lie as in an almost absolute truth. It sanctions this lie and penalizes any departures from it. What is worth mentioning is the newly passed Russian law which forbids, under a prison sentence, undermining the integrity of the Russian Federation which also includes the Crimea as an integral part (until recently within Ukrainian jurisdiction) and the autonomous city of Sevastopol. What a paradox that we talk about philosophy, which after all is the love of wisdom, in the context of lie?! This tendency is neither new nor particular. It does not only concern modern Russia. We can also refer to the USA which in its

international policy uses specific sophistry in realization of its own international strategic plans, with no exclusion to the justified use of force during so-called preventive operations towards other countries [see: Chomski 1999].

Probably in the history of international relations we more often deal with lie than truth as a Polish philosopher Wojciech Chudy convinces in his outstanding work devoted to social consequences of departing from truth as a social principle. We are the witnesses of universality of lie in social, political and international sphere [Chudy 2008]. I will not look for examples in distant times. Current reality is a good source of it. I will carefully examine Russia, its current international policy, especially its intellectual tradition as a source of practical operation of Russian authorities.

I am writing this essay from a normativistic position, therefore I will avoid evaluative judgements and moral assessments. Even the use of two notions of “truth” and “lie” as moral categories distances me from positivist approach, which means breaking off from passing judgements and moralizing. Long-standing studies over personalistic thought, political philosophy of personalistic universalism and social Catholicism as well as knowledge concerning the phenomena and processes occurring in the international space convinced me that behaviouristic revolution has not provided a sufficient justification for the rejection of normative theory [Gunnell 1983: 16]. It seems to me that the world still needs a substantive and free from ideology,² a debate concerning the moral values, which should motivate the architects of international order. My aim is to understand the reasons and consequences of the state in which lie has become the principle of international policy, especially the policy realized by Russian authorities, in fact I also formulate a repair programme – or rather its outline – which is based on a specific normative system to which I will refer in a further part of the essay.

Before I move on to the analysis of Russian intellectual tradition where we can discern the inspiration for the practices of the Kremlin decision-makers, I would like to indicate more universal reasons for the state which can be defined as a deficit of truth in international relations. The operations of Russian authorities motivated by specific intellectual tradition, epistemological tradition to be precise, are in fact inscribed in this universal tendency. One can risk a statement that they constitute its highest form not due to the same actions but due to that intellectual legacy. The root of the problem related to the deficit of truth in international sphere in general is the approach, which in my opinion is mistakenly defined as realism in international relations, as we are dealing with cynicism which seeks justifications for its overly frequent unlawful actions in reason of state while using skilled rhetoric art of justification for vile such as war, breaking human rights or invasion. This approach is connected with the practice of political decision-makers as well as thinkers taking up the reflection on international relations. In my opinion for the

² I would not like to connect my text with enunciations appearing in Polish right-wing press. In its papers, inter alia “Gazeta Polaska”, the term “empire of falsehood” is mentioned in the Ukrainian context. However, I am far from the interpretation of reality and understanding of truth, which is presented there.

latter the notion of *realism* does not seem adequate. The notion of *scepticism* appears to be more appropriate with the reference to this approach. It conveys its sense appropriately to which Charles Bietz, who was responsible for the rebirth of normative reflection on the basis of international relations studies, paid attention [1999]. Main theses of so-called realistic school correlate with the practice of international actors, however not all *realists* have rejected the principle of truth in the manner which we could define as absolute. Hans Morgenthau, one of the most prominent representatives of modern *realism* in international relations, seemed to make an attempt to reconcile *power* and *truth* to some extent. However, the result of his analyses is rather to come down to opinions and assessments propagated by the intellectualists whom he righteously suspected of snobbism and condescension with relation to politicians. Therefore, he observes that two worlds: *truth* and *power* live in separation [1970: 14].

I am more interested in the architects of international order who are responsible for the rift between *power* and *truth* on practical basis rather than in academic digressions of *the sceptics*. They ruined the principle of truth preferring their own or national interest to the confession of guilt, bearing the responsibility or the courage to express own judgements. They obscured a real image of reality by rhetoric figures feigning real intentions. Truth and politics have become the totally strange, if not hostile, spheres. The rift reveals even more when the notion of international policy or diplomacy is put in the place of politics. And even though in some cases we notice the turn towards politics based on values, which has its modern example the European Union³, world order is generally based on realistic assumptions determined by absolutized reason of state.

Right at the beginning of the deliberations, doubts of epistemological and practical nature multiply. Firstly, what is truth? Secondly, can we build international relations on truth? Thirdly, doesn't truth have totalizing features, that is, doesn't it become the tool of *power*? The answer to the first doubt is not and may not be unambiguous in a pluralistic world. The question, which has been accompanying our civilization since its ancient beginnings, which also great philosophers dealt with, is here a critical question. Without answering this question and in principle without relating to a precise epistemological concept, this essay would not have *raison d'être*. I am not going to present various views concerning the issues of truth which has already been studied. I will focus on a traditional view, and then I will refer to its "modernised" variants. I do not refer to the classical concept only due to utilitarian and pragmatic reasons, logically authorizing my reasoning. Although one can notice that this concept justifies my position. Only classical theory also known as the theory of correspondence may constitute the basic premise for the conclusions which I will present in this essay. One cannot forget, which usually happens to its critics, that this concept is based on ontological assumptions which, by definition, have universal or even transcendental dimension as it is encompassed by the Thomistic philosophy [Krapiec 1985], and a man is

³ In this case values clash with compromises but in fundamental matter the European Union may be regarded as an example of departing from realistic premises in internal and external policy. Nevertheless, I am far from the statement that the activity of the Union authorities is based on the respect of the principle of truth and it constitutes their priority.

empowered to get to know the truth, thanks to his cognitive activity, somehow accepting the truth in an intuitive manner. Beyond any philosophical discourse, in a man there is a natural, intuitive tendency to get to know and seek truth about reality. It has its practical justification. Only cognition of truth gives us an opportunity to existence, rational decision-making and conducting daily activities. While being deprived of truth, we are “blind” and “deaf” in a world of nature as well as in social relations. Aforementioned Wojciech Chudy used a suggestive metaphor explaining the meaning of truth in human life. He compared it to air. In the first words of his book, he writes: “Truth is like air, which we do not notice when we breathe easily, but it becomes arduous when it is stifling and polluted. We do not notice its existence and need when we use it normally in social communication, in thousands daily activities and it is used as the means building community bonds. When we start to feel its shortage when social life is dominated by falsehood, lie, hypocrisy and violence, then a distinctive need for truth occurs” [2008: 4].

The issue of truth is not only an epistemological problem. Affirming the epistemology based on realistic premises and recognition of the existence of objective and absolute truth may lead to the recognition of its moral consequences. Truth is also an ethical category. Its esthetical dimension usually appears in interpersonal relation. The authenticity of these relations requires an approach of openness to truth from the people engaged in it. Openness appears in two meanings: as a readiness to prove truth as well as readiness to accept truth. However, it is not about promoting and accepting subjective truth. Ethics, which emphasises the significance of truth in interpersonal and social relations, is built on realistic premises. We deal with two moments: objective and subjective. An objective moment means noticing the truth, that is statement that “there is something” based on examination of reality. A subjective moment is an affirmation of truth by subject which is *de facto* the interiorization of truth and so connecting the subject with truth [Starnawski 2008: 80]. To put it simple, one can state that the extent to which we strive for strengthening our decisions and actions on truth in our daily life is similar to the way we aspire and yearn for the situation when our relations with other people are based on honesty and authenticity, which can only be guaranteed by the recognition of truth. In the deeper and more elementary dimension it is about the recognition of existential truth about the other man, about his personal wealth; it means the perception of man in his full existence as a human being.

At this stage the second doubt appears. It is related to building international relations based on truth. Going beyond direct interpersonal relations it may seem an unentitled abuse or even idealistic utopianism. However, we must remember that ethics is not a real science and in this sense it does not concern the description and explanation of existing reality; it is a reflection of obligation forming the idea of a desired world. This idea as a paradigm may serve and in general *implicite* serves us in the analysis of the reality in which we may find the realisations of ethical assumptions or departing from them. So-called *realism* orders to perceive international relations from the angle of interest. This realism has removed the category of truth, which according to Hans Morgenthau may collide with national interest, from the consciousness of political decision-makers and the architect of international order. I would not suspect Morgenthau and other realists of cynicism,

and replacing truth with falsehood. They may have allowed errors, but an error or falsehood are not lies, which by definition have a deliberate and conscious character. Wojciech Chudy notices the reasons for contemporary problem of spreading the lie in a social and public sphere in an Enlightenment liberalism. It is my belief, at least when it refers to the sphere of international and political relations which I am interested in, that realism bears the blame. As I have already mentioned, I would not suspect realists of bad intentions but of wrong assumptions, whose consequence is the legitimization of truth deficit. This error has become the basis for the structures of lie which we encounter in real life [Chudy 2008: 170]. They are built by the social architects, political decision-makers, who have made the principle of their action from cynicism. As Jeffrey Goldfarb convinces cynicism is a scorn which makes the high and mighty of this world even stronger and it confirms the weak in their weakness disregarding their attempts of life according with the moral principles [1997: 43]. This scorn can also be noticed on the plane of relations between countries. It is especially visible when mercenary approach orders to prefer particular interests to universal values, economy to morality and law, power and money to good of man. Owing to so-called *realists* the world started to believe that the principle of truth does not exist in international relations and that truth is only an illusion behind which any ideological radicalism or religious fanaticism may stand. Nevertheless, even cynics need truth. They become cynics when – I mean rather a life approach than a philosophical stance – they disregard truth as an ethical category and cultivate false propaganda in the name of realisation of particular interests. As noticed by Barbara Skarga, one of the most prominent Polish philosophers: “Cynical speech is usually located beyond values. If it defends them, it is evident that it has some interest; if it destroys, it also happens for that reason. Cynicism is pragmatic. Cold-bloodedly it spins an argument sneering at the addressee and when it is comfortable it sneers at the reason and rationalism. It takes every effective weapon without any doubts in order to humiliate the opponent” [1997: 11].

The words of professor Skarga fit well as a commentary to the present situation in international politics. The assurance of the president of the Russian Federation of the actions in accordance with the norms of international law with reference to the annexation of Crimea, humanitarian aid delivered to the inhabitants of eastern Ukraine or volunteers who buy their high-class military equipment in the shops for *survivormen* is an example of cynicism of the highest degree, sneering at the audience, their abilities to rational examination and assessment of reality. In order to do justice, one must mention religious and nationalistic fanatics who in the name of this or that God or a nation commit the most terrifying crimes on innocent civilians. It happens in the XXI century before the eyes of amazed and slightly bored by media messages world. One must remember about imaginary reasons for American military intervention in Iraq during the presidency of George Bush Jr. as well as about the breach of the fundamental human rights by the officials of the state which proudly calls itself *the leader of free world*. In addition, there is mercantile mentality which disregarding injustice and thorn of human persecution allows for commercial negotiations and deals with various tyrants and dictators. One could say: *profit over morality!* The president of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin is not an isolated case. I think it

would be unjust to attribute all the responsibilities of this case to him. Examples of cynicism in internal and external politics may proliferate endlessly. Putin realises that he is not alone in *the cynics' club*, and therefore in his argumentations he skilfully points at western politicians who use double moral standards. The cynics' strategy is effective but quite short-sighted. The effectiveness appears as a reason for their actions, legitimizing even the most reprehensible crimes. These actions may bring notable benefits for an individual or a group, or even nations for a long period of time, measured in years or decades. They contribute to ostensible peace or internal calmness, the improvement of security. However, I do not believe that they definitely contributed to the elimination of the sources of problem. The cynicism of the leaders of privileged causes frustration and hatred in underprivileged groups, which will sooner or later lead to the violation of calmness or ostensible peace order. Therefore, only the implementation of the principle of truth into international politics creates the basis for permanent peace and just co-existence of countries and nations. One of the most recognizable and creative social and political thinkers coming from Central Europe Karol Wojtyła, later to become the Pope John Paul II, was convinced about it. He is mentioned as one of the most important participants in the debates on the grounds of normative theory of international relations. His contribution to the development of normativism, precisely speaking universalism (cosmopolitanism) is noticed by both Polish researchers and interpreters of his philosophy [Górski 2006, Gałganek 2009, Modrzejewski 2011], as well as their Western colleagues [Rengger 2000]⁴. Wojtyła believed that the recognition of truth on the plane of international relations is a peace-making act. In one of his addresses he noticed: „Restoring peace means in the first place calling by their proper names acts of violence in all their forms. Murder must be called by its proper name: murder is murder; political or ideological motives do not change its nature, but are on the contrary degraded by it. The massacre of men and women, whatever their race, age or position, must be called by its proper name. Torture must be called by its proper name; and, with the appropriate qualifications, so must all forms of oppression and exploitation of man by man, of man by the State, of one people by another people. The purpose of doing so is not to give oneself a clear conscience by means of loud all-embracing denunciations - this would no longer be calling things by their proper names - nor to brand and condemn individuals and peoples, but to help to change people's behaviour and attitudes, and in order to give peace a chance again” [John Paul II 1980]. Briefly speaking John Paul II talked about the need for honest calling spade a spade, which means the way they are. His epistemological attitude and ethics resulting from it was clear. In fact he affirmed classical theory of truth based on ontological premises. He thought that the source

⁴ I mentioned Wojtyła deliberately, which may seem an unnecessary interpolation. Intellectual environments of Central and Eastern Europe often forget about the contribution of philosophers and scientists from this part of the world to the development of academic disciplines and philosophical concepts. It is a peculiar complex being an expression of post-colonial mentality which is rooted in our minds. Without a doubt Wojtyła belonged to a circle of prominent creators of philosophical ideas and his ethical-anthropological works may equal the works of the most influential contemporary thinkers.

of authenticity of cognition is the object. However, what is important is to seize the personalistic depth of his statement. In the further part of a quoted address the Pope indicated the anthropological implications of the affirmation of truth as a peace-making factor. Wojtyła stated: "To promote truth as the power of peace means that we ourselves must make a constant effort not to use the weapons of falsehood, even for a good purpose. Falsehood can cunningly creep in anywhere. If sincerity - truth with ourselves - is to be securely maintained, we must make a patient and courageous effort to seek and find the higher and universal truth about man, in the light of which we shall be able to evaluate different situations, and in the light of which we will first judge ourselves and our own sincerity. It is impossible to take up an attitude of doubt, suspicion and skeptical relativism without very quickly slipping into insincerity and falsehood. Peace, as I said earlier, is threatened when uncertainty, doubt and suspicion reign, and violence makes good use of this. Do we really want peace? Then we must dig deep within ourselves and, going beyond the divisions we find within us and between us, we must find the areas in which we can strengthen our conviction that man's basic driving forces and the recognition of his real nature carry him towards openness to others, mutual respect, brotherhood and peace. The course of this laborious search for the objective and universal truth about man and the result of the search will develop men and women of peace and dialogue, people who draw both strength and humility from a truth that they realize they must serve, and not make use of for partisan interests" (John Paul 1980).

The task which John Paul II assigned to the architects of international order and humanity is not easy. It requires crossing the borders delimited by one's own and group egoism. He was also convinced that this was the price of real peace. He was not an utopist but from the viewpoint of so-called realism he appears as a representative of naive idealism. *Iron logics* of facts accomplished by the actors of international politics brings ethical and epistemological consequences with it. We can owe the popularity of relativism to the aforementioned cynicism among other things. Due to it absolute truth was replaced by *reason*, which in fact is a relativized form of truth. Haven't we got accustomed to a quite widespread conviction that each of us has their own *truth*? This conviction is deeply rooted in Russian intellectual tradition. At this stage we can investigate the sources of current critical situation in relation between Western world and Ukraine with Russia. The above-mentioned conviction is displayed in Russian language in the form of dichotomy occurring between two notions *pravda* and *istina*. Both terms have one equivalent in English, namely *truth*. It is similar in majority of European languages - in Latin *veritas*, in Polish *prawda*, in Slovak and Czech *pravda*, in German *Wahrheit*, in Italian *verità* etc. The term *istina* is found in South Slavic languages but there is not a dichotomy which can only be found in Russian. In Russian the term *pravda* by definition means relative truth, someone's truth: "my", "your", "our", "your", "their". When a Russian says : *eta pravda* (it is true) he or she does not mean an objective truth. He or she may take into consideration for example his or her own opinion or rightness which by nature is subjective. Only *Istina*, often capitalized, usually being a synonym of divine truth, eternal and stable, has the hallmarks of absolute and universal truth, but in general it is beyond human capacity of cognition. Though in Russian political philosophy it may become a domain of the state, the role of its

guardian falls to the ruler and the state apparatus. Subordination to Truth means in fact the subordination to the ruler who is a carrier of this Truth – *Istina*. The ruler is exalted becoming a “terrestrial “ God, “the image” of God on earth. In a more secular version *istina* has been directly associated with the country (empire) since the times of tsar Peter I the Great. All what brings benefit to the state and strengthens its power becomes proper. Allegiance to a sovereign has ceased to be connected with the care for soul salvation. The interest of a more and more powerful empire has become its strength [Kuriewicz 2010: 172-173]. One does not have to be an attentive observer to notice the influence of this intellectual tradition on present Russia. The interest of the state, its development often occurring at a great cost of its own and foreign citizens – has become a superior matter. Reason of state has grown to one and absolute truth whose trustee and proponent is the state apparatus with the president at the head. In this way the totalization of truth occurs. The term *Istina* occurring in Russian political philosophy had a totalizing effect. However, until the moment when it did not have any political connotations, it has been treated as an attribute of the Absolute, one could treat the term *istina* as a synonym of an absolute truth. The inclusion of this term into the dictionary of the philosophy of politics has resulted in its relativisation. What is *an absolute truth*? It is nothing more than a relativized form of truth which displays ambitions and aspirations to be an absolute truth. Most often it is entangled in some ideology. The more totalitarian ideology is, the more *total truth*, being an expression of this ideology. A historian Robert Conquest defined totalitarianism as an extreme form of ideological subjectivism, in which the state machinery serves first and foremost to impose *Ideas* believed in by the ruler or ruling group [2002: 125]. However, *total truth* may assume more subtle forms than condemned totalitarianism. It may be noticed wherever reason or interest may have a superior value and they are granted the status of *being true*.

And here we reach the third doubt – won't the truth display totalizing properties in international relations? In my opinion it is just the opposite. The lack of absolute truth, turning away from it leads us inevitably towards relativism from which *total truth* may emerge. By nature it is relative, it only assumes the form of absolute and objective truth, it pretends in order to achieve the particular aims. It is relativism which is the source of totalitarianism and injustices in international relations. The lack of belief in the existence of absolute truth pushes humanity into the arms of totalizing relativism because instead of truth we will notice only reason, rightness or interest which will not free us from conflicts or injustices. Looking again at the situation in Ukraine don't we notice that the absolutizing idea of the reason of state and national interest are not the source of breaching of the standards of international law, injustices, crimes and violence committed on civilians?

It is surprising that in the era of information we become less and less oriented in the complexity of reality and we believe less in the existence of absolute truth being replaced by the opinions of commentators and experts. To a great extent the media are to blame. And I do not mean Russian propaganda. We are not free from totalizing propaganda even in the Western world. We surrender to subtle temptation of an easy and pleasant life, willingness to gain profit, political correctness and peace of mind. We want to live in an ideally ordered world where

everything has its place and justification. I think that the observations of Hanna Arendt from *The Origins of Totalitarianism* may be extremely present. The philosopher noticed that masses „do not believe in anything visible, in the reality of their own experience; they do not trust their eyes and ears but only their imaginations, which may be caught by anything that is at once universal and consistent in itself. What convinces masses are not facts, and not even invented facts, but only the consistency of the system of which they are presumably parts of (...) what the masses refuse to recognize is the fortuitousness that pervades reality. They are predisposed to all ideologies because they explain facts as mere examples of laws and eliminate coincidences by inventing as all-embracing omnipotence which is supposed to be at the root of every accident. Totalitarian propaganda thrives on this escape from reality into fiction, from coincidence into consistency” [1962: 351-352].

Despite the fact that the era of great XX-century totalitarianisms has finished, the magic of schematic thinking is still attractive and that can be the source of the consent for injustice, aggression and violence. Public opinion is either manipulated or it is not interested to force the politicians of their own country to actions which could oppose to pathologies occulting in relations with other countries. At times just the opposite support is granted to actions which are doubtful from the point of view of international law or morality. As philosophers prove we have come to live in the age of falsehood. Global information network, world media or social media give the appearance of reliable information on the basis of which we build our knowledge of the world. In fact they often trigger information chaos overcoming which requires great intellectual effort. However, in searching for truth one must take up this effort. Absolute truth does not come down to religious catechism, the collection of obviousness or judicial decisions, it requires great cognitive engagement, overcoming stereotypes, elimination of mental abbreviation, criticism towards opinions, liberation from particularistic perception of the reality. By recognizing the existence of objective truth one may easily become a megalomaniac, *the owner of truth*. However, this is a straight way to totalistic relativism. In case of the issue of truth, it primarily concerns constant searching for it, deepening assumed reality in its various and multi-coloured aspects. In fact, it is a metaphysical approach. Stefan Swieżawski, an eminent Polish philosopher, characterised this approach in a following manner: „In order to get familiar with reality and understand it, man must assume a humble approach towards it, neither belittle himself nor exaggerate nor be a disgrace nor assume the appearance of an angel. The approach of true humbleness fully meets the requirements of full objectivism”, as it concerns the cognition of reality as it is with its all complicated structure and multi-dimension, therefore metaphysical cognition, which is needed here, requires „to be man full and open towards all material and spiritual matters” [1999: 40].

The way to establishing international order based on the principle of truth is a laborious process; however, true and permanent peace requires taking up intellectual effort. It must be accompanied by education in the spirit of humanism, thanks to which it will be possible to shape citizens sensitive to truth and other absolute and universal values. In the long run the future of the world lies in the hands of humanists and not cold technocrats. The sooner we realize this, the

sooner we will overcome bothersome conflicts, wars, disasters and injustices. It would be naive to think that we are inevitably proceeding towards a better future. Post-modern world is not an idyll or if it is, then to a very limited extent. Post-modernism has taught us to live in a pluralistic world of ideas and opinions. Unfortunately, it has also deprived us of the belief in the existence of absolute truth and universal values. Absolute truth has been replaced by particular reasons and interests. We may observe with great amazement how their particular or global totalization occur. The belief in their rightness starts to obscure a real image of reality. Common sense is still subject to propaganda. The moment will come when we will live in the empire of falsehood. Its territory does not limit only to the Russian Federation, which at present is playing an obvious role of aggressor and forger of reality. Contemporary empire of falsehood assumes a global form and all state societies participate in it to a greater or lesser extent.

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